Go Green Disposal & Recycling, LLC and Anwar Gaber v. Mabb Productions, LLC

GO GREEN DISPOSAL & * NO. 2025-CA-0408
RECYCLING, LLC AND
ANWAR GABER *
COURT OF APPEAL
VERSUS *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
MABB PRODUCTIONS, LLC *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2023-02165, DIVISION “D”
Honorable Monique E. Barial, Judge
******
Judge Dale N. Atkins
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase,
Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Joseph B. Landry, Jr.
JOSEPH B. LANDRY, JR., LLC
3015 19th Street
Metairie, LA 70002

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES, Go Green Disposal &
Recycling and Anwar Gaber

Michael A. Mahone, Jr.
THE MAHONE FIRM LLC
111 Veterans Memorial Blvd., Suite 810
Metairie, LA 70005

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, MABB Productions, LLC

AFFIRMED
FEBRUARY 9, 2026

DNA

RLB

TGC

The civil lawsuit underlying this present appeal concerned an alleged breach

of contract and resulted in a default judgment. In the present appeal, Appellant,

MABB Productions, LLC (“MABB”), seeks review of the trial court’s February

18, 2025 judgment, which granted in part and denied in part the Petition to Annul

Default Judgment (“Petition to Annul”) filed by Appellees, Go Green Disposal &

Recycling, LLC (“Go Green”), and Anwar Gaber (“Mr. Gaber”) (collectively

“Appellees”). Specifically, the judgment granted Appellees’ Petition to Annul and

annulled the default judgment as to Mr. Gaber, finding improper service of

process; but the trial court denied Appellees’ Petition to Annul with respect to Go

Green. MABB only seeks review of the judgment in the former regard, not the

latter. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment insofar as it

granted the Petition to Annul and annulled the default judgment as to Mr. Gaber.

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

MABB’s Petition for Damages and Default Judgment

On April 26, 2019, MABB filed a Petition for Damages against Mr. Gaber

and Go Green, wherein it asserted that Go Green breached a contract confected

between Go Green and MABB. In the Petition for Damages, MABB also asserted

1

that Mr. Gaber had personally guaranteed the amounts owed by Go Green under

the contract such that he was solidarily liable to MABB for the payments owed. On

May 31, 2019, MABB requested service on Go Green and Mr. Gaber. In pertinent

part, MABB requested service on Mr. Gaber individually at 3617 Corinne Ave.,

Chalmette, LA 70043 (“3617 Corinne”), his family home.1 Ultimately, Lieutenant

Walter R. Geiser (“Lieutenant Geiser”) of the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office

served MABB’s Petition for Damages on Mr. Gaber’s wife at 3617 Corinne in

June 2019.2

Subsequently, with no answer forthcoming from Mr. Gaber or Go Green,

MABB filed a “Motion for Default Judgment” and, in pertinent part, attached an

affidavit from Lieutenant Geiser who attested that he served MABB’s Petition for

Damages in June 2019 on Mr. Gaber’s wife at 3617 Corinne, thereby effectuating

domiciliary service on Mr. Gaber. On June 7, 2022, the trial court granted

MABB’s Motion for Default Judgment and entered judgment in favor of MABB

for the amount allegedly due on the contract plus interest.

1 As delineated later in this Opinion, MABB and Appellees ultimately stipulated to
certain facts ahead of the trial on Appellees’ Petition to Annul. In pertinent part, they stipulated:

Other than a brief period when [Mr. Gaber] was living in Florida for work and . . .
in a prison camp in Alabama for 6 months or thereafter in a residential reentry
center in New Orleans for 6 months, he continuously lived at 3617 Corinne from
the time that he and [his wife] purchased the home in approximately 2006 through
the present day.
2 The parties also debated the sufficiency of the service of process on Go Green before

the trial court. However, because neither MABB nor Appellees assigned error to the trial court’s
denial of MABB’s Petition to Annul with regard to Go Green, this Opinion’s focus is on the
propriety of the service of process on Mr. Gaber.

2

Appellees’ Petitions to Annul

Thereafter, Appellees filed their Petition to Annul.3 In pertinent part,

Appellees explained that on the date “on which [MABB] contend[ed] to have

effected domiciliary service on [Mr.] Gaber, in his individual capacity, Mr. Gaber

was in the custody of the United States Government, Federal Bureau of Prisons,”

such that “3617 Corinne . . . was not [his] dwelling house or usual place of abode,

as required for domiciliary service under [La. C.C.P.] [a]rt. 1234.” Moreover,

Appellees asserted MABB knew of Mr. Gaber’s status in federal custody yet failed

to serve him in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1 as it should have.4

Joint Pretrial Outline

On November 4, 2024, Appellees and MABB filed a Joint Pretrial Outline.

Therein, in pertinent part, the parties jointly agreed that “[i]n or around 2018, [Mr.]

Gaber plead guilty to misbranding of a product and was sentenced to one year

which consisted of 6 months of incarceration in a federal prison camp in

Montgomery, Alabama,” as well as “6 months in a residential reentry center in

New Orleans, Louisiana.” Further, MABB and Appellees stipulated that Mr. Gaber

“was transferred from the federal prison camp to the [Volunteers of America]

residential reentry center [in New Orleans, Louisiana (“VA residential reentry

center”),] in February 2019” and “left the [VA] residential reentry center in July

2019,” whereupon he “immediately returned to live at his house at 3617 Corinne.”

Additionally, the parties agreed that Lieutenant Geiser served MABB’s

Petition for Damages on Mr. Gaber’s wife in June 2019 at 3617 Corinne “as a
3 Some of the arguments asserted by Appellees as to why the trial court should annul its

default judgment arose in subsequent, supplemental and amending petitions to annul. For ease,
this Opinion will refer to all of these filings collectively as Appellees’ “Petition to Annul.”
4 As we will discuss more fully throughout this Opinion, La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1 pertains

to “Service on [an] incarcerated person.”

3

means to effectuating domiciliary service upon [Mr.] Gaber in his individual

capacity.” MABB and Appellees specified, however, that they were “not

stipulating that such service by Lieutenant Geiser was proper under the facts of this

case but merely that it occurred.” In pertinent part, the parties also listed the

following as a contested issue: “Whether [Mr.] Gaber was required to be served

pursuant to [La. C.C.P.] [a]rt. 1235.1 . . . or whether domiciliary service at 3617

Corinne was proper.” Essentially, the parties disagreed before the trial court (as

they do before this Court) as to whether MABB had to serve Mr. Gaber per the

terms of La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1 due to his status in the VA residential reentry center

in June 2019, or if domiciliary service was proper.

Bench Trial and Judgment on Appellees’ Petition to Annul

On December 5, 2024, the trial court held a bench trial on Appellees’

Petition to Annul. In relevant part, the trial court heard testimony from Mr. Gaber.

Additionally, the parties stipulated prior to trial that the deposition testimony of

Olugbenga Akanji (“Mr. Akanji”) was “admissible for all purposes” and identified

him as the program director of the VA residential reentry center when Mr. Gaber

was there from February to June 2019. Accordingly, the trial court admitted into

evidence Mr. Akanji’s deposition testimony. We will summarize Mr. Gaber’s

testimony and Mr. Akanji’s deposition testimony in turn.

Testimony of Mr. Gaber

Mr. Gaber testified that at the time of service of process of MABB’s Petition

for Damages in June 2019, he was living at the VA residential reentry center. Mr.

Gaber explained that during his six-month stay at the residential reentry center, he

ultimately got a job and received permission to visit his family home at 3617

Corinne and stay overnight there on the weekends. As explained by Mr. Gaber,

4

while on home visits, he had to check in and out with the residential reentry center

and also received calls from the residential reentry center on his home’s landline

thereby enabling the center to verify his location. Regarding the service of

MABB’s Petition for Damages on his wife, Mr. Gaber testified that she never told

him she received the papers from Lieutenant Geiser in June 2019. Rather, as Mr.

Gaber explained, the first time he became aware of the lawsuit and the default

judgment was shortly before he and Go Green filed their Petition to Annul. Mr.

Gaber noted that his wife immigrated to the United States in 1999; her native

language was Arabic; and the language spoken in their home was Arabic.

Deposition Testimony of Mr. Akanji

During his October 2024 deposition, Mr. Akanji testified that the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (“Bureau of Prisons”) contracted with Volunteers of America to

operate the VA residential reentry center. When asked about how someone ends up

at the VA residential reentry center, Mr. Akanji responded that the Bureau of

Prisons sends a referral to the center, which he reviews and then decides whether

“to accept or deny the individual.”5 Mr. Akanji explained that at the time Mr.

Gaber was in the VA residential reentry center, the staff referred to an individual

who stayed there as “resident, inmate, [or] client,” which all “mean[t] the same

thing.” Mr. Akanji explained that, at the time of his deposition, the staff of the VA

residential reentry center also referred to an individual who stayed there as an

“adult in custody.”

When asked what individuals are “allowed to do during the period that [they

are] staying [in the VA residential reentry center,]” Mr. Akanji explained they

5 Mr. Akanji clarified that “everyone that comes [to the residential reentry center] is from

federal prison.”

5

complete an orientation and then must secure employment within twenty-one days

of finishing their orientation. Mr. Akanji testified the VA residential reentry center

tightly regulates and monitors the residents’ schedules. For example, Mr. Akanji

explained the VA residential reentry center expects each resident to not only return

to the center at the end of the day but to do so at a designated time based on when

the resident’s employment ended for the day and estimated travel time from the

jobsite.

Mr. Akanji testified that when referring an individual to the VA residential

reentry center, the Bureau of Prisons deems whether that individual is “competent

for release,” such “that he should have more access in the community once he

completes his orientation [at the center] and is employed.” In this regard, Mr.

Akanji explained that if the Bureau of Prisons so decrees, then once the individual

secures employment and begins working, he becomes “eligible for . . . pre-release

status,” including “weekend passes” that permit him to “go[] home to spend time

with his family for two days, Friday [after work] to Sunday.” Additionally, Mr.

Akanji explained an individual with a weekend pass is “confined to [his] house”6

but can receive authorization to conduct limited personal matters such as dinner

with his spouse, grocery shopping, haircuts, medical appointments, and educational

activities for his children. However, Mr. Akanji stated the activities “are time

restricted.”

Like Mr. Gaber testified, Mr. Akanji explained the residential reentry center

calls to check up on individuals who are away for the weekend on a pass; and Mr.

Akanji further stated an individual might “be placed on escape” if he does not

6 Mr. Akanji testified the individual is confined to his house because “the purpose of the

pass is to spend time with . . . family members.”

6

answer the phone in a timely manner. Mr. Akanji also clarified during his

testimony that an individual at the VA residential reentry center is “still in the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons” and serving the time remaining on his sentence.

Moreover, Mr. Akanji stated an individual cannot have a weekend pass if the VA

residential reentry center has taken “disciplinary action” against the individual for

violating one of the center’s rules, and violations of the rules might even result in a

return to federal prison.

Counsel for Appellees asked Mr. Akanji whether “there [is] someone [at the

VA residential reentry center] to accept service of process on behalf of a resident,

and Mr. Akanji explained: “[W]e call the individual, and if the individual is

around, we let the sheriff know [he is] around . . . . They serve him, they transfer

his papers.” When asked what happens if a service attempt occurs for “a resident

who is not physically [at the VA residential reentry center] at the time,” Mr. Akanji

responded:

If [the individual is] not physically [at the VA residential reentry
center], then [it] depends on the sheriff if [they are] going to make
the determination to leave it or not. If [the sheriff] say[s] [they are]
going to come back, we tell them what time [the individual will] be
in. [The sheriff will] say we [will] come back. When they come back,
then they come serve him.

The trial court took this matter under advisement before ruling.

Judgment

The trial court issued its oral ruling and reasons for judgment on January 14,

2025. The trial court stated the issue for resolution was “whether or not domiciliary

service on” Mr. Gaber was proper “at his historical residence on Corinne [Avenue]

in Chalmette . . . during a period of time where he was still technically in the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons and residing at the [VA residential reentry center]

7

where he was doing his work release program.” The trial court noted Mr. Gaber

“was indeed frequenting his residence” and had “frequent opportunities to have

overnight stays” at 3617 Corinne during his time at the VA residential reentry

center. However, the trial court also acknowledged that “[w]hether or not [Mr.

Gaber] was at the residence on Corinne was not up to him” but rather “based upon

whether or not he was given a pass by the” VA residential reentry center. The trial

court also pointed out that the terms Mr. Akinaji said the staff used when

referencing individuals at the residential reentry center—resident, inmate, client, or

adult in custody—“indicate that those persons are not free to do as they will” and

“as they wish,” thereby further demonstrating “the control that the [VA residential

reentry center] has over” the individuals. For those reasons, the trial court found

that 3617 Corinne was not Mr. Gaber’s “usual place of abode at the time of

service,” such that domiciliary service at 3617 Corinne was not appropriate.

Accordingly, the trial court orally granted Appellees’ Petition to Annul with regard

to Mr. Gaber.

Subsequently, the trial court signed its February 18, 2025 judgment, which

granted Appellees’ Petition to Annul and annulled the default judgment with

respect to Mr. Gaber but denied Appellees’ Petition to Annul with respect to Go

Green. MABB’s timely appeal to this Court followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In its brief to this Court, MABB asserts one assignment of error.

Specifically, MABB questions “[w]hether the [trial] [c]ourt erred in nullifying” the

default judgment “as to [Mr.] Gaber by determining that the . . . domiciliary

service on [Mr.] Gaber through his wife at 3617 Corinne was improper.”

8

DISCUSSION

MABB contends the domiciliary service on Mr. Gaber’s wife at 3617

Corinne in June 2019 was proper. Further, MABB argues it did not have to serve

Mr. Gaber in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1. Mr. Gaber counters the trial

court correctly found the attempted domiciliary service “was improper and without

effect” because 3617 Corinne “was not his ‘usual place of abode’ at the time of the

attempted service.” Additionally, Mr. Gaber contends that because he was

incarcerated at the time of service, the service had to be personal and, in support,

he cites to La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1; La. R.S. 13:3471(6);7 and Blue, Williams &

Buckley v. Brian Invs., Ltd., 1996-1451, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97), 706 So.2d

999, 1004. Resolution of this matter requires us to determine whether the

domiciliary service effectuated on Mr. Gaber’s wife at 3617 Corinne was proper in

June 2019 during Mr. Gaber’s time at the VA residential reentry center which, in

turn, informs the propriety of the annulment of the default judgment. With this

issue in mind, we next outline the relevant nullity and service of process principles,

as well as the applicable standard of review.

Nullity Principles: Annulment of Default Judgments

In the matter sub judice, MABB filed its Petition for Damages and

ultimately sought and obtained a default judgment regarding same when no answer

was forthcoming from Appellees. In turn, Appellees filed their Petition to Annul,

alleging insufficient service of process of MABB’s Petition for Damages.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2002(A)(2) instructs that “[a] final

judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered . . . [a]gainst a defendant who has not

7 Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3471(6) provides that “[s]ervice of process on an inmate

of a public institution may be made by the sheriff or any constable of the parish where the
institution is situated.”

9

been served with process as required by law and who has not waived objection to

jurisdiction, or against whom a valid default judgment has not been taken.”8 In this

latter regard, a “defendant against whom [a] default judgment ha[s] been taken”

can bring “suit to annul the [default] judgment” on the basis “that there [was]

improper service on [that] defendant in the initial suit.” Carlton v. Electrical

Maintenance & Installation, Co., 306 So.2d 881, 885 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974)

(citing Termplan Gentilly, Inc. v. Parker, 281 So.2d 163, 165 (La. App. 4th Cir.

1973)). “In an action to annul a judgment based on the validity of service, the

burden of proof lies on the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence

that service was not properly made.” Green v. Taylor Rental Props., Inc., 55,515,

p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 384 So.3d 421, 426 (citing Harriss v. Archives Grill,

LLC, 51,298, p. 12 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/17), 217 So.3d 1203, 1210). If the claimant

meets this burden of proof, then the default judgment must be annulled. Carlton,

306 So.2d at 885. In other words, “[f]or a default judgment to be valid,” the default

judgment “must be based on valid service of process” of the initial petition.

Termplan, 281 So.2d at 165.

The reason a court should annul a default judgment on the basis of improper

service is because “[p]roper citation is the cornerstone of all actions.” Brigandi v.

Egana, p. 3, 2001-176 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/01), 788 So.2d 680, 681 (citing Rivers

v. Groth Corp., 1095-2509, p. 2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 680 So.2d 762, 763).

Thus, without “evidence of proper citation and service of process” that “inform[ed]

8 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1702 delineates the default judgment
procedure. Because Appellees sought to annul the default judgment based on improper service of
MABB’s Petition for Damages rather than on the basis that MABB failed to follow the default
judgment procedure, we need not outline same.

10

the defendant of the claim against him, in strict compliance of law, all subsequent

proceedings are absolutely null.” Id. (citations omitted).

Service of Process Principles: Types of Service

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1231 lists the types of service. It

states that “[s]ervice of citation or other process may be either personal or

domiciliary, and except as otherwise provided by law, each has the same effect.”

La. C.C.P. art. 1231. As defined in La. C.C.P. art. 1232, “Personal service is made

when a proper officer tenders the citation or other process to the person to be

served.” Domiciliary service occurs “when a proper officer leaves the citation or

other process at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the person to be

served with a person of suitable age and discretion residing in the domiciliary

establishment.” La. C.C.P. art. 1234.

Discussing the types of service, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal

has held that “[s]ervice of citation on incarcerated persons . . . must be personal.”

Blue, Williams & Buckley, 1996-1451, p. 9, 706 So.2d at 1004. Louisiana Code of

Civil Procedure Article 1235.1 outlines the process for “[s]ervice on [an]

incarcerated person.” It states that “[s]ervice is made on a person who is

incarcerated in a jail or detention facility through personal service on the warden or

his designee for that shift. The warden or his designee shall in turn make personal

service on the person incarcerated.” La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1(A). It is the

applicability or inapplicability of La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1 that the parties dispute in

this matter.

Standard of Review

As previously stated, MABB and Appellees stipulated to certain facts and to

the trial court admitting Mr. Akanji’s deposition into the record. Importantly, based

11

on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we need not look beyond these

undisputed facts to resolve this matter. If “the parties do not dispute the essential

facts related to” service, then “the question of whether the trial court properly

granted or denied a petition for nullity [based on improper service] is a question of

law, and questions of law are reviewed under the de novo standard of review.”

Anderson v. Anderson, 20-186, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20), 309 So.3d 868, 874

(citing Nunez v. Superior Hospitality Sys., Inc., 2014-668 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/23/14), 166 So.3d 1004, 1007). See also Brooks v. Shamrock Constr. Co., 2018-

226, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/19/18), 262 So.3d 423, 428 (applying the de novo

standard in reviewing a trial court court’s ruling on a petition for nullity based on

an allegation of lack of service of process). Accordingly, we analyze this matter de

novo.

Analysis

After thorough research, we have determined that the question of whether

La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1 applies to someone in a residential reentry center such that

they must be personally served presents a res novo issue for this Court. To resolve

this matter, we consider whether the particular facts and circumstances of this case

called for personal service on Mr. Gaber as an “incarcerated person” under La.

C.C.P. art. 1235.1. Before doing so, we provide some background information on

residential reentry centers like the one at issue in this matter.

Notably, an individual at a residential reentry center (“RRC”) is still serving

out the remainder of his federal sentence. Residential Reentry Centers,

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (March 2020)9 (explaining that the

Bureau of Prisons “has the authority to place an inmate in a [residential reentry

9 This information is available at https://www.uscourts.gov/file/28164/download.

12

center] while serving the remainder of [his] sentence”).10 See also Rivera-Perez v.

Stover, 757 F.Supp.3d 204, 215 (D. Conn. 2024) (explaining that if the Bureau of

Prisons authorizes “[p]rerelease custody,” it “may include either placement at a

residential reentry center or in home confinement” (citing 18 U.S.C. §

3624(g)(2))). The Bureau of Prisons emphasizes that residential reentry centers are

“accountable” for the residents:

In-house counts are conducted throughout the day at scheduled and
random intervals. An inmate is only authorized to leave the
[residential reentry center] through sign-out procedures for approved
activities, such as seeking employment, working, counseling, visiting,
or recreation purposes. During the approved activity, the inmate’s
location and movements are constantly monitored and [residential
reentry center] staff may visit or call them at any time. In addition,
when the inmate returns they may be given a random drug and alcohol
test.

About Our Facilities, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (last visited Jan. 23, 2026).11

Turning to the undisputed facts, the parties agree Mr. Gaber was a resident

of the VA residential reentry center at the time of domiciliary service at 3617

Corinne in June 2019. Mr. Akanji testified that an individual like Mr. Gaber at the

VA residential reentry center is “still in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons”;

serving the time remaining on his sentence; and subject to a return to federal prison

if he violates the center’s rules. Mr. Akanji’s description of the VA residential

reentry center at issue in the matter sub judice comports with the Bureau of

Prisons’ emphasis on “accountability” for center residents. As Mr. Akanji testified,

the VA residential reentry center closely monitors the timing of the residents’

10 As an appellate court, we “can take judicial notice of government websites.” Lannon v.

Pherian, LLC, 2024-0757, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/14/25), 418 So.3d 420, 426 (quoting Pri-Tal v.
Progressive Prop. Ins. Co., 2024-0531, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), 414 So.3d 1064, 1068,
n.1).
11 This information is available by visiting the following website:
https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/residential_reentry_management_centers.jsp#:~:text=Provi
ding%20services%20for%20ex%2Doffenders,Inmate%20placement%20into%20a%20RRC.

13

return from work. Additionally, Mr. Akanji explained the Bureau of Prisons

determines whether a resident at the VA residential reentry center will even be

entitled to a weekend pass; and, thereafter, the resident can only receive the pass if

he completes his orientation and secures employment. Mr. Akanji also testified that

a resident might lose his weekend pass if the residential reentry center institutes

any disciplinary action against him. Essentially, Mr. Akanji’s testimony

established that the VA residential reentry center restricted Mr. Gaber’s freedom of

movement during the work week. Further, Mr. Akanji’s testimony established that

the weekend pass Mr. Gaber received to go to 3617 Corinne was a privilege, not a

right, initially conditioned upon permission from the Bureau of Prisons and then

conditioned upon continued permission from the VA residential reentry center, i.e.,

Mr. Gaber was not guaranteed the weekend pass in the first place and it could be

subsequently taken from him.

Moreover, Mr. Akanji’s testimony outlined the restrictions imposed on an

individual like Mr. Gaber even with a weekend pass, namely confinement to his

house unless the residential reentry center grants him permission to go elsewhere;

restrictions on the types of personal matters that can be conducted with said

permission; and time limits on activities outside the house. Mr. Gaber and Mr.

Akanji both confirmed the residential reentry center monitors a resident when he is

away on a weekend pass by calling his home phone, and Mr. Akanji explained the

center “place[s] [a resident] on escape” if he does not answer in a timely manner.

Thus, according to Mr. Akanji’s testimony, even Mr. Gaber’s weekend pass did

not provide him with complete freedom because the VA residential reentry center

continued to monitor him.

14

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “incarcerate” as “to subject to

confinement,” and the Cambridge Dictionary defines it as “to keep someone in a

closed place and prevent them from leaving it.” The word “[i]ncarcerated is a

nonspecific term which refers to a person confined to a jail, prison, or other

institution.” Care of Justice-Involved Populations, Dawn Davis, MISSOURI

MEDICINE (May-June 2022).12 The term “incarcerated” thus includes confinement

and detention of a person and restriction of his freedom regardless what type of

facility so detains him and restricts his freedom. In light of the above-delineated

confinement, detainment, and restrictions on his freedom and movement that Mr.

Gaber experienced during his time at the VA residential reentry center, we find

that he was an “incarcerated person” under La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1, such that

domiciliary service was improper. As an incarcerated person, the service on Mr.

Gaber had to be personal. Blue, Williams & Buckley, 1996-1451, p. 9, 706 So.2d at

1004. Had MABB tried to serve Mr. Gaber in accordance with La. C.C.P. art.

1235.1, Mr. Akanji confirmed the VA residential reentry center staff would have

informed the sheriff if Mr. Gaber was present at the time so that the sheriff could

personally serve him. Mr. Akanji’s deposition testimony established that if Mr.

Gaber was not present at the time the sheriff arrived, the VA residential reentry

center staff would have informed the sheriff when they expected Mr. Gaber to

return so that the sheriff could have returned at that time to effectuate personal

service on him.

We find our position buoyed by a decision rendered by the Louisiana

Second Circuit Court of Appeal (“Second Circuit”). In Blackledge v. Sol’s Pipe &

Steel, Inc., the Second Circuit considered whether Shawn Blackledge (“Mr.

12 This information is available at https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9324728/.

15

Blackledge”) was “incarcerated” for purposes of workers’ compensation benefits

while living at a halfway house13 at the time he sustained a workplace injury at his

inmate-work release program. 46,148 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/23/11), 59 So.3d 564.14

The Second Circuit ruled Mr. Blackledge “was still incarcerated, even though

extended the privilege of occupancy in a halfway house,” noting that “[a] work-

release program[] . . . is one point on a continuum of possible punishments.” Id. at

p. 4, 59 So.3d at 567. As the Second Circuit explained, the fact that Mr. Blackledge

“did not return to a correctional facility at the end of each work day, but instead

returned to a halfway house” constituted “a distinction without a difference.” Id. at

pp. 3-4, 59 So.3d at 567. Likewise, Mr. Gaber’s status at the VA residential reentry

center was part of his federal punishment. That he returned to the VA residential

reentry center after his work days instead of a federal correctional facility and

sometimes received permission to go to 3617 Corinne was a distinction without a

difference.

Our finding is that the restraints on Mr. Gaber’s freedom rendered him an

incarcerated person under La. C.C.P. art. 1235.1. That is, despite the fact that he

had a weekend pass that enabled him to sometimes go to his family home at 3617

Corinne, Mr. Gaber had institutional constraints on his freedom that necessitated

personal service in this situation. Mr. Gaber did not have control over his own

schedule, where he stayed each night, and his freedom of movement like a non-

incarcerated individual enjoys. In Appellees’ Petition to Annul, Mr. Gaber met his

13 The terms “halfway house” and “residential reentry center” are interchangeable. About

Our Facilities, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (last visited Jan. 23, 2026),
https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/residential_reentry_management_centers.jsp.
14 The workers’ compensation statute in question provides that an “employee’s right to

compensation benefits, including medical expenses, is forfeited during any period of
incarceration . . . .” La. R.S. 23:1201.4.

16

burden of proving service was not appropriately made because the domiciliary

service effectuated upon his wife at 3617 Corinne in June 2019 was improper.

MABB had to personally serve Mr. Gaber. Therefore, the trial court correctly

granted Appellees’ Petition to Annul and annulled MABB’s default judgment with

respect to Mr. Gaber; so we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We emphasize,

however, that our holding is limited to the facts and circumstances of this case.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s February 18, 2025

judgment insofar as it granted Appellees’ Petition to Annul and annulled MABB’s

default judgment as to Mr. Gaber.

AFFIRMED

17