Elizabeth W. Magner and Michael W. Magner v. Michael Deas

ELIZABETH W. MAGNER * NO. 2025-C-0302
AND MICHAEL W. MAGNER
*
VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
*
MICHAEL DEAS FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2022-05431, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M. Medley, Judge
******
Judge Dale N. Atkins
******
(Court composed of Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge
Dale N. Atkins)

Gilbert R. Buras, Jr.
710 Carondelet St.
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, Michael Deas

Michael W. Magner
P.J. Kee
JONES WALKER, LLP
201 St. Charles Avenue, 50th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70170

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS, Elizabeth W. Magner and Michael W.
Magner

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
MAY 16, 2025

DNA

SCJ

PAB

The underlying dispute in this matter is between neighbors regarding a

petition for permanent injunction and right of use. Relator, Michael Deas (“Mr.

Deas”), seeks expedited supervisory review of the trial court’s April 29, 2025

judgment, which granted his Motion for Suspensive Appeal; set the amount of

security to be furnished for his suspensive appeal at $45,000; and ordered him to

furnish his bond via a third-party surety.1 Mr. Deas asks us to vacate that judgment

and permit him to suspensively appeal—without posting a bond—the trial court’s

January 6, 2025, March 19, 2025, and March 20, 2025 judgments. Respondents are

Elizabeth W. Magner and Michael W. Magner (collectively the “Magners”). For

the following reasons, we grant Mr. Deas’ writ application but deny the relief

requested.

1 Mr. Deas requested expedited consideration from this Court pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.

2124. It provides, in pertinent part:

Where the party seeking to appeal from a judgment for a sum of money is
aggrieved by the amount of the security fixed by the trial court, the party so
aggrieved may seek supervisory writs to review the appropriateness of the
determination of the trial court in fixing the security. The application for
supervisory writ shall be heard by the court of appeal on a priority basis.

La. C.C.P. art. 2124(C) (emphasis added). As discussed more fully throughout this Opinion, the
judgments at issue herein are not for a sum of money. Thus, based on a plain reading of La.
C.C.P. art. 2124(C), it is inapplicable to the matter sub judice. Nonetheless, we have exercised
our discretion to decide this matter on a priority basis.

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RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Judgments Mr. Deas Seeks to Appeal

The Magners and Mr. Deas are neighbors; and the Magners sought access to

parts of Mr. Deas’ property to perform work and maintenance on their own

property.2 In resolving the dispute between the Magners and Mr. Deas, the trial

court issued three judgments. In its January 6, 2025 judgment, the trial court

granted the Magners a limited right of use to access part of Mr. Deas’ property “for

the purpose of repair and maintenance of the Magner Property”3 and delineated

that Mr. Deas will be entitled to a compensation rate of $25 per day multiplied by

the number of days the Magners access his property for certain maintenance and

repair projects on their property.4 The trial court also granted the Magners’ Petition

for Permanent Injunction and issued a permanent injunction ordering Mr. Deas not

to restrict the Magners’ access to his property. Further, the trial court granted the

Magners access to Mr. Deas’ property for “[f]uture [w]ork” but ordered the

Magners would have to provide Mr. Deas with notice forty-eight hours prior to the

work and pay Mr. Deas $25 per day for any future work. In its March 19, 2025

judgment, the trial court denied Mr. Deas’ Motion for New Trial regarding these

rulings. Additionally, having ruled in favor of the Magners, in its March 20, 2025

judgment, the trial court assessed Mr. Deas with $6,135.50 in court costs.

2 The facts of the underlying dispute are not at issue in Mr. Deas’ expedited writ
application.
3 The trial court also granted this limited right of use to the Magners’ “agents,
representatives and contractors.”
4 In particular, the trial court permitted the Magners to access Mr. Deas’ property “for the

purpose of conducting repairs to the parapet and wall running perpendicular to Governor
Nicholls Street on the side bounded by the Deas Property including, but not limited to, the
construction of scaffolding on the Deas Property.” The trial court specified the $25 per day
compensation rate applies so long as the Magners’ access to Mr. Deas’ does not surpass twenty-
one days, after which time the Magners owe Mr. Deas $75.00 per day.

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Hearing on Mr. Deas’ Motion for Suspensive Appeal

In response to the three judgments summarized above, Mr. Deas filed a

Motion for Suspensive Appeal. The trial court held a hearing on Mr. Deas’ motion

on April 24, 2025. In pertinent part, counsel for the Magners stated:

Because this [is not] a money judgment, I think . . . it is up to you to
set an amount that takes into account the potential damages that could
result in the interim, so we are asking that bond be set at [$]45,000,
which would account for the costs that have been set already in the
matter as well as the risk to the Magner[s’] property during this period
where they would not be able to repair the property as we are going
into the hurricane season and waiting for this appeal to play out.

In response, counsel for Mr. Deas stated, “Assuming the $45,000 is acceptable to

my client, we will post his property as the immovable property” pursuant to La.

C.C.P. art. 5121.1 “provided that there is no mortgage standing in the way of that

in excess of value, with the appraisal [showing the property is worth over

$500,000] being the demonstrated value of the property.” Thereafter, counsel for

the Magners argued:

The [Louisiana] Fourth Circuit [Court of Appeal] has a case on this
[Franco v. Franco, 2004-0967 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/28/04), 881 So.2d
131] that basically makes clear that the judgment debtor [cannot] be
the person or the party who is providing the security or a bond for his
own debt. A bond, though, can be secured by immovable property, but
it would need to be -- Mr. Deas would need to go through an actual
bonding company or a third party that would -- and that is who the
Magner’s [sic] would be able to go against in the case that they would
need to. . . . The Court just makes clear that the judgment debtor
cannot be securing his own debt.

Counsel for Mr. Deas then countered that the Franco case does not stand for the

above proposition urged by counsel for the Magners. Further, counsel for Mr. Deas

argued the Code of Civil Procedure does not require a suspensive appeal bond to

be placed with a commercial surety if the immovable property serves as the

security. Rather, as counsel for Mr. Deas, explained, “The immovable property

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itself is the bond,” and this “operates as a judicial mortgage against the property

until satisfaction of the judgment.” Neither counsel for Mr. Deas nor counsel for

the Magners introduced evidence at the hearing.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court orally ruled that the amount of the

suspensive appeal bond was set at $45,000 and that Mr. Deas could secure the

bond with his immovable property but had to go through a commercial bonding

company to do so. In response, counsel for Mr. Deas argued, “$45,000 is excessive

considering the court costs” and in light of the only money awarded by the

judgments being in favor of his client, i.e., the trial court’s order that the Magners

pay Mr. Deas $25 per day if and when they access his property for maintenance

and repair of their property. The trial court then explained, “[It is] not about the

money . . . . [It is] about us continuing on and the potential damage to the [Magner]

home.”

Judgment on Mr. Deas’ Motion for Suspensive Appeal

On April 29, 2025, the trial court issued the judgment at issue in Mr. Deas

expedited writ application. That judgment states:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Defendant, Michael
Deas’ suspensive appeal is granted, that the amount of security to be
furnished for the suspensive appeal is set at [$45,000], and that the
security shall be furnished through a bond from a third-party surety.

Mr. Deas’ expedited writ application to this Court followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his writ application to this Court, Mr. Deas asserts three assignments of

error regarding the trial court’s April 29, 2025 judgment:

[1.] The [trial] [c]ourt erred in ruling that [Mr. Deas’] suspensive
appeal bond must be posted with a “third party surety”.

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[2.] The [trial] [c]ourt erred in setting a suspensive appeal bond in an
instance in which the only money damages awarded were damages in
favor of the appellant [Mr. Deas].

[3.] The [trial] [c]ourt abused its discretion in setting an appeal bond
in this appeal of the imposition of a mandatory injunction where there
was no evidence of a demand for compliance nor of the measure of
damages for the delay resulting from the suspension of the execution.

Based on Mr. Deas’ writ application and the Magners’ response thereto, we will

discuss and resolve the following topics: (1) third-party surety requirement; (2)

whether the trial court erred in setting a suspensive appeal bond; and (3) if not,

whether the trial court abused its discretion in the amount set. We discuss each of

these in turn.

DISCUSSION

Third-Party Surety

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Deas contends “[t]he [trial] [c]ourt erred

in ruling that [Mr. Deas’] suspensive appeal bond must be posted with a ‘third

party surety’.” Mr. Deas asserts La. C.C.P. art. 5121.1 permitted him to secure his

bond with his immovable property and did not require him to use a third-party

surety. Further, Mr. Deas explains that while the Magners cited Franco to the trial

court for the proposition that a commercial surety is required to secure his bond,

this is an improper summary of this Court’s holding in Franco. Resolution of this

assignment of error requires us to interpret La. C.C.P. arts. 2124 and La. C.C.P. art.

5121.1 et seq.

This Court recently held that “[a]n appellate court reviews a question of law,

including the proper interpretation of a statute [or code article], under the de novo

standard of review, thereby giving no deference to the trial court’s interpretation of

same.” Hurel v. Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2025-0049, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir.

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3/11/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 762645, at *3 (alteration in original)

(quoting 225 Baronne Complex, LLC v. Roy Anderson Corp., 2024-0401, p. 10

(La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 354086, at *5). Likewise,

an appellate court employs the de novo standard of review to the trial court’s

application of a statute or code article to the facts of the case because this also

presents a question of law. Id. (quoting State v. Crowther, 2024-0625, p. 7 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 354084, at *3). The language

of the statute or code article is the starting point for interpretation. Id. (quoting

Gemelli v. State, 2022-0345, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/22), 352 So.3d 131, 133).

Louisiana Civil Code Article 9 instructs courts that “[w]hen a law is clear and

unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law

shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of

the intent of the legislature.” With this standard of review and these principles in

mind, we turn to the text of La. C.C.P. arts. 2124 and 5121.1.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2124 provides, in pertinent part:

B. The security to be furnished for a suspensive appeal is
determined in accordance with the following rules:

(1) When the judgment is for a sum of money, the amount of
the security shall be equal to the amount of the judgment, including
the interest allowed by the judgment to the date the security is
furnished, exclusive of the costs.

....

(2) When the judgment distributes a fund in custodia legis,[5]
only security sufficient to secure the payment of costs is required.

(3) In all other cases, the security shall be fixed by the trial
court at an amount sufficient to assure the satisfaction of the

5 A fund in custodia legis refers to money or property that is under the control and

custody of the court.

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judgment, together with damages for the delay resulting from the
suspension of the execution.

The trial court’s judgments that Mr. Deas seeks to appeal were not for a sum of

money. For purposes of La. C.C.P. art. 2124, a “judgment for a sum of money” is

“a judgment condemning [one party] to pay a specific sum of money” to another

Pan-Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Ransom, 150 La. 142, 143, 90 So. 548, 548 (La.

1921). In that instance, the amount of the security to be furnished for the

suspensive appeal “is fixed by law.” Id., 150 La. at 144, 90 So. at 548. Though the

January 6, 2025 judgment orders the Magners to pay $25 per day to Mr. Deas for

access to his property, the judgment does not contain a specific sum of money

because the amount Mr. Deas receives—if any—depends upon whether the

Magners do in fact access his property and, if so, for how many days. Additionally,

the March 20, 2025 judgment ordered Mr. Deas to pay court costs, but La. C.C.P.

art. 2124(B)(1) distinguishes between money awarded in a judgment and the

assessment of costs. Therefore, La. C.C.P. art. 2124(B)(1) is inapplicable to this

matter. Further, the judgments do not distribute a fund in custodia legis, so La.

C.C.P. art. 2124(B)(2) does not apply.

Rather, the trial court needed to fix the amount of the bond for Mr. Deas’

suspensive appeal in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 2124(B)(3) “at an amount

sufficient to assure the satisfaction of the judgment, together with damages for the

delay.” To this end, in Wright v. Jefferson Roofing, Inc., the Louisiana Supreme

Court explained the rationale behind an appellant having to post security for a

suspensive appeal bond is to protect the appellee, stating:

The purpose of the requirement of security for a suspensive
appeal is to protect the judgment creditor against the insolvency of the
judgment debtor during the course of the appeal. The judgment
creditor who by the suspensive appeal loses the right to interim

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execution on the judgment reciprocally gains the right to execute
against additional parties or property if the judgment is affirmed on
appeal.

1993-1217 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 773, 775 (emphasis added).

In this latter regard, i.e., the judgment creditor’s right to execute against

property, La. C.C.P. art. 5121.1 is titled “Bond secured by immovable property.” It

states:

Any party to a judicial proceeding who is required by law or court
order to provide security may furnish as security a bond secured by
immovable property located in this state. The party providing the
property bond shall present to a judge of the parish in which the
immovable is located an assessment certificate, a homestead
exemption waiver if applicable, and a mortgage certificate. Prior to
presenting the bond to the court having jurisdiction over the judicial
proceeding the bond shall be recorded in the mortgage office of the
parish where the immovable is located and the recordation shall be
evidenced on the mortgage certificate.

If an appellant furnishes security for his suspensive appeal bond with immovable

property pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 5121.1, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure

ensures the judgment creditor is protected by requiring the appellant to submit an

affidavit “that he is worth the amount for which he has bound himself and that the

immovable securing the bond contains assets subject to execution, over and above

all his other obligations.” La. C.C.P. art. 5122. This guarantees “the equity in the

property is adequate to pay the bond.” Aries Marine Corp. v. Blue Streak Marine,

Inc., 538 So.2d 316, 317 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).

None of the provisions in La. C.C.P. art. 2124 delineate that the security for

a suspensive appeal bond cannot be secured by immovable property pursuant to

La. C.C.P. art. 5121.1. In fact, La. C.C.P. art. 2124(E) states:

A suspensive appeal bond shall provide, in substance, that it is
furnished as security that the appellant will prosecute his appeal, that
any judgment against him will be paid or satisfied from the proceeds

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of the sale of his property, or that otherwise the surety is liable for the
amount of the judgment.

(Emphasis added). Based on the above-emphasized portion of La. C.C.P. art.

2124(E), the Louisiana Legislature intended that property could serve as the basis

for an appellant’s security in a suspensive appeal. Further, the language used in the

last part of the sentence—“or that otherwise the surety is liable for the amount of

the judgment” (emphasis added)—establishes that an alternative to a surety being

liable for the amount of the judgment in a suspensive appeal is property serving as

the security. Under our de novo review of La. C.C.P. arts. 2124 and 5121.1, we

find it to be “clear and unambiguous” that a party may furnish the security for a

suspensive appeal bond with immovable property. La. C.C.P. art. 9. Further, this

“application does not lead to absurd consequences.” Id.

Our position is also buoyed by another rule of statutory interpretation:

When courts interpret statutes, courts are to “presume[] the
Legislature’s actions in crafting a law were knowing and intentional”
and to presume the Legislature “enacted each statute with deliberation
and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject.”
Richards Clearview City Ctr., LLC v. Starr Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,
2024-104, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/5/24), 391 So.3d 101, 107 (first
citing La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. La. Ins.
Guar. Ass’n, 2009-0023, p. 10 (La. 6/26/09), 17 So.3d 350, 356; and
then citing Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 1995-2895, p. 4 (La.
5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186). Courts are to “plac[e] a construction
on the provision in question that is consistent with the express terms
of the law and with the obvious intent of the Legislature in enacting
it.” Commodore [v. City of New Orleans,] 2019-0127, p. 13 [(La.
App. 4 Cir. 6/20/19),] 275 So.3d [457,] 468-69 (quoting Pumphrey,
[v. City of New Orleans,] 2005-0979, p. 11 [(La. 4/4/06),] 925 So.2d
[1202,] 1210). . . . “Courts should give effect to all parts of a statute
and should not give a statute an interpretation that makes any part
superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be avoided.” Id. at pp.
13-14, 275 So.3d at 469 (quoting Pumphrey, 2005-0979, p. 11, 925
So.2d at 1210).

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225 Baronne Complex, LLC v. Roy Anderson Corp., 2024-0401, pp. 24-25 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 354086, at *12. If we were to

hold that a party seeking a suspensive appeal cannot furnish the security for same

with immovable property, this would render La. C.C.P. art. 5121.1 superfluous and

meaningless. Also, to take the position that a party cannot furnish the security for a

suspensive appeal with immovable property would be to contradict the

presumption that the Legislature enacted La. C.C.P. arts. 2124 (in 2001) with

knowledge of La. C.C.P. art. 5121.1 (enacted in 1984). That is, under the rules of

statutory interpretation, we are to presume that the Legislature already knew about

La. C.C. art. 5121.1 but nonetheless did not restrict its application in outlining the

process concerning security to be furnished for an appeal in La. C.C.P. art. 2124. If

the Legislature did not want an appellant to be able to use immovable property to

secure a suspensive appeal bond, the Legislature would have decreed this in La.

C.C.P. art. 2124.

We not only find this result warranted after reviewing the relevant codal

articles but also note that jurisprudence supports this holding too. In Aries Marine

Corp., after determining that the subject immovable property had “adequate equity

to meet the obligation,” this Court upheld a suspensive appeal bond secured by

immovable property pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 5121.1. 538 So.3d at 317. Therein,

this Court explained that the Louisiana Legislature did not even restrict “the

immovable property used to secure appeal[] bonds [under La. C.C.P. art. 5121.1]

to property which is not subject to another encumbrance.” Id.

Further, we agree with Mr. Deas that Franco is distinguishable. In Franco,

“the plaintiff[-appellant] filed a document in affidavit form styled ‘Personal

Surety’ in which he bound himself under oath ‘for payment of any validly rendered

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judgment upon demand and further waives all notice thereof.’” 2004-0967, p. 2,

881 So.2d at 132-33. This Court held that such a bond was defective because “as a

matter of law, an appellant may not act as his own surety in meeting the

requirement for a suspensive appeal bond.” Id. at p. 10, 881 So.2d at 137. Unlike in

Franco, Mr. Deas is not trying to act as his own surety; rather, he seeks to have his

immovable property secure his suspensive appeal bond. For example, in Duran v.

Allmerica Financial Benefit Insurance Company, the Louisiana Second Circuit

Court of Appeal affirmed Hanover Insurance Company’s ability to serve as surety

because, in doing so, Hanover was “not serving as ‘surety for its own debt’” as

neither Hanover nor its named insured had been cast in judgment. 55,599, 55,600,

p. 28 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 384 So.3d 1177, 1194. Similarly, though the trial

court’s January 6, 2025 judgement contains a permanent injunction restraining Mr.

Deas’ conduct, no part of the trial court’s judgments is against Mr. Deas’

immovable property thereby preventing it from securing his suspensive appeal

bond.

However, in light of the showing Mr. Deas made before the trial court and

this Court, we deny his request to vacate that part of the trial court’s judgment

ordering him to furnish the security through a third-party surety. That is, Mr. Deas

did not provide evidence to the trial court or to this Court that he could and did

comply with the requirements of La. C.C.P. arts. 5121.1 and 5122. Mr. Deas has

not even filed a pleading purporting to be his bond in compliance with the

requirements of those articles. See, e.g., Franklin v. Secretary of State, 2006-1332

(La. App. 3 Cir. 10/19/06), 942 So.2d 62, (wherein the plaintiff filed “a pleading

styled Security Bond for Costs,” but the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal

found that “on its face, the document fail[ed] to substantially comply with the

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requirements of a bond”). Further, considering the return day for Mr. Deas’ appeal

was originally set by the trial court as today, May 16, 2025, we decline to remand

this matter to provide Mr. Deas with additional time to comply with La. C.C.P.

arts. 5121.1 and 5122, thereby further delaying resolution of this matter.

Whether the Trial Court Erred in Setting a Suspensive Appeal Bond

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Deas contends the trial court erred in

setting a suspensive appeal bond because the only money damages awarded were

damages in favor of him, i.e., the $25 per day the Magners must pay Mr. Deas if

and when they access his property to perform maintenance and repairs on their

property. We disagree with Mr. Deas and point to Palmisano v. Lake Forest Blvd.

Med. Dev., 413 So.2d 913 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) and Dempsey v. Hamilton,

2019-1077 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/23/19) as examples of cases that run contrary to Mr.

Deas’ position. In both of those cases, the trial court imposed—and this Court and

the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, respectively, affirmed—a suspensive

appeal bond in a matter concerning a judgment that did not award a sum of money

to the plaintiff. As this Court explained in Palmisano, the rationale behind the

suspensive appeal bond therein was that:

[S]uspension of the judgment cancelling the lis pendens prevents the
sale of the land for $650,000 during the appeal, and the question is
what damages will defendants sustain as a result. The land is vacant
and producing no income. Its conversion into cash would provide
defendants with the opportunity to earn interest on the money. Interest
is precisely the damages resulting from the loss of the use of money.

413 So.2d at 914. Similarly, in their opposition to Mr. Deas’ expedited writ

application, the Magners explain that the original cost for the repairs to their home

was approximately $30,000; yet, as the Magners further explain, “[t]hat figure will

increase not only due to inflation, but by the continuing water intrusion that has

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been allowed as a result of Mr. Deas’[] refusal to allow the work to be performed.”

Thus, the suspensive appeal bond in this matter is based on the original repair

estimate and represents the further damages the Magners may suffer as a result of

the continued delay in executing the trial court’s January 6, 2025 judgment

allowing them to access Mr. Deas’ property for the maintenance and repair of their

property (if that judgment is affirmed on appeal, that is). This assignment of error

has no merit.

Amount of Suspensive Appeal Bond

Having determined the trial court did not err in setting a suspensive appeal

bond in this matter, we next consider the amount set by the trial court, $45,000. As

this Court has previously explained, La. C.C.P. art. 2124(B)(3) “specifies exactly

the items the bond shall cover, and naturally, the [trial] [c]ourt must exercise some

discretion in estimating the amount of it.” Ignolia v. Pique, 139 So.2d 34, 37 (La.

App. 4th Cir. 1962). See also Palmisano, 413 So.2d at 914 (explaining that La.

C.C.P. art. 2124(B)(3) governs the amount of the suspensive appeal bond and

“confers discretion on the trial court to fix an amount sufficient to secure the

judgment’s satisfaction and to indemnify the appellee against damages he may

sustain from the delay in executing his judgment”). However, according to the

Louisiana Supreme Court, “this does not mean that [the trial court] may act

arbitrarily in the matter” of setting the appeal bond. Johnson v. Nat’l Sand &

Gravel Co., 170 La. 423, 425, 127 So. 889, 890 (La. 1930). If the trial court is

“unreasonable or arbitrary in fixing the amount of the bond” or “abuses [its]

discretion,” then the trial court’s “judgment will be modified on appeal.”

Palmisano, 413 So.2d at 914. Thus, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s

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judgment setting a suspensive appeal bond for an abuse of discretion., 2019-1077,

p. 1, 2019 WL 4013971, at *1.

As stated previously, in their opposition to Mr. Deas’ expedited writ

application, the Magners explain that the trial court record establishes the original

estimate for the repairs to their home was approximately $30,000 but that number

is likely to increase because of inflation and the water intrusion that continues

while the January 6, 2025 judgment cannot be executed during the appeal delays.

Considering the trial court’s knowledge of same, we find the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in setting the suspensive appeal bond at $45,000. Moreover, we

agree with the Magners that Mr. Deas’ argument that the suspensive appeal bond

should not have been set at this amount without “evidence of a demand for

compliance” is “a red herring” because the Magners “may not do so during the

pendency of [Mr. Deas’] suspensive appeal.” In sum, Mr. Deas’ third assignment

of error is without merit.

ANCILLARY MATTER

Before concluding this Opinion, we also note that Mr. Deas’ writ application

did not contain a signed order setting the return date. Accordingly, this Court

determined that Mr. Deas’ writ application failed to comply with Rules 4-3 and 4-5

of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal. On May 15, 2025, we ordered the

trial court to sign an order setting the return date. Further, we ordered Mr. Deas

and the trial court to file the signed order setting the return date with the Clerk of

this Court by 12:00 p.m. on May 16, 2025. As of the time this Opinion is being

handed down,6 this Court still has not received the signed order setting the return

date.

6 This Opinion is being handed down at approximately 7:30 p.m. on May 16, 2025.

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Though Rule 4-3 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal states that a

writ application “shall contain documentation of the return date and any extensions

thereof,” that Rule further states that “any application that does not contain this

documentation may not be considered by the Court of Appeal.” (Emphasis added.)

This Court has held that the “use of the permissive ‘may’ ” in Rule 4-3 “does not

prohibit this Court from exercising supervisory jurisdiction.” State in Interest of

L.R., 2021-0141, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/25/21), 314 So.3d 1139, 1142. In light of

the permissive language in Rule 4-3, we considered Mr. Deas’ expedited writ

application despite the lack of a signed order setting the return date.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Mr. Deas expedited writ application but

deny the relief he requested.

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

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