State of Louisiana in the Interest of E.J.W

STATE OF LOUISIANA

FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 CJ 0024

STATE OF LOUISIANA

IN THE INTEREST OF E.J.W.

Judgment Rendered.-. mg1t W

21" Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Tangipahoa
State of Louisiana
Suit No. J-20030

The Honorable Blair Edwards and Mary Devereux, Presiding

Brett K. Duncan Counsel for Appellant
Christen Abels L.G. ( father)
Hammond, Louisiana

Amanda James Counsel for Appellee
Hammond, Louisiana State of Louisiana

Christopher Strickland Counsel for Appellee
Livingston, Louisiana E.J.W. (minor child)

Laura G. Slocum Counsel for Appellee
Livingston, Louisiana State of Louisiana, Department of
Children and Family Services

BEFORE: McCLENDON, C.J., LANIER, AND BALFOUR, JJ.

LANIER, J.

The appellant, L.G., father of the minor child E. J. W., appeals the

adjudication/ disposition judgment of the Twenty -First Judicial District Court,

adjudicating E.J. W.' to be a Child in Need of Care ( CINC), ordering E.J. W. to

remain in custody of the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family

Services ( DCFS), and approved the case plan submitted by DCFS. For the

following reasons, we affirm.2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 7, 2023, the State of Louisiana filed an instanter order

seeking removal of E.J. W. from his parents' custody and placement of provisional

custody with DCFS. DCFS attested through affidavit that on September 4, 2023, a

report of neglect concerning E.J. W. as a drug -affected newborn was received.

Shortly after birth, a drug test was performed on E.J. W., with the result indicating

he was positive for cocaine and amphetamines. The mother, V. W., stated that

E.J. W.' s father is L.G., but that L.G. did not sign the birth certificate since his

sister had power of attorney over him. L.G.' s sister refused to let L.G. sign the

birth certificate until a DNA test proved he was E.J. W.' s father.

According to the affidavit of Jessica Kirkland, DCFS investigator, V.W.

admitted she had used tetrahydrocannabinol ( THC) during the pregnancy, but

denied using cocaine and amphetamines. L.G. stated that he was aware that V.W.

had used THC during the pregnancy, and both admitted that the THC used by

V.W. was laced with other substances. V.W. stated she did not have a crib,

bassinet, bottles, or any other items needed to care for an infant. She further stated

The minor child and his parents are referred to by their initials to preserve their anonymity in
this confidential proceeding. See Uniform Rules— Courts of Appeal, Rule 5- 2.
2 This court has jurisdiction over these proceedings subject to La. Ch.C. art. 330. The article

provides that in CINC proceedings, an appeal may be taken only after judgment of disposition,
and the appeal shall include all errors assigned concerning adjudication and disposition. See
State in Interest ofA.S., 2019- 0248 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 4/ 19), 285 So. 3d 1129, 1134.

2

that L.G. was supposed to buy these items, but that he was not allowed to do so

until his paternity was proven. Both V.W. and L.G. stated that they did not have

any family or friends that could assist in caring for E.J.W., and stated further that

they did not want L.G.' s family involved. On August 31, 2023, V.W.' s parental

rights were terminated as to another child of hers due to neglect, inadequate shelter

and supervision, and drug use.

Based on the above facts, DCFS asserted that there was good cause to

believe E.J. W.' s safety and well-being were endangered while in the care of his

parents, and that it was in E.J. W.' s best interest to be temporarily placed in the

custody and care of the state through DCFS. A minute entry dated September 7,

2023 indicates the district court found probable cause for E. J. W.' s removal,

ordered that E.J. W. be continued in the state' s custody, and ordered a paternity test

for L.G. L.G. took a paternity test on October 3, 2023, and the results revealed that

L.G. is E.J. W.' s biological father. On the same date of that determination, the state

filed a petition to declare E.J. W. as a child in need of care ( CINC petition). On

October 17, the state filed a motion for judicial determination that reunification

efforts are not required as to V.W. only.

On October 30, 2023, an answer hearing to the CINC petition was held,

where L.G. denied the allegations.3 An adjudication hearing was set for November

30, 2023. On November 27, 2023, the state filed a motion and order for a clinic

assessment, individual diagnostic interview, and psychological testing to assess the

mental capacity, intellectual functioning, I.Q., and parental ability of L.G. A

hearing on the motion was set for December 14, 2023. The adjudication hearing

set for November 30, 2023 was continued to January 11, 2024, so that the

aforementioned testing could be administered to L.G.

3 Although L.G.' s paternity had been definitively determined through a DNA test, the judgment
from the answer hearing does not specifically indicate this. Further, L.G. has not denied that he
is E. J. W.' s father.

3

At the adjudication hearing, L.G. confirmed he complied with all testing and

assessments, but that the results were still pending. V.W. stipulated that E.J. W.

was a child in need of care as to herself only, and the district court found

reasonable grounds for E. J. W.' s removal. Adjudication of E.J. W. as to L.G. was

continued to February 22, 2024, and then to March 28, 2024, as L.G.' s test results

were still pending. On that date, as to V.W., the court approved a permanency plan

of adoption.4 Adjudication of E. J.W. as to L.G. was continued to April 18, 2024.

The district court received L.G.' s psychological evaluation on April 11, 2024. In

the evaluation, clinical psychologist Dr. Brandon Romano diagnosed L.G. as

having a mild intellectual disability. Dr. Romano recommended that L.G. receive

professional services to address parenting skills, and estimated that L.G.' s

prognosis would be " poor" if no intervention occurred.

On April 18, 2024, the district court held an adjudication hearing and a

disposition hearing. The district court adjudicated E.J. W. as a child in need of care

as to L.G. and ordered that it was in the best interest of E. J. W. to remain in the

state' s custody through DCFS. The district court signed a written judgment

approving DCFS' s case plan and approving DCFS' s permanent plan for E.J. W.' s

reunification with L.G.' The judgment also ordered DCFS to provide L.G. a

simplified case plan. On April 29, 2024, the district court signed a written

judgment of adjudication and disposition, adjudicating E.J. W. as a child in need of

care as to L.G., and ordering DCFS' s continued custody of E.J. W. as the least

restrictive disposition consistent with the circumstances of the case.

According to the state' s brief, there was a delay in forwarding the

adjudication/ disposition judgment to the signing judge, which is why both

judgments, although rendered on April 18, 2024, were signed eleven days apart.

4 VW' s parental rights as to E.J. W. were subsequently terminated on July 25, 2024.
5 While Judge Blair Edwards is the judge of record in this case, Judge Mary Devereux, ad hoc,
presided over the April 18, 2024 adjudication hearing.

rd

On August 26, 2024, L.G. filed a motion to dismiss the case review and

permanency judgment of April 18, 2024, but the motion is silent as to the

adjudication/disposition judgment of April 29, 2024, since it was not filed into the

record until August 27, 2024.

On September 23, 2024, after receiving notice of the judgment of

adjudication and disposition, L.G. filed a motion for appeal of that judgment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

L.G. submits the following assignments of error:

1. The district court erred in finding good cause to justify granting four
continuances in the adjudication against L.G. resulting in his trial not
commencing until 190 days after the filing of the CINC petition.

2. The district court erred in dismissing the September 19, 2024 motion for
new trial despite counsel for L.G. having not received a notice of
judgment as of the date of filing.

3. The district court erred in admitting substantial and prejudicial hearsay
evidence during L.G.' s adjudication.

4. The district court erred in adjudicating E.J. W. to be in need of care as to
L.G. for dependency despite the lack of verified and factual proof and
admissible evidence.

5. The district court erred in determining DCFS made reasonable efforts
without consideration of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), to
reunify L.G. and the child or finalize the child' s placement with L.G. in
an alternative safe and permanent home, namely the home of the paternal
aunt, E.G.

6. The district court erred in finding that maintaining the child in state
custody was the necessary disposition to ensure the child' s safety and
protection without the consideration of any reasonable and less restrictive
alternatives.

7. The district court erred in approving the case plan and finding DCFS
made reasonable efforts at the adjudication/disposition hearing for L.G.
without any consideration for compliance with the ADA.

8. The district court deprived L.G. of due process with respect to his

fundamental right of family integrity in failing to require DCFS to
employ the least restrictive and most appropriate permanent plan for the
family.

5

DISCUSSION

As to assignment of error number one, L.G. argues the district court did not

have good cause to continue the adjudication hearing four times, resulting in undue

delay and a violation of L.G.' s due process.

Louisiana Children' s Code article 659( A) states, in part, that if a child is

placed in continued custody, the adjudication hearing shall commence within forty-

five days of the filing of the CINC petition. However, Paragraph ( B) allows, upon

a showing of good cause, a continuance of the proceeding in extraordinary

circumstances. The hearing may be continued for up to five additional days, and

the district court in its order must set out the particular facts justifying the

continuance. Paragraph ( C) states that if the hearing has not been timely

commenced, upon motion of the child, the district court shall release the child in

continued custody.

As stated, on October 11, 2023, a CINC petition was filed on behalf of

E. J. W. While the adjudication/disposition hearing was first set for November 30,

2023, the state filed its motion for clinic assessment, psychological testing,

intellectual functioning, I.Q., and parental ability of L.G. three days before the

hearing. The minutes of November 30, 2023 reflect that L.G. was unsure if he had

been served with the motion, and the clerk stated that it would attempt to serve

L.G. once again. The state moved to continue the adjudication/ disposition hearing

to January 11, 2024, which the district court granted. No objection by L.G. to the

motion for continuance is noted in the minutes.

At the January 11, 2024 hearing, the minutes reflect that L.G.' s sister, E.G.,

who is his caretaker, stated that L.G. was unable to take care of himself, much less

an infant. An I.Q. evaluation and parental competency evaluation, which were

requested by the state in its motion, had been conducted, but the results had not yet

been released to DCFS. The district court ordered that E.J. W. remain in the

G

custody of the state, and the adjudication/ disposition hearing was reset for

February 22, 2024. L.G. received notice in court, and no objection by L.G. to the

continuance is noted in the minutes.

On February 22, 2024, the district court was notified that the results of the

parental competency evaluation were still pending, and that L.G. could not make a

stipulation until he received the results of his evaluation. The

adjudication/ disposition hearing was again reset to March 28, 2024, and L.G.

received notice of the hearing in open court. No objection by L.G. to the

continuance is noted in the minutes.

On March 28, 2024, the state filed the parental competency evaluation

results and its case plan into the record.' The minutes of the March 28, 2024

hearing indicate that Summer Martin, a DCFS foster care worker, testified that

DCFS was evaluating E.G.' s home as a possible placement for E.J.W., and that the

goal of L.G.' s case plan was reunification. Results for L.G.' s psychological

evaluation were still pending. The district court ordered the state' s custody of

E.J. W. be maintained, and the hearing was reset for April 18, 2024. L. G. received

notice of that date in open court, and the minutes do not reflect an objection by

L.G. to the continuance.

On April 18, 2024, after reviewing all of L.G.' s psychological evaluation

results, the district court adjudicated E.J. W. as a child in need of care as to L.G.

The court ordered DCFS to simplify the case plan so that L.G. could follow it.

Custody of E.J.W. was ordered to remain with the state, and a review date was set

for September 5, 2024.

We agree with L.G. that the adjudication/ disposition hearing occurred

beyond the required forty-five day period of La. Ch.C. art. 659( A). However,

6 While the minutes indicate a parental competency evaluation was filed, it is not contained in
the record on appeal.

7

Paragraph ( C) states that upon motion of the child, the district court shall release a

child from continued custody and dismiss the CINC petition if the hearing does not

commence within the forty-five day delay. The record contains no such motion

filed on behalf of E.J. W. While the term " extraordinary circumstances" is not

defined by La. Ch.C. art. 659, we find that the circumstances in the instant case

warranted the continuances. The district court was seeking to accommodate L.G.

by continuing the adjudication/disposition hearing until all the evaluation results

had been received, so that the district court could make the most informed decision

possible concerning L.G.' s ability to follow a case plan. Furthermore, L.G. did not

make a contemporaneous objection to any of the continuances of the

adjudication/ disposition hearing. The first assignment of error is without merit.

In the second assignment of error, L.G. argues that his motion for new trial

should not have been dismissed, since he had not received notice of the April 29,

2024 judgment as of the date of filing the motion for new trial. The motion for

new trial was argued in open court on September 19, 2024, and that the district

court denied the motion in open court on October 3, 2024. A written denial of the

motion for new trial was filed on October 18, 2024. The judgment on the motion

for new trial states that the motion was denied. While the denial of a motion for

new trial is an interlocutory judgment that is not immediately appealable, when an

unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment, the appellant is entitled to seek

review of all adverse interlocutory rulings, including the denial of a motion for

new trial, in addition to the review of the final judgment. See Jackson v. Wise,

2017- 1062 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 13/ 18), 249 So. 3d 845, 850, writ denied, 2018- 0785

La. 9/ 21/ 18), 252 So. 3d 914.

The motion for new trial was filed on October 21, 2024. The judgment of

adjudication and disposition was signed on April 29, 2024. Although such a

motion for new trial is facially untimely, the record does not contain proof that

notice of judgment was mailed to L.G., as required by La. C. C. P. art. 1913( A).

Louisiana Code of Civil procedure article 1974 provides " A party may file a

motion for new trial not later than seven days, exclusive of IE. G.al holidays, after

the clerk has mailed or the sheriff has served the notice of judgment as required by

Article 1913." As there is no proof of mailing or service of notice of judgment on

L.G., L.G.' s motion for new trial appears to be timely. See Bell v. Demax

Management Inc., 2002- 0618 ( La. 5/ 24/ 02), 819 So. 2d 293. We therefore must

address the merits of the motion for new trial, and will do so in our discussion of

the fourth assignment of error.

In the third assignment of error, L.G. argues that the district court' s

admission of Dr. Romano' s psychological evaluation of L.G., which was then

partially read aloud by Ms. Kirkland at the adjudication/disposition hearing, was

erroneous as it was hearsay. At the hearing, just before Ms. Kirkland read from the

psychological evaluation, counsel for L.G. objected to the evaluation as hearsay,

since Ms. Kirkland did not author the evaluation. Ms. Kirkland then read one line

from the psychological evaluation, stating it is more likely than not that L.G. was

incapable of providing adequate care for E.J.W. The district court then admitted

the psychological evaluation into evidence over objection by L.G.' s counsel.

The applicability of the rules of evidence during " child in need of care"

proceedings depends on the stage at which the evidence is being submitted. For

example, at the continued custody hearing, " hearsay evidence is admissible." La.

Ch.C. art. 624( G) and ( F). At the disposition hearing ( after the child has been

adjudicated as a child in need of care), the rules of evidence are not applicable. La.

C. E. art. 1101( C)( 3). In fact, at the disposition hearing, under La. Ch.C. art. 680, a

court "
may consider evidence which would not be admissible at the adjudication

hearing," including hearsay. State ex rel. D.I. , 2004- 2105 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

9

2/ 11/ 05), 906 So. 2d 554, 562. However, at the adjudication hearing, the rules of

evidence are fully applicable. Id.

Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of an out-of-

court statement offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein.

La. C. E. art 801( C); State v. Farrar, 374 So. 2d 1204, 1205 ( La. 1979). Hearsay

evidence is inadmissible, except as provided by law. La. C. E. art. 802. In the

instant case, the statement given by Ms. Kirkland constitutes hearsay because the

statement was read from a document authored by Dr. Romano and not Ms.

Kirkland, and was asserted to be true. Dr. Romano was not present at the hearing.

The statement therefore fits the definition of hearsay.

However, despite the introduction of the aforementioned hearsay evidence,

Ms. Kirkland did testify to things of her own knowledge that we find justify an

adjudication of E. J.W. as a child in need of care as to L.G. She was aware that

E. J. W. was a drug -exposed newborn, and that L.G. and V.W. were E. J. W.' s

parents. She stated that DCFS validated an allegation of dependency against L.G.

because he was unable to care for a child due his significant developmental delays.

She testified that both L.G. and members of his family admitted that they did not

believe he was capable of meeting his own needs, let alone an infant' s. L.G. did

not object to any of this testimony.

Ms. Kirkland further testified that to her knowledge, L.G. has never

maintained a household on his own, and that he has always had to rely on a family

member. At the time of the hearing, he was living with V.W. Ms. Kirkland' s

interview with L.G. revealed that he could not answer her questions without

V.W.' s assistance. When she asked L. G. if E. J. W. was born with cocaine and

amphetamines in his system, he stated he was unsure, but that he knew V.W. used

marijuana that may have been laced with other drugs. Ms. Kirkland' s assessment

of L.G.' s and V.W.' s living conditions was that they lived in a small camper that

10

was not adequate for an infant. Ms. Kirkland indicated that there was no safe place

for an infant to sleep, and the few baby items that were present were dirty and

appeared to have been used by others.

Furthermore, the district court received a Court -Appointed Special Advocate

CASA) report filed into the record on March 21, 2024, which also advised that

L.G.' s living conditions were not appropriate for an infant, and that L.G. had tested

positive for cocaine on a drug screen. There was no objection by L.G. as to the

CASA report. The district court also had access to Dr. Romano' s evaluation prior

to the adjudication/disposition hearing. We find the abundant non -hearsay

evidence outweighs any prejudicial effect the hearsay evidence may have had

against L.G., if any. The district court' s adjudication of E.J. W. as a child in need

of care as to L.G. is therefore maintained.

In the fourth assignment of error, L.G. argues that the district court erred in

adjudicating E.J. W. to be a child in need of care as to him, and in his motion for

new trial, argues that the judgment of adjudication and disposition is " contrary to

law and evidence, particularly La. Ch.C. art. 606( A), et seq." In cases involving

the custody of children, the district court is vested with a vast amount of discretion.

The district court is in a better position to evaluate the best interest of a child

because of its superior opportunity to observe the parties and the witnesses who

testified at the trial. It is well settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a

district court' s findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or in the clearest

case of abuse of the district court' s great discretion.

The two- part manifest error test considers: ( 1) whether there is a reasonable

factual basis in the record for the finding; and ( 2) whether the record further

establishes that the finding is not manifestly erroneous. If a reasonable factual

basis exists, an appellate court may set aside a district court' s factual finding only

if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, it determines the district court' s finding

11

was clearly wrong. Moreover, where factual findings are based on detenninations

regarding the credibility of witnesses, the trier of fact' s findings demand great

deference and are virtually never manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Even

though an appellate court may feet that its own evaluations and inferences are more

reasonable than the factfinder' s, reasonable evaluations of credibility and

reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict

exists in the testimony. State oJ' Louisiana in the Interest oj' CS., LK., and. R. K.,

2023- 1. 166 ( La. App. I Cir. 2/ 23/ 24), 2024 WL 744375, * 2 ( unpublished opinion).

As stated above, the district court heard valid evidence of L.G.' s paternity of

E. J. W., his cognitive ability, his relationship with V.W., their living conditions,

and his inability to care for himself, much less an infant. The district court

therefore had a reasonable basis for finding that E.J.W. was a child in need of care

as to L.G., and our review of the record establishes that the district court' s finding

is not clearly wrong. As for the motion for new trial, the standard of review of a

judgment on a motion for new trial is that of abuse of discretion. Wood v.

Humphries, 2011- 2161 ( La. App. I Cir. 10/ 9/ 12), 103 So. 3d 1105, 1116, writ

denied, 2012- 2712 ( La. 2/ 22/ 13), 108 So. 3d 769. Since the motion for new trial

does not present any new law or evidence applicable to the instant case and does

not specifically state how the district court' s adjudication was contrary to law and

evidence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the motion for new trial. The fourth assignment of error is therefore without merit.

Although the fifth assignment of error allE. G.es the district court' s

noncompliance with the ADA in making reasonable efforts to reunify E.J. W. with

L.G., his argument in brief makes no mention of the ADA at all; rather, L.G.

argues that the district court erred in placing E. J.W. with non -relative foster parents

instead of E. G., who he considers to be the best temporary placement for E.J. W.

12

Moreover, L.G. has not raised the purported violations of the ADA with the district

court.

At the time the instanter order was filed, L.G.' s paternity of E.J. W. had not

been established. In fact, E. G., who had power of attorney over L.G., instructed

him not to sign E.J. W.' s birth certificate. A continued custody hearing was set for

September 7, 2023. During that time, E. J.W. had no relative placement options

from neither L.G.' s nor V.W.' s family. At the continued custody hearing, L.G.,

although purported to be E.J.W.' s father by V.W., still had not admitted paternity

nor had yet taken a DNA test to prove paternity. Furthermore, both L. G. and V.W.

stated they did not want L.G.' s family to be involved. With the status of relative

placement unchanged, the district court had no other choice but to place E.J. W. in

the state' s custody.

DCFS placed E.J. W. with non -relative foster parents that were found to be

suitable for the care and security of E.J. W. These foster parents also had

temporary custody of E.J.W.' s half s- ibling. Once L.G. was determined to be

E.J. W.' s father on October I I, 2023, E.J.W. had been with the foster parents for

approximately one month. In a CASA report dated September 4, 2024, received

by the district court without objection, E.G. allegedly stated to the CASA volunteer

that L.G. and V.W. were no longer living together. The CASA volunteer told E. G.

that L.G. had said he had temporarily moved in with E.G. because their camper

needed repairs, and would move back in with V.W. as soon as the repairs were

completed.
E.G. replied that L.G. misspoke, and that he was permanently living

with her. The CASA volunteer then told E. G. that her home would be assessed,

and that all its residents would undergo a background check.

E.G. further stated that she had taken a year sabbatical from her job in order

to support L.G. She also stated that she would be willing to adopt E.J.W. " if it

came down to it." When CASA expressed to DCFS E. G.' s desire to be a possible

13

placement for E.J. W., DCFS stated that E. G. had never before expressed to them

her desire to be a placement or a caregiver for E.J. W. At a permanency hearing on

October 3, 2024, L.G.' s case plan was changed from reunification to adoption.'

E. G., who was present at the hearing, spoke to the district court on her own behalf.

The district court then ordered a home study of E.G.' s residence be completed by

DCFS, and DCFS stated that E. G. and L.G. could visit with E.J. W. together. This

is the last court appearance contained in the record.

The record indicates that after L.G. filed his appeal, the district court took

E. G. under consideration as a possible relative placement for E.J. W. Although the

result of the home study of E.G.' s residence is not contained in the record, it is

clear that the district court has in fact taken E.G. under consideration as a possible

foster placement for E.J. W., rendering the fifth assignment of error moot. The

sixth assignment of error, which complains that the district court erred in

maintaining the state' s custody without considering less restrictive placement with

relatives, is also moot for the same reasons.

The seventh assignment of error affirmatively makes the argument that

DCFS failed to abide by the ADA in formulating a case plan, and the district court

erred in approving that case plan. Essentially, L.G. argues that DCFS used his

intellectual disability as the basis for removing E.J. W. from his custody and

placing E.J. W. with non -relatives, rather than members of his own family. We

disagree.

Again, L.G. and his family were not initially a possible placement for E.J. W.

for the reasons stated above. DCFS removed E. J.W. from V.W.' s custody because

he was a drug -affected infant, and V.W. lost the parental rights to her other child

for the same reason. L.G. lived with V.W., was aware of her drug use, and tested

7 The instant appeal predates this change in L.G.' s case plan, and thus he has not raised any
arguments against this action by the district court.

14

positive for cocaine himself The camper in which they lived was found to be

inadequately furnished for the caring of an infant. All of these reasons, which

were discovered through DGFS' s investigations and submitted to the district court,

have nothing to do with L.G.' s intellectual disability.

Moreover, the psychological evaluation of Dr. Romano recommended that

L.G. receive professional services to address his parenting skills, that information

should be presented to him in a simplified manner, and that he be referred to

Louisiana Rehabilitation Services for vocational assistance. DCFS amended its

case plan for L.G. to add the services recommended by Dr. Romano, and reviewed

the case plan with L. G. in a simplified manner, with E.G. present. It was explained

to L.G. that, pursuant to the ADA, he had one year to work his case plan. The

district court approved all case plans submitted by DCFS.

Based on the findings of DCFS, we find the recommendations made to the

district court in the implementation of a case plan for L.G. to be reasonable and not

in violation of the ADA. See State in the Interest ofN.B., 2022- 0596 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 12/ 16/ 22), 2022 WL 17729229, * 5- 6 ( unpublished opinion), writ denied,

2023- 00058 ( La. 2/ 24/ 23), 356 So. 3d 339. The seventh assignment of error is

without merit.

In the eighth and final assignment of error, L.G. argues that he was deprived

of due process with respect to his right to family integrity when the district court

failed to employ the least restrictive case plan for E.3. W. The integrity of the

family unit has found protection in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in the plinth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution. A parent is entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his

children are taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing, the state denies the

parent his right of due process. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649, 92 S. Ct.

1208, 1211 ( 1972); see also Kinnett v. Kinnett, 2023- 00060 ( La. 6/ 27/ 23), 366

15

So. 3d 25, 29, cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 493, 217 L.Ed.2d 258 ( 2023). We disagree

that L.G.' s due process rights were violated. Throughout the course of the instant

case, L.G. has not been prohibited from visitation with E. J.W., and his due process

right of maintaining a relationship with E.J. W. has been upheld. See Foret v.

Serrano, 2023- 1034 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 30/24), 395 So. 3d 876, 882- 833.

L.G. has been present at the hearings in the instant matter since the 72 -hour

CINC continued custody hearing on July 7, 2023, even though his paternity for

E. J. W. had not yet been determined. At the adjudication/ disposition hearing, L.G.

was afforded the opportunity to call witnesses and introduce evidence, although on

the hearing date of April 18, 2024, L.G. chose not to testify on his own behalf, did

not call any witnesses, and did not submit evidence. The DCFS case plan dated

October 10, 2023, which was signed by L.G., granted him weekly supervised

visitation with E.J. W. for one hour. Another DCFS report dated March 20, 2024

indicated that L.G.' s visitation with E.J. W. was ongoing and regular. In the case

plan dated February 27, 2024, which L.G. signed, the previous weekly visitation

schedule was maintained. At the time the instant appeal was filed, the case plan

goal for E. J. W. was reunification with L.G.

We find no evidence in the record that L.G. was deprived of his due process

right to family integrity. L.G. was afforded the opportunity to be present at every

court hearing, he was allowed visitation with E.J. W., and the original goal of

E.J. W.' s case plan was reunification with L.G. The eighth assignment of error is

therefore without merit.

DECREE

The adjudication/disposition judgment of the Twenty -First Judicial District

Court, adjudicating E.J.W. to be a child in need of care as to the appellant, L.G.,

ordering E.J.W. to remain in the custody of the State of Louisiana, Department of

Children and Family Services, and approving the case plan of reunification

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submitted by the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services, is

affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant.

AFFIRMED.

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