Dominique Rotolo Olivier and Ryan J. Olivier v. Sara U. Bayhi, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Maison Insurance Company, Inc.

DOMINIQUE ROTOLO * NO. 2025-CA-0124
OLIVIER AND RYAN J.
OLIVIER *
COURT OF APPEAL
VERSUS *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
SARA U. BAYHI, STATE *
FARM MUTUAL STATE OF LOUISIANA
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE *******
COMPANY, AND MAISON
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
ET AL

APPEAL FROM
25TH JDC, PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES
NO. 64-884, DIVISION “B”
Honorable Michael D. Clement
******
Judge Karen K. Herman
******
(Court composed of Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Karen K. Herman, Judge
Nakisha Ervin-Knott)

John E. Pivach
PIVACH, PIVACH, HUFFT, THRIFFILEY & DUNBAR, LLC
8311 Highway 23, Suite 104
P.O. Box 7125
Belle Chasse, LA 70037

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

W. Briggs Scott
Stephen R. Barry
BARRY ROME & SCOTT, LLC
612 Gravier Street
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, LOUISIANA INSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION

AFFIRMED
AUGUST 8, 2025

KKH
RDJ
NEK

Dominique Rotolo Olivier and Ryan Olivier (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the

October 10, 2024 judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Louisiana

Insurance Guaranty Association (“LIGA”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 11, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Damages against

various defendants alleging damages arising out of an accident that occurred on

November 10, 2017. The petition asserts that Mrs. Olivier was struck by a golf

cart that was operated by Sara Bayhi (“Mrs. Bayhi”) and owned by Sarah B.

Lasseigne and Christopher D. Lasseigne, Jr. (“the Lasseignes”). The accident

occurred on property owned by Carrie Dore and Jared Dore (“the Dores”).1

At the time of the accident, Mrs. Bayhi had automobile insurance with State

Farm Mutual Insurance Company and homeowner’s insurance with Maison

Insurance Company (“Maison”). On September 27, 2022, LIGA intervened after

Maison became insolvent.

The Lasseignes filed a Cross-Claim against their homeowner’s insurer,

United Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“UPC”). UPC filed a Motion

1 By Order dated August 5, 2024, the Lasseignes and the Dores have been dismissed from this

action.

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for Summary Judgment arguing that pursuant to an endorsement contained in the

policy (“UPC Policy”) coverage was excluded for any damages arising out of the

use of a recreational vehicle such as a golf cart. A judgment was rendered on

September 14, 2021, granting summary judgment in favor of UPC. Plaintiffs did

not appeal the judgment dismissing UPC.

On July 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting

that the homeowner’s policy issued to Mrs. Bayhi by Maison (“Maison Policy”)

provided coverage for the damages incurred as a result of the accident. Therein,

Plaintiffs argued that an endorsement relied upon by LIGA to deny coverage

creates a conflict within the Maison Policy that should be interpreted in favor of

coverage.

In response, LIGA filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment asserting

that the Recreational Vehicle Endorsement (“Endorsement”) contained in the

Maison Policy precluded coverage for damages arising out of the golf cart

accident.

The matters were heard on October 3, 2024. Judgment was rendered on

October 10, 2024, denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and granting

LIGA’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Reasons for Judgment, the

trial court determined that the Endorsement contained in the Maison Policy

“clearly applies to Ms. Olivier’s injuries as she was injured by Ms. Bayhi’s

operation of a recreational vehicle.” Plaintiffs’ timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of LIGA by: 1) improperly applying the Endorsement to

conclude that the Maison Policy does not provide coverage; and 2) reasoning that

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the Endorsement contained in the UPC Policy was “nearly identical” to the Maison

Policy endorsement.2

SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary

judgment de novo.” In re Medical Review Complaint by Downing, 2021-0698, p. 8

(La. App. 4 Cir. 5/26/22), 341 So.3d 863, 869 (citing Indep. Fire Ins. Co. v.

Sunbeam Corp., 1999-2181, 1999-2257, p. 7 (La. 2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, 230).

In Mapes v. State through Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. Agric.

& Mech. Coll., 2021-0166, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/2/22), 336 So.3d 494, 497,

this Court reiterated the law on summary judgment, stating:

“The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except
those disallowed by Article 969.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). “The
procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these
ends.” Id. “[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the
motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is
no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). “The only
documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the
motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and
admissions.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4).

“The burden of proof rests with the mover.” La. C.C.P. art.
966(D)(1). However, “if the mover will not bear the burden of proof
at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary
judgment, the mover's burden ... does not require him to negate all
essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense.” Id.
Instead, the moving party must “point out to the court the absence of
factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse
party’s claim, action, or defense.” Id. Then, “[t]he burden is on the
adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

2 Plaintiffs have not presented an argument related to the denial of their motion for summary

judgment.

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“A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could
disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there
is no need for trial on that issue, and summary judgment is
appropriate.” Maddox v. Howard Hughes Corp., 19-0135, p. 5 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 4/17/19), 268 So.3d 333, 337. “ ‘A fact is material when
its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiffs [sic]
cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is
material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a
litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal
dispute.” Id. (quoting Chapital v. Harry Kelleher & Co., Inc., 13-
1606, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/4/14), 144 So.3d 75, 81). “Whether a fact
is material is a determination that must be made based on the
applicable substantive law.” Maddox, 19-0135, p. 5, 268 So.3d at 337.

“Whether an insurance policy provides for, or precludes, coverage as a

matter of law is an issue that can be resolved within the framework of a motion for

summary judgment.” Riggio v. Ports America Louisiana, LLC, 2024-0436, p. 16

(La. App. 4 Cir. 12/5/24), 407 So.3d 636, 645 (quoting Certain Underwriters at

Lloyd’s of London v. Duxworth Roofing and Sheetmetal, Inc., 2022-0821, p. 7 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 7/18/23), 370 So.3d 1144, 1149).

DISCUSSION

In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, LIGA introduced the

following: 1) a certified copy of the Maison Policy; 2) Plaintiffs’ Petition for

Damages; 3) the Judgment granting UPC’s Motion for Summary Judgment; 4) the

Lasseignes’ Responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of

Documents issued by UPC; 5) UPC’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment; 6) Transcript of the August 5, 2021 Hearing on UPC’s

Motion for Summary Judgment; 7) the Lasseignes’ Responses to Requests for

Admissions issued by UPC; and 8) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Summary Judgment.

In opposition, Plaintiffs introduced documents presented in connection with

their Motion for Summary Judgment, including the Petition for Damages, the

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Maison Policy, and certain discovery responses that are not particularly germane to

the issue before us in this appeal. In its Motion for Summary Judgment and in

opposition to LIGA’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs assert that

coverage for the accident is provided by Section 2(d)(1) of the Motor Vehicle

Liability Exclusions (“Section 2(d)(1)”) contained in the Maison Policy, which

provides in pertinent part:

SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS

A. “Motor Vehicle Liability”

...

2. If Exclusion A.1 does not apply, there is still no coverage for
“motor vehicle liability” unless the “motor vehicle” is:

...

d. Designed for recreational use off public roads and:

(1) Not owned by and “insured”[.]

Plaintiffs submit that Section 2(d)(1) provides coverage for the exact set of facts

surrounding the accident, i.e., the golf cart was designated for recreational use off

public roads, and it was not owned by the insured, Mrs. Bayhi.

LIGA counters that Section 2(d)(1) only narrows the scope of coverage, it

does not provide coverage as argued by Plaintiffs. In denying coverage, LIGA

relies on the Endorsement. Specifically, the Maison Policy contains a SPECIAL

PROVISIONS section stating that THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE

POLICY, PLEASE READ CAREFULLY, with the following pertinent section:

Section II - LIABILITY COVERAGES

Section II - EXCLUSIONS

...

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The following Exclusions are added:

...

11. Recreational Vehicles

“Bodily injury” or “property damage” because of or originating
from:

The use, supervision, care, custody or control of any “insured”, or
that of your “employee”, agent, visitor or tenant, of a recreational
off road or unlicensed vehicle, including but not limited to,
ATV’s, 3-wheelers, 4-wheelers, dune buggies, rock climbers, go-
carts, minibikes, dirt bikes, snowmobiles, motorized skateboards,
and motorized scooters:

a. Whether owned or not owned by any “insured”, and

b. Whether or not the injury or damage occurs on the “insured
location” or any other location.

In response to LIGA’s argument, Plaintiffs argue that the Endorsement does

not amend or delete Section 2(d)(1). Thus, when read as a whole, the policy

contains conflicting language because Section 2(d)(1) confirms coverage and the

Endorsement purports to exclude coverage for the same set of facts.

Interpretation of Insurance Policies

“Whether an insurance policy exclusion applies to exclude coverage in a

particular case may present a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to

the manifest error standard of review.” Lombard v. Nobre, 2023-0746, p. 19 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 6/18/24), 398 So.3d 1, 25 (citing Power v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

2015-0796, p. 11 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 193 So.3d 471, 477).

The Court in Lombard also reiterated the legal principles courts must apply

in analyzing insurance policies, as follows:

• An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and
should be construed by using the general rules of interpretation of
contracts set forth in the Civil Code. [Footnote omitted]

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• The parties’ intent as reflected by the words in the policy
determine the extent of coverage. Such intent is to be determined in
accordance with the general, ordinary, plain and popular meaning of
the words used in the policy, unless the words have acquired a
technical meaning. LSA-C.C. Art. 2047.

• An insurance policy should not be interpreted in an
unreasonable or a strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its
provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so
as to achieve an absurd conclusion.

• Absent a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy,
insurers, like other individuals, are entitled to limit their liability and
to impose and to enforce reasonable conditions upon the policy
obligations they contractually assume.

• [I]f the policy wording at issue is clear and unambiguously
expresses the parties’ intent, the insurance contract must be enforced
as written. LSA-C.C. Art. 2046 (providing that when the words of a
contract are clear, no further interpretation may be made to determine
the parties’ intent).

• When the language of an insurance policy is clear, courts lack
the authority to change or alter its terms under the guise of
interpretation. The determination of whether a contract is clear or
ambiguous is a question of law.

Lombard at pp. 25-26, 398 So.3d at 19 (citing Moon v. Safeway Ins. Co. of

Louisiana, 2022-0455, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/6/22), 353 So.3d 352, 356).

“Although the insured bears the burden of proving a policy of insurance

affords coverage for an incident, the insurer bears the burden of proving the

applicability of an exclusionary clause within a policy.” Cosey v. Flight Academy

of New Orleans, LLC, 2019-0757, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/13/20), 364 So.3d

226, 231 (citing Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 2003-1424, p. 12 (La. 4/14/04), 870

So.2d 1002, 1010). “The exclusionary provisions of an insurance contract are

strictly construed against the insurer, and any ambiguity in the exclusion is

construed in favor of the insured.” Calix v. Ideal Market # 6, 2021-0555, pp. 6-7

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(La. App. 5 Cir. 7/13/22), 396 So.3d 458, 464 (citing Garcia v. St. Bernard Parish

Sch. Bd., 576 So.2d 975 (La. 1991)).

As this Court held in King v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 2016-0170, pp. 6-7 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 9/7/16), 200 So.3d 989, 993-994:

“An insurer, like other individuals, is entitled to limit its
liability and to impose and enforce reasonable conditions upon the
policy obligations it contractually assumes; it may change or amend
the coverage provided by the policy by an endorsement attached to the
policy as long as the provisions and/or endorsements do not conflict
with statutory law or public policy.” Zeitoun v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd.,
2009–1130, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/10), 33 So.3d 361, 365 (citing
Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 93-0911 at p. 6, 630 So.2d at 763). “If an
endorsement is attached to the policy and the policy and endorsements
are parts of the same contract, the endorsement becomes part of the
contract, and the two must be construed together.” Zeitoun, 2009-1130
at p. 4, 33 So.3d at 365 (citing Mattingly v. Sportsline, Inc., 98-230, p.
7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/98), 720 So.2d 1227, 1230). “If a conflict
between the endorsement and the policy exists, the endorsement
prevails.” Zeitoun, 2009-1130 at p. 4, 33 So.3d at 365 (citing Chicago
Property Interests, L.L.C. v. Broussard, 2008-526, p. 10 (La. App. 5
Cir. 1/13/09), 8 So.3d 42, 49). “If coverage is provided in the policy,
but then excluded in the endorsement to the policy, coverage will be
excluded.” Id.

Moreover, in Eads v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., 2013-0224, p. 10 (La. App.

3 Cir. 2/26/14), 133 So.3d 722, 728 (quoting Sims v. Guerrero, 39,091, pp. 4-5

(La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/04), 889 So.2d 1184, 1186), considering whether a policy

endorsement creates an ambiguity, the Third Circuit Court further recognized:

[I]f the exclusion found in the endorsement provides a narrower
scope of coverage than the provisions in other sections of this policy,
such differences do not necessarily create ambiguity. The extent of
coverage is determined by the parties’ intent as reflected by the words
of the policy; the intent is to be determined in accordance with the
general, ordinary, plain and popular meaning of the policy’s words,
unless those words have acquired a technical meaning. Ledbetter v.
Concord General Corporation, 95-0809 (La.01/06/96), 665 So.2d
1166. The very purpose of exclusions added through endorsements is
to change what otherwise would be the meaning of the terms in the
policy or the scope of the coverage. The use of such endorsements
allows the parties to adjust a policy without having to confect an
entire new policy in place of a “standard” policy.

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As stated above, the Endorsement in the Maison Policy excludes

coverage for:

“Bodily injury” or “property damage” because of or originating
from:

The use, supervision, care, custody or control of any “insured”, or
that of your “employee”, agent, visitor or tenant, of a recreational
off road or unlicensed vehicle, including but not limited to,
ATV’s, 3-wheelers, 4-wheelers, dune buggies, rock climbers, go-
carts, minibikes, dirt bikes, snowmobiles, motorized skateboards,
and motorized scooters: (Emphasis added).

It is undisputed that the golf cart in question was a recreational off-

road vehicle and that it was an unlicensed vehicle. In response to Requests

For Admissions issued by UPC, Plaintiffs admitted that the golf cart was not

registered with the Louisiana Department of Motor Vehicles.

The Maison Policy represents that “THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES

THE POLICY.” The Endorsement clearly provides for a narrower scope of

coverage than Section 2(d)(1) and unambiguously excludes coverage for Plaintiffs’

claims. Moreover, even if the Endorsement was viewed to be in conflict with

Section 2(d)(1), the prevailing jurisprudence provides that the Endorsement

prevails. Finally, we note that Plaintiffs do not assert that the Maison Policy

language conflicts with statutory law or public policy.

After strictly construing the Endorsement, which narrows the insurer’s

obligation, we find that the Maison Policy did not provide coverage for the

damages arising out of Mrs. Bayhi’s use of an unlicensed golf cart. Thus, we find

no merit in Plaintiffs’ first assignment of error that the trial court improperly

applied the Endorsement to conclude that the Maison Policy does not provide

coverage.

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Likewise, we find no merit in Plaintiffs’ remaining argument that the trial

court erred in reasoning that the Endorsement contained in the UPC Policy was

“nearly identical” to the Maison Policy Endorsement. We note that the trial court

did reference the UPC Policy Endorsement in its Reasons for Judgment, stating

that the “UPC insurance provision was nearly identical to the one in the Maison

Policy.” However, it is well-settled that appellate courts review judgments, not

reasons for judgment.3

The excerpt from the UPC Policy that is contained in this record states as

follows:

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE
READ IT CAREFULLY.

RECREATIONAL OR SERVICE VEHICLE EXCLUSION
ENDORSEMENT

This insurance will not provide coverage or payments for indemnity
or expense costs under any part of the policy for any occurrence
arising wholly or in part out of or in connection with the following
activities:

Any ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle or other
motorized land conveyance designed for recreational or service use
off public roads or which is not subject to motor vehicle registration.

All other provisions and exclusions of this policy apply.

While not necessarily identical, it is clear that the endorsements contained in

the two policies have similar language. Regardless, after reviewing this matter de

novo and applying the general principles of contract interpretation, we conclude

that the Maison Policy unambiguously excludes coverage for Plaintiffs’ claims.

3 3000-3032 St. Claude Avenue, LLC v. City of New Orleans, 2022-0813, p 11 (La. App. 4 Cir.

6/22/23), 368, 1160, 1170, n. 2 (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, appellate courts may
review the trial court’s reasons for judgment to gain insight into the trial court’s judgment. See
Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2009-0571, p. 77 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error on the part of the trial court in

granting summary judgment in favor of LIGA. Accordingly, the October 10, 2024

Judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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