Ellen F. Earhart v. Great American Insurance Company and Sentry Insurance Company

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 CA 0479

ELLEN F. EARHART

VERSUS

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY AND SENTRY INSURANCE
COMPANY

Judgment Rendered:
DEC 2 3 2025

On Appeal from the
Office of Workers' Compensation, District 5
Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
No. 22- 04723

The Honorable Denise J. Lee, Workers' Compensation Judge Presiding

J. David Smith Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Ellen F. Earhart

George Ernest, III Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellees
Matthew D. Fontenot Great American Insurance Company
Lafayette, Louisiana and Sentry Casualty Insurance
Company

BEFORE: McCLENDON, C.J., GREENE, AND STROMBERG, JJ.

STROMBERG9 J.

In this workers' compensation case, plaintiff, Ellen F. Earhart, appeals a

summary judgment rendered against her, and in favor of defendants, Great American

Insurance Company ( Great American) and its insurer, Sentry Insurance Company
For
Sentry), dismissing her cross-motion for summary judgment with prejudice.

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was a remote worker employed with Great American. In anticipation

of Hurricane Ida, she evacuated from her remote office/ home in Metairie, Louisiana

to Houston, Texas. Plaintiff utilized leave under Great American' s " Strategic Comp

Hurricane Preparedness Plan" ( HPP). The HPP granted employees the following

leave: two days " to focus solely on the safety and well-being of [their] family and

property"; up to two days " to transition" to " be on-line and fully operational"; and

one day without penalty to get back home and resume your normal work schedule

in your home office." The HPP further provided: " Any delays past the time allowed

will result in tapping your available PTO [ paid time off] or leave without pay if no

accrued PTO is available. The same rules apply should you elect not to evacuate

and are unable to get back on- line within the ... two[-] day time allotment." On

September 9, 2021, plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision while

traveling from Houston to Metairie.

On August 23, 2022, plaintiff filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation,

naming Great American and Sentry, Great American' s insurer, as defendants.

Plaintiff' s claim alleged that, on September 9, 2021, she was involved in a multi -

vehicle car crash, while operating her vehicle in the course and scope of her

employment. Great American and Sentry ( defendants) answered plaintiffs

Disputed Claim for Compensation with a general denial.

0)

On June 22, 2023, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting

that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the alleged accident did not

constitute an accident arising out of and in the course and scope of plaintiff' s

employment.' Therefore, defendants argued that plaintiff was not entitled to benefits

under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act, La. R.S. 23: 1020. 1, et seq., which

provides the exclusive remedy for an employee who is injured during the course and

scope of her employment. Defendants prayed that " summary judgment be granted

in their favor, dismissing the claims of [plaintiff] with prejudice[.]"

Defendants filed a memorandum in support of their motion for summary

judgment, attaching several exhibits, which included plaintiff's Disputed Claim for
Compensation, defendants' answer, and plaintiff' s deposition. On March 27, 2024,

defendants filed a supplemental memorandum, attaching the deposition of Catherine
2
Senac, a corporate representative for Great American. Attached to Senac' s

deposition was the FIPP. Senac confirmed that the HPP was in effect at the time of

plaintiff' s accident. Senac testified that " the decision whether or not to evacuate

was] really with the employee and their family." Senac' s testimony confirmed that

the employees of Great American who chose not to evacuate received the same

benefits as the employees who chose to evacuate, including paid days during which

to get their workspace running. Senac testified that, pursuant to the HPP, an

employee could be paid for days they were not performing work for Great American,

similar to paid holidays.

Although the file stamp on defendants' motion for summary judgment is not legible, the minute
entry indicates the file date was June 22, 2023. See Brien v. Smith/American Plumbing, 2006-
1712 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 14/ 07), 971 So. 2d 336, 338 n.2.

2 Although the file stamp on defendants' supplemental memorandum is not legible, the minute
entry indicates the file date was March 27, 2024. See Brien, 971 So.2d at 338 n.2.
3

Plaintiff opposed defendants' motion for summary judgment arguing that she

was injured while traveling back to her home office from a remote worksite that was
on the clock at the time
set up pursuant to the HPP. Plaintiff argued that she was "

of the accident and was under the time pressure imposed upon her by [ Great

American] to return from the remote worksite[.]" Plaintiff further argued that she

should be covered under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act because her trip

to Houston was made for the benefit of Great American to ensure minimal

interruptions for their customers.

On January 26, 2024,3 plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment,

arguing that she was injured by an accident during the course and scope of her
employment and said accident arose from her employment such that her injuries and

under the Louisiana Workers'
the resulting disability were compensable

Compensation Act.'

Defendants opposed plaintiff' s cross motion for summary judgment, asserting

that she was not in the course and scope of her employment and her accident did not

arise out of her employment; thus, she was not entitled to workers' compensation

benefits. Defendants argued that plaintiff was not engaged in work activities or on

work premises when the accident occurred; moreover, she was not on a specific

mission for Great American. Defendants further argued that plaintiff worked

remotely, and her job did not call upon her to travel between work sites— her work

site was wherever she could access her work. Furthermore, the accident did not arise

out of her employment. The risk of an automobile accident, while traveling, was not

3 Although the file stamp on plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is not legible, the minute
entry indicates the file date was January 26, 2024. See Brien, 971 So.2d at 338 n.2.

4 In support of her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed into evidence her Disputed Claim
for Compensation and her deposition, defendants' answer, Senac' s deposition, and the HPP.
4

distinct to this employee; rather, any person who had evacuated the area due to

Hurricane Ida and returned found themselves in a similar traveling situation.

Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum, arguing, in part, that she should be

afforded the protections of the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act from " portal

to portal" as the trip was made for the benefit of Great American under time

constraints imposed by Great American to ensure its own operation integrity during
Hurricane Ida.

On April 26, 2024, the workers' compensation judge heard both motions for

summary judgment.' That same day, the parties entered a stipulation that the

exhibits filed on behalf of plaintiff in support of her motion for summary judgment

and the exhibits filed by defendants in support of their motion for summary
were
judgment, including those filed with their supplemental memorandum,

admissible as part of the record ... and [ were] in support and opposition to both

6
filed After hearing arguments, the workers'
motions by the parties [.],,

compensation judge took the matter under advisement. On May 8, 2024, the

workers' compensation judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment

and signed an order, which stated:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that ... [ d] efendant[ s'] [ m] otion for [ s] ummary U] udgment is hereby
granted, as there exists no genuine issue of material fact that ...
plaintiff] was not in the course and scope of employment on September
9, 2021. The Court rules for ... [d] efendant[ s] and against ... [ plaintiff],

We note the transcript of the hearing is not in the record before us.

6 We note that the workers' compensation judge did not have the discretion to consider defendants'
late -filed supplemental memorandum and evidence in support of their motion for summary
judgment because those documents were not timely filed within the mandatory time limitations set
forth in La. C. C. P. art. 966( B)( 1), which provides that "[ u] nless extended by the court and agreed

to by all of the parties ... "[ a] motion for summary judgment and all documents in support of the
motion shall be filed ... not less than sixty-five days prior to the trial." Guidry v. Southern Regional
Medical Center, 2024- 0760 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 30/ 24), 403 So. 3d 1241, 1251. However, the
record reveals that the parties stipulated that the exhibits filed with the supplemental memorandum
were admissible as part of the record. Therefore, plaintiff waived her right to object to defendants'
late -filed supplemental memorandum and evidence by later stipulating to the admissibility of
evidence filed with the late -filed memorandum. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( B)( 5).
5

granting ... [ d] efendant[ s'] [ m] otion for [ s] ummary [j]udgment and ...
plaintiff' s] [ m] otion for [ s] ummary [j]udgment is denied.

In written reasons for judgment, the workers' compensation judge found, in

pertinent part:

Plaintiff] made a decision to evacuate due to Hurricane Ida. She
stated in her deposition, she would have evacuated no matter what for
the comfort and safety of her family and understood evacuation was not
mandatory. She also wanted to continue to work so she brought her
company issued equipment to work. [ Great American] did not provide
reimbursement for travel or mileage. [ Great American] did provide
assistance for employees who needed help with travel arrangements,
but would not pay for the hotels or transportation associated with
evacuation. [ Plaintiff] further testified, she completed work prior to
returning home and did not do any work while traveling home. Use of
HPP leave [ was] a benefit and the use of that benefit [ did] not

automatically place an employee in the course and scope of

employment.

The aforementioned facts alone demonstrate there [ was] no

genuine issue of material fact resulting in the Court' s granting of ...
d] efendant[ s'] motion, finding ... [ plaintiff] was not in the course and
scope of employment on September 9, 2021 [,] when she was involved
in an automobile accident. The Court denies ... [ plaintiff' s] motion in
favor of ... [d] efendant[ s].

On May 9, 2024, the workers' compensation judge mailed a " NOTICE OF

SIGNING OF INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT," advising of its signing of an

interlocutory judgment in the above referenced matter[.]" On May 20, 2024,

plaintiff timely filed a notice of intent to seek supervisory review, asserting that the

workers' compensation judge erred in denying her cross motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the May 8, 2024 order. On August 23,

2024, this court denied plaintiffs supervisory writ application stating that "[ o] nce a

judgment with appropriate decretal language [ was] issued by the Office of Workers'

Compensation, it [would] represent a final, appealable judgment, and ... plaintiff ...

would] be entitled to file a motion for an appeal[.]" Earhart v. Great American

Insurance Company, Sentry Casualty Insurance Company, 2024- 0601 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 8/ 23/ 24), 2024 WL 3914332. On August 26, 2024, the workers' compensation

judge signed an " AMENDED ORDER"" stating, in pertinent part:8

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that there be a ruling in favor of ... [defendants] and against [ plaintiff]
granting ... [ d] efendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment, as there
exists no genuine issue of material fact. The matter is dismissed with
prejudice.

Plaintiff subsequently appealed the August 26, 2024 " AMENDED ORDER."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review the granting of a summary judgment de novo using

the same criteria governing the district court' s consideration of whether summary

judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and

whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See La. C. C. P. art.

966( A)(3); Thibodeaux v. American Alternative Insurance Corporation, 2024- 0383

La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 20/ 24), 2024 WL 5182404, * 2 ( unpublished).

The summary judgment procedure is expressly favored in the law and is

designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of non-domestic

civil actions. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(2). The purpose of a motion for summary

judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether

there is a genuine need for trial. Hines v. Garrett, 2004- 0806 ( La. 6/ 25/ 04), 876

So. 2d 764, 769 (per curiam). After an adequate opportunity for discovery, summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents

7 We note that the " AMENDED ORDER" does not deny plaintiffs cross motion for summary
judgment. However, the " AMENDED ORDER" language stating "[ t] he matter is dismissed with
prejudice" sufficiently sets forth the relief awarded and makes it a final judgment, for purposes of
the appeal. See Chandler v. Cajun Ready Mix Concrete, 2019- 1650 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 7/ 21), 328
So.3d 1189, 1192- 93 ( finding the judgment plainly stated the specific relief that was granted, as it
provided that the motion to quash was granted and that the matter was dismissed without
prejudice).

8 We note that the amended order contains a typographical error in stating " defendant" instead of
defendants." However, it is discernable from the record and the parties' briefs that the summary
judgment was granted in favor of Great American and Sentry. Moreover, both defendants are
identified in the caption and are also identified as the parties in whose favor relief is being awarded.
7

show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966( A)(3). The only documents that

may be filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings,
memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical

records, certified copies of public documents or public records, certified copies of

insurance policies, authentic acts, private acts duly acknowledged, promissory notes

and assignments thereof, written stipulations, and admissions. La. C. C. P. art.

966( A)(4)( a). 9

On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden of proof rests with the

mover. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1); Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Holden,

2023- 1347 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 7/ 24), 391 So. 3d 751, 756, writ denied, 2024- 01032

La. 11/ 14/ 24), 396 So. 3d 62. If, however, the mover will not bear the burden of

proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion, the mover' s burden

on the motion does not require that all essential elements of the adverse party' s

claim, action, or defense be negated. Instead, after meeting their initial burden of

showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the mover may point out

to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements

essential to the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, summary

judgment shall be granted unless the adverse party can produce factual evidence

sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the

9 Both motions for summary judgment in this case were heard after the effective date of the 2023
amendments to La. C. C. P. art. 966 by 2023 La. Acts No. 317, § 1 ( eff. Aug. 1, 2023) and 2023 La.
Acts No. 368, § 1 ( eff. Aug. 1, 2023). Both motions for summary judgment were heard prior to
the effective date of the 2025 amendments to La. C. C. P. art. 966. See La. Acts. 2025, No. 250, § 3,
effective August 1, 2025. We apply the version of La. C. C. P. art. 966 in effect at the time of the
hearing of the parties' motions for summary judgment to the matter before us. See Horrell v.
Barrios, 2016- 1547, 2016- 1548 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 15/ 18), 2018 WL 1373653, * 10 n. 8
unpublished), writ denied, 2018- 0931 ( La. 9/ 28/ 18), 253 So. 3d 144. ( applying the version of La.
C. C. P. art. 966 in effect at the time of the hearings on the motions for summary judgment.)
8

mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1);

iew, 391 So. 3d at 756- 57.
Ba v

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues on appeal that the workers' compensation judge erred in

granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and in denying her cross motion

for summary judgment. We will first address defendants' motion for summary

judgment. Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the

plaintiff was not in the course and scope of her employment when the accident

occurred.

For purposes of workers' compensation coverage, the requirement that an

employee' s injury occur " in the course of employment focuses on the time and

place relationship between the injury and the employment. Sharp v. United Fire &

Indemnity Company, 2015- 0976 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 185 So. 3d 830, 833.

The principal criteria for determining " course of employment" are time, place, and

employment activity. Mundy v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 593

So. 2d 346, 349 ( La. 1992). An accident occurs in the course of employment when

the employee sustains an injury while actively engaged in the performance of her

duties during work hours, either on the employer' s premises or at other places where

employment activities take the employee. McLin v. Industrial Specialty

Contractors, Inc., 2002- 1539 ( La. 7/ 2/ 03), 851 So. 2d 1135, 1140.

The submitted summary judgment evidence proves that at the time of the

accident, plaintiff was employed by Great American, was not on Great American' s

premises, and was traveling home from Houston. Defendants argue that there is no

genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was not engaged in any employment

activity at the time of her accident.

1

In support of their argument, defendants cite to McLin, which holds that

injuries sustained by an employee while traveling to and from work are not

considered to have occurred within the course and scope of employment, generally

Defendants
known as the " going and coming" rule. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140 n. 1.

admit that there are several exceptions to this rule, which include: ( 1) if the accident

occurs on the employer' s premises; ( 2) if the employee was deemed to be on any

specific mission for the employer (the " special mission" rule), such as making a trip

in the interest of the employer' s business or pursuant to the employer' s order; ( 3) if

the employer had interested itself in the transportation of the employee as an incident

to the employment agreement by either contractually providing transportation or

reimbursing the employee for the travel expenses; ( 4) if the employee was doing

work for the employer under the circumstances where the employer' s consent could

be fairly implied; ( 5) if the employee was hurt while traveling to and from one work

site to another; ( 6) if the employee was injured in an area immediately adjacent to

the place of employment and the area of injury contained a distinct travel risk to the

employee; and ( 7) if the operation of a motor vehicle was itself the performance of

one of the duties of the employee. McLin, 851 So. 2d at 1141 n. l .

Defendants argue that the McLin exceptions to the " going and coming" rule

do not apply to this case because: ( 1) the accident did not occur on Great American' s

premises; ( 2) plaintiff was not on a specific mission for Great American or pursuant

to an order from Great American; ( 3) defendants did not involve itself in the

transportation of plaintiff as an incident to the employment agreement by either

contractually providing transportation or reimbursing plaintiff for the travel

expenses; ( 4) plaintiff was not performing work at the time of the accident; ( 5)

plaintiff's travel was not from one work site to another, but was from an evacuation

place of her choosing back to her own home; ( 6) plaintiff was not injured in an area

H

immediately adjacent to the place of employment and the area of injury did not
contain a distinct travel risk to plaintiff; and ( 7) the operation of a motor vehicle was

not the performance of one of plaintiff' s employment duties.

Defendants further argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact that

plaintiffs accident did not arise out of her employment. The requirement that an

employee' s injury " arise out op' her employment relates to the character or origin of

the injury suffered by the employee and whether the injury was incidental to the
employment. Holden v. Mike' s Catfish Inn, Inc., 2017- 1056 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

2/ 27/ 13), 243 So. 3d 588, 591- 92. Defendants argue that plaintiff was at the location

where the subject accident took place because she had chosen to evacuate for

Hurricane Ida and was subsequently returning home at a time of her choosing.

Defendants argue that the details of plaintiff' s evacuation, such as when, where, and

by what route to evacuate, were left to her, as was the decision of whether to

evacuate. The risk involved to plaintiff was no more than any other resident or

traveler, and the mere fact plaintiff happened to work remotely does not transform

every instance of travel into a work-related trip. Therefore, defendants argued that

the accident did not arise out of plaintiff' s employment.

A workers' compensation claimant has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the disability suffered is related to an on-the-job

injury. Starkey v. Livingston Parish Council, 2012- 1787 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 6/ 13),

122 So. 3d 570, 574. Thus, defendants, as the movers, had to first point out an

absence of support for plaintiff' s claim that her injury occurred on the job, and then

the burden of proof shifted to plaintiff to show there was a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether her injury occurred on the job.

The summary judgment evidence establishes that plaintiff was a salaried

employee of Great American as an insurance underwriter who worked remotely at

11

her home. Before Hurricane Ida in September 2021, plaintiff chose to evacuate to

Houston and continue working while evacuated. Plaintiff was not reimbursed by

Plaintiff
Great American for any expenses or costs associated with her evacuation.

was not directed by Great American on when to evacuate, where to evacuate, or even

whether she should evacuate before Hurricane Ida. Senac, a corporate representative

for Great American, testified that all employees received the same benefits

regardless of whether they chose to evacuate or not in accordance with the HPP.

Defendants' evidence further establishes that on September 9, 2021, plaintiff

worked remotely that morning in Houston and while on her return trip to Metairie,

she was involved in the accident. Plaintiff unilaterally decided to undertake the trip

to Houston to evacuate in her personal automobile, and that decision was not related

to her continued work as an insurance underwriter for Great American. See

Macaluso v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 2010- 1478 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 23/ 11), 59

So. 3d 454, 462. The summary judgment evidence also reveals that plaintiff had no

duty to perform a service or task en route to Houston. Plaintiff testified that on the

date of the accident, when she was driving home, her phone records only show phone

calls made after her accident. Thus, considering the nature of plaintiff' s work as an

insurance underwriter, her drive back home from Houston, can in no way be viewed

as a function of her employment, but instead was simply conduct instituted for her

personal decision to evacuate for Hurricane Ida. Therefore, there is no genuine issue

of material fact that plaintiff' s commute is outside the course and scope of her

employment. See Richey v. Miller, 2017- 0462 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 29/ 18), 247 So. 3d

964, 970.

Accordingly, we find that in this case, the injury -producing activity was

plaintiff's travel, which resulted from her personal choice to evacuate in anticipation

Hurricane Ida. And while the record shows that plaintiff performed work for Great

11VA

American on the date ofthe accident, the summary judgment evidence does not show

that plaintiff performed any work that benefited Great American at the time of the

accident or even after. Therefore, plaintiffs accident was outside the course and

scope of her employment. We find that summary judgment was properly granted in

favor of defendants dismissing plaintiff' s claim with prejudice.

Thus, having reviewed the summary judgment evidence de novo, along with
the applicable law and jurisprudence, we find the workers' compensation judge

properly granted summary judgment to defendants, denied summary judgment to
plaintiff, and dismissed her claims with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the August 26, 2024 summary judgment

of the workers' compensation judge granting summary judgment to Great American

Insurance Company and Sentry Insurance Company and dismissing Ellen F.

Earhart' s claims against them. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Ellen

F. Earhart.

Evffyl i

13

STATE OF LOUISIANA

10 ,
10 • *

FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 CA 0202

ELLEN F. EARHART

VERSUS

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY AND
SENTRY INSURANCE COMPANY

McClendon, C.J.,, dissenting.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors,,

Inc., 2002- 1539 ( La. 7/ 2/ 03), 851 So. 2d 1135, set forth both the general " going -and -

coming rule" and exceptions to same. Under the general rule, injuries sustained by an

employee while traveling to and from work are not considered to have occurred within

the course and scope of his employment, and thus, are not compensable under the

Workers' Compensation Act. McLin, 851 So. 2d at 1140. This is premised on the theory

that, ordinarily, the employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee

leaves his work to go home until he resumes his work. The going -and -coming rule further

recognizes that an employee' s place of residence is a personal decision not directly

controlled by the employer, and that treating commuting time as part of the

determination of course and scope of employment would remove manageable boundaries

from the determination. McLin, 851 So. 2d at 1140.

However, the jurisprudence does recognize exceptions to the going -and -coming

rule: if the accident happened on the employer's premises; if the employee was deemed

to be on a specific mission for the employer, such as making a trip in the interest of his

employer's business or pursuant to his employer's order; if the employer had interested

himself in the transportation of the employee as an incident to the employment

agreement either by contractually providing transportation or reimbursing the employee

for his travel expenses; if the employee was doing work for his employer under the

circumstances where the employer' s consent could be fairly implied; if the employee was

hurt while traveling to and from one work site to another; if the employee was injured in

an area immediately adjacent to his place of employment and that area contained a

distinct travel risk to the employee ( the " threshold doctrine"); and if the operation of a

motor vehicle was the performance of one of the duties of the employment of the

employee. McLin, 851 So. 2d at 1141.

Here, Great American Insurance Company ( Great American) had in place a

Strategic Comp Hurricane Preparedness Plan" ( HPP). Of note, the HPP contained the

following language:

It is important to remember that when a disaster strikes, how a company
responds, and how the public perceives that response, can have a

significant and lasting impact on its business.

In any event, our office in Cincinnati will serve as a communication,
computer and management base.

As always, your safely and that ofyour family is our first priority[ .

Our second priority Is to Implement the plan so we may continue to
effectively serve our insureds[.]

As you know, the majority of our customers are not located in hurricane
zones, and their business needs continue whether or not we are
operating out of our individual home offices.

Strategic Comp employees may evacuate as soon as it is deemed
appropriate by your and your family.

You will have up to ( 2) two days to focus solely on the safety and well-
being of your family and property.

If, during an event, employees use their personal cell phone to
complete work tasks, they could submit a prorated portion of their
bill for reimbursement[.]

All remote employees are requested to evacuate along with their home-
office computer equipment[.]

Everyone Is required to check -In with their manager directly as soon as
possible alter evacuating the area[.]

if you made the decision to remain In the storm s path and ultimately
lose power, you are still expected to communicate your whereabouts
and status with management Volcemall service will continue to be
operational.]

2

WHEN EVACUATING

Confirm your reservations/ accommodations...

Notify your manager of any Issues that must be addressed should you
be out ofyour home off1ce for a week or more[.

Enter your Outlook ' budof-offIce" message & change your voice mail

message[.]

Evacuate with laptop/ home office computer equipment & cell phone,
etc., & make sure you have everything necessary to recreate your

working set-up at your evacuation destination{.]

The HPP further allowed employees two days to transition in case of an evacuation,

and allowed one day to return home and " resume your normal work schedule in your

home office." During an evacuation, employees were directed to check- in with their

manager - as soon as possible" and to periodically check the company's site for updates

and status reports. The bottom of the second page of the HPP read, " Let's make this

work for everyone."

Additionally, in her deposition, Great American' s corporate representative,

Catherine Senac, testified that the HPP was intended to further Great American' s goal to

try to stay operational, within the abilities of our confines to do so." She confirmed that

the HPP allowed employees two days to evacuate, get settled, and become operational,

without tapping into their PTO. And same with the return. They are given another day

to get back home without using their PTO as well." Consequently, Ms. Earhart was paid

for the two days spent evacuating to Houston, as well as the day she spent returning to

Metairie.

The specific language of the HPP and Ms. Senac' s testimony create a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Great American had a business interest in Ms. Earhart

evacuating and taking with her "' everything necessary to recreate" her home -office.

Likewise, a factual issue exists as to whether Ms. Earhart's evacuation, at least in part,

served the business interests of her employer. Consequently, I find that under the specific

facts presented, there exist genuine issues of material fact which precludes summary

judgment.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

3