In Re: Daryl Andre Gray

Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 17, 2025
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: DARYL ANDRE GRAY
No. 2025-B-00408
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Office of Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Notice of Discipline in
Another Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule XIX, Section 21 and Motion to Initiate
Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings;
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 17, 2025
Reciprocal discipline imposed. See per curiam.
JBM
JLW
JDH
WJC
PDG
JMG
CRC
06/17/2025 "See News Release 028 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2025-B-0408
IN RE: DARYL ANDRE GRAY
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CURIAM
This matter arises from a Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline
Proceedings filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against
respondent, Daryl Andre Gray, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana and
Tennessee, based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2020, the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of the
State of Tennessee filed a petition for discipline against respondent, alleging that he
had committed misconduct during his representation of the plaintiffs in two personal
injury lawsuits, as follows:
The Seiler Complaint
Felisa Jackson hired respondent to represent her in a personal injury action
following a 2015 automobile accident. Ms. Jackson received medical treatment
from several providers, including Dr. Alan James. At the request of Dr. James, Ms.
Jackson and respondent signed a “Notice of Doctor’s Lien,” which gave Dr. James
a lien on any funds recovered and instructed respondent to “pay directly to [Dr.
James] such sums as may be due and owing him for medical service rendered.” By
the end of her treatment, Ms. Jackson owed nearly $6,000 to Dr. James, as well as a
few hundred dollars each to Baptist One Care and Campbell Clinic.

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Ms. Jackson carried automobile insurance through State Farm. Her policy
contained a provision that provided up to $5,000 for medical expenses incurred from
an automobile accident. Respondent submitted the bills from Dr. James to State
Farm for reimbursement under th is provision. State Farm drafted a payment of
$1,800 on those bills and intended to send it to Dr. James. Respondent, however,
insisted that all payments be sent to his office instead. State Farm eventually paid
the full policy amount of $5, 000 and sent the check to respondent’s office.
Respondent forwarded none of that amount to Dr. James.
In June 2016, Ms. Jackson settled her personal injury action. The settlement
closing statement, which s he and respondent signed, listed the total settlement as
$19,000, including $14,000 from the at -fault driver’s insurance carrier and $5,000
from State Farm. It also valued Ms. Jackson ’s medical expenses at $5,658. Dr.
James was the only medical provider listed on the agreement, and the agreement
indicated that all $5,658 was owed to Dr. James. Additionally, the following text
appeared at the bottom of the settlement statement:
I, Felisa Jackson ... understand that only those providers
listed above have been paid, and I am personally
responsible for the payment or reimbursement of any
medical expense or other expenses which are not listed
above. I authorize and instruct my attorney to disburse the
settlement or recovery to any medical provider listed
above.

Despite this express authorization and the existence of the docto r’s lien,
respondent still did not disburse any of the settlement proceeds to Dr. James.
In July 2016, Dr. James sent respondent a demand letter. He enclosed a copy
of the doctor’s lien and requested that his bills be paid from the settlement proceeds.
In response, respondent informed Dr. James that he was unable to pay the bills as
other medical providers had asserted claims.
Dr. James hired attorney Vincent Seiler to help him recover from respondent.
Mr. Seiler sent two letters to respondent explaining that State Farm had paid money

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to him meant to cover Dr. James’ medical bills. Mr. Seiler also explained that Dr.
James was the only provider with an interest in the funds and requested payment of
the outstanding medical bills. Respondent failed to comply with Mr. Seiler’s
request. Mr. Seiler then filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent, alleging
that he failed to disburse funds to Dr. James as required by the doctor’s lien.
In January 2017, respondent sent letters to each of the medical providers he
believed had interests in the settlement funds. Only Dr. James replied. In April
2017, almost ten months after the case settled, respondent deposited $6,333 with the
Shelby County Circuit Court and initiated an interpleader action. Respondent served
Dr. James, Baptist One Care, and Campbell Clinic with notice of the action. Dr.
James filed an answer claiming the interpleaded funds for his medical bills, which
totaled $5,915. Dr. James also filed a counterclaim for breach of contract and
conversion and asked for court costs, attorney ’s fees, and expenses. No other
medical provider, insurer, or third party filed an answer or asserted a claim to the
interpleaded funds. In January 2019, t he trial court ordered disbursement of the
interpleaded funds to Dr. James and Mr. Seiler for the medical bills and attorney ’s
fees.

The McMickens Complaint
In December 2016, Kristopher McMickens was injured in an automobile
accident. He hired respondent to represent him in a personal injury action against
the at -fault driver, Alfred Farmer. Mr. Farmer passed away from crash -related
injuries before the suit could be filed. No estate was opened following Mr. Farmer’s
death, so no personal representative was appointed to accept service of process.
In July 2017, respondent filed a lawsuit in the Shelby County Circuit Court ,
styled Kristopher McMickens v. John Doe, as Administrator of the Estate of Alfred
G. Farmer, Deceased . The summons filed with the complaint was returned as

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unserved. The return of non -service of summons noted that “John Doe is (are) not
to be found in this County after diligent search and inquiry for the following
reason(s): as he does not exist.”
Respondent asked attorney J. Vincent Perryman to petition the Shelby County
Probate Court to open a probate estate for Mr. Farmer and to be permitted to accept
service of process in the tort action. Mr. Perryman agreed and filed a “Petition to
Appoint Administrator Ad Litem for Cause of Action Only .” In January 2018, the
court entered an order appointing Mr. Perryman as Administrator ad litem for the
sole purpose of serving as a nominal defendant and accepting service of process .
After serving the original “John Doe” complaint on Mr. Perryman, respondent filed
an amended complaint in the McMickens case correctly naming Mr. Perryman as
the Administrator ad litem of Mr. Farmer ’s estate . However, respondent never
served the amended complaint on Mr. Perryman or anyone representing him.
In late 2018, the relationship between respondent and Mr. McMickens began
to deteriorate. Mr. McMickens became extremely hostile with respondent and his
office staff, going so far as to angrily call respondent’s office on several
occasions. During these calls, he made clear that he knew respondent’s home
address and threatened to kill respondent and his family. Mr. McMickens
emphasized the seriousness of these threats by referencing his record of being
charged with violent crimes. In February 2019, during a text exchange in which Mr.
McMickens threatened respondent, respondent stated : “I no longer represent you.
Find another attorney.” Respondent also sent a withdrawal letter to Mr. McMickens,
informing him that “we will no longer [be] able to represent you .... Accordingly, we
will no longer be rendering legal services to you in this matter and will have no
further attorney -client relationship.” Respondent explained that a motion to
withdraw would be filed and that Mr. McMickens would have thirty days to find

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substitute counsel. Respondent sent Mr. McMickens a copy of his file but did not
file the motion to withdraw.
In June 2019, Mr. Farmer’s insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss the tort
action, arguing that there were deficiencies in the service of process and that the
statute of limitations had lapsed. The motion was set for hearing on July 26, 2019.
On June 27, 2019, about four months after he told Mr. McMickens that “I no
longer represent you,” respondent finally filed a motion to withdraw. Respondent,
however, did not have the motion docketed for a hearing, so it could not be ruled on.
One month after the motion to dismiss was filed and nine days before it was
to be heard, respondent sent Mr. McMickens a letter to inform him about the pending
motion to dismiss. The letter did not mention that respondent had filed a motion to
withdraw.
In September 2019, the Shelby County Circuit Court dismissed the tort action
against the estate of Mr. Farmer. The court ’s order explained that the original
complaint had been filed against a non -entity and that the amended complaint was
never served on anyone ; t hus, the statute of limitations barred Mr. McMickens ’
claim.
While the motion to withdraw was still pending, Mr. McMickens retained new
counsel and filed a malpractice action against respondent. The motion to withdraw
was finally granted in January 2022, nearly three years after respondent told Mr.
McMickens that he no longer represented him.
On March 10, 2025, the Supreme Court of Tennessee suspended respondent
from the practice of law for six months, with two months active and the remainder
to be served on probation, 1 for violating the following provisions of the Tennessee

1 The Supreme Court of Tennessee order of discipline provides that during the probationary period,
respondent would be required to (1) meet with a monitor on a monthly basis, and (2) complete six
additional hours of continuing legal education in law office management and ethics.

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Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (neglect of a legal matter), 1.4 (failure to
communicate with a client), 1.15(d)(e) (safekeeping property of clients or third
parties), 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), 4.1(a) (truthfulness in
statements to others), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation). Gray v. Board of Prof ’l Responsibility , 2025 WL
749621 (Tenn. 3/10/25), __ S.W. 3d __. The court concluded that, among other
misconduct, respondent lacked any legal basis for withholding payment to Dr. James
and failed to promptly withdraw from the representation of Mr. McMickens after
informing him that he no longer represented him.
After receiving notice of the Tennessee order of discipline, the ODC filed a
motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. A copy of the decision issued by the Supreme Court
of Tennessee was attached to the motion. On April 1, 2025, this court rendered an
order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical
discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response
in this court.

DISCUSSION
The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis is set forth in
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D). That rule provides:
Discipline to be Imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty
days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical
discipline … unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer
demonstrates, or this court fi nds that it clearly appears
upon the face of the record from which the discipline is
predicated, that:

(1) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity
to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due
process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that
imposed the discipline, there was such infirmity of

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proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the
clear conviction that the court could not, consistent
with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that
subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court
would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the
public policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially
different discipline in this state; …

If this court determines that any of those elements exists,
this court shall enter such other order as it deems
appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different
discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the
imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

In the instant case, respondent has made no showing of infirmities in the
Tennessee proceeding, nor do we discern any from our review of the record.
Furthermore, we feel there is no reason to deviate from the sanction imposed in
Tennessee as only under extraordinary circumstances should there be a significant
variance from the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction. In re: Aulston , 05-
1546 (La. 1/13/06), 918 So. 2d 461. See also In re Zdravkovich, 831 A. 2d 964, 968-
69 (D.C. 2003) (“there is merit in according deference, for its own sake, to the
actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share
supervisory authority”).
Under these circumstances, we believe it is appropriate to defer to the
Tennessee judgment imposing discipline upon respondent. Accordingly, we will
impose reciprocal discipline in the form of a six-month suspension from the practice
of law, with two months active and the remainder to be served on probation, subject
to the conditions set forth by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in its order imposing
discipline.

DECREE
Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that

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respondent, Daryl Andre Gray, Louisiana Bar Roll number 34225, be and he hereby
is suspended from the practice of law for six months, with two months active and
the remainder to be served on probation, governed by the conditions set forth by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in its order imposing discipline in Gray v. Board of
Professional Responsibility, 2025 WL 749621 (Tenn. 3/10/25), __ S.W. 3d __.