State of Louisiana in the Interest of N.T. Vs.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2025-C-0415
THE INTEREST OF N.T.
*
COURT OF APPEAL
*
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2025-082-09-DQ-F, SECTION “F”
Honorable Ranord J Darensburg,
******
Judge Paula A. Brown
******
(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Tiffany
Gautier Chase)

JASON R. WILLIAMS
District Attorney
Parish of Orleans
BRAD SCOTT
Assistant District Attorney
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR

Radha Yerramilli
1100 Milton Street, Suite B
New Orleans, LA 70122

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED;
RELIEF DENIED

JULY 31, 2025

PAB
DLD
TGC

Relator, State of Louisiana (“the State”), seeks supervisory review of the

juvenile court’s April 7, 2025 judgment, which granted the Motion to Release filed

on behalf of Respondent, N.T.1 The juvenile court granted N.T.’s motion based on

the State’s failure to bring the juvenile to appear to answer the petition of

delinquency (the “petition”) within five days of the filing of a petition, as

mandated by La. Ch.C. art. 854(A).2 On May 23, 2025, the State filed a Motion to

Correct Judgment, requesting the juvenile court correct the record to indicate that

the State lacks authority to order a juvenile to appear to answer the petition—

1 Throughout this opinion we will use the initials of the minor child in order to protect the child’s

identity, pursuant to Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2:

To protect the minor's identity and to ensure the confidentiality of a minor who is
a party to or whose interests are the subject matter in the proceedings listed in
Rule 5-1(a) or (c) above, initials shall be used in all filings and in opinions
rendered by the Court of Appeal.
2 Louisiana Children’s Code article 854 provides:

A. If the petition is filed prior to or during the hearing to determine continued
custody, the court may order the child to answer the petition upon completion of
the hearing. If not so ordered and the child is continued in custody, he shall be
ordered to appear to answer the petition within five days after the filing of the
petition.

B. In all other cases, the child shall be ordered to appear to answer the petition
within fifteen days after the filing of the petition.

C. For good cause, the court may extend such period.

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which the juvenile court denied on July 8, 2025. For the reasons that follow, we

grant Relator’s writ, but deny the requested relief.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

N.T. was detained and held at the Juvenile Justice Intervention Center on

March 23, 2025. On March 24, 2025, the State accepted several criminal charges

against N.T., the substance of which is not pertinent to our review. Also on March

24, the juvenile court held a continued custody hearing where both N.T. and his

mother were present. Shortly thereafter, on March 26, 2025, the State filed the

petition against N.T. Thirteen days later, on April 7, 2025, the juvenile court held

an answer hearing, where N.T. appeared represented by counsel. At that hearing,

counsel for N.T. waived the reading of the petition and entered a general denial on

N.T.’s behalf. On that same day, N.T.’s counsel filed a motion for immediate

release, arguing that because the answer hearing had not been held within five days

of the filing of the petition, as mandated by La. Ch.C. art. 854(A), N.T. was

entitled to be released. After the hearing, the court issued a written judgment: (1)

noting and accepting that counsel for N.T. waived the reading of the petition and

entered a general denial on N.T.’s behalf; (2) ordering that N.T. be released

pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 854(A); (3) expressing that “the Court objects for the

State’s failure to follow [La. Ch.C.] [a]rt. 854A;” and (4) setting pre-trial hearing

and adjudication dates. Some five weeks later, on May 23, 2025, the State filed a

Motion to Correct Judgment, asserting that it was compulsory for the court—not

the State—to issue an order for the child to appear at an answer hearing. At a July

8, 2025 hearing on the State’s Motion to Correct Judgment, the juvenile court

judge again took the position that it was not the responsibility of that court to

timely set the answer hearing, but that it was incumbent upon the State to file a

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motion to set the hearing. The State timely filed an application for supervisory

writ to this Court.

DISCUSSION

“An appellate court reviews a question of law, including the proper

interpretation of a statute, under the de novo standard of review, thereby giving no

deference to the trial court's interpretation of same.” 225 Baronne Complex, LLC

v. Roy Anderson Corp., 24-0401, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), 408 So.3d 291,

299 (citing Commodore v. City of New Orleans, 19-0127, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir.

6/20/19), 275 So.3d 457, 465-66). This Court has explained that “[t]he starting

point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself.”

Lepine v. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 22-0160, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/5/22),

350 So.3d 988, 992 (quoting Whitley v. State ex rel. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State

Univ. Agric. Mech. Coll., 11-0040, p. 6 (La. 7/1/11), 66 So.3d 470, 474). “It is

axiomatic that when statutory language is troublesome, i.e. ambiguous, it falls to

the courts to parse their meaning.” Id. “As the Supreme Court articulated in Pierce

Founds., Inc. v. Jaroy Const., Inc., 15-0785, p. 6 (La. 5/3/16), 190 So.3d 298 at

303, ‘[l]egislation is the solemn expression of the legislative will; thus, the

interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent.’” Id.

See also La. R.S. 24:177(B)(1). “However, ‘[w]hen a law is clear and

unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law

shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of

the intent of the legislature.’” Id., at p. 6, 350 So.3d at 992 (quoting La. C.C. art.

9). “Similarly, ‘[w]hen the wording of a section of the revised statutes is clear and

free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of

pursuing its spirit.’” Id. (quoting Whitley, 11-0040, p. 6, 66 So.3d at 474). “Words

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and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the

common and approved usage of the language.” Id. (quoting La. R.S. 1:3).

“Nevertheless, ‘[w]hen the language of the law is susceptible of different

meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the

purpose of the law.’” Id. (quoting La. C.C. art. 10). “Additionally, ‘[w]hen the

words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the

context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.’” Id. (quoting La.

C.C. art. 12). With these precepts in mind, we will discuss the interpretation and

application of the statute at issue.

Louisiana Children’s Code article 854 is silent with regard to who

specifically issues the order for the child to appear. However, considering the

provisions of Section A of the article, the plain language presumes the

responsibility remains with the court to order the juvenile to appear. The first

sentence of Section A provides that “the court may order,” indicating that the court

is granted permissive authority if the petition is filed during or prior to the custody

hearing. Correspondingly, the very next sentence states that the juvenile “shall be

ordered,” if not ordered and the minor is in continued custody.3 Once again,

although the statute does not explicitly provide which party is responsible for

ordering the child to appear to answer a petition of delinquency, the article’s

context and plain language contemplates that the court—previously identified as

the acting authority—is charged with this responsibility.4 Thus, the juvenile

3 The word “shall” is mandatory, and the word “may” is permissive. La. Ch.C. art. 107.
4 Notably, several codal articles assign responsibility to the juvenile court in delinquency
proceedings: La. Ch.C. art. 855(A) mandates the court to “determine that the child is capable of
understand statements about his rights under the Code;” (2) La. Ch.C. art. 855(B) mandates the
court to advise the child of various aspects of the juvenile proceedings, including the nature of
the delinquency proceeding and the allegations of the petition, the range of answers to the

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court’s observation that the statute does not state who is responsible is only correct

when considered in isolation. This conclusion is further supported by Section C of

La. Ch.C. art. 854, which allows that the court may extend that period for good

cause. It is well settled that “courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute

and cannot give a statute an interpretation that makes any part superfluous or

meaningless, if that result can be avoided.” Council of City of New Orleans v.

Donation, 23-01106, p. 8 (La. 3/22/24), 382 So.3d 27, 33. Accordingly, we find

that the juvenile court—not the State—is statutorily mandated to order a juvenile

to appear to answer a petition of delinquency.

Next, the State requests that we order the court to order the juvenile to

appear to answer the petition. However, in this instance, as the juvenile court

noted in its Answer Judgment and as acknowledged by the State in its Motion to

Correct Judgment, an answer hearing was held on April 7, 2025, at which N.T.’s

counsel waived the reading of the petition and entered a general denial on his

behalf. The State has provided no law or rationale as to why a second answer

hearing is now required. Consequently, we deny the State’s request that this Court

order the juvenile court to hold a second answer hearing.

DECREE

For all the foregoing reasons, Relator’s writ is granted, but the requested

relief is denied.

WRIT GRANTED;
RELIEF DENIED

petition that the child can make, and the right to an adjudication hearing; (3) La. Ch.C. art.
854(B) mandates the juvenile court to hold such a hearing to determine whether good cause
exists for the failure of Minor “to appear to answer the petition within fifteen days after the filing
of the petition.” (cited in State in Interest of G.S., 2019-0605 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/19), 287
So.3d 752).

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