Bobbi Harrigan O/B/O Matthew Surgenor, Robert Surgenor, and Cathy Surgenor v. Dr. William Risher and University Medical Center - New Orleans

BOBBI HARRIGAN O/B/O * NO. 2025-CA-0309
MATTHEW SURGENOR,
ROBERT SURGENOR, AND *
CATHY SURGENOR COURT OF APPEAL
*
VERSUS FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
DR. WILLIAM RISHER AND STATE OF LOUISIANA
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL *******
CENTER - NEW ORLEANS

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2023-10791, DIVISION “A”
Honorable Ellen M. Hazeur
******
Judge Monique G. Morial
******
(Court composed of Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge
Monique G. Morial)

CHASE, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT

George M. McGregor
Cesar R. Burgos
Robert J. Daigre
Leila M. Bonilla
N. Blake Peters
Colin Leonard
William R. Penton, III
BURGOS, DAIGRE & McGREGOR, LLC
3535 Canal Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS

Kelli M. Khalaf
J. Marc Vezina
VEZINA AND GATTUSO, L.L.C.
401 Weyer Street
P. O. Box 461
Gretna, LA 70054

Elizabeth Baker Murrill
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Louisiana Department of Justice
Litigation Division
1885 North Third Street, 3rd Floor
Baton Rouge, LA 70802

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES

AFFIRMED
DECEMBER 10, 2025

In this medical malpractice litigation, Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s

judgment dismissing their medical malpractice suit filed against defendant Dr.
MGM
DNA
William Risher for failure to request service against him within a 90-day period as

required under La. R.S. 13:5107(D). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 18, 2023, Plaintiffs, the descendants of Dennis Surgenor1,

filed a medical malpractice suit against Dr. William Risher and University Medical

Center (“UMC”) arising out of Mr. Surgenor’s death following his November 14,

2019 esophagectomy/jejunostomy procedure performed by defendant Dr. Risher at

UMC.2

On February 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental and Amending Petition

naming Dr. Risher, UMC, and the State of Louisiana, Louisiana State University

1 The named Plaintiffs are Bobbi Harrigan, on behalf of Matthew Surgenor, Robert Surgenor and

Cathy Surgenor.
2 On October 13, 2023, University Medical Center Management Corp. d/b/a University Medical

Center, after receiving service of the original petition, filed an Answer to the original petition.
On April 12, 2024, UMC filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Dr. Risher is not
and was not an employee of UMC at the time of the alleged malpractice. On July 1, 2024, the
trial court granted UMC’s motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs’ suit against UMC was
dismissed with prejudice.

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Health Sciences Center (“LSUHSC”), Dr. Risher’s employer at the time of the

alleged malpractice. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs withheld service of the petition

on Dr. Risher and that he was never served with the initial petition for damages.

The first request for service reflected in the record upon Dr. Risher was with the

filing of the supplemental and amending petition on February 2, 2024,

approximately 137 days after the filing of the initial petition. The record further

reflects that Dr. Risher was served with the supplemental and amending petition on

March 12, 2024.

On January 5, 2024, Dr. Risher filed a “Motion to Dismiss” pursuant to La.

R.S. 13:5107(D), La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C), and La. C.C.P. art. 1672, seeking to have

Plaintiffs’ petition dismissed without prejudice for failure to serve him timely

within the 90-day period provided for in La. R.S. 13:5107(D).3 The trial court set

the motion to dismiss for contradictory hearing on February 23, 2024. The matter

was continued on multiple occasions.4

Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Dr. Risher’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs did

not dispute that Dr. Risher was never served with the initial petition. Plaintiffs’

3Defendant in this case filed a contradictory motion rather than a declinatory exception of
insufficiency of service of process. This Court has held that, “[i]f the requirements of Article
1201(C) are not followed, a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1672(C)
is the proper procedural vehicle to obtain a dismissal of the claims.” Draten v. Univ. Med. Ctr.
Mgmt. Corp., 20-0519, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/21/21), 325 So.3d 441, 445, n.2 (citing Filson v.
Windsor Court Hotel, 04-2893, p. 9 (La. 6/29/05), 907 So.2d 723, 729-30). Moreover, La.
C.C.P. art. 1201(C), which controls general service requirements, was recently amended to
expressly permit the filing of a contradictory motion in addition to the filing of a declinatory
exception of insufficiency of service of process where a party complains of insufficient service.
La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(2) further provides that “[i]f service is not requested… the action shall be
dismissed without prejudice, after contradictory motion… .” In this appeal, no party has objected
to or assigned as error the procedural vehicle utilized to raise the issue of insufficiency of service
in this matter.
4 On March 14, 2024, Dr. Risher filed a “Motion to Reset Motion to Dismiss.” On May 14,

2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion to continue and reset the motion to dismiss due to a
scheduling conflict. On May 31, 2024, Dr. Risher filed a motion to reset his previously filed
motion to dismiss without prejudice, which was granted, and the matter was reset to July 26,
2024.

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counsel claimed that the decision was made to hold service of the initial petition

upon Dr. Risher as a courtesy to spare Dr. Risher the embarrassment of being

served by the sheriff at his office in front of patients. In their opposition, Plaintiffs

argued first that the subsequent filing of the supplemental and amending petition,

which was properly served upon Dr. Risher, rendered the motion to dismiss

concerning the initial petition “moot.” Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that his office

was advised by Dr. Risher’s counsel that Plaintiffs needed to amend their petition

to name as a defendant LSUHSC and to properly serve the petition on the Attorney

General, Office of Risk Management, and Board of Supervisors of LSUHSC.

Plaintiffs’ counsel further contended that defense counsel advised their office by

telephone that if a supplemental petition were filed and properly served, the motion

to dismiss would be rendered moot.

The documents attached to the opposition to the motion to dismiss include

email correspondence between the law clerk for the district court and the parties’

attorneys, wherein the law clerk states:

I am emailing in regards to a hearing that is scheduled for Friday,
February 23rd in the above referenced matter. Based on my review of
the record, Plaintiffs were served with the rule to show cause, and no
opposition was filed. Are the parties entering into a consent
judgment? If so, please let the Court know by Wednesday, February
21st at 4:00 p.m.

On February 18, 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded to the court indicating

that it was his understanding that, in light of the supplemental petition filed and

served, the motion to dismiss was rendered moot and the matter should be removed

from the docket. On February 18, 2024, Dr. Risher’s counsel responded to the

court and counsel, “[y]ou are correct.”

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Dr. Risher filed a reply memorandum to the opposition, arguing that

dismissal without prejudice is mandatory under the facts of this case under La. R.S.

13:5107—where service was not requested within 90 days and the supplemental

and amending petition with proper service requested was made outside of the

original 90-day period. Dr. Risher’s counsel further argued that her e-mail

communication to opposing counsel and the court did not constitute an express

written waiver of service on behalf of her client, but rather was communicated only

with the intent to inform the court that the matter should be removed from the

February 23, 2024 docket, as she was unavailable on that date.

On July 26, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to

dismiss. At the hearing, Dr. Risher’s counsel argued that she never intended to

expressly waive service on behalf of Dr. Risher, that she did not have authority

from her client to do so, and that she never filed a written motion to withdraw the

previously filed motion to dismiss. She explained that initially, while speaking by

telephone with Plaintiffs’ counsel’s staff, wherein she provided additional service

information verbally as to how to properly serve LSUHSC and Dr. Risher, she

confused this case with another pending case in the office in which service upon

the state defendant had been requested within the 90-day period. Further,

concerning her email communication to the court, counsel asserted that she never

intended to withdraw her motion to dismiss but rather simply desired to have the

matter removed from the Court’s February 23, 2024 docket. Counsel explained to

the court that the hearing on the motion to dismiss was scheduled for the Friday

before Mardi Gras, a date on which she would not be available. Dr. Risher’s

counsel further pointed out that both the phone call with a staff member of

opposing counsel’s office as well as the email communication to the court

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concerning removing the matter from the docket occurred after the initial 90-day

period had expired.

At the conclusion of the hearing, after considering all evidence introduced

by the parties, the trial court found that neither the verbal telephone

communications between Dr. Risher’s counsel and opposing counsel’s staff nor the

email communication to the court and opposing counsel constituted “an express

waiver of service on behalf of her client” in writing as required under La. R.S.

13:5107. The trial court further made a factual determination that Plaintiffs did not

meet their burden to show that “good cause” existed for their failure to request

service upon Dr. Risher within the initial 90-day period after the filing of the initial

petition. The trial court granted Dr. Risher’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the

suit against Dr. Risher without prejudice.5 This timely appeal followed.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s judgment granting Dr. Risher’s motion to

dismiss, contending (1) that the filing of the supplemental and amending petition

cured any service deficiency of the initial petition and (2) Dr. Risher expressly

waived the statutory service requirements through oral and written

communications to counsel.

La. R.S. 13:5107(D) controls the service requirements and consequences for

failure to properly request service when the state or a state agency or employee is

named as a defendant in suit. La. R.S. 13:5107(D) provides:

(1) In all suits in which the state, a state agency, or political
subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof is named as a party,

5 The trial court initially executed the judgment on December 19, 2024, but failed to include the

required decretal language dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims and, thus, the trial court amended
the judgment on February 19, 2025.

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service of citation shall be requested within ninety days of the
commencement of the action or the filing of a supplemental or
amended petition which initially names the state, a state agency, or
political subdivision or any officer or employee thereof as a party.
This requirement may be expressly waived by the defendant in such
action by any written waiver. If not waived, a request for service of
citation upon the defendant shall be considered timely if requested on
the defendant within the time period provided by this Section,
notwithstanding insufficient or erroneous service.

(2) If service is not requested by the party filing the action within the
period required in Paragraph (1) of this Subsection, the action shall be
dismissed without prejudice, after contradictory motion as provided in
Code of Civil Procedure Article 1672(C), as to the state, state agency,
or political subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof, upon
whom service was not requested within the period required by
Paragraph (1) of this Subsection.6

This Court has previously addressed the service requirements involved when

a lawsuit names as a defendant a state office, agency, or employee:

As mandated by La. R.S. 13:5107(D) and La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C),
service shall be requested within ninety days of filing suit where the
State or state agency, officer, or employee is a named party.
Moreover, unless good cause is shown, the action shall be dismissed
as to the party for whom service has not been timely requested upon
sustaining said party's declinatory exception pursuant to La. C.C.P.
art. 1672(C).

Velasquez v. Chesson, 13-1260, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/8/14), 151 So.3d 812,
813–14, writ denied, 14-2361 (La. 2/27/15), 159 So.3d 1067(footnotes omitted).

On appeal, a judgment dismissing an action for failure to timely request

service is subject to the manifest error standard of review. Llopis v. Louisiana State

Bd. of Dentistry, 13–0659, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/11/14), 143 So.3d 1211, 1214.

6 La. C.C.P. art. 1672(C) provides:

C. A judgment dismissing an action without prejudice shall be rendered as to a
person named as a defendant for whom service has not been requested within the
time prescribed by Article 1201(C) or 3955 upon the sustaining of a declinatory
exception filed by such defendant, or upon contradictory motion of any other
party, unless good cause is shown why service could not be requested, in which
case the court may order that service be effected within a specified time.

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In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs failed to request service of the

initial petition, filed on September 18, 2023, upon the state defendant-employee

Dr. Risher within the required 90-day period. In their first assignment of error on

appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the filing of the supplemental and amending petition,

filed on February 2, 2024, and properly served upon Dr. Risher on March 12, 2024,

cured any service defect in the initial petition. In support of their argument,

Plaintiffs point to this Court’s decision in Llopis v. Louisiana State Board of

Dentistry, 13-659 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/11/14), 143 So.3d 1211.

In Llopis, this Court found that service of a supplemental and amending

petition, incorporating all allegations set forth in the initial petition not first served

upon the state defendant, would satisfy the service requirements provided in La.

R.S. 13:5107. However, in Llopis, this Court emphasized that service in that case

was made within the statutorily required 90-day period from the date of the filing

of the original or initial petition. Moreover, this Court in Llopis noted that key

distinction from other appellate court decisions where the filing and service of an

amended and supplemental petition was requested outside of the original 90-day

period. Llopis, 13-659, pp. 6-7, 143 So.3d at 1215.7 Upon review of the record, we

find that Llopis is factually distinguishable from the instant case, where service

7 The Court in Llopis stated:

This case is distinguishable from the Fifth Circuit case of Pylant v. Jefferson
Parish, State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals, 05–148 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 6/28/05), 907 So.2d 807, in which a request for service of process
on the correct agent was not made within ninety days of filing suit. This case is
also distinguishable from the Fifth Circuit case of McGuire v. Environmental
Monitoring Service, Inc., 03–497 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 865 So.2d 759, in
which the amended petition was filed more than ninety days after the filing of
the original petition.

Llopis v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 13-0659, p. 7, 143 So.3d at 1215, n.3.

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upon Dr. Risher of any petition was not requested within the statutorily required

90-day period from the date of the filing of the initial petition.

In their second assignment of error, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Risher’s

counsel’s communications to opposing counsel and to the court constitute an

express waiver of service. La. R.S. 13:5107 provides that the statutory service

requirements may be “expressly waived by the defendant in such action by any

written waiver.” La. R.S. 13:5107(D). The specific statutory provisions require an

express, written waiver of the 90–day service requirement in suits against political

subdivisions and their employees, and neither an implied waiver nor an oral waiver

will suffice. Davis v. Caraway, 14-264, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/14), 164

So.3d 223, 226; Filson v. Windsor Ct. Hotel, 04-2893, p. 9 (La. 6/29/05), 907

So.2d 723, 729.

This Court reviews a judgment dismissing an action for failure to timely

request service under the manifest error standard of review. Llopis, supra. This

Court has stated:

Under the manifest error standard, in order to reverse a trial court’s
determination of a fact, an appellate court must review the record in
its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist
for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes
that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.

Draten v. Univ. Med. Ctr. Mgmt. Corp., 20-0519, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/21/21),

325 So.3d 441, 444 (citing Allerton v. Broussard, 10-2071, p. 3 (La. 12/10/10), 50

So.3d 145, 147).

The trial court considered the following: (1) arguments of counsel presented

at the hearing on the motion to dismiss explaining the need to remove the motion

to dismiss from the docket and (2) evidence introduced of the email

communications between the trial court’s law clerk and all counsel concerning the

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scheduling of the motion hearing. Based on the foregoing, the trial court made a

factual determination that Dr. Risher’s counsel did not execute an express, written

waiver of the 90-day service requirement on behalf of her client as contemplated

under La. R.S. 13:5107. Considering the record before us, we cannot find that the

trial judge was manifestly erroneous in this factual finding.

DECREE

Accordingly, for the reasons provided herein, the February 19, 2025 trial

court judgment granting defendant Dr. Risher’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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