Rashanda Porter Kyles v. Derrick Wayne Kyles

STATE OF LOUISIANA

2025 CA 0526

VERSUS

DERRICK WAYNE KYLES

Judgment Rendered: OEM

On Appeal from the Family Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Docket No. F222671

Honorable Erika L. Green, Judge Presiding

Heidi M. Vessel Counsel for Plaintiff/ 1St Appellant
Zachary, Louisiana Rashanda Porter Kyles

Lon E. Roberson Counsel for Defendant/ 2nd Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Derrick Wayne Kyles

U 0 1 ORIM
, 1 1

McCLENDON,. C.J.

Both spouses appeal the trial court's partition of the community property pursuant

to LSA- R. S. 9: 2801. For the reasons that follow, we vacate in part, reverse in part, amend

in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Derrick and Rashanda Kyles were married on March 30, 2013. Rashanda filed a

petition for divorce and ancillary matters on August 15, 2020. In Rashanda' s petition for

divorce, she requested that Derrick be granted the exclusive use and possession of the

family residence, located at 7502 Hanks Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and all contents

located therein. Rashanda "' reserve[ d] her right to rental reimbursement and [ to] state

the amount thereof."

Derrick filed an answer and reconventional demand on November 9, 2020, likewise

seeking a divorce and other incidental relief. As petitioner -in -reconvention, Derrick

alleged that Rashanda had voluntarily vacated the former family residence, and therefore,

he sought exclusive use of the home and the contents therein. Derrick also sought a

judicial partition of the community property pursuant to LSA- R. S. 9: 2801.

Following a contradictory hearing on December 8, 2020, the trial court rendered

an interim judgment granting Derrick the exclusive use and possession of the family
residence; reserving Rashanda' s right to seek rental reimbursement for Derrick's use of

the family residence; and granting each party the exclusive use and possession of their

customary vehicles, with each party being responsible for the vehicles' respective

mortgage notes and insurance.

The parties were divorced by judgment dated November 24, 2021. By stipulated

judgment, the parties resolved issues of custody. Specifically, the parties were awarded

joint custody of their two minor children, and Rashanda was designated as the domiciliary
parent. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement as to the partition of

community property. Thus, a bench trial was held on June 15, 2023 to partition the

community property pursuant to LSA- R. S. 9: 2801. The trial court took the matter under

advisement and thereafter issued an oral ruling on July 5, 2023. On September 20, 2023,

2

the trial court signed a " Final Community Property Judgment" which provided, in pertinent

part:

Having considered the law, pleadings, evidence and
testimony of the witnesses, the Court hereby made the following
factual findings:

The Court finds that[] the [ s] ole [ immovable] property at issue was
identified as 7502 Hanks Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana[,] which is deemed
the separate property of Derrick Wayne Kyles due to a donation of the lot,
valued at $ 20, 000. 000 by Mr. Kyles'[] aunt to him as his separate property.

Thus, the home which was permanently attached to the lot during the
existence of the community property regime between the parties takes on
the nature of the land, thereby leaving at issue the increased value of the
land.

The Court further finds that[] the multiple indebtedness mortgage
which [e] ncumbered the property located at 7502 Hanks Drive, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana[,] is a community obligation.

THUS, pursuant to the above stated findings, the Court hereby
renders] the following Judgment:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,,] and DECREED that the
immovable] property located at 7502 Hanks Drive, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana[,] is the separate property of Derrick Wayne Kyles.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,,] and DECREED that
the mortgage secured by the property at 7502 Hanks Drive, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana[,] is a community obligation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,. ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
Rashanda Porter Kyles is entitled to one half of the increased value of the
property located at 7502 Hanks Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,. ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
as of the date of the trial, the improved value of the property located at
7502 Hanks Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana is ... $ 417, 500. 00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
utilizing the tax assessor' s value of the home in 2016, the court finds that
the home was worth $ 248, 930. 00 in 2016. Therefore, the court deems the
increased value of the lot to be $ 168, 070[. 00]. Ms. Kyles is entitled to half
of the increased value of the improvement on the lot in the amount of
84, 035. 00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED [ that]
Mr. Kyles is granted full ownership of the property located at 7502 Hanks
Drive and it shall be deemed his separate property.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
Ms. Kyles shall be awarded one half the value of the furniture in the
possession of Mr. Kyles listed on the detailed descriptive list. The total value
of the movables is $ 34, 520. 00. Mr. Kyles shall reimburse Ms. Kyles the
amount of $ 17, 260. 00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED] that
the court will not consider the Toyota Solara.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
Ms. Kyles shall be granted full ownership of the 2020 BMW x5 and she is
solely] responsible for the mortgage thereon.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,. ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
Mr. Kyles is granted full ownership of the 2013 Chevrolet Van, the 2013
Lexus GS 350, and the 2018 Denali and he is solely responsible for any
mortgages or obligations associated with these vehicles.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
the court finds that the Denali is valued at $ 42, 654.[ 00], and the 2013
Chevy Van is valued at $ 17, 011. 00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
at the termination of the community, the parties had the following financial
accounts: Derrick Kyles[' account] ending in # 2662 with $ 1, 611. 15[;] both
parties[] account ending in 1370 [ with a balance of $ 1, 402. 60;] Derrick
Kyles[' account] ending in 5089 [ with a balance of $ 1, 375. 49;] Derrick
Kyles[' account] ending in 7427 [ with a balance of] $ 872. 39. These
accounts total $ 6, 582. 44. Each party is entitled to one half of the total value
of the accounts, in the amount of $3, 291. 22 each.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
there was no evidence of liabilities entered into the record, therefore the
liabilities of the parties shall not be considered pursuant to a status
conference held to clarify the instant ruling.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,. ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
that court shall not consider reimbursement claims for moving and storage
fees requested by Ms. Kyles.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED , ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
Ms. Kyles listed attorney' s fees in the amount of $8, 500. 00. Mr. Kyles shall
pay one half of the amount listed on the [ Detailed Descriptive List].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that
Ms. Kyles shall not be entitled to rental reimbursement, due to being
awarded one half of the increased value of the home.

IT IS FURTHER RDERED, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED [ that]
there shall be no reimbursement for appraisal fees to either party.
Following the trial court's September 20, 2023 judgment, Rashanda filed a motion

for partial new trial and/ or reconsideration. Rashanda argued the trial court erred in its

valuation of the 7502 Hanks Drive property; in failing to find she was entitled to

reimbursement for one half of the principal of the mortgage payments made during the

community on the family residence built on the 7502 Hanks Drive property; and in failing

to order Derrick to pay her an equalizating payment for the award of the three vehicles

to him.

Derrick opposed Rashanda' s motion for new trial and/ or reconsideration. Derrick

also requested written reasons for judgment pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1917.

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On November 14, 2023, the trial court signed written reasons for judgment

regarding the September 20, 2023 " Final Community Property Judgment" and heard

Rashanda' s motion for new trial and/ or reconsideration. On March 7, 2024, the trial court

signed a written judgment on Rashanda' s motion.' The trial court denied Rashanda' s

motion seeking a higher valuation of the 7502 Hanks Drive property and reimbursement

of one half of the mortgage principal payments, but granted the motion as to Rashanda' s

request for an equalizing payment. On March 8, 2024, 2 the trial court signed a judgment

which provided, in pertinent part:

IT IS ORDERED ... that RASHANDA PORTER KYLES shall be
awarded an equalizing payment of $ 32, 740. 00 for the award of the
community vehicles to DERRICK WAYNE KYLES. This shall be paid by
DERRICK WAYNE KYLES in two installments[.] [ T] he first shall be paid
by September 15, 2024, and the second and final payment shall be due on
March 15, 2025.

The parties now separately appeal both the September 20, 2023 judgment

partitioning the community property assets and liabilities and the March 8, 2024 judgment

On appeal, Derrick raises three assignments of error. His first assignment of error

challenges that portion of the September 20, 2023 judgment finding that Rashanda is

entitled to one half of the increased value of the 7502 Hanks Drive property. His third

assignment of error contends the trial court erred in not offsetting the parties' competing

reimbursement claims regarding the family residence. Derrick's second assignment of

I The March 7, 2024 judgment on Rashanda' s motion for new trial and/ or reconsideration provided, in
pertinent part:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,] and DECREED that the Motion for
Rehearing and/ or Reconsideration filed by Rashanda Porter Kyles is DENIED in part, and
GRANTED in part with the Court not reconsidering the issue of solely relying on the
Appraisal of the court appointed appraiser, Val Lowery; but rather considering Mr. Kyles'
appraiser and other factors more specifically detailed in the Court's written reasons for
judgment.

The Court further refuses to reconsider/ rehear the issue of the value of the
immovable property and how said value was derived. The Court will[,] however, grant
reconsideration of an equalizing payment to Ms. Kyles for the community vehicles awarded
to Mr. Kyles. The court will issue an amended judgment to specify the said amount of the
equalizing payments to Ms. Kyles.

2 We note that the trial court signed a judgment that was nearly identical to the March 8, 2024 judgment
on March 5, 2024. It is unclear why the trial court signed both judgments. However, both Rashanda and
Derrick specifically referenced the March 8, 2024 judgment in their motions to appeal.

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error argues the trial court erred in failing to award reimbursement for the community's

rent-free use of his separate property residence.

In three assignments of error and her appellee brief, Rashanda contends the trial

court properly awarded her one half of the increase in value of the 7502 Hanks Drive

property, but erred in its valuation of same. In two assignments of error, Rashanda argues

the trial court erred in its determinations regarding the community vehicles. Specifically,

she asserts the trial court erred in basing its valuation of two of the community vehicles

on its ".5ua sponte "research and in failing to consider that the vehicles awarded to Derrick

had no proven mortgages. In two assignments of error, Rashanda argues the trial court

erred in " in partitioning alleged tax and other liabilities asserted by Mr. Kyles despite there

being no tangible or credible evidence thereof" and in ordering that " all remaining

liabilities be split, leaving it to the parties to determine what assets the court was speaking
about and in what amounts[.]" Finally, in a last assignment of error, Rashanda asserts

the trial court erred in " simply dividing equity for all assets and not awarding an equalizing
payment for the non possessing party."

COMMUNITY PROPERTY PARTITION

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2801 provides the mandatory procedure by which
community property is partitioned when the spouses are unable to agree on a partition.

See Trahan v. Trahan, 2016- 0108 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 16/ 16), 203 So. 3d 447, 450. Both

parties file sworn detailed descriptive lists and either traverse or concur in the inclusion

or exclusion of each asset and liability and the valuation contained on the other party's
list. LSA- R. S. 9: 2801( A)( 1) and ( 2); Hardy v. Hardy, 2018- 0487 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

2/ 28/ 19), 273 So. 3d 448, 452. Thereafter, the trial court values the community assets,
determines the community liabilities, and adjudicates the spouses' claiMS. 3 LSA- R.S.

9: 2801( A)( 4)( a). The court also divides and allocates the community assets and liabilities

so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value. LSA- R. S. 9: 2801( A)( 4)( b)

3 Pursuant to LSA- R. S. 9: 2801( A)( 4)( a), the court is to value community assets " as of the time of the trial
on the merits[.]"
However, it is well settled that when the parties do not submit evidence of the current
value of community assets, the trial court does not err in making its valuations based upon the evidence
presented by the parties. Mabray v. McSherry, 54, 022 ( La. App. 2 Cir. 8/ 11/ 21), 325 So. 3d 1157, 1164,
writ denied, 2021- 01498 ( La. 12/ 21/ 21), 329 So. 3d 828; see also Christie v. Christie, 2021- 359 ( La. App.
3 Cir. 1/ 26/ 22), 333 So. 3d 840, 846; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 2017- 645 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 5/ 16/ 18), 247
So. 3d 1105, 1113; Trahan, 203 So. 3d at 454; Katner v. Katner, 2009- 0974 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 12/ 23/ 09),
28 So. 3d 566, 570.

N.

and ( c). If the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the

court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money. LSA- R. S. 9: 2801( A)( 4)( d);

Trahan, 203 So. 3d at 451.

It is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion in adjudicating issues raised

by the partition of the community. The trial court is afforded a great deal of latitude in

arriving at an equitable distribution of the assets between the spouses. Hardy, 273 So. 3d

at 453. Factual findings and credibility determinations made in the course of valuing and

allocating assets and liabilities in the partition of community property may not be set

aside absent manifest error. Berthelot v. Berthelot, 2017- 1055 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

7/ 18/ 18), 254 So. 3d 800, 806. A trial court can, but is not required to, accept a party' s

valuation in testimony of assets or debts at face value. The evidence must, nevertheless,

support the valuation assigned by the trial court. McCarroll v. McCarroll, 1999- 0046

La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 12/ 00), 767 So. 2d 715, 723, writ denied, 2000- 2370 ( La. 11/ 3/ 00), 773

So. 2d 146. Assets, liabilities, and reimbursements are factual determinations that should

not be disturbed absent manifest error or an abuse of discretion. Hardy, 273 So. 3d at
453 ( assets and liabilities); Pierce v. Pierce, 2019- 0689 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 21/ 20), 298

So. 3d 902, 911 ( reimbursements). However, the allocation or assigning of assets and

liabilities in the partition of community property is reviewed under the abuse of discretion

standard. Hardy, 273 So. 3d at 453.

Regarding questions of law, appellate review is simply a review of whether the

trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. The appellate court gives no special

weight to the trial court's findings on legal issues. Boyd v. Boyd, 2010- 1369 ( La. App. 1
Cir. 2/ 11/ 11), 57 So. 3d 1169, 1174. A legal error occurs when a trial court applies

incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Legal errors are prejudicial

when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. When

such a prejudicial error of law skews the trial court's finding of a material issue of fact

and causes it to pretermit other issues, the appellate court is required, if it can, to render

judgment on the record by applying the correct law and determining the essential material

7

facts de novo. Tanana v. Tanana, 2012- 1013 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 31/ 13), 140 So. 3d 738,

742.

DISCUSSION

At the outset of this discussion, we note that LSA- R. S. 9: 2801 does not require the

trial court to include in the judgment the calculations used to determine the final allocation

of assets, liabilities, and reimbursements, as long as it is clear from the record that the

assets were valued, the liabilities were determined, and the claims were adjudicated. In

such circumstances, this court has previously looked to the trial court's oral reasons and

spreadsheets the trial court provided to the parties regarding the values and calculations.

See Hoover v. Hoover, 2010- 1245 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 17/ 11), 62 So. 3d 765, 768.

Therefore, we rely on the trial court's written reasons, oral reasons, and spreadsheets as

needed. However, where there is a conflict between the judgment and the reasons for

judgment, we defer to the judgment, as the judgment controls. See Benoit v. Benoit,

2021- 0864 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 4/ 22), 341 So. 3d 719, 725 n. 1, writ not considered, 2022-

00951 ( La. 10/ 4/ 22), 347 So. 3d 890.

Reimbursement Claims

On appeal, Derrick contends the trial court erred in awarding Rashanda

reimbursement for one half of the increased value of the 7502 Hanks Drive property.

Derrick also argues that the trial court erred in failing to offset, reconcile, or " net out"

competing reimbursement claims between the parties. We agree, and find that the trial

court legally erred on both issues. These legal errors obligate us to render judgment on

the record to the extent possible. See Tanana, 140 So. 3d at 742. However, deficiencies

in the record preclude us from determining, on review, whether each spouse received

property of an equal net value or if one party was entitled to an equalizing sum.

Accordingly, we address those assignments of error pertaining to the claims we are able

to decide based on the record before us, and remand the remaining matters to the trial

court for the partition of the community property to be properly made in accordance with

LSA- R.S. 9: 2801 and this opinion. See Corkern v. Corkern, 2005- 2297 ( La. App. I Cir.
11/ 3/ 06), 950 So. 2d 780, 784, writ denied, 2006- 2844 ( La. 2/ 2/ 07), 948 So. 2d 1083;

McElwee v. McElwee, 93- 1010 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 17/ 94), 649 So. 2d 975, 977- 978.

The record establishes that Derrick's aunt donated land located at 7502 Hanks

Drive, to him as his separate property. The parties initially financed construction of the

family residence thereon with a loan from Derrick's father. After the family residence was

built, the parties executed a " Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage" on the 7502 Hanks Drive

property ( the mortgage) on April 28, 2016, to secure a separate promissory note in the

amount of $225, 000. 00. 4 Derrick signed the mortgage as the mortgagee, and Rashanda

signed as the " Intervenor Spouse." The parties repaid Derrick's father with the proceeds

of the loan secured by the mortgage.

There is no dispute on appeal that the family residence built on the 7502 Hanks

Drive property is Derrick's separate property, nor is there any dispute on appeal that the

mortgage secured by said property is a community obligation. See LSA- C. C. arts. 2360

and 2361; 5 LSA- C. C. art. 2366; McGee v. McGee, 2004- 0288 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 24/ 05),

905 So. 2d 300, 302, writ denied, 2005- 1561 ( La. 12/ 16/ 05), 917 So. 2d 1118. Based on

these facts, Rashanda' s claim for reimbursement relative to the family residence is

governed by LSA- C. C. art. 2366, which sets forth the applicable rules for reimbursement

when community property is used for the improvement of a spouse' s separate property.

See Downey v. Downey, 2023- 0060 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 15/ 23), 375 So. 3d 987, 992.

Louisiana Civil Code article 2366 provides:

If community property has been used during the existence of the
community property regime or former community property has been used
thereafter for the acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit of the separate
property of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-
half of the amount or value that the community property had at the time it
was used.

Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and
plantings made on the separate property of a spouse with community
property belong to the owner of the ground. The other spouse is entitled to
reimbursement for one- half of the amount or value that the community
property had at the time it was used.

This court applied LSA- C. C. art. 2366 to a factually similar case in McGee, 905

So. 2d 300. The spouses in McGee used proceeds from a loan secured by a mortgage on

I Although the multiple indebtedness mortgage was sometimes referred to as a " refinance" during trial, the
refinance" and the mortgage were the same document.

5 An obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime for the common
interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation. LSA- C. C. art. 2360.
Except as provided in LSA- C. C. art. 2363 ( defining a separate obligation), all obligations incurred by a
spouse during the existence of a community property regime are presumed to be community obligations.
LSA- C. C. art. 2361.

1041

the husband's separate property to construct their family residence on said property.
McGee, 905 So. 2d at 301. In assessing the reimbursement owed, the McGee court

M[. McGee MOUSt ReiDOhm[ se MS. McGee for the community funds used to
build the hOUS8 OO his separate property. The proper DO88SUn8 Of the
D8iOlbU[ Se[ Oent iS" OAe- ha!fOfthe aOOOUOt or VB| U8 that the CO[ OD0UOU«
assets had at the time they were US2d/" not the SUOOS applied to the
mortgage over the years. Mr. McGee listed the amount OFcommunity funds
used iObuilding the house @S$ 69, O0O. 00. Therefore, one- half ofthe actual
value Ofthe community funds used iS$ 34/ 500' 0O. lti5undisputed that the
hal8OC8 of the | O@O at the time of the filing of the detailed descriptive lists
was $
44/082, 81' Therefore, as community obligation, M6. McGee owed
M[ K4CG2e one- half of the balance of the lO@O at the time of the partition,
or $ 22, 041. 40.

After offsetting the amount OfMs. reimbursement h« the a[ DOUOt
of her loan obligation, VVe find that Mr. McGee owes Ms. McGee $ 12/ 458. 60
for the use of community funds 8SSOC@ted with the COOStrUCtiO0 of house
OO his Sep8[ 8t8 pR] DeMv. Therefore, we will amend the ' UMnOl2Mt of the
trial [ OUyt to reduce the reimbursement award from $ 15/ 540. 86 to

McGee, 905 So. 2d at 302- 303 ( internal citations omitted).

Considering the record before us in light of the plain language of LSA- C. C. art.

2366 and McGee, it is clear that the proper measure of Rashanda' s reimbursement claim

under . art. 2366 is based OO the value the COD1OlUDit« property had at the time

i[ was used. See [ SA- C. C' art. 2366; McGee, 905 SO. 2dBt 302. This iStrue regardless Of

the value Ofthe separate property 3fthe time Oftrial Or any mortgage payments made

during the co0mUMity. 6 See Stockton v. Stockton, 2027- 0145 / La.ADD. 1 Cir,

10/ 18K23\/ 377 Sn, 3d 282/ 290; McGee, 905 Sn. 2d at 302. Thus, the trial court legally

erred in finding that R8Sh8Od8 was entitled to, one half Ofthe iOCRe8Se in value of the

family residence. 7

Consequently, we pretermit consideration of Rashanda' s assignments of error challenging the trial court's
valuation ofthe 7SO2Hanks Drive property and find nomerit inher arguments seeking reimbursement for
mortgage payments made during the marriage.
From its reasons for judgment, it appears that the trial court erroneously applied LSA- C. C. art. 2368,
rather than LSA- C. C. art. 2366. Under LSA- C. C. art. 2368, if the separate property of a spouse has increased
in value as a result of the uncompensated common labor or industry of the spouses, the other spouse is
entitled to be reimbursed from the spouse whose property has increased in value one half of the increase
attributed to the common labor. When seeking reimbursement pursuant to LSA- C. C. art. 2368, the claimant
spouse has the burden of establishing that ( 1) the property is separate; ( 2) the property increased in value;
and ( 3) the increase in value was based on the uncompensated labor of the other spouse. Thereafter, the
burden shifts tothe other spouse to prove that the increase in value was due tofactors other than the
uncompensated or undercompensated labor. Downey, 375 So. 3d at 992- 993. Here, Rashenda does not
argue that the family residence increased in value as a result of the uncompensated common labor or
industry of the spouses, and the record does not reflect that either spouse expended labor or industry in
the construction of the family residence. Thus, LSA- C. C. ah. 2368 does not apply.

10

It is also clear that the trial court legally erred in failing to offset the amount of

Rashanda' s reimbursement by the amount of her share of the mortgage obligation. The

September 20, 2023 judgment correctly found that the mortgage was a community

obligation. However, while the trial court's written reasons state that Derrick was to

assume" the mortgage, the September 20, 2023 judgment failed to allocate the

mortgage to Derrick. We also note that the trial court failed to include the mortgage in

its calculations of the net value of property allocated to each spouse, as evidenced by the

written reasons. Thus, the trial court legally erred in failing to comply with the mandatory

provisions of LSA- R. S. 9: 2801( 4).

Here, the record is adequate for us to determine on appeal both Rashanda' s LSA-

C. C. art. 2366 reimbursement claim and the amount by which her mortgage obligation

offsets her reimbursement claim. The parties executed a mortgage in the amount of

225, 000.00 in order to repay the loan from Derrick's father used to build the family

residence. Thus, Derrick must reimburse Rashanda for " one- half of the amount or value

that the community property had at the time it was used" to build the family residence

on his separate property, or $ 112, 500. 00. At trial, Rashanda stipulated that the mortgage

balance was $ 181, 403. 00. Therefore, Rashanda is liable for one half of the balance of

this community obligation, or $ 90, 701. 50.

Accordingly, those portions of the September 20, 2023 judgment finding that

Rashanda is entitled to one half of the increased value of the 7502 Hanks Drive property,

and assessing the value of the 7502 Hanks Drive property, are vacated. The September

20, 2023 judgment is amended to provide that Rashanda is entitled to reimbursement of

one half of the value of the community property used to improve the 7502 Hanks Drive

property in the amount of $ 112, 500. 00 ($ 225, 000. 00 —' 2 = $ 112, 500. 00); that the

balance owed on the community mortgage on the 7502 Hanks Drive property is

181, 403. 00; that responsibility for the community mortgage is allocated to Derrick; and

that the $ 112, 500. 00 reimbursement Derrick owes to Rashanda must be offset by her

one half of the balance of the community mortgage at the time of the partition, or

90, 701. 50 ($ 181r403. 00 + 2 = $ 90, 701. 50).

M

Community Vehicles

We next consider Rashanda' s arguments on appeal as to values and liabilities

associated with the community vehicles. During trial, Rashanda offered into evidence a

Kelley Blue Book printout reflecting that the 2013 Lexus GS 350 was worth between

13, 594.00 and $ 15, 943. 00. She testified that based on Derrick's discovery responses,

she believed the balance owed on the Lexus GS 350 was $ 7, 636. 56. Derrick traversed

the balance in his detailed descriptive list, asserting it was $ 500. 00. The written reasons

reflect that the trial court found the Lexus was worth $ 15, 943. 00 and found the balance

owed on the Lexus was $ 7, 636. 56. The September 20, 2023 judgment allocated the

Lexus and the associated liability to Derrick.

Regarding the 2020 BMW x5, Rashanda offered into evidence a Kelley Blue Book

printout reflecting a value between $ 39, 591. 00 and $ 42, 868. 00. She testified the balance

owed on the BMW was $ 56, 940. 81. The written reasons reflect that the trial court valued

the BMW at $ 42, 868. 00 and found the balance owed thereon was $ 56, 940. 81. The

September 20,
2023 judgment allocated the BMW and the associated liability to
Rashanda.

Regarding the 2018 GMC Sierra, Rashanda testified she believed the GMC Sierra

was worth between $ 30, 000. 00 and $ 34, 000. 00 based on a Kelley Blue Book search but

did not offer the Kelley Blue Book document supporting her testimony. She believed the

balance owed on the GMC Sierra was $46,000. 00, based on Derrick's discovery responses.

Neither party offered testimonial or documentary evidence regarding the value or the
debt associated with the Chevrolet van. The trial court's written reasons state that

because there was no documentary evidence regarding the value of the GMC Sierra and
the Chevrolet van, it had, " sua sponte,"
obtained values for these vehicles from Kelley
Blue Book of $42, 654. 00 and $ 17, 011. 00, respectively. The written reasons further reflect

that the trial court valued the GMC Sierra at $ 42, 654. 00 and found the balance owed

thereon to be $ 46, 000. 00, while it valued the Chevrolet van at $ 17, 011. 00 and did not

assess a debt associated with the van, presumably due to the lack of evidence. The

September 20, 2023 judgment allocated the GMC Sierra, the Chevrolet van, and the

liability associated with the GMC Sierra to Derrick.

12

Rashanda contends on appeal that the trial court erred in its valuation of the GMC

Sierra and the Chevrolet van. We agree. Evidence not properly and officially offered and

introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record. Landis

Construction Co., L. L.C. v. State, 2015- 1167 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 2/ 29/ 16), 199 So. 3d 1,

2- 3. Thus, the trial court legally erred in conducting a " sua sponte" investigation into the

values of the GMC Sierra and the Chevrolet van. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of

the September 20, 2023 judgment finding that the GMC Sierra is valued at $ 42, 654. 00

and the Chevrolet van is valued at $ 17, 011. 00. Further, because the evidence in the

record is insufficient to permit us to ascertain a value for these assets,$ we must vacate

that portion of the March 8, 2024 judgment awarding Rashanda an equalizing payment

in the amount of $32, 740. 00, which was based in part on the improper valuations of the

vehicles, and remand this case to the trial court to properly determine the values of the

GMC Sierra and the Chevrolet van. Finally, as we have vacated that portion of the March

8, 2024 judgment awarding an equalizing payment in favor of Rashanda, we pretermit

her assignment of error regarding the equalizing payment.

Rashanda also contends on appeal that the trial court erred in its determination of

the liabilities associated with the community vehicles allocated to Derrick, i.e., the GMC

Sierra, the Lexus, and the Chevrolet van, because Derrick did not offer documentary proof

of said debts. We disagree. Factual findings and credibility determinations made in the

course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities in the partition of community

property may not be set aside absent manifest error. Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 806. Our

review of the record reflects that the only evidence offered regarding the liabilities

associated with the community vehicles was Rashanda' s testimony. The trial court plainly

accepted Rashanda' s testimony as credible and determined the debts owed on the BMW,

the Lexus, and the GMC Sierra based on her testimony. Accordingly, the trial court's

determination of the liabilities associated with the four community vehicles is affirmed.

8 The trial court's reliance on the Kelley Blue Book $42, 654.00 valuation of the GMC Sierra clearly establishes
that it did not accept Rashanda' s testimony valuing the GMC Sierra between $ 30, 000. 00 and $ 34, 000. 00.
It is well- settled that a trier of fact is free to believe in whole or in part the testimony of any witness. See
Berthelot v. Berthelot, 2017- 1055 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 18/ 18), 254 So. 3d 800, 809; Pennison v. Carrol,
2014- 1098 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 24/ 15), 167 So. 3d 1065, 1076, writ denied, 2015- 1214 ( La. 9/ 25/ 15), 178
So. 3d 568.

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Family Residence Rental Reimbursement

Both parties argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to grant rental

reimbursement for use of the family residence. Derrick argues, without citing any legal

authority, that he should be awarded rental reimbursement for the community's rent-free

use of his separate property during the marriage. We find no authority supporting this

argument, and accordingly find this assignment of error lacks merit.

Rashanda argues the trial court erred in denying her claim for rental

reimbursement for Derrick's exclusive use and occupancy of the family residence. We

disagree. Pursuant to LSA- R. S. 9: 374( C), a spouse who uses and occupies the family

residence pending a partition of the community in accordance with LSA- R. S. 9: 374( A) or

B) may be liable to the other spouse for rent.9 Averill v. Averill, 2018- 0299 ( La. App. 1
Cir. 9/ 21/ 18), 393 So. 3d 351, 353. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 374(A) and ( B) provide,

in pertinent part:

A. When the family residence is the separate property of either spouse,
after the filing of a petition for divorce or in conjunction therewith, the
spouse who has physical custody or has been awarded temporary custody
of the minor children of the marriage may petition for, and a court may
award to that spouse, after a contradictory hearing, the use and occupancy
of the family residence pending the partition of the community property or
one hundred eighty days after termination of the marriage, whichever
occurs first. In these cases, the court shall inquire into the relative economic
status of the spouses, including both community and separate property,
and the needs of the children, and shall award the use and occupancy of
the family residence to the spouse in accordance with the best interest of
the family. The court shall consider the granting of the occupancy of the
family residence in awarding spousal support.

B. When the family residence is community property or is owned by the
spouses in indivision, . . .either spouse may petition for, and a court may
award to one of the spouses, after a contradictory hearing, the use and
occupancy of the family residence ... pending partition of the property or
further order of the court, whichever occurs first. In these cases, the court
shall inquire into the relative economic status of the spouses, including both
community and separate property, and the needs of the children, if any,
and shall award the use and occupancy of the family residence ... to the
spouse in accordance with the best interest of the family. If applicable, the
court shall consider the granting of the occupancy of the family residence .
in awarding spousal support.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 374(A) governs when the family residence is the separate

property of one spouse, and LSA- R. S. 9: 374( B) governs when the family residence is the

9 Louisiana Revised Statute 9: 374 was amended in 2022 and again in 2024. Herein, we apply the version
in effect at the time of the trial of the community property partition. However, we note that neither the
2022 amendments nor the 2024 amendments resulted in substantive changes that would affect our analysis
herein.

14

community property of the spouses or is owned by the spouses in indivision. As the trial

court properly classified the family residence as Derrick's separate property, LSA- R.S.

9: 374( 8) is inapplicable. Thus, we consider and apply LSA- R. S. 9: 374(A).

Under the plain language of LSA- R. S. 9: 374( A), when the family residence is the

separate property of either spouse, a non -owning spouse who has physical custody of

minor children of the marriage may petition for the use and occupancy of a separate

property family residence. The non -owning spouse may only be awarded the use and

occupancy of the other spouse' s separate property while the community property

partition is pending, or for one hundred eighty days after termination of the marriage,

whichever occurs first. In short, under LSA- R. S. 9: 374( A), the spouse with physical

custody of the minor children of the marriage may petition for the use and occupancy of

the family residence that is the separate property of the other spouse.

Consequently, because Rashanda was designated the domiciliary parent and

awarded physical custody of the parties' two minor children, she could have sought the

use and occupancy of the family residence under LSA- R. S. 9: 374( A), even though it was

Derrick's separate property. If Rashanda had been awarded use and occupancy of the

family residence, or had exercised the use and occupancy of the family residence in fact,

Derrick could have moved for an award of rent for Rashanda' s use of his separate

property. However, LSA- R. S. 9: 374 does not support an award of rent from Derrick to

Rashanda for Derrick's use and occupancy of his separate property. When one spouse

exercises use and occupancy of his separate property, the other spouse has no ownership

in said property, and therefore, has no right to rental reimbursement for same.

Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the September 20, 2023 judgment denying

Rashanda's claim for rental reimbursement for Derrick's use and occupancy of the former

family residence.

Allocation of Assets and Liabilities

Rashanda further contends the trial court erred " in partitioning alleged tax and

other liabilities asserted by [ Derrick] despite there being no tangible or credible evidence

thereof" and in ordering that " all remaining liabilities be split, leaving it to the parties to

determine what assets the court was speaking about and in what amounts[.]" As set forth

15

above, LSA- R. S. 9: 2801 requires that the trial court allocate the community assets and

liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value. LSA- R. S.

9: 2801( A)( 4)( b) and ( c). Further, while LSA- R. S. 9: 2801 does not require the trial court

to include in the judgment the calculations used to determine the final allocation of assets,

liabilities, and reimbursements, it must be clear from the record that the assets were

valued, the liabilities were determined, and the claims were adjudicated. See Hoover,

62 So. 3d at 768.

Here, however, the only community liabilities the trial court allocated by judgment

were those associated with the vehicles and Rashanda' s attorney fees. The only other

reference to community liabilities contained in the September 20, 2023 judgment stated,

there was no evidence of liabilities entered into the record, therefore the liabilities of the

parties shall not be considered pursuant to a status conference held to clarify the instant

ruling." Further, the trial court's determinations of the liabilities are unclear. For example,

the written reasons indicate the trial court denied Derrick's reimbursement claims " for

both the family home and the auto insurance" for lack of supporting evidence, but went

on to include Derrick's auto insurance reimbursement claim in its calculations. Similarly,

the written reasons stated Derrick's reimbursement claims for taxes "*are listed in the

community liabilities but there was no evidence or testimony indicating [ Derrick] paid off
those liabilities." Nevertheless, the tax reimbursement claims are included in the trial

court's calculations, together with the uncontested community liabilities.

As discussed herein, a trial court's final allocation under LSA- R. S. 9: 2801 must

show that the assets were valued, the liabilities were determined, and the claims were

adjudicated. See Hoover, 62 So. 3d at 768. Here, the judgment failed to comply with the

LSA- R. S. 9: 2801 mandate to allocate the community liabilities, and it is unclear from the

record that the liabilities were determined and the claims were adjudicated. In light of

this legal error, and the necessity of vacating the March 8, 2024 judgment awarding
Rashanda an equalizing payment, we remand this matter to the trial court to make an

express determination of the community liabilities and to complete the partition as

required by LSA- R.S. 9: 2801( A).

16

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we render judgment as follows:

Those portions of the September 20, 2023 judgment finding that Rashanda Porter

Kyles is entitled to one half of the increased value of the 7502 Hanks Drive property are

reversed, and those portions of the September 20, 2023 judgment valuing the 7502

Hanks Drive property are vacated.

The September 20, 2023 judgment is amended to provide that Rashanda Porter

Kyles is entitled to reimbursement of one half of the value of the community property at

the time it was used to improve the 7502 Hanks Drive property, in the amount of

112, 500. 00; that the balance owed on the community mortgage on the 7502 Hanks

Drive property is $ 181, 403. 00; that responsibility for the community mortgage is allocated

to Derrick Wayne Kyles; and that the $ 112, 500. 00 reimbursement Derrick Wayne Kyles

owes to Rashanda Porter Kyles shall be offset by her one half of the balance of the

community mortgage at the time of the partition, or $ 90, 701. 50.

That portion of the September 20, 2023 judgment finding the GMC Sierra valued

at $42, 654. 00 and the 2013 Chevy van valued at $ 17, 011. 00 is vacated.

That portion of the March 8, 2024 judgment awarding Rashanda Porter Kyles an

equalizing payment of $ 32, 740. 00 is vacated.

In all other respects, the September 20, 2023 and March 8, 2024 judgments are

affirmed.

This matter is remanded to the trial court for proper determination of the value of

the 2018 GMC Sierra and the 2013 Chevrolet van, determination of the community

liabilities, and partition of the community property in accordance with LSA- R. S. 9: 2801,

including a determination and the timing of an equalizing payment, consistent with the

views expressed herein. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally to Rashanda Porter

Kyles and Derrick Wayne Kyles.

VACATED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART; AFFIRMED
IN PART; AND REMANDED.

I VA