Larry Ned v. City of Baton Rouge_Parish of East Baton Rouge

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 CA 0294

DEC 19 2025
Judgment Rendered:

ON APPEAL FROM
THE OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 5
IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 19- 05009

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Andrew C. Blasini Attorneys for Defendant -Appellant
John J. Rabalais City of Baton Rouge/ Parish of
Joshua B. Couvillion East Baton Rouge
Covington, Louisiana

Ted Williams Attorney for Plaintiff A
- ppellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Larry Ned

BEFORE: MILLER, EDWARDS, AND FIELDS, JJ.

FIELDS, J.

In this workers' compensation proceeding, employer, City of Baton

Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge ( City/Parish), appeals a judgment awarding

employee, Larry Ned, supplemental earnings benefits ( SEBs). For the following

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 20, 2017, Mr. Ned was employed as a police officer with the

Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD) when he was involved in a motor vehicle

accident while operating his squad car, resulting in disabling injuries. The accident

occurred after Mr. Ned' s full-time employment with the BRPD was completed for

the day, but prior to the start of his " extra -duty" detail.' The accident was deemed

compensable under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act (LWCA), and Mr.

Ned received indemnity and medical benefits from City/Parish. In October 2018,

Mr. Ned was released by his physician to full-time employment with light-duty

restrictions. It is the policy of the BRPD that an officer with light-duty restrictions

may not work extra -duty detail.

On August 6, 2019, Mr. Ned filed a disputed claim for compensation,

asserting that he was entitled to SEBs from October 15, 2018 to the present.

City/Parish answered the claim, admitting to Mr. Ned' s original compensable injury

and his return to work status.

On or about April 30, 2024, City/Parish filed an unopposed motion to set this

matter for a trial on the briefs. City/Parish referenced a prior telephone status

conference held with the Workers' Compensation Judge ( WCJ), during which the

parties represented that there were no disputes over material facts relevant to the

issue of law; the only dispute between the parties concerned the calculation of Mr.

I Extra -duty employment is an employment opportunity offered by the BRPD to eligible,
commissioned, full-time police officers to provide security to approved establishments or agencies.
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Ned' s average weekly wage for purposes of determining his entitlement to SEBs.

Specifically, the sole issue before the WCJ was whether Mr. Ned' s extra -duty
compensation should be aggregated with his pre -injury BRPD wages to calculate his

average weekly wages and entitlement to SEBs.

Following the submission of briefs and evidence by the parties, the WCJ

signed a judgment in favor of Mr. Ned on June 27, 2024, and ordered that Mr. Ned' s

average weekly wage calculation include wages from his full-time employment with

the BRPD and his part-time extra -duty employment. The WCJ then set out the

amounts Mr. Ned was owed in SEBs by City/Parish and denied Mr. Ned' s claims

for penalties and attorney' s fees. It is from this judgment that City/Parish appeals.

In its sole assignment of error, City/Parish asserts the WCJ erred in its

interpretation of the law in awarding SEBs under the LWCA based on a calculation

of Mr. Ned' s average weekly wage that included wages from both his regular

employment with the BRPD and " his successive employment with separate

employers for paid [ extra -duty] detail work."

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Legislation is the solemn expression of the will of the legislature. La. Civ.

Code art. 2; First National Bank, USA v. DDS Construction, LLC, 2011- 1418

La. 1/ 24/ 12), 91 So. 3d 944, 953. The determination of the legislature' s will must

start with the language of the statute itself. First National Bank, 91 So. 3d at 953.

The words used must be interpreted as they are generally understood. La. Civ. Code

art. 11; First National Bank, 91 So. 3d at 953. The rules of statutory construction

provide that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, and the

application of the law does not lead to absurd consequences, the statute should be

applied as written and no further effort should be made to determine the legislature' s

intent. See La. Civ. Code art. 9; see also La. R.S. 1: 4; First National Bank, 91

So. 3d at 953. When the language is susceptible of different meanings, it must be

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La.
interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.

Civ. Code art. 10; M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007- 2371 ( La.

7/ l/ 08), 998 So.2d 16, 27.

Applicable Law

The LWCA was enacted to provide for the timely payment of temporary and

permanent disability benefits to all injured workers who suffer an injury or disease
La. R.S.
arising out of and in the course and scope of their employment.

23: 1020. 1( B)( 1). The LWCA is to be interpreted so as to assure the delivery of

benefits to an injured employee. La. R.S. 23: 1020. 1( C)( 1).

The purpose of SEBs is to compensate the injured employee for the wage-

earning capacity he has lost as a result of his accident. Ziegler v. Slidell Memorial

Hospital, 2017- 0671 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 2/ 17), 236 So. 3d 565, 568, citing Pinkins

v. Cardinal Wholesale Supply, Inc., 619 So. 2d 52, 55 ( La. 1993). An employee is

entitled to receive SEBs if he sustains a work-related injury that results in his

inability to earn ninety percent or more of his average pre -injury wage. See La. R.S.
23: 1221( 3)( a)( i). The LWCA defines " wage" as " average weekly wage at the time

of the accident." La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13).

Historically, the LWCA made no specific provision for the computation of

the average weekly wage of an employee who might be employed by more than one

employer. H. Alston Johnson III, "Employees of more than one employer," 14 La.

Civ. L. Treatise, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 325, ( 5th ed. October

2025 Westlaw Update). Such employment may be successive or joint, and wages

were calculated differently based on these classifications. Id. Joint employment

was jurisprudentially defined as multiple employers engaged in a common enterprise

that contemplates the employment and control of the employee by one of the

interested parties for the benefit of all. See Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling

Corp., 170 So.2d 518, 529 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ( en Banc), writs refused, 172

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So. 2d 700 ( 1965); Roberson v. Gordon, 2009- 0472 ( La. App. lst Cir. 10/ 23/ 09),

2009 WL 34543409 * 6 ( unpublished). Successive employment was found in cases

where an employee is engaged in multiple tasks for multiple employers, but not at

the same time. H. Alston Johnson 111, " Multiple employment relationship —

Successive employment," 13 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Workers' Compensation Law and

Practice § 60 ( 5th ed. October 2025 Westlaw Update); see also City of Shreveport

v. Kingwood Forest Apartments, 32,370 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 10/ 29/ 99), 746 So. 2d

234, 239. In cases ofjoint employment, the aggregate of multiple wage sources was

the proper basis upon which benefits should be calculated. However, in successive

employment scenarios the employer in whose employ the injury occurred is

responsible for the payment of compensation. See Johnson, 14 La. Civ. L. Treatise

325.

The LWCA was amended to acknowledge the aggregate computation in joint

employment as found in La. R.S. 23: 1031, whereas the codified reference to

successive employment and wage computation is more vague and found only in the

definitions" section of the LWCA, specifically under " Wages". Louisiana Revised

Statutes 23: 1021( 13) provides the following guidance as to the manner of calculating

an hourly employee' s wages in successive employment scenarios:

13) " Wages" means average weekly wage at the time of the accident.
The average weekly wage shall be determined as follows:

a) Hourly wages.

i) If the employee is paid on an hourly basis and the employee is
employed for forty hours or more, his hourly wage rate multiplied by
the average actual hours worked in the four full weeks preceding the
date of the accident or forty hours, whichever is greater[.]

iv) A part-time employee, as defined in R.S. 23: 1021( 9) and who is
employed by two or more different employers in two or more
successive employments, shall be entitled to receive benefits as
follows:

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aa) If an employee is employed by two or more different employers in
two or more successive employments and the employee incurs a
compensable injury under the provisions of this Chapter in one of the
employments, the employer in whose service the employee was injured
shall pay the benefits due the employee as provided in this Chapter.
bb) If the employee is a part-time employee in one of the successive
employments, is injured in that employment, but as a result of the injury
also incurs loss of income from other successive employments, that
employee shall be entitled to benefits computed by determining wages
under the provisions of this Subsection using his hourly rate in
employment at the time of injury and using the total hours worked for
all employers of the part-time employee, but not to exceed his average,
actual weekly hours worked or forty hours weekly, whichever is less.
Questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed

by appellate courts under the de novo standard of review, and the appellate court is
not required to give deference to the lower court in interpreting a statute. Odoms v.

2021- 0828 ( La. 1st Cir. 3/ 3/ 22), 2022 WL 620773, * 3
Cammon, App.

unpublished), writ denied, 2022- 00560 ( La. 5/ 24/ 22), 338 So. 3d 1186.

Judicial Interpretation of Multiple Employment Relationships under the
LWCA

Citing to City of Shreveport, 746 So.2d at 239, City/Parish asserts that Mr.

Ned' s extra -duty as security for separate employers is successive employment.

City/Parish accordingly argues that Mr. Ned' s wage computation for his successive
employment is based on wages from his employment with BRPD alone. In support

of its contention, City/Parish argues that Holden v. City of New Orleans (NOPD),

2011- 2075 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 8/ 12), 93 So.3d 729, is the case most directly on

point to the facts at issue in this matter. However, the Holden court is not

authoritative in this matter because no evidence of the successive employment or

moonlighting jobs" was ever submitted in that case. Rather, the Holden court

provided dicta on successive employment stating in a footnote, "[ i] t is ... evident that

the only time wages from other employers are included in computing the employer' s

workers' compensation liability is when the employers are joint employers of the

same employee." Holden, 93 So. 3d at 732 n. 5. The Holden court' s dicta is not

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precedent, nor was it based on any actual evidence of the employers' relationships

to each other or to the employee.

Light Co., 377
City/Parish further relies on Lott v. Louisiana Power &
In
So. 2d 1277 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), writ denied, 381 So. 2d 1232 ( La. 1980).

Lott, an employee worked in the same capacity for two separate companies. After

the employee' s death, the decedent' s family sought to increase the amount of

benefits they were receiving, claiming that benefits should be based on the combined

weekly earnings of the decedent. The Lott court determined that wages paid by a

second employer are not considered in determining the compensation liability of the

employer for whom the employee was working at the time of his death. Id. at 1281.

The court held, "[ La.] R.S. 23; 1031 evidences the intent of the legislature to make

an employer' s workmen' s compensation liability to an injured employee depend

only upon the wages which that employer pays to the employee and not upon the

total income of the employee." Id. at 1280. Accordingly, the Lott court determined

that the only time wages from other employers are included in computing the

employer' s workers' compensation liability is when the employers are joint

employers of the same employee. Id. at 1281. The Lott court further noted that " to

fix an employer' s liability for payment of benefits on all income of the employee,

regardless of the source, would be patently unfair to the employer responsible for

the payment of benefits." Id.

City/Parish further cites to Guillory v. Interstate Hotels & Resorts, 2005-

650 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 12/ 30/ 05), 918 So. 2d 550, and Phillips v. United Parcel

Service, 28, 110 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 2/ 28/ 96), 669 So. 2d 1375, in support of its

argument. In Guillory, the employee was injured while in the course and scope of

his full-time employment but was also employed part-time with a different

employer. The WCJ determined that the average weekly wage calculation for an

employee injured in the course and scope of his full-time employment should not

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On
include wages from his part-time employer. See Guillory, 918 So.2d at 550.

appeal, the Guillory court summarized the holding in Lott, but then noted that the
legislature' s 1991 amendment of La. R.S. 23: 1021 carved out an exception to Lott

by allowing a part-time employee injured at his part-time employment to cumulate
wages from another unrelated part-time or full-time employer, not to exceed forty

hours. Guillory, 918 So.2d at 551- 52. Since the claimant was injured in his full-

time employment, the Guillory court noted that any cumulation with an unrelated

employer would take the claimant beyond the forty -hour limit; therefore, the

claimant' s part-time wages could not be considered. Id. at 552.

In Phillips, the injured employee worked full-time at a bank and had a part-

time job at UPS. 669 So. 2d at 1376. The claimant' s injury occurred while at his

part-time job. The claimant never missed work from the full-time position, but

sought SEBs, arguing that he was eligible for SEBs until he was able to earn ninety

percent of the combined wages he was earning from both jobs when he was injured.

The Phillips court acknowledged that the LWCA does not explicitly limit

computation of the average wages to the wages earned in the employment in which

the employee was injured. Id. The Phillips court concluded that subsection ( bb)

of the former version of what is now La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv))2 applies when the

injury sustained in one successive employment disables the employee from

performing work for that employer and for his other employer( s), while subsection

aa) ( of the former version of what is now La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv))3 applies to

successive employees, like the claimant in Phillips, when the injury and resulting

disability occur in the service of one successive employer, but not the other.4 Id. at

2 At the time Phillips was decided, La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv)(bb) was designated as " La. R.S.
23: 1021( 10)( a)( iv)(bb)"; however, the language is identical.
3 At the time Phillips was decided, La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv)(aa) was designated as " La. R.S.
23: 1021( 10)( a)( iv)(aa)' ; however, the language is identical.
4 The Phillips court noted that paragraph ( iv), which immediately precedes subsections ( aa) and
bb) applies the subsections to a part-time employee as defined in now redesignated La. R.S.
23: 1021( 11), who is employed by two or more employers in successive employments, whereas the

1378. When subsection ( aa) of La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv) applies, the calculation

may be made in either of two ways: by including the claimant' s full-time earnings
and comparing his combined pre -accident earnings from both jobs to his post-
accident earnings from the full-time job, or by excluding the full-time earnings and

comparing his pre -accident earnings from his part-time job alone to his part-time
earnings after the injury. See Phillips, 669 So. 2d at 1378.

Mr. Ned also cites to the Phillips case and its discussion of aggregating wages

and directs this court' s attention to jurisprudence that holds despite successive

employment classification, weekly wage calculations should be based on aggregate

wages of all employment. The court in Leger v. Calcasieu Parish School Board,

2009- 1261 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 4/ 7/ 10), 34 So. 3d 1042, writ denied, 2010- 1005 ( La.

6/ 25/ 10), 38 So. 3d 348, was tasked with deciding whether the claimant' s average

weekly wage should include, in addition to her wages from her full-time

employment ( where she sustained her injuries), her wages from her part-time

employment. 34 So. 3d at 1043. The claimant in Leger was unable to continue either

employment until approximately a year after the accident. Id. While the parties

seemed to agree that subsection ( bb) ( of the former version of what is now La. R.S.

23 :102 l (13)( a)( iv))5 applied, they disagreed as to the meaning of the phrase " that

employment" therein. See Leger, 34 So. 3d at 1044. The employer argued that the

phrase should be interpreted as referring to part-time employment only, while the

claimant contended that it refers to any of her successive employments. Id. The

Leger court reasoned:

If the [ employer' s] reading is correct, it would mean that,
because [ the claimant] was not injured in the course and scope of her
employment with [ her only part-time employment], the statute would
not apply in this case. If [the claimant] is correct in her reading that the

claimant worked full-time for the bank and was a part-time employee only of UPS. 669 So. 2d at
1377 n. l. Since the litigants did not argue the inapplicability of the subsections, the court did not
address the issue of the " definition problem." Id.
5 At the time Leger was decided, La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv)(bb) was designated as " La. R.S.
23: 1021( 12)( a)( iv)(bb)"; however, the language is identical.

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statute refers to either of the successive employments, then the statute
would be applicable in this case as she was injured in her successive
employment as a school bus driver.

Id. at 1045. After recognizing that both interpretations of the statute are plausible,

the court noted that workers' compensation statutes are to be interpreted liberally in

favor ofthe employee. Id., 61ing McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc.,

2002- 1539 ( La. 7/ 2/ 03), 851 So. 2d 1135, 1139. In light of the ambiguity of the

former version of what is now La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv), the liberal construction

in favor of the employee regarding workers' compensation laws, and the cases cited

in its opinion, the Leger court found that the WCJ was correct in including the

claimant' s wages from her part-time employment in its calculation of her average

weekly wages. Leger, 34 So. 3d at 1046.

Mr. Ned argues the same conclusion was reached in Jones v. Orleans Parish

School Board, 370 So.2d 677 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), where the claimant was a

teacher who was injured while breaking up a fight between two students; he was also

employed as a used -car salesman. 370 So. 2d at 679. The Jones court held that in

order to determine the difference between the claimant' s pre -injury earnings and

post -injury earnings, his salaries from both positions should be considered. Id. at

680. The Jones court reasoned that, otherwise, this would unjustly penalize

potential claimants from moonlighting to pay for family expenses. Id.

Mr. Ned also cited to Glynn v. City of New Orleans, 95- 1353 ( La. App. 4th

Cir. 4/ 3/ 96), 672 So. 2d 1112, which dealt specifically with SEBs. The claimant in

Glynn was an employee of the City of New Orleans, and was injured in that

employment. Glynn, 672 So. 2d at 1113. The employee filed a workers'

compensation action in which he sought SEBs. Id. at 1114. The WCJ awarded

SEBs, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1114- 16. Citing Jones, the Glynn

court determined that the claimant' s additional revenues from employment other

than the city and his state supplemental pay were properly included in his earnings

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to calculate his SEBs. Id. at 1115. See also Mitchell v. Winnfield Holding Corp.,

2003- 677 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 12/ 17/ 03), 861 So. 2d 931, 934, writ denied, 2004- 0191

La. 4/ 2/ 04), 869 So.2d 878, citing Glynn, 672 So.2d 1112 ( finding that excluding

the wages from the claimant' s part-time employment in the wage calculation was

improper).

Analysis

In the instant matter, we note that both City/Parish and Mr. Ned relied on

much of the same evidence including, in pertinent part, BRPD' s policy regarding

extra -duty work. The BRPD' s extra -duty policy initially provides that the BRPD

regulates off-duty employment for all officers. The policy states that officers are

restricted to working a set number of hours per day, including regular duty, overtime,

and extra -duty, and that a process is employed to document such hours. As the

policy explains, "[ e] xtra-duty employment is a job where one of the requirements is

being a sworn law enforcement officer[,]" and provides examples of " suitable"

extra -duty jobs, which include traffic control, crowd control, security and protection

of life and property, and routine law enforcement for public authorities. The policy

provides eligibility qualifications for extra -duty work, including being an officer in

good standing and a full-time employee. The policy further provides that

misconduct or poor performance may result in revocation of approval for extra -duty.

According to the policy, employers who wish to employ extra -duty officers must

complete an application and submit same to the Extra -Duty Office, which processes

the application and gives it to the Chief of Police who approves or denies the

employer' s request.
The Chief of Police also has sole authority to establish

minimum extra -duty rates and approve officers for extra -duty work following the

officer' s formal request for approval. A police officer engaged in any outside

employment who is called -out by BRPD is expected to leave his extra -duty job.

Furthermore, the policy provides that Extra -Duty Administrative Officers exist and

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are responsible for scheduling officers to cover the hours needed by the extra -duty

employers and making sure all paperwork that is needed for officers working extra -

duty is provided to the Extra -Duty Office. Finally, the policy specifically states that
officers that are on workers compensation shall not work extra[ -]duty or secondary

employment."

In his affidavit, Mr. Ned attested to being a twenty -five-year employee of the

BRPD. Mr. Ned stated that prior to his injury, his weekly wages were made up of

his BRPD employment and extra -duty details with Our Lady of the Lake Regional

Medical Center and the Louisiana Department of Agriculture. Mr. Ned further stated

that his " extra -duty" job assignments had to be approved by the BRPD and that he

could not work these extra -duty job assignments unless they were so approved. He

stated that his extra -duty assignments were coordinated by an Extra -Duty Officer.

Mr. Ned stated that BRPD required him to submit monthly documentation of the

dates and hours he worked extra -duty as well as the pay he received. Mr. Ned

attested that BRPD required him to wear an issued departmental uniform during his

extra -duty assignments and that he was also required to check in with BRPD at the

start of every extra -duty assignment to give his location and hours. Mr. Ned also

stated that he was authorized to make arrests while on extra -duty and did so on

several occasions. Finally, Mr. Ned attested that his extra -duty job assignments

made up thirty- six percent of his wages at the time of the accident, which he has

been unable to earn otherwise.

Based on the evidence provided regarding Mr. Ned' s extra -duty details, we

find the cases cited by City/Parish discussing successive employment factually

distinguishable. Although City/Parish attempts to deemphasize the issue of BRPD' s

control over Mr. Ned' s extra -duty details such that the court considers these details

as completely separate employment, BRPD' s own policies provide otherwise. Mr.

Ned did not find part-time employment on his own, unrelated to his full-time

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position as a police officer, but applied within the BRPD to work an extra -duty detail

for a BRPD- approved employer. In so doing, he had to meet certain qualifications

within the BRPD in order to be considered for such assignments, such as be a full-

time employee, commissioned, and a police officer in good standing. The BRPD

was in charge of setting officer pay rates and administering paperwork and schedules

to ensure that officers stay in compliance with BRPD policies. This factual scenario

is more akin to a borrowed employer relationship wherein both employers are

considered jointly liable for an injured employee, thereby making an aggregate

calculation of all wages appropriate for the determination of the employee' s average

weekly wage and entitlement to SEBs. Accordingly, we find no error in the WC' s

calculation of Mr. Ned' s average weekly wage taking all of his income into account

and finding Mr. Ned to be entitled to SEBs.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the WCJ' s June 27, 2024

judgment. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $ 1058. 00 to be borne by the

appellant, City of Baton Rouge/ Parish of East Baton Rouge.

AFFIRMED.

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