Valentina V. Bryan, In Her Capacity As Natural Tutrix Of Dalila Carol Aymond v. Chantel G. Aymond, In Her Capacity As Trustee Of The Dalila Carol Aymond Trust, Et Al.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 25, 2025
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
VALENTINA V. BRYAN, IN HER
CAPACITY AS NATURAL TUTRIX OF
DALILA CAROL AYMOND
VS.
CHANTEL G. AYMOND, IN HER CAPACITY
AS TRUSTEE OF THE DALILA CAROL
AYMOND TRUST, ET AL.
No. 2025-C-01103
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I
N RE: Chantel Georgette Aymond - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Writ Of
Certiorari, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Number(s) 2023 -0775,
Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Number(s) 24-334;
_ _ _ _ _ _
November 25, 2025
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Griffin, J., concurs.
CRC
JLW
WJC
JBM
JMG
11/25/2025 "See News Release 052 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-C-01103

VALENTINA V. BRYAN, IN HER CAPACITY AS NATURAL TUTRIX OF
DALILA CAROL AYMOND

VS.

CHANTEL G. AYMOND, IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE
DALILA CAROL AYMOND TRUST, ET AL.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal,
Third Circuit, Parish of Avoyelles

PER CURIAM

This case concerns the court of appeal’s removal of Chantel G. Aymond
(“Chantel”) as Trustee of the Dalila Carol Aymond Trust (the “Trust”). For the
reasons set forth herein and in the companion case Succession of Carol James
Aymond, Jr., 2025-01101 (La. 11/25/25), --- So. 3d ---, we find Chantel did not
breach the duty she owed to the Trust, nor did she breach the prudent administrator
standard set forth in the trust statutes. La. R.S. 9:2082; La. R.S. 9:2090 ; La. R.S.
9:2127. We therefore reverse the court of appeal, reinstate the judgment of the trial
court, and remand.
BACKGROUND
Carol James Aymond Jr. (“ testator”) died testate on February 26, 2021. His
will divided his estate between his daughter, Chantel, and his younger daughter,
Delila Aymond (“Delila”). D elila, a minor, is represented in this litigation by her
tutor and mother, Valentina Bryan. Testator’s will left a usufruct of one -half of his
estate to Chant el, for her life. He left the remainder of his estate to the Trust that
named Delila as sole beneficiary with Chantel appointed as sole Trustee. After the
testator’s death, Chantel was confirmed as Independent Executrix of the succession,
in accordance with the will. Thus, under the combined provisions of the Trust and

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the will, Chantel had separat e roles as Independent Executrix, Trustee, and
usufructuary.
Section 5.1.1 of the Trust prohibited the Trustee from alienating the
immovable property held in trust. As explained in the related case, the will did not
contain a similar prohibition. During the estate administration, Chantel, in her
capacity as Independent Executrix, sold a portion of the immovable property that
formed part of the estate. After consultation with tax attorneys, Chantel believed the
succession lacked the liquidity to pay likely estate tax obligations. Chantel invested
the proceeds of the sale in certificates of deposit held by the succession.
Ms. Bryan, as Tutrix of the trust beneficiary, objected to the sales and sought,
among other remedies, to remove Chantel as Trustee of the Trust .1 The trial court
dismissed Ms. Bryan’s claims. A divided five judge panel of the court of appeal
reversed. Bryan v. Aymond as Trustee of Dalila Carol Aymond Trust, 2024-334 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 7/30/25), 417 So. 3d 96. It also remanded the matter to the trial court to
appoint a new Trustee and to decide the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred
by the Trust and to assess those fees and costs to Chantel. Id.
ANALYSIS
The crux of this dispute is whether Chantel had the authority to sell the
immovable property. Chantel had multiple roles in her father’s estate planning, and
each of those roles came with distinct rights and obligations. As explained in the
related case, when Chantel sold the immovable property, she was not acting in her
capacity as Trustee, and her failure to act as Trustee to oppose the sale of the
immovable property is not a valid ground for her removal . La. R.S. 9:1789 (“A
trustee shall be removed . . . by the proper court for sufficient cause.”).

1 In the related matter, Ms. Bryan sought to remove Chantel as independent executor and to
terminate her usufructuary rights over the proceeds of the sale. Succession of Carol James Aymond,
Jr., 2025-01101 (La. 11/25/25), --- So. 3d ---.

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A trustee may not be removed without “sufficient cause.” La. R.S. 9:1789.
The jurisprudence has set forth that n o cause for removal exists unless the trustee
materially impairs or interferes with the proper administration of the trust.
McCaffery v. Linder , 2018-163, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/27/18), 263 So. 3d 1205,
1210, writ denied, 2019-0140 (La. 3/18/19), 267 So. 3d 89 (citing Succession of Noe,
398 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1981), writ denied, 405 So. 2d 530 (La.
1981)); See also 11 La. Civ. L aw Treatise, Trusts § 5:7 (3d ed.) (“[R]emoval of a
fiduciary is a drastic step.”) (internal quotations omitted).
The administration of this Trust in this case has not yet commenced. The Trust
has not been placed in possession of the property; therefore, it was impossible for
Chantel, as Trustee, to sell or otherwise dispose of Trust property that was not yet
under the Trust’s control. It follows, therefore, that the only grounds for the removal
of Chantel as Trustee would be for her failure to object to the sales. As explained in
the related case, a s Independent Executrix, Chantel had a fiduciary duty to file the
estate tax return and remit any taxes owed. 26 U.S.C. § 2002 (2025). By objecting
to the sale as Trustee, Chantel would have been acting contrary to the fiduciary duties
owed by her as the Independent Executrix—a situation that does not rise to the level
of a “material impairment” or “interference” with the Trust that would warrant her
removal.2
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal
removing Chantel G. Aymond as Trustee of the Dalila Carol Aymond Trust. We also
vacate the court of appeal’s order requiring Chantel to pay attorney fees and costs to
the Trust, finding no grounds for the imposition of any such fees. We reinstate the
judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for further

2 Indeed, as found by the trial court and as noted by the dissents in the court of appeal, the sales
substantially increased the assets and stream of income that would go to the Trust, thereby further
eroding any argument that she acted in any way to impair the Trust.

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proceedings consistent with this opinion, including any further proceedings relating
to the administration of Dalila Carol Aymond Trust as may be necessary.
REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED; AND
REMANDED.