Firas Shalabi D/B/A Zeen Wireless 2, LLC, Zeen Wireless 3, LLC, Zeen Wireless 7, LLC, Zeen Wireless 13, LLC, Zeen Wireless 14, LLC, Expressway Wireless, LLC and Expressway Wireless 2, LLC v. Nautilus Insurance Company and Underwriters at Lloyd's London
Firas Shalabi D/B/A Zeen Wireless 2, LLC, Zeen Wireless 3, LLC, Zeen Wireless 7, LLC, Zeen Wireless 13, LLC, Zeen Wireless 14, LLC, Expressway Wireless, LLC and Expressway Wireless 2, LLC v. Nautilus Insurance Company and Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 2025-C-0310 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. June 27, 2025).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 401 So. 3d 721 not in our corpus
- 396 So. 3d 963 not in our corpus
- Mauberret-Lavie v. Lavie 850 So. 2d 1
- 364 So. 3d 87 not in our corpus
- Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co. 998 So. 2d 946
- Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co. 24 So. 3d 813
Opinion text
FIRAS SHALABI D/B/A ZEEN * NO. 2025-C-0310
WIRELESS 2, LLC, ZEEN
WIRELESS 3, LLC, ZEEN *
WIRELESS 7, LLC, ZEEN COURT OF APPEAL
WIRELESS 13, LLC, ZEEN *
WIRELESS 14, LLC, FOURTH CIRCUIT
EXPRESSWAY WIRELESS, *
LLC AND EXPRESSWAY STATE OF LOUISIANA
WIRELESS 2, LLC *******
VERSUS
NAUTILUS INSURANCE
COMPANY AND
UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD'S LONDON
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2022-07351, DIVISION “J”
Honorable D. Nicole Sheppard
******
Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott
******
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Nakisha
Ervin-Knott)
Douglas Kleeman
J. Clark McMillan
Luke B. St. Germain
PHELPS DUNBAR LLP
365 Canal Street, Suite 2000
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR
W. Patrick Klotz
KLOTZ & EARLY
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2950
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED
JUNE 27, 2025
NEK Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Subscribing to Policy No. AP-CF-
RML
A0629 (“Relator”) seeks review of the district court’s April 9, 2025 judgment
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denying its exception of improper cumulation of actions. For the following reasons,
we grant Relator’s writ, reverse the district court’s ruling, and remand the matter
back to the district court to sever the actions for trial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 16, 2022, Firas Shalabi (“Mr. Shalabi”) sued Relator and Nautilus
Insurance Company (“Nautilus”) for property damage sustained due to Hurricane
Ida as well as penalties and attorneys’ fees based on those insurers’ claim
adjustments of the damage. Mr. Shalabi sought damages and penalties from Relator
– under Policy No. AP-CF-A0629 – for alleged damage to property located at 8998
Westbank Expressway, Suite 6, Westwego, Louisiana 70094 that was insured under
Relator’s policy. He also alleged that Relator improperly handled this claim. In the
same lawsuit, Mr. Shalabi sought damages and penalties from Nautilus – under
Policy No. NN1213140 – for alleged damage to five properties insured under the
Nautilus policy. He also alleged that Nautilus improperly handled the claim.
Noteworthy, the property insured under Relator’s policy is not insured under the
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Nautilus Policy, and none of the properties insured under the Nautilus policy are
insured under Relator’s policy.
On January 7, 2025, Relator filed an exception of improper cumulation of
actions (“exception”), asserting there is no community of interest between the
actions against Relator and Nautilus. The district court heard the exception on March
13, 2025, denied the exception in open court, and issued a signed judgment on April
9, 2025. This timely writ application for supervisory review followed.
DISCUSSION
As its sole assignment of error, Relator asserts the district court erred as a
matter of law by denying Relator’s exception as there is no community of interest
between Mr. Shalabi’s action against Relator and his action against Nautilus as
required under La. C.C.P. art. 463.
A district court’s judgment concerning an exception of improper cumulation
of actions is examined under a manifest error standard of review. Girod Titling Tr.
v. Hermes Health All., L.L.C., 2024-0221, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/1/24), 401 So.3d
721, 728, writ denied, 2024-01199 (La. 12/11/24), 396 So.3d 963. Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure Article 463(1) provides that “[t]wo or more parties may be joined
in the same suit, either as plaintiffs or as defendants,” when “[t]here is a community
of interest between the parties joined.” “The test in determining whether the parties
have a community of interest is whether the cumulated causes of action arise out of
the same facts or whether they present the same factual or legal
issues….[C]ommunity of interest is present between different actions or parties,
where enough factual overlap is present between the cases to make it
commonsensical to litigate them together.” Mauberret-Lavie v. Lavie, 2003-0099, p.
2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/11/03), 850 So.2d 1, 2-3.
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In the instant matter, Mr. Shalabi filed one suit against two insurance
companies – Relator and Nautilus – for property losses he sustained due to Hurricane
Ida. The property insured under Relator’s policy is not insured under the Nautilus
policy. Likewise, the property insured under the Nautilus policy is not insured under
Relator’s policy. In essence, Mr. Shalabi’s suit involves separate losses to unrelated
properties insured by different insurance companies under different insurance
contracts.
In opposition to this writ application, Mr. Shalabi insists his suit satisfies the
“community of interest” requirement as his claims against both insurers arise out of
the same occurrence – Hurricane Ida – and present common questions of law and
fact. Citing to his petition, Mr. Shalabi maintains the allegations against both
insurers with respect to all properties are identical, and he has asserted claims against
both insurers for bad faith and breach of contract. We disagree.
In Derbes v. City of New Orleans, 2019-0574 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/19), 364
So.3d 87, this Court found that two actions, involving the same plaintiff and
defendant, concerning separate zoning board decisions were improperly cumulated
because of the differences in the actions. This Court observed:
Mr. Derbes argues, in effect, that although the BZA determinations
were not consolidated before the BZA because the BZA considered the
two actions separate, it was error for the district court to grant the
exception of improper cumulation when he attempted to appeal the two
decisions in one proceeding.
This is a procedural matter. Although both BZA decisions pertain to
Mr. Derbes’ property and his attempt to build an additional structure on
it for commercial purposes, the BZA decisions arise from different
permit applications and procedural postures with separate BZA docket
numbers and records. The Civil District Court sits as an appellate court
in administrative review matters. The matters were not consolidated
before the BZA. In granting the exception of improper cumulation, the
district court specifically ordered Mr. Derbes to proceed with the appeal
of one BZA decision and file a separate action in Civil District Court to
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appeal the other BZA decision, thereby protecting Mr. Derbes’ right to
appeal both decisions. Pursuant to La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 464, it was
within the district court’s discretion as to whether to order separate
trials of the actions or to order Mr. Derbes to proceed in separate
actions.
Id., 2019-0574, pp. 4-5, 364 So.3d at 89-90. Mr. Shalabi attempts to distinguish
Derbes by asserting it turned on a procedural issue not present in the matter herein.
However, as Relator points out, this Court, in Derbes, recognized that fewer and less
extreme differences between the actions present in this case supported the granting
of an exception of improper cumulation of actions.
Within the context of hurricane litigation, we recognize that federal district
courts have rejected an insured’s attempt to join multiple claims involving different
properties and different insurance policies in a single suit. In Cresson v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., unpub., No. CIV A 06-8788, 2007 WL 1191817, at *2 (E.D. La.
2007), the federal district court granted a motion to sever, noting:
[P]laintiffs cannot rely on the fact that one natural disaster, Hurricane
Katrina, caused the damage to all of their properties as a basis for
joining the claim against Hartford with each of their separate claims
regarding the four other properties insured exclusively by State Farm.
The claims involve entirely different factual and legal issues, including
each property’s respective condition and location before the storm, the
value of the properties, the terms of their insurance policies, and the
extent of damage sustained. Therefore, aside from Hurricane Katrina as
the cause, the State Farm claims do not arise “out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” as the
Hartford claim under Rule 20(a).
Consequently, the federal district court determined Hartford and State Farm – the
two defendant insurers – were not properly joined in the same suit.
Furthermore, in Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., the Third Circuit addressed
the cumulation of multiple actions against various oil and gas companies for
contamination to several non-contiguous tracts of land. 2008-0233 (La. App. 3 Cir.
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12/10/08), 998 So.2d 946, 953, affirmed, 2009-0449, 2009-0469 (La. 10/20/09), 24
So.3d 813. The Third Circuit observed:
[W]e cannot say that there is enough factual overlap present between
all the to make it commonsensical to litigate them together. The
properties allegedly affected by the contamination are five non-
contiguous tracts located in 3 separate sections, different parties and
combinations of parties are alleged to have contributed to the
contamination on each, and the times at which contamination allegedly
occurred differs for each property. The proof of damages for each will
necessarily be different as well as the amount of damages, if any, and
the people and/or entities found liable, if any.
Id., 2008-0233, p. 10, 998 So.2d at 953. The court, in Broussard, determined the
claims did not share a community of interest and affirmed the district court’s
granting of the exception of improper cumulation. Id.
The only commonality between Mr. Shalabi’s claims against Relator and
Nautilus are (1) they arise from damage caused by Hurricane Ida, and (2) he is a
named insured on both insurance policies involved in this suit. However, “[t]hese
can not [sic] serve as a common transaction or occurrence because Hurricane [Ida]
effected each property differently, each property was different with respect to its
prior condition, and each property was covered by a separately negotiated insurance
policy.” Campo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIV.A. 2006-2611, 2007 WL
2155792, at *3 (E.D. La. July 26, 2007). In this case, we find there is no community
of interest between two actions concerning distinct properties insured under separate
policies, and the handling of independent claims. Accordingly, the district court was
manifestly erroneous in denying the dilatory exception of improper cumulation.
DECREE
Based on the above and foregoing reasons, we grant Relator’s writ, reverse
the district court’s April 9, 2025 judgment denying its exception of improper
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cumulation of actions, and remand the matter back to the district court to sever the
actions for trial.1
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED
1 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 464 provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]hen the
cumulation is improper for any other reason [besides lack of jurisdiction or improper venue], the
court may: (1) order separate trials of the actions.”
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