BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Nicole Stockstill and Brandon Stockstill
BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Nicole Stockstill and Brandon Stockstill, No. 2025 CW 0869 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT
BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, NO. 2025 CW 0869
L.P.
VERSUS PAGE 1 OF 2
NICOLE STOCKSTILL AND MARCH 9, 2026
BRANDON STOCKSTILL
In Re: Bank of America, N.A., Successor by merger to BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing, LP, applying for supervisory writs, 23rd
Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension, No. 99663.
BEFORE : McCLENDON, C.d0., GREENE AND STROMBERG, JJ.
WRIT GRANTED. The portions of the trial court’s April 15,
2025 judgment, which denied the motion for summary judgment filed
by defendant~in-reconvention, Bank of America, N.A., on the Truth-
in-Lending Act (“TILA”) and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”) claims raised by plaintiffs-in-reconvention, Nicole
Stockstill and Brandon Stockstill, are reversed.
The Consumer Credit Protection Act, commonly known as the
Truth-in-Lending Act, provides disclosure requirements for lenders
to borrowers, to ensure that certain information will be clearly
and conspicuously brought to the borrower’s attention and not
obscured by other information. Doggett v. Ritter Fin. Co. of
Louisa, 384 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd in part, rev’d in
part sub nom., Doggett v. Ritter Fin. Co. of Louisa, 528 F.2d 860
(4th Cir. 1975). TILA provides that a consumer’s rights are subject
to a one-year limitation (prescriptive) period which begins to run
“from the date of the occurrence of the violation.” 15 U.S.C.A. §
1640(e). The United States Fifth Circuit has interpreted
“occurrence of the violation” to mean consummation; thus, a TILA
violation occurs when the transaction is consummated. Moor v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1986). Consummation is
the time at which a contractual relationship is created by the
parties, and state law governs this determination. Clark v. Troy
& Nichols, Inc., 864 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1989).
The Stockstills’ reconventional demand pled the promissory note
was signed on November 3, 2006. The reconventional demand was filed
on May 20, 2011, and pled the TILA claim for the first time.
Further, the allegedly improper private mortgage insurance charges
were added to the escrow account on February 25, 2010, more than
one year before the reconventional demand raising the TILA claims
was filed. Thus, we find the Stockstills’ TILA claims are time-
barred on their face, and the Stockstills have provided no evidence
or argument to establish any exception to the one-year prescriptive
period. Moreover, to the extent the Stockstills asserted a TILA
claim for the imposition of such charges, the allegedly improper
private mortgage insurance charges do not fall within the purview
of TILA’s disclosure requirements. Plaintiffs’ TILA claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2025 CW 0869
PAGE 2 OF 2
The purpose of the FDCPA is to “eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote
consistent State action to protect consumers against debt
collection abuses.” 15 U.S.c. § 1692(e). 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)
defines a “debt collector” as “any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business, the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly
or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another.” However, the term “debt collector” does not include “any
person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ..
(ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person [or] (iii)
concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained
by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (F). Courts have held that a
mortgagee’s successor through merger was not a “debt collector”
within meaning of the FDCPA because the mortgagee’s successor stood
in the mortgagee’s shoes as creditor. See Lam v. PNC Mortg., 130
F.Supp.3d 429 (D. Mass. 2015); Fenello v. Bank of America, N.A.,
926 F.Supp.2d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2/15/13), 2013 WL 5965635 (N.D. Ga.
11/8/13), affirmed, 577 Fed.Appx. 899 (llth Cir. 8/12/14).
Amy Bernal, Vice President of Bank of America, N.A., executed
an affidavit attesting that Bank of America, N.A. acquired BAC
Home Loans Servicing, L.P. through merger on July 1, 2011. No
evidence was admitted showing that any entity other than Bank of
America, N.A owned the loan at the time Bank of America, N.A began
servicing the loan. Thus, we find Bank of America, N.A stepped
into the shoes of BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. as servicer of
the loan when Bank of America, N.A. acquired BAC Home Loans
Servicing, L.P. through merger and Bank of America, N.A is not a
“debt collector” within meaning of the FDCPA. Plaintiffs’ FDCPA
claims are dismissed with prejudice.
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OURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT
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