Henry Consulting, LLC v. the New Orleans City Council

HENRY CONSULTING, LLC * NO. 2025-CA-0171

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

THE NEW ORLEANS CITY * FOURTH CIRCUIT
COUNCIL
* STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

RAMELLI JANITORIAL SERVICES, INC. NO. 2025-CA-0172

VERSUS

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, HENRY
CONSULTING, LLC., THE COUNCIL OF
THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2024-11139, DIVISION “M”
Honorable Paulette R. Irons
******
Judge Monique G. Morial
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins,
Judge Monique G. Morial)

LOBRANO, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS
JENKINS, J., CONCURS IN RESULT AND ASSIGNS REASONS

Kim M. Boyle
Allen C. Miller, Sr.
Jesse C. Stewart
Mark D. Ackal
PHELPS DUNBAR LLP
365 Canal Street
Suite 2000
New Orleans, LA 70130-6534

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

Judy Y. Barrasso
Shaun P. McFall
Aaron M. Steeg
BARRASSO USDIN KUPPERMAN FREEMAN & SARVER, LLC
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2350
New Orleans, LA 70112

Adam J. Swensek
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
1300 Perdido Street
Room 5E03
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

REVERSED
AUGUST 15, 2025

Appellants, the New Orleans City Council and its individual members,

MGM appeal the district court’s December 16, 2024 judgment granting mandamus relief,

ordering the Council to make a motion to vote and authorize the Council

President’s signature to a city contract between the City of New Orleans and

Appellee, Henry Consulting, L.L.C. For the following reasons, we reverse the

district court’s judgment.

Factual and Procedural History

On December 9, 2024, Henry Consulting, L.L.C. (“Henry”) filed a “Petition

for Writ of Mandamus” against the New Orleans City Council and its individual

members1 (collectively “the Council”), contending that the Council improperly

refused to authorize the Council President’s signature to a professional services

agreement (“PSA”) between the City of New Orleans and Henry. The petition

alleged that the City of New Orleans issued a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) on

May 7, 2024, for “Service Area 5 French Quarter and Downtown Development

1 The petition named individual Council members Helena Moreno, Jean-Paul Morrell, Lesli

Harris, Freddie King, III, Joseph Giarrusso, Eugene Green, and Oliver Thomas in their official
capacities only.

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District (“DDD”) Sanitation Services” and that Henry submitted its response to the

RFP, including a technical proposal and a price proposal, on June 21, 2024. The

PSA between the City of New Orleans and Henry for services was approved and

executed by the Mayor of New Orleans on December 9, 2024. Helena Moreno, the

then Council President, however, did not execute or sign the designated signature

space to authorize the PSA between the City of New Orleans and Henry.

In its petition, Henry alleged that the Council’s refusal to authorize and the

Council President’s refusal to sign the PSA is in violation of the New Orleans

Home Rule Charter (“HRC”) and the Code of the City of New Orleans,

specifically Chapter 70, Article I, Section 70-10 (“the Ordinance”). Henry

contended that the HRC and the Ordinance at issue require that the Council move

to authorize the Council President to sign any contract or PSA previously approved

and executed by the Mayor. Henry asserted that the Council’s motion and the

Council President’s signature are mandatory and ministerial duties required by the

HRC and the Ordinance. Henry alleged that the Council has “failed to perform the

purely administerial function of calling a motion to authorize the Council President

to sign the Henry PSA.” Henry alleged that the “Council’s failure to call a motion,

and the Council President’s failure to sign the Henry PSA is arbitrary, capricious,

an abuse of discretion, and a direct threat to the health and safety of the citizens of

New Orleans… .”2 Henry sought mandamus relief, asking the trial court to compel

“the City Council, through its President, to sign the Henry PSA.”3

2 Henry alleged that the Council refused to authorize the Council President’s signature on the

PSA in light of Henry’s subcontractor modification request, in which Henry sought to replace the

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The district court conducted a hearing on December 16, 2024. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the petition for mandamus.

The district judge found that the Ordinance requires the Council to make a motion

to authorize the Council President to sign any city contract executed and presented

by the Mayor. The district judge found that the language of the Ordinance

provides simple ministerial actions required by the Council and Council President

and subsequently granted mandamus relief, issuing “a writ against the City Council

and its members directing the Council to vote and the Council President to sign the

Henry public service contract.” This timely appeal followed.

Law and Analysis

“A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the

performance of a ministerial duty required by law... .” La. C.C.P. art. 3863. A

ministerial duty is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or

proved to exist, and imposed by law. Hoag v. State, 04-0857, p. 7 (La. 12/1/04),

889 So.2d 1019, 1024 (quotations omitted). Ministerial duties are duties in which

no element of discretion is left to the public officer. Id.

This Court has recently stated:

‘A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be applied where
ordinary means fail to afford adequate relief.’ Hoag v. State, 04-0857,
p. 6 (La. 12/01/04), 889 So.2d 1019, 1023. The remedy ‘must be used
sparingly ... to compel action that is clearly provided by law.’ Hamp’s

original contractor, Richard’s Disposal, Inc. (“RDI”) with another subcontractor, Clean Force.
On November 14, 2024, RDI filed suit against Henry, alleging that RDI and Henry had reached
an agreement for RDI to act as subcontractor for the PSA contract at issue with the City and
seeking injunctive relief prohibiting Henry from contracting with any other subcontractor for the
PSA. Subsequently, RDI’s suit for injunctive relief was consolidated with the instant case at the
district court level. The injunctive suit is not before this Court at this time.
3 In its petition, Henry acknowledges that “[t]his is a mandamus action only, and does not

challenge the underlying legality of the Ordinance.”

3

Const., L.L.C. v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 10–0816, pp. 3-4 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 12/01/10), 52 So.3d 970, 973, quoting Allen v. St.
Tammany Parish Police Jury, 96–0938, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97),
690 So.2d 150, 153. ‘Mandamus will not lie in matters in which
discretion and evaluation of evidence must be exercised.’ Hamp’s, 10-
0816, p. 4, 52 So.3d at 973. ‘The remedy is not available to command
the performance of an act that contains any element of discretion,
however slight.’ Id.

Humane Soc’y of New Orleans v. Landrieu, 13-1059, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.
2/26/14), 135 So.3d 1195, 1197 (quoting A.M.E. Disaster Recovery Servs.,
Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 10-1755, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/24/11), 72
So.3d 454, 459).

Thus, mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy and is not available to

command performance of an act that contains any element of discretion, however

slight. Id. A writ of mandamus is never granted in doubtful cases. State ex rel.

Hutton v. City of Baton Rouge, 217 La. 857, 869, 47 So.2d 665, 669 (1950);

Russell v. Morrell, 11-1635, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/2/12), 91 So.3d 533, 534.

“Generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s judgment on a writ of

mandamus under an abuse of discretion standard.” Commodore v. City of New

Orleans, 19-0127, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/20/19), 275 So.3d 457, 465. “However,

questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed by

appellate courts under the de novo standard of review… .” Id; see also Cooley v.

Williams, 22-0564, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/23), 358 So.3d 127, 129.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether Appellant Henry is entitled

to mandamus relief under the facts of this case. The parties do not contest the

validity of the Ordinance in this litigation and, nevertheless, “a mandamus

proceeding is not a proper proceeding for a relator to attack the validity of a

statute.” State ex rel. Hutton, 47 So.2d at 668.

Our analysis requires review and interpretation of the Ordinance to

determine whether there is discretion, however slight, as to whether the Council is

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required to make a motion to authorize the Council President to sign contracts

executed by the Mayor. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated the following

general principles concerning interpretation of statutory language:

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of
the statute itself. Id. Thus, “[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall
be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in
search of the intent of the legislature.” La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1:4.
However, “[w]hen the language of the law is susceptible of different
meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best
conforms to the purpose of the law.” La. C.C. art. 10. Moreover,
“[w]hen the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be
sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of
the law as a whole.” La. C.C. art. 12.

Carollo v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 21-01670, pp. 12-13 (La. 9/1/22), 346 So.3d
751, 759-60.

The Ordinance at issue in this litigation, in pertinent part, provides:

Sec. 70-10. - Execution by council president.

(a) The following contracts must be signed by the president of the city
council, in addition to the signatories required by section 6-308 of
the Home Rule Charter:

(1) Any contract providing for the aggregate expenditure of more
than $1,000,000.00 in city funds during the initial term and all
allowable renewal terms or having an initial term of more than one
year; and
(2) Any professional services agreement providing for legal
representation on behalf of the city, including any city department,
board, or officer, together with any amendment or extension
thereof.

(b) The president of the city council shall not execute any agreement
pursuant to this section unless authorized to do so by council motion.

Henry points to the Ordinance language in subsection (a) directing that

contracts “must be signed by the president of the city council,” and argues that

such language sets forth a ministerial and mandatory action or function of the

Council President—instructing that the Council President must sign contracts

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presented. The Council, on the other hand, points to the similarly mandatory

language in subsection (b) providing that the Council President “shall not execute

any agreement…unless authorized to do so by council motion.” (emphasis added).

The Council argues that the Council President is not authorized to sign any

contract unless the Council has made a motion to authorize the Council President

to do so.

The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative

intent. Carollo, 21-01670, p. 12, 346 So.3d at 759 (quotations omitted). The

Ordinance at issue was initially ordained as Section 70-10 of the Code of the City

of New Orleans on November 27, 2022. The preamble language considered by the

Council in connection with the passing of the Ordinance provided the following

context for the amendment of the Code of the City of New Orleans:

AN ORDINANCE to ordain Section 70-10 of the Code of the City of
New Orleans relative to the approval and execution of City of New
Orleans contracts valued at more than one million dollars
($1,000,000) or having a term of more than one (1) year by the City
Council; and otherwise to provide with respect thereto.

WHEREAS, Section 6-308 of the Home Rule Charter provides:
“[t]he Council may by ordinance provide for the manner of executing
other contracts and may in the case of any contract require the
signatures of other officers in addition to those specified in this
Section as it may deem proper for the protection of the interests of the
City;” and

WHEREAS, it is in the public interest to ensure community
awareness of and engagement on matters pertaining to significant
taxpayer expense; and

WHEREAS, the City Council serves as the representative body of the
citizens of the City of New Orleans and desires to consider public
input prior to the expenditure of taxpayer dollars; NOW
THEREFORE

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SECTION 1. THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW
ORLEANS HEREBY ORDAINS, That the Code of the City of New
Orleans, Louisiana, is hereby amended by adding a section to be
numbered as section 70-10…

NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE of ORDINANCES, ch. 70, art. I § 70-10 (M.C.S.
Ord. No. 29258, § 1, eff. 11-27-2022)(Preamble)(emphasis added).

The preamble language demonstrates that the Ordinance at issue was

considered and drafted “relative to the approval and execution” of certain city

contracts. The preamble language also references HRC Section 6-308, which

provides authority for the Council to pass ordinances relative to city contracts in an

effort to protect the interests of the City of New Orleans.4 Reading the preamble

language preceding the enactment of Section 70-10 in conjunction with the

language in the Ordinance itself, we find that such language supports a finding that

the Council’s intent or purpose, relying on Section 6-308 of the HRC, was to place

restrictions or additional requirements on certain city contracts in excess of

$1,000,000.00 or with a term exceeding one year in an effort to protect the interests

of the City of New Orleans.

Considering the plain language of Section 70-10, which provides that the

Council President “shall not” sign such contracts “unless authorized to do so by

Council motion,” we find that the Council President’s signature is not a ministerial

and mandatory duty clearly provided for by law. Rather, the language in subsection

(b) of the Ordinance itself directs that the Council President shall not sign such

contracts unless the Council authorizes him or her to do so. Therefore, the Council

President’s duty to sign city contracts is not definite and ministerial unless

4 The New Orleans Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 6-308(7) provides:

The Council may by ordinance provide for the manner of executing other
contracts and may in the case of any contract require the signatures of
other officers in addition to those specified in this Section as it may deem
proper for the protection of the interests of the City.

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authorized by Council motion and, thus, is not appropriate to compel by a writ of

mandamus in this case.

Turning to whether the Council has a duty to make a motion to authorize the

Council President’s signature, the Ordinance does not contain any mandatory

language clearly directing the Council to make such a motion. Mandamus relief is

an extraordinary remedy and is only awarded when appropriate to “compel the

performance of a ministerial duty required by law.” La. C.C.P. art. 3863 (emphasis

added). If there is any doubt that the performance sought to be commanded is

clearly provided for by law, mandamus relief cannot lie. Humane Soc’y of New

Orleans, 13-1059, p. 3, 135 So.3d at 1197. Because the Ordinance appears to

grant discretion to the Council as to whether to make a motion to authorize the

Council President’s signature on certain city contracts, or at least presents doubt as

to whether such action is required, we find mandamus relief is not proper in this

case.

Decree

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s December 16, 2024 judgment

granting mandamus relief, and dismiss Henry’s petition for mandamus.

REVERSED

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