State Of Louisiana v. LaKendall T. Brown

S/ V
N 2026
1udgment Rendered:

1. 0 0! s i i
1

Kevin V. Boshea Attorney for Defendant -Appellant
Metairie, Louisiana LaKendall Travon Brown

J. Collin Sims Attorneys for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Butch Wilson
Assistant District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
and

Jason Cuccia
Franklinton, Louisiana
Assistant District Attorney

BEFORE: MCCLEND , C. 3., GREENE, and SiI'ROMBERG, 33.
ger 7

GREENE, I

A grand jury indicted the defendant, LaKendall T. Brown', with second degree murder

count one), in violation of La. R. S. 14: 30. 1; obstruction of justice by tampering with

evidence ( count two), in violation of La. R. S. 14: 130. 1( A)( 1) and ( B)( 1); and carrying a

firearm or dangerous weapon on school property and its use in the commission of a crime

of violence ( count three), in violation of La. R. S. 14: 95. 2( A) and ( 13)( 2). The defendant pled

not guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found him guilty of the

responsive verdict of manslaughter, in violation of La. R. S. 14: 31, on count one and guilty

as charged on counts two and three. The defendant filed a motion for new trial and a

motion for post -verdict judgment of acquittal, both of which the trial court denied.

The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty years imprisonment at hard labor

without the benefit of parole or suspension of sentence on count one'; twenty years

imprisonment at hard labor on count two, to run concurrent with count one; and five years

imprisonment at hard labor on count three, to run consecutive to counts one and two. The

trial court also imposed a $ 50, 000 fine on count two. The defendant filed a motion to

reconsider sentence in open court, which the trial court later denied.

The defendant now appeals, arguing his convictions were contrary to law and

evidence, and the trial court erred in denying his motions for new trial, post -verdict judgment

of acquittal, and to reconsider sentence. After review, we affirm the defendant's convictions;

affirm the sentence on count one, as amended; affirm in part and vacate in part the sentence

on count two; affirm the sentence on count three; and remand to the trial court for a hearing

in compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 875. 1.

FACTS

On October 14, 2022, the Bogalusa Police Department ( BPD) responded to a shooting

at the Bogalusa High School ( BHS) homecoming football game. When BPD officers arrived

at the alleyway where the shooting had just occurred, they encountered Jerome Wilson,

The record reflects a discrepancy in the spelling of the defendant's name. We spell the defendant's name
as it is spelled in the indictment.

2 There is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript as to the sentence on count one. The
minutes indicate the trial court restricted the defendant' s probation and suspension of sentence; however, the
sentencing transcript indicates the trial court restricted his parole and suspension of sentence. We address
this discrepancy in the patent error section.
2

who was holding a young child. Officers told Mr. Wilson to take cover - he responded that

everything was okay and " It's over now." BPD Detective Casey Hidalgo found Jerry Smith

hereinafter, J. S.) lying on the ground at the far end of the alleyway with a gun directly
beside him. 3 J. S. was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Officers canvassed the alleyway and found three sets of shell casings, leading them to

conclude that three guns were used in the shooting - two sets of shell casings were found

on opposite sides of the alleyway and a third set was found on the far end of the alleyway

near where J. S. was found. Officers also reviewed video footage from cameras mounted

on the BHS Fieldhouse and identified several individuals who were in the alleyway at the

time of the shooting. Those individuals included Mr. Wilson, his child, Sharde Laurent ( the

mother of the child), Jordan Smith, and the defendant.

Days after the shooting, the defendant voluntarily turned himself in to police after

learning there was a warrant for his arrest. Several months later, BPD officers executed a

search warrant for an unrelated crime at Jordan Smith' s residence and recovered a

disassembled 9mm Glock handgun. That handgun was sent to the crime lab for testing and

it ballistically matched one set of shell casings recovered from the alleyway where J. S. was
shot. At the time of the defendant's trial, Mr. Smith was still considered a suspect in the

case, but officers had not yet sought an arrest warrant for him. An arrest warrant was also

issued for Mr. Wilson, but the record does not show the status of that warrant.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ONE, TWO, AND THREE

In these combined assignments of error, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence .4 He argues he did not kill J. S., and the evidence did not eliminate the

likelihood that either Mr. Wilson or Mr. Smith killed J. S. He also argues a rational trier of

3 Three persons referenced in this opinion have the surname " Smith." To avoid confusion, we reference Jerry
Smith, the victim, as J. S.

4 In these assignments of error, the defendant argues the verdict of manslaughter is contrary to the law and
the evidence, and the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial, as well as his motion for post -verdict
judgment of acquittal, both of which were premised upon the insufficiency of evidence. A challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence is properly raised by a motion for post -verdict judgment of acquittal, not a motion
for new trial. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 821. A motion for new trial presents only the issue of the weight of the
evidence and is examined under the so- called thirteenth juror standard, under which the trial judge reweighs
the evidence. State v. Francis, 2019- 1392 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 17/ 20), 318 So. 3d 862, 867, n. 6. Appellate

courts may review the grant or denial of a motion for new trial only for errors of law. See La. C.Cr. P. art. 858.
Accordingly, the only issue reviewable in the defendant's first three assignments of error is the constitutional
issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, which he raised in his motion for post -verdict judgment of acquittal.
See State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 3/ 23), 378 So. 3d 766, 770, n. 3, writ denied, 2024- 00027
La. 5/ 21/ 24), 385 So. 3d 242; Francis, 318 So. 3d at 867, n. 6.

3

fact would have concluded the shooters were Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith. 5 Further, he

challenges the credibility of the State' s only eyewitness, Ms. Laurent, who testified that she

saw the defendant with a gun in the alleyway after the shooting. Specifically, the defendant

argues the jury was irrational in accepting Ms. Laurent's testimony.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process.

See U. S. Const. amend. XIV, La. Const. art. 1, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of

the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the

essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. C. CrR art. 821( 8); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307,

319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 ( 1979); State v. Coleman, 2021- 0870 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 4/ 8/ 22), 342 So. 3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022- 00759 ( La. 11/ 21/ 23), 373 So. 3d 460.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing

court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts

established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial

evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Currie, 2020-

0467 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 22/ 21), 321 So. 3d 978, 982.

When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R. S. 15: 438 provides that the factfinder

must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis

of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty

unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Fair, 2024-

0759 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 11/ 25), 417 So. 3d 1166, 1174, writ denied, 2025- 00933 ( La.

1/ 21/ 26), 424 So. 3d 1092, cert denied, S. Ct. , 2026 WL 1855066 ( 2026).

Importantly, the due process standard set forth in Jackson does not require the

reviewing court to determine whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes the

5 At trial, the defendant advanced a dual theory defense challenging his identification and asserting that he
acted in self-defense. The jury was instructed on self-defense and the aggressor doctrine. The defendant
abandoned the self-defense theory on appeal.
4

evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Stewart, 2025- 01032 ( La.

6/ 29/ 26), _ So3d , —, 2026 WL 1861893, * 3. Rather, the reviewing court must

accord much discretion to the fact finder in its determinations of the evidence and witness

credibility; the reviewing court may impinge on this discretion only to the extent necessary

to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. See Id. The Jackson

standard does not permit a reviewing court to substitute its appreciation of the facts for that

of the trier of fact, to assess witness credibility, or to reweigh the evidence. Id. We now

review the evidence presented at trial.

Det. Hidalgo was working security detail for the BHS football game on the night of

the shooting. At trial, Det. Hidalgo testified that she was standing in the BHS football

stadium near the Fieldhouse when she heard multiple gunshots coming from the alleyway.

She initially heard two shots and then heard several more shots being fired from what she
6
thought was more than one gun. The shooting lasted about ten seconds. During the

gunfire, Det. Hildago looked under a fence abutting the alleyway and saw the legs and feet

of a person wearing light-colored jeans and bright white sneakers in the alleyway. After the

shooting, that person ran up the alleyway toward Avenue B. Det. Hidalgo and two other

officers proceeded into the alleyway to investigate the shooting. They encountered a man

holding a young child and told him to take cover. The man, later identified as Mr. Wilson,

responded, " It's okay. It's over now."

Det. Hidalgo then continued to the far end of the alleyway and found I.S. lying on

the ground. She turned him over to administer CPR and noticed a gun, later identified as a

Ruger 57 pistol, directly beside hi M. 7 After J. S. was transported to the hospital, Det. Hidalgo

recovered two shell casings near where his body was found. It was later determined that

those shell casings came from the Ruger 57 pistol.

When she returned up the alleyway, Det. Hidalgo discovered and collected two

separate clusters of 9mm shell casings. She found one cluster of nine shell casings between

6 During Det. Hidalgo' s testimony, the State played a TikTok video for the jury which was apparently filmed
by a spectator at the football game. The barrage of gunfire, which occurred while the football game was being
played, can be heard on the video. Det. Hidalgo confirmed that the video accurately reflected the shots as
she heard them.

7 The State introduced the Ruger 57 pistol at trial as State' s exhibit 40.

5

two vehicles near the fence where she had seen the person wearing light-colored jeans and

bright white sneakers. She found a second cluster of eight shell casings across the alleyway

from there and next to a gate behind an AT&T building. As she was testifying, Det. Hidalgo

marked an aerial photograph of the scene with marks showing where she was initially

standing before the shooting, where she found I.S. in the alleyway, and the two alleyway

areas from where she collected the spent shell casings. The State introduced the aerial

photograph into evidence. Det. Hidalgo also testified J. S. was a suspect in two unrelated

shootings, one of which occurred in Bogalusa days before the instant shooting.

BPD Detective Justin Blackwell also participated in the investigation of the shooting.

At trial, Det. Blackwell reviewed several segments from video footage recovered from the

BHS fieldhouse cameras as those videos were published to the jury. He explained the video

showed what happened at one end of the alleyway ( near Avenue B) before and after the

shooting, but there was no footage of the actual shooting, which occurred further down the

alleyway. According to Det. Blackwell, the first video showed a close- up view of several

individuals walking down a sidewalk prior to the shooting: I.S. walking alone; and then,

minutes later, a group consisting of Ms. Laurent carrying her child; followed by Mr. Wilson

and Mr. Smith walking side by side; and then the defendant and an unidentified male walking

side by side. We note that, in this video, the defendant is wearing light-colored jeans and

is the only person in the group wearing solid white sneakers.

Another video shows a remote view of the alleyway after the shooting. The video

shows Mr. Wilson carrying his child, running up the alleyway, and then stopping at its

intersection with Avenue B; the defendant and Mr. Smith running in that same direction, on

opposite sides of the alleyway; the three men apparently conversing; the defendant

approaching and then ducking down between two vehicles, standing again, and walking

away down Avenue B; Mr. Smith turning the same way as the defendant on Avenue B and

leaving the area; Ms. Laurent walking up the alleyway to meet Mr. Wilson and their child;

and police officers approaching, who speak to the couple and then continue down the

alleyway to where J. S. was found. Minutes later, another video shows several unidentified

males approaching and one of them ducking down between the same vehicles where

defendant had ducked down. However, Det. Blackwell admitted that he had no physical

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evidence establishing " what was placed under the truck" and that no gun was ever found

connecting the defendant to the shooting.

Det. Blackwell also testified that both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith were interviewed

about the shooting; however, their accounts were both inconsistent with the physical

evidence and the video footage. Det. Blackwell confirmed that a relative of Mr. Wilson was

injured in a Bogalusa shooting that occurred days earlier and I.S. was a suspect in that

Sharde Laurent, a State witness, testified at trial that she attended the BHS football

game with Mr. Wilson and their two-year-old child. She stated that she parked her car and,

before getting out, she saw Mr. Wilson put a gun in the car's glove compartment. According

to Ms. Laurent, she and the child separated from Mr. Wilson once inside the stadium and

they did not meet up again until after the game. Then, as the couple and their child left the

stadium, Mr. Wilson began talking to friends, including the defendant. After about ten to

fifteen minutes, Mr. Wilson, the defendant, and another man Ms. Laurent did not know

presumably, Jordan Smith) walked with her and the child toward her car, and, at some

point, Mr. Wilson picked up the child. As the group walked down the alleyway, Ms. Laurent

saw " a guy pop out" from behind a car and point a gun in their direction. Ms. Laurent

testified that she then hid behind a car while Mr. Wilson ran up the alleyway with their child.

She then heard several gunshots. Immediately after the shooting, Ms. Laurent testified that

she saw the defendant with a gun in his hand, though she did not know if he fired it. Ms.

Laurent did not see what the defendant did with that gun and did not see him duck down

between vehicles. She also did not see what happened to the other man with their group

presumably Jordan Smith). She indicated that her attention was focused on her child.

Ms. Laurent also testified that, after the shooting, police officers met with her three

times, but she did not give a statement until the third time. The first time, she was with

Mr. Wilson when the police interviewed him, and she admitted that she did not correct

certain false statements he made to the officers. She met with police again the next day

but gave no statement. According to Ms. Laurent, at the third meeting ( five days after the

shooting), an officer indicated he would take safety measures for her if she was forthcoming

and that she then felt comfortable enough to talk to him about the shooting. It was then

7

that she claimed she told the officer what she told the jury -- that she saw the " guy pop

out" from behind a car pointing a gun ( later identified as J. S.) and that, after the shooting,

she also saw the defendant with a gun, but that she did not see either J. S. or the defendant

actually shoot a gun. On re -direct examination, Ms. Laurent admitted that she actually had

told the officer that she saw both I.S. and the defendant fire the guns. She did not know

who fired the first shot or the last shot.

On cross examination, Ms. Laurent testified she did not know what kind of gun Mr.

Wilson had with him in her car, but that it "looked something like" the gun defense counsel

was showing her, the Ruger 57 pistol found near I.S.' s body.8 Ms. Laurent stated she had
Ms. Laurent
no relationship with the defendant and did not know how Mr. Wilson knew him.
did not notice whether the defendant or the other person walking with them ( presumably

Jordan Smith) had a gun when the group was walking down the alleyway before the

shooting. Further, Ms. Laurent testified she did not know whether the defendant brought

the gun with him or if he picked it up off the ground later. Ms. Laurent maintained that,

after the shooting, she saw the defendant running with a gun. She also clarified that she

only saw two guns.

Stanley Nathaniel testified as a defense witness at trial and stated that he attended

the BHS football game on the night of the shooting. He left the game early and encountered

the defendant outside the stadium. Mr. Nathaniel testified that the defendant greeted him

and the two talked as they headed toward Mr. Nathaniel' s vehicle. When asked about the

defendant's demeanor, Mr. Nathaniel stated he seemed " normal and cheerful." After the

two parted, Mr. Nathaniel heard no noise that caught his attention before he got to his car,

while he was inside his parked car, or as he drove off in his car. On cross examination, Mr.

Nathaniel was asked whether he noticed anything suggesting the defendant had a gun and

he stated, " I mean, we hugged, and I didn' t feel anything or see anything, no." Mr.

Nathaniel later clarified that he could not definitively say whether the defendant had a gun

that night.

Latania Magee, I.S.' s mother, testified that her son was sixteen years old when he

died. Ms. Magee did not know J. S. was a suspect in two unrelated shootings. According to

8 In his brief, the defendant represents that defense counsel showed Ms. Laurent a Glock handgun.
8

Ms. Magee, I.S. had been living in a state-run group home for approximately four or five

months. About one month before the shooting, I.S. ran away from the group home and

she had not seen him since.

Dr. Michael B. Defatta, accepted as an expert in forensic pathology, testified

9
regarding the autopsy performed on I.S. Dr. Defatta testified that I.S. suffered three

gunshot wounds. The first shot grazed his left upper back and then entered his left arm,

where it lodged. A second shot entered the left side of J. S.' s back, hitting the lower portion

of his left lung and the top portion of his heart before impacting his sternum. The second

shot was fatal. A third shot entered I.S.' s left thigh and the bullet lodged in muscle tissue.

Dr. Defatta confirmed the trajectory of the bullets was from left to right and the bullets were

fired from a distance, as " there [ was] no stippling, no soot, [ or] searing [ on I.S.' s body]."

The projectiles recovered from I.S.' s body were sent to the crime lab for testing.

BPD Sergeant Tyler Lindsey also testified at trial. He stated that, in May 2023 ( about

seven months after the instant shooting), BPD arrested Mr. Smith for an unrelated attempted

shooting. During that investigation, BPD executed a search warrant at Mr. Smith' s

residence, where they recovered a disassembled Glock handgun." The gun was sent to the

crime lab for testing.

St. Tammany Parish Deputy Sheriff Jene' Rauch, accepted as an expert in firearms

and toolmarker examination, testified that her main duties were to test -fire weapons

submitted to the lab to make sure they were operable and to examine casings to determine

if they were fired from a particular weapon. Dep. Rauch analyzed the nineteen shell casings

recovered from the scene, two guns submitted to the lab, and the three projectiles recovered

from I.S.' s body. She ultimately concluded that two of the casings were fired from the gun

collected from where I.S. was found, the Ruger 57 pistol; the cluster of eight 9mm shell

casings recovered in the alleyway near the AT&T building were fired from the newer model

Glock handgun recovered from Mr. Smith' s residence; and the cluster of nine 9mm casings

found near the alleyway fence ( where Det. Hidalgo had seen the person wearing light-

colored jeans and bright white sneakers) were all fired from another newer model Glock

9 Dr. Christopher Tape, a forensic pathologist, actually performed the autopsy. No objections were made to
Dr. Defatta testifying in lieu of Dr. Tape.

10 The State introduced the Glock handgun at trial as State exhibit 43.
9

handgun. There was no gun to match the cluster of nine casings, but Dep. Rauch was

certain they were fired from the same gun. Finally, she testified the projectiles recovered

from I.S.' s body were all of the same class, were consistent with newer model Glocks, and

were all fired from the same gun, but she could not determine from which gun they were

fired. Det. Rauch opined that, if she had a third gun to compare, she might have been able

to make that determination.

Rosalyn Smith, called at trial as a defense witness, testified that she was a close

friend of the defendant's mother. Ms. Smith saw the defendant at the football game on two

separate occasions; he was wearing a black sweater and dark blue jeans, but she could not

recall if he had on " bright white tennis shoes." She testified she hugged the defendant and

did not feel a gun or anything unusual on him. Ms. Smith claimed she knew the defendant

did not have a gun and that Mr. Smith did, though she admitted she was not present during

the shooting and did not see either of the men with a gun.

Manslaughter Conviction

The grand jury indicted the defendant with second degree murder ( count one);

however, the jury convicted him of the responsive verdict of manslaughter. Manslaughter

is a legislatively approved responsive verdict to a charge of second degree murder. See La.

C. Cr. P. art. 814( A)( 3).

Manslaughter is defined as a homicide which would be murder under either La. R. S.

14: 30 ( first degree murder) or La. R. S. 14: 30. 1 ( second degree murder), but the offense is

committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient

to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. La. R. S. 14: 31( A)( 1).

Alternatively, manslaughter can also be pertinently defined as a homicide committed without

any intent to cause death or great bodily harm, when the offender is engaged in the

perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in La. R. S. 14: 30 or

14: 30. 1. La. R. S. 14: 31( A)( 2)( a). This second type of manslaughter is known as felony

manslaughter. See State v. 66odley, 2001- 0077 ( La. 6/ 21/ 02), 820 So. 2d 478, 483; State

v. Myers, 1999- 1849 ( La. 4/ 11/ 00), 760 So. 2d 310, 315.

The trial court instructed the jury of both manslaughter definitions, setting forth the

requisite elements as follows:

we]

I] n order to convict the defendant of manslaughter, you must find:

One, that the defendant killed [ J. S.]; and

Two, that the defendant had a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm;
and

Three, that the killing was committed in sudden heat – in sudden passion or
heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an
average person of his self-control and cool reflection.

Or that the defendant killed [ I.S.] whether or not he had an intent to kill and
that the killing --

Two, that the killing took place while the defendant was engaged in the
commission or attempted commission of ... illegal use of a weapon or
aggravated assault.

Illegal use of a weapon is the intentional or criminally negligent discharging of any

firearm, where it is foreseeable that it may result in death or great bodily harm to a human

being. La. R. S. 14: 94( A). Illegal use of a weapon is a felony and will support a conviction

for felony manslaughter under La. R. S. 14: 31( A)( 2)( a). See State v. Brown, 513 So. 2d 425,

428 ( La. App. 2 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 516 So. 2d 367 ( La. 1988).

The State bears the burden of proving the elements of the offense, along with the

burden of proving the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. State v. Howard, 2023- 1060

La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 3/ 24), 392 So. 3d 365, 371, writ denied, 2024- 00812 ( La. 2/ 19/ 25), 400

So. 3d 923. When, as in this case, the key issue is the defendant' s identity as the perpetrator

of the crime, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate

any reasonable probability of misidentification to carry its burden of proof. State v. Johnson,

99- 2114 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 18/ 00), 800 So. 2d 886, 888, writ denied, 2001- 0197 ( La.

12/ 7/ 01), 802 So. 2d 641. Positive identification by even one witness may be sufficient to

support a conviction. State v. Jones, 2018- 0085 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 5/ 18), 2018 WL

5785450, * 2, writ denied, 2018- 1993 ( La. 4/ 22/ 19), 268 So. 3d 294.

Under Louisiana law, a defendant whose involvement in a murder is demonstrated

by the evidence can be convicted of manslaughter, regardless of whether he directly

committed the act, as all persons involved in the commission of a crime are treated as

principals. See Stewart, — So. 3d at ; 2026 WL 1861893 at * 5. Louisiana Revised

Statutes 14: 24 provides that "[ a] ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether

present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid

11

and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit

the crime, are principals."

The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, any witness's testimony.

Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which

depends upon a determination of witness credibility, the matter is one of the weight of the

evidence, not its sufficiency. Further, the fact that the record contains evidence that

conflicts with the testimony accepted by the trier of fact does not render the accepted

evidence insufficient. State v. Quinn, 479 So. 2d 592, 596 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1985). An

appellate court is constitutionally precluded from acting as a " thirteenth juror" in assessing

what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. See State v. Mitchell, 1999- 3342 ( La.

10/ 17/ 00), 772 So. 2d 78, 83. As such, the trier of fact's determination of the weight given

to evidence is not subject to appellate review, and we will not reweigh the evidence to

overturn a trier of fact's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97- 2261 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

9/ 25/ 98), 721 So. 2d 929, 932.

Based on the record, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, we conclude there was sufficient evidence from which the jury found the defendant

was guilty of felony manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant does not

dispute that he was in the alleyway at the time of the shooting. As shots were being fired,

Det. Hidalgo saw a person wearing light-colored jeans and bright white sneakers in the

alleyway. When the gunfire stopped, Det. Hidalgo saw that person run up the alleyway

toward Avenue B. She later found spent shell casings near the fence where she saw the

person wearing light-colored jeans and bright white sneakers. Further, Ms. Laurent testified

that, immediately after the shooting, she saw the defendant running with a gun in his hand

in the alleyway. Although Ms. Laurent may have had credibility issues as a witness, and

although no gun was ever found connecting the defendant to the shooting, the jury was

fully informed of Ms. Laurent's apparent lack of credibility and that she was the only

eyewitness who saw the defendant with a gun. As the trier of fact, the jury was free to

accept her testimony as true, assess its weight, and find it to be sufficient factual proof that

the defendant possessed and shot a gun. See Jones, 2018 WL 5785450 at * 6. In this case,

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the weight given to Ms. Laurent's testimony is not subject to appellate review. See Mitchell,

772 So. 2d at 83; Taylor, 721 So. 2d at 932.

Additionally, the post -shooting video evidence supports Det. Hidalgo' s testimony and

Ms. Laurent's testimony — that is, the video shows the defendant, wearing light-colored

jeans and white sneakers, running up the alleyway, and then ducking between two vehicles,

as though hiding something, and then leaving the scene. In fact, during jury deliberations,

the jury asked to watch the post -shooting video twice. Although one video shows four

persons leaving the alleyway ( Mr. Wilson, Mr. Smith, the defendant, and Ms. Laurent) after

the shooting, the jury carefully considered and clearly rejected the defendant's hypothesis

of innocence, to wit: that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith were the shooters.

In felony manslaughter, the mens rea of the underlying felony provides the malice

necessary to transform an unintended homicide into a murder. See State v. Johnson, 2015-

0513 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 185 So. 3d 822, 827, writ denied, 2016- 0174 ( La. 2/ 3/ 17),

215 So. 3d 688. Thus, under La. R. S. 14: 31( A)( 2)( a), specific intent to kill or inflict great

bodily harm is not an essential element of felony manslaughter. See Id. The testimony and

video evidence provide sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably found

that the defendant illegally discharged a gun, where it was foreseeable that such would

result in death or great bodily harm to a human being. See La. R. S. 14: 94( A). Thus,

because a homicide was committed when the defendant was engaged in the perpetration

of the illegal use of a weapon, a felony, we find the evidence presented by the State was

sufficient to support a conviction of felony manslaughter.

Obstruction of Justice Conviction

With respect to the obstruction of justice conviction, the defendant argues the State

failed to prove he possessed a gun or that he removed a gun from the crime scene.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14: 130. 1, as it read at the time of the offense,"

pertinently provided:

A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when committed
with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual
or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding as described, in this
Section:

11 We use the version of the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. See State v.
Sugasti, 2001- 3407 ( La. 6/ 21/ 02), 820 So. 2d 518, 520- 21.

13

1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results
of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove
relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding. Tampering with evidence
shall include the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any
object or substance either:

a) At the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good
reason to believe will be the subject of any investigation by state, local, or
United States law enforcement officers; or

b) At the location of storage, transfer, or place of review of any such evidence.

The trial court instructed the jurors they could find the defendant guilty of obstruction

of justice by tampering with evidence if they found:

One, the defendant knew or had good reason to believe that his act
may affect an actual, potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding;
and

Two, that the defendant tampered with evidence by hiding a firearm
under a truck near Bogalusa High School, or removing a firearm from the
premises; and

Three, that the defendant had the specific intent to distort the results
of an actual, potential, present, past, or future criminal proceeding or

investigation; and

Four, that the evidence was reasonably likely to be relevant to an
actual, potential present, past, or future criminal investigation or proceeding.

In State v. Jones, 2007- 1052 ( La. 6/ 3/ 08), 983 So. 2d 95, 101, the Louisiana Supreme

Court set forth four elements the State must prove to establish obstruction of justice. First,

the obstruction must be committed with the knowledge that the act has, reasonably may,

or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding. La. R. S.

14: 130. l(A). Second, the perpetrator must tamper with evidence with the specific intent of

distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding that may prove relevant to

such. La. R. S. 14: 130. 1( A)( 1). Third, the tampering must be by the intentional alteration,

movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance. Id. at 102. Finally, the

tampering must be done at the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has
good reason to believe will be the subject of any investigation by law enforcement officers.

Id. at 102. Nothing beyond " movement" is required by the statute if accompanied by the

requisite intent and knowledge. Id. at 102. Specific criminal intent is that state of mind

that exists when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed

criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R. S. 14: 10.

14

As discussed, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant possessed

a gun and shot at I.S. After the shooting, the video footage depicted the defendant running

up the alleyway, apparently conversing with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith, then approaching

and ducking down between two vehicles, standing again, and walking away down Avenue

B. Minutes later, another individual was seen walking between the same two vehicles and

ducking down in the same spot as the defendant, before walking away.

Hiding or disposing of a gun after a shooting, even if the gun is never recovered, can

be sufficient to support a conviction of obstruction of justice. See State v. Loggins, 23- 519

La. App. 5 Cir. 10/ 30/ 24), 397 So. 3d 1265, 1283. Based on our review, the evidence

supports a finding that the defendant possessed a gun; tampered with evidence by

intentionally " moving" the gun to a hidden location under a vehicle with knowledge that the

location would be the subject of a shooting investigation; and that he did so knowing his

act might affect a future investigation of the shooting and with the specific intent to distort

that future investigation. See Jones, 983 So. 2d at 102; Loggins, 397 So. 3d at 1283.

Based on the evidence presented, the jury was satisfied that the State met its burden

of proving that the defendant obstructed justice by hiding the gun he had just used to shoot

at IS. Applying the appropriate standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence on

the obstruction of justice conviction, we cannot say the jury erred in finding the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Carrying a Firearm or
Dangerous Weapon on School Property Conviction

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14: 95. 2( A) pertinently states:

Carrying a firearm, or dangerous weapon as defined in R. S. 14: 2, by a student
or nonstudent on school property, at a school sponsored function, or in a
firearm -free zone is unlawful and shall be defined as possession of any firearm
or dangerous weapon, on one' s person, at any time while on a school campus,
or at any school sponsored function ... including ... athletic competitions[.]

For purposes of La. R. S. 14: 95. 2, " campus" means all facilities and property within

the boundary of the school property, and " school" includes a high school. See La. R. S.

14: 95. 2( B)( 1), ( 3). Here, witness testimony establishes the defendant possessed a gun.

When the defendant possessed the gun, he was at an athletic competition on a high school

campus. Again, based on the evidence presented, the jury was satisfied that the State met

its burden of proof as to the carrying a firearm charge. Applying the appropriate standard

15

for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we cannot say the jury erred in finding the

onF-
1-** I 49 11

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find,

based on the record, a rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved beyond

a reasonable doubt the defendant's identity, as well as all of the elements of manslaughter,

obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence, and carrying a firearm on school property.

Accordingly, these combined assignments of error are meritless.

In assignment of error number four, the defendant argues the trial court erred in

denying his motion to reconsider sentence.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 20 of the

Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence

falls within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive

punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 767 ( La.

1979). A sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of

the crime or constitutes nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. A

sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in

light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate that it shocks one' s sense of justice.

State v. Livous, 2018- 0016 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 24/ 18), 259 So. 3d 1036, 1044, writ denied,

2018- 1788 ( La. 4/ 15/ 19), 267 So. 3d 1130. The trial court is given wide discretion in the

imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and an appellate court should not set aside

the sentence imposed unless the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. State v. Fruge,

2014- 1172 ( La. 10/ 14/ 15), 179 So. 3d 579, 584.

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure article 894. 1 sets forth factors the trial court must

consider before imposing a sentence. The trial court need not recite the entire checklist of

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894. 1, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the criteria.

State v. Scott, 2017- 0209 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 15/ 17), 228 So. 3d 207, 211, writdenied, 2017-

1743 ( La. 8/ 31/ 18), 251 So. 3d 410. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is

the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894. 1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Id.

The trial court should review the defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the

ff-
1

seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential

for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. Id. On appellate

review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad

sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate.

Scott, 228 So. 3d at 211.

On count one, the defendant faced imprisonment at hard labor for not more than

forty years. La. R. S. 14: 31( 6). On count two, the defendant faced a fine not more than

100, 000, imprisonment for not more than forty years at hard labor, or both. La. R. S.

14: 130. 1( B)( 1). 12 On count three, the defendant faced a fine not more than $ 2, 000,

imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years with or without hard labor,

or both. La. R. S. 14: 95. 2( D)( 2). Further, La. R. S. 14: 95. 2( D)( 2) provides any sentence

imposed pursuant to a violation of a crime of violence shall be served consecutively.

On appeal, the defendant argues his criminal history does not place him in the "worst

possible offender" category and that he was barely above the legal age when he was

prosecuted.

In imposing the sentence, the trial court noted, "[ the defendant's] actions show a

callous disregard for human life." Further, the trial court found the defendant' s actions

created a grave risk to human life[,] even beyond this victim, [ 33J." See La. C. CrR art.

894. 1( B)( 5). Lastly, the trial court noted that the defendant's actions involved " the

deliberate indiscriminate use of a deadly weapon." See La. C. Cr. P. art. 894. 1( 13)( 10).

After reviewing the record, we reject the defendant's argument that the sentences

imposed are unconstitutionally excessive. The transcript of the defendant's sentencing

indicates that the trial court adequately considered the sentencing guidelines. Despite the

defendant's young age and this being his first offense, that first offense was a homicide and

involved three felonies. We find the trial court's reasoning is more than sufficient to support

his sentences. The sentences imposed do not shock this Court' s sense of justice; thus, we

find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in imposing the sentences, nor are the sentences

12 The applicable sentencing range for obstruction of justice is determined by the type of investigation and/ or
offense charged. See State v. Benoit, 2022- 310 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 11/ 30/ 22), 355 So. 3d 68, 88- 90, writ denied,
2023- 00010 ( La. 9/ 26/ 23), 370 So. 3d 470. Further, we use the version of the statute in effect at the time of
the commission of the offense. See State v. Sugasti, 2001- 3407 ( La. 6/ 21/ 02), 820 So. 2d 518, 520- 21.

17

grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenses committed. Therefore, we find

the trial court did not manifestly abuse its wide discretion in sentencing the defendant.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is meritless.

1191-NF4TL FillF4..,;,.

Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 920( 2), this Court routinely conducts a review of all

appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and

without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023- 0117 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 3/ 23),

378 So. 3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024- 00027 ( La. 5/ 21/ 24), 385 So. 3d 242. After review

of the record, we have found tWo13 patent errors.

First, we note the sentencing transcript reveals the trial court imposed a restriction

on parole for the defendant' s conviction of manslaughter. The penalty provision of the

manslaughter statute does not authorize such a restriction on defendant's parole eligibility.

La. R. S. 14: 31( 8). Thus, the inclusion of the parole restriction renders this sentence illegal.

Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 882( A), which provides that an appellate court may correct an

illegal sentence at any time on review, we amend the sentence to delete the parole

restriction. See State v. Lee, 2024-0468 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 11/ 25), 2025 WL 1913565, * 12.

Next, on count two, obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence, the trial court

imposed a fine of $ 50, 000. Prior to imposing the fine, however, the trial court did not

conduct a hearing pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 875. 1, which deals with the trial court's

imposition of fines, fees, and restitution as part of sentencing. Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure article 875. 1, effective August 1, 2022, pertinently states:

A. The purpose of imposing financial obligations on an offender who is
convicted of a criminal offense is to hold the offender accountable for his
action, to compensate victims for any actual pecuniary loss or costs
incurred in connection with a criminal prosecution, to defray the cost of

13 After sentencing, the trial court advised the defendant that under La. C. CrR art. 930.8( A), in pertinent part,
he had " two years from the date [ his] sentence becomes final" to file an application for post -conviction relief.
R720) As written, Article 930. 8( A) provides that "[ n] o application for post conviction relief ... shall be
considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final
under the provisions of Article 914 or 922[.]" According to La. C. CrR art. 930. 8( D), the trial court shall " inform
the defendant of the prescriptive period for post -conviction relief either verbally or in writing." Here, the trial
court's language did not track the language of Article 930. 8( A) verbatim, as the trial court did not inform the
defendant that he must file any application for post -conviction relief within two years after "the judgment of
conviction and sentence" become final. ( Emphasis added). We nevertheless find that the trial court' s
instruction satisfied the requirements of Article La. C. CrR art. 930. 8( D) as the defendant's sentence could not
become final until there was a final judgment of conviction. Thus, we do not find that the trial court's advice
constituted patent error. Even if we did, which we do not, the trial court's advice has no bearing on the
sentence and would not constitute grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. See State v.
McCarty, 2024- 1155 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 2/ 25), 2025 WL 3635498, * 6, n. 8, _ So. 3d _, _, n. 8, writ denied,
2025- 01576 ( La. 5/ 27/ 26), 432 So. 3d 184; State v. Vongchanh, 2024- 0369 ( La. App 1 Cir. 12/ 27/ 24), 404
So. 3d 76, 82.
18

court operations, and to provide services to offenders and victims. These
financial obligations should not create a barrier to the offender's successful
rehabilitation and reentry into society. Financial obligations in excess of
what an offender can reasonably pay undermine the primary purpose of
the justice system which is to deter criminal behavior and encourage
compliance with the law.Financial obligations that cause undue hardship
on the offender should be waived, modified, or forgiven. Creating a
payment plan for the offender that is based upon the ability to pay, results
in financial obligations that the offender is able to comply with and often
results in more money collected. Offenders who are consistent in their
payments and in good faith try to fulfill their financial obligations should be
rewarded for their efforts.

B. For purposes of this Article, " financial obligations" shall include any fine,
fee, cost, restitution, or other monetary obligation authorized by this Code
or by the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 and imposed upon the
defendant as part of a criminal sentence, incarceration, or as a condition
of the defendant's release on probation or parole.

C. ( 1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, prior to ordering
the imposition or enforcement of any financial obligations as defined by
this Article, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether
payment in full of the aggregate amount of all the financial obligations to
be imposed upon the defendant would cause substantial financial hardship
to the defendant or his dependents.

2) The defendant or the court may waive the judicial determination of a
substantial financial hardship required by the provisions of this Paragraph.
If the court waives the hearing on its own motion, the court shall provide
reasons, entered upon the record, for its determination that the defendant
is capable of paying the fines, fees, and penalties imposed without causing
a substantial financial hardship.

G. The provisions of this Article shall apply only to defendants convicted of
offenses classified as felonies under the applicable law.

The record reflects that the trial court did not conduct a hearing to determine whether

the $ 50, 000 fine would cause substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his

dependents, nor did it waive judicial determination of such. Further, the defendant did not

explicitly or implicitly waive his right to a hearing. We note the defendant failed to raise

noncompliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 875. 1 in the trial court. However, based on the purpose

of La. C. Cr. P. art. 875. 1, as set out in subsection ( A), we find the defendant need not object

on the basis the trial court failed to comply with La. C. Cr. P. art. 875. 1, nor need he include

such a claim in a motion to reconsider sentence to preserve the matter for review. State v.

Trantl7am, 2024-0203 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 27/ 24), 404 So. 3d 975, 981- 82; State v. Tucker,

2022- 735 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 5/ 31/ 23), 368 So. 3d 187, 201. Since the trial court failed to

comply with La. C. Cr. P. art. 875. 1, we vacate the $ 50, 000 fine imposed on count two and
19

remand to the trial court for a hearing in compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 875. 1 and

resentencing as to the fine. See Trantham, 404 So. 3d at 982; State v. McKnight, 2023- 0886

La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 24/ 24), 395 So. 3d 897, 906, writ denied, 2024-01069 ( La. 12/ 11/ 24), 396

So. 3d 969.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions, amend the

defendant's sentence on count one and affirm as amended; affirm the sentence on count

two in part; vacate the $ 50, 000 fine; and affirm the sentence on count three. We remand

this case to the trial court for compliance with La. C. Cr.P. art. 875. 1 and resentencing as to
the fine imposed on count two.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE ON COUNT ONE AMENDED AND
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; SENTENCE ON COUNT TWO AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED IN PART; SENTENCE ON COUNT THREE AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR A
HEARING IN COMPLIANCE WITH LOUISIANA CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ARTICLE 875. 1 AND RESENTENCING AS TO THE FINE IMPOSED ON COUNT TWO.

20

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 KA 0437

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

LAKENDALL T. BROWN

I
WIMcClendon, C.I...concurring.

In cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the evidence must consist of proof of

collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Stewart, 2025- 01032 ( La. 6/ 29/ 26),
So. 3d 2026 WL 1861893, * 3. Moreover, under general principles of

accessorial liability, all parties to a crime are guilty for deviations from the common plan

that are the foreseeable consequences of carrying out the plan. State v. Smith, 98- 2078

La. 10/ 29/ 99), 748 So. 2d 1139, 1143 ( per curiam). When a murder occurs during the

perpetration or attempted perpetration of an unenumerated felony or intentional

misdemeanor directly affecting the person ( such as illegal discharge or aggravated assault),

one need not possess specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, nor be the person

who physically killed the victim, in order to be a principal to felony manslaughter. The jury
in this case was presented with sufficient evidence that the defendant illegally discharged a

gun where it was foreseeable that such could result in death or great bodily harm to a

human being.

More specifically, an officer testified that she heard gunfire coming from an area

behind a fence where an individual wearing light colored jeans and bright white sneakers

was standing. Further, ejected cartridge casings were later found on the ground near where

the individual wearing light colored jeans and white sneakers had been standing. Video

surveillance showed several individuals walking down a sidewalk prior to the shooting and

defendant was the only individual wearing light colored jeans and bright white sneakers.

Additionally, there was a video of defendant appearing to place an object under a vehicle

after the shooting and a witness also testified that she saw the defendant with a gun after

the shooting.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was

sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions. Accordingly, I concur with the result

reached by the majority.

2