State of Louisiana in the Interest of A.N. Vs.

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2025-CA-0566
THE INTEREST OF A.N.
* COURT OF APPEAL

* FOURTH CIRCUIT

* STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

APPEAL FROM
JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2023-093-20-DQ, SECTION “A”
Honorable Clinton Smith, Judge
******
Judge Rachael D. Johnson
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)

Samantha Marrone
Hannah Van De Car
LOUISIANA CENTER FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
1100 B Milton Street
New Orleans, LA 70122

COUNSEL FOR JUVENILE/APPELLEE

Jason R. Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Brad Scott
CHIEF OF APPEALS
Zachary M. Phillips
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
619 S. White St.
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED
DECEMBER 3, 2025

RDJ
Appellant, the State of Louisiana, seeks review of the July 10, 2025 juvenile
RLB
PAB court judgment granting Appellee, A.N.’s, Motion to Dismiss Petition for Failure

to Timely Prosecute. Finding no abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal involves whether the State timely prosecuted the juvenile

delinquency petition against A.N. for violations of domestic abuse battery, La.

Rev. Stat. 14:35.3(I), and simple criminal damage to property, La. Rev. Stat.

14:56(A)(1), within 90-days pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 877. The underlying facts

giving rise to the delinquency charges against A.N. are irrelevant to the procedural

issues raised in this appeal.

The State filed a delinquency petition against A.N. on or about April 3,

2023. Thereafter, the juvenile court found probable cause on both charges at a

continued custody hearing before releasing A.N. to his parents’ custody.

Considering that the tolling of the 90-day limitation period is at issue, below is a

recount of the relevant procedural history beginning with A.N.’s answer to the

petition:

1

May 3, 2023
A.N. entered a denial to the delinquency
petition in the juvenile court, which sets a May 23, 2023
pretrial conference on May 23, 2023. A.N.’s counsel appeared at the pretrial
conference, waived A.N.’s presence and
requested a reset of the hearing so A.N. can retain
August 30, 2023 an immigration attorney. There was no objection.
No judgment appears in the record; The pretrial conference was reset to August 30,
however, the record reflects a November 6, 2023.
2023 pre-trial conference was set. November 2, 2023
0 During an add on hearing before the juvenile
November 8, 2023 court, A.N.’s counsel requested the November
At the pretrial conference, A.N.’s counsel 6th pretrial conference be reset to November
informed the Court that A.N. is 8th. The juvenile court found good cause and
incarcerated in Texas, waived his presence A.N. waived the La. Ch. Code art. 877
and requested the conference be reset. deadlines.
January 18, 2024
Counsel further waived art. 877 and art. The Court issued an order closing the Court
854 deadlines. The Court found good from Tuesday, January 16th to January 18,
cause to grant the request. A status hearing 2024, due to severe weather, finding good
was set for January 16, 2024. cause. The pretrial conference was reset for
February 6, 2024.
February 6, 2024 March 19, 2024
At the pre-hearing conference, the Court A status hearing was held wherein the State
noted that A.N. was still detained in was instructed to contact the victim to see if
Texas. The Court set a status hearing on he wished to proceed. A.N. was being held
March 19, 2024. July 16, 2024 in Texas on a pending adult matter. A.N.
A.N. appeared for trial, but defense counsel requested this matter be set for trial and
requested a continuance due to her illness. waived La. Ch. Code art. 877 deadlines. The
The Court granted the continuance finding Court found
September 26,good
2024cause and an adjudication
good cause. Defense counsel waived all time During an add onforhearing,
hearing was set July 16,the
2024.
parties were
delays pursuant to art. 877. Trial was set informed that the Court was unavailable for
for October 2, 2024. an October 2, 2024 adjudication hearing.
The adjudication hearing was reset to
December 3, 2024 December 3, 2024, with the Court finding
State moved to continue the adjudication good cause. A.N.’s Counsel objected to the
hearing because an essential witness was continuance and to the good cause to extend
unavailable. Over A.N.’s Counsel’s the La. Ch.C. art. 877 deadlines.
objection, the Court found good cause to
extend the statutory deadline. A.N. objected
to the finding of good cause. The
adjudication hearing was reset to January 21,
2025. January 21, 2025
The Court was closed on this date due to
anticipated winter storms.
February 3, 2025
The Court reset this matter for “pre trial/to
pick a trial date” on February 12, 2025.
February 12, 2025
A.N.’s Counsel appeared for a pretrial
April 2, 2025 conference and the Court set an April 2,
The Court reset the adjudication hearing to 2025 adjudication hearing, finding good
June 17, 2025—without finding good cause cause. A.N. waived the statutory time
to extend the La. Ch. Code art. 877 requirements.
deadlines— because the court reporter was
unavailable. A.N. alleges he objected to the
continuance.
June 12, 2025
A.N. moved to dismiss the delinquency petition for failure to
timely prosecute.

Following a July 10, 2025 contradictory hearing on the motion to dismiss,

the juvenile court granted the motion, reasoning that the court reporter’s absence at

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the April 2, 2025 hearing did not provide the statutorily required “good cause” for

the suspension of the statutory prosecutorial period:

. . . [T]he Court’s own calculations reflect that as of
April 2nd of 2025, the Court did not have a court reporter.
And the Court believes that due to the absence of the
court reporter on that day, whatever calculations that the
Court thought was appropriate and within the timelines
after further review we determined that it was not. As
much as the Court wants to agree with the State that the
absence of a court reporter is good cause and this Court
clearly believes that it is especially when the situation
occurs beyond the control of the Court as it did in this
situation. [sic]

The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear
to this court that that is not sufficient for good cause.
And I think Ms. Marrone sort of stated, but the pertinent
part of that is as follows: And this is stating State
(inaudible) GC Supreme Court 149 southern third 63.
And it states as follows: The court system cannot excuse
itself from an accused trial within the delays required by
law simply by relying upon eternal [sic] operation
procedures, which result in non-compliance with the
statutory mandate. This observation applies even in
greater force in the context of the juvenile proceeding.
And as noted by Defense Counsel, this was a case
involving a court reporter who was unavailable when the
court believed that [] he/she would be. So while the Court
would like to agree with the State the absence of, again,
the court reporter is an implicit good cause found, the
Court’s own calculations shows that as [of] April 2nd,
2025 when the case was set for trial 76 days later on June
12th—on June the 12th1 the Court did determine that 96
days had passed where good cause to waive was not
found and did not exist. So, the Court does believe that
the 877 time delays had expired and therefore is going to
grant the motion to dismiss.

This timely appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1 We note that 71 days passed between April 2 and June 12, 2025.

3

The State raises three assignments of error; however, the pertinent issue on

appeal is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it dismissed the

delinquency petition against A.N. for untimely prosecution.2

APPLICABLE LAW

Article 877 of the Louisiana Children’s Code, entitled Adjudication hearing;

time limitations, provides prosecutorial time limitations in juvenile delinquency

matters:

A. When the child is charged with a crime of violence as defined in
R.S. 14:2(B) and the child is continued in custody pursuant to Chapter
5 of this Title, the adjudication hearing shall commence within sixty
days of the appearance to answer the petition. In all other cases, if the
child is continued in custody pursuant to Chapter 5 of this Title, the
adjudication hearing shall commence within thirty days of the
appearance to answer the petition.

B. If the child is not continued in custody, the adjudication hearing
shall commence within ninety days of the appearance to answer the
petition.

C. If the hearing has not been commenced timely, upon motion of the
child, the court shall release a child continued in custody and shall
dismiss the petition.

D. For good cause, the court may extend such period.

The mandatory time limitations provided in La. Ch.C. art. 877 “ensure

expedited adjudication of children.” State v. Roberson, 14-1996, p. 4 (La.

10/14/15), 179 So.3d 573, 576. Without the timely prosecution of juvenile

delinquency matters, a juvenile may seek release and dismissal of the petition for

untimeliness. La. Ch.C. art. 877(C). Applicable here is La. Ch.C. art. 877(B),

2 The State avers that the juvenile court abused its discretion by dismissing the delinquency

petition where: a) A.N. failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection to any extensions of the
time delays required by law, and the juvenile court found appropriate good cause to extend the
time delays at every relevant moment; and b) where the juvenile court accepted all of A.N.’s
waivers of time delays and requests for future hearing dates, all of which were beyond the
expiration of the time limitations period. Additionally, the State asserts that A.N.’s acquiescence
to scheduling an adjudication hearing for a date beyond the expiration of the La. Ch. Code art.
877 time limitations constitutes a waiver of the time limitations altogether.

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setting forth that adjudication hearings must commence within 90 days where a

juvenile is not held in continued custody. Upon a juvenile’s motion, dismissal of

the delinquency petition and release is mandated where the State fails to timely

prosecute within 90-days of “the appearance to juvenile’s answer to the petition.”

La. Ch.C. art. 877(B). The sole caveat to the tolling of the 90-day period is that

juvenile courts may extend the time period for “good cause.” La. Ch.C. art.

877(D). The State may move for a “good cause” extension or the juvenile court,

sua sponte, may find good cause to suspend the 90-day prosecution period:

The time limits in Article 877 are mandatory and may not be extended
absent a showing of good cause, and it is “incumbent [upon] the
[S]tate to make a showing of good cause and obtain an extension
before the period has run.” State in Interest of R.D.C., Jr., 93-1865
(La. 2/28/94), 632 So.2d 745, 748-49 (emphasis in original); see La.
Ch.C. art. 877(D). Additionally, the juvenile court may extend the
time limitations on its own motion if good cause is found. State in
Interest of Franklin, 95-0423, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/26/95), 659
So.2d 537, 538. Although Article 877 allows for the adjudication
hearing time limitations to be extended if good cause is found, the
statute does not allow the juvenile court to set the adjudication hearing
if the time limitation has already expired. See State ex rel. J.B. &
G.M., 03-0587, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/10/03), 863 So.2d 669, 671.
The Code does not define “good cause.” However, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in discussing good cause under Article 877(D), has
stated “[t]he judge should be mindful of those situations where
defense motions or causes beyond the control of the state may
impinge on its ability to prepare for the hearing.” R.D.C., Jr., 632
So.2d at 749; see also State ex rel. S.D., 09-1113, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.
12/9/09), 28 So.3d 1160, 1161.

State in Int. of L.D., 24-0784, 24-0786, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/17/25), 409

So.3d 265, 267-68.

DISCUSSION

The State argues A.N., is precluded from raising an untimely prosecution

claim because he both requested continuances and acquiesced in them over the

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course of these proceedings. Thus, the State avers that the lower court abused its

discretion in granting the motion for dismissal.

The State contends that as a result of A.N.’s May 3, 2023 answer to the

petition the 90-day adjudication period would have expired on August 1, 2023.

However, on May 23, 2023, A.N. requested the hearing for that day be reset in

order for A.N. to consult with an immigration attorney. This led to the juvenile

court setting a pre-trial conference on August 30, 2023, thereby exceeding the

original 90-day period. The State, relying upon State in the Int. of R.W., 18-0069,

p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/18), 246 So.3d 619, 622, contends A.N.’s acquiescence

to a hearing date beyond the August 1, 2023 expiration of the 90 day period, served

as an extension for “good cause” under art. 877(D).

In R.W., a juvenile appealed his delinquency adjudication to this Court, for

being in possession of marijuana, a violation of La. R.S. 40:966E(1), and being in

possession of stolen things, a violation of La. R.S. 14:69B(1), asserting that the

time limits to adjudicate the matter expired. 18-0069, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir.

5/23/18), 246 So.3d 619, 619. The juvenile, R.W., was charged by petition on the

aforementioned offenses, but he pleaded not guilty when he appeared with counsel

on September 12, 2017. Id. His adjudication hearing was set for November 28,

2017, as he was not held in custody, and the juvenile court ordered him to enroll in

the M.E.L.O.W. program (Men Engaging in Leadership Opportunities Works”),

participate in a drug testing program, attend school, and abide by the curfew laws.

Id., 18-0069, p. 1, 246 So.3d at 619-20.

During the course of the proceedings, R.W. was arrested on new charges of

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and possession of stolen property. Id., 18-

0069, p. 2, 246 So.3d at 620. He also failed to participate in the court-ordered

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M.E.L.O.W. program and to submit himself for drug testing; thus, the juvenile

court issued a warrant for his arrest. He was subsequently arrested on October 24,

2017. Id.

Thereafter, R.W. filed a motion for release and plan for release, which were

both signed by the juvenile court on November 27, 2017, and set for hearing the

following day. Id. On the morning of the November 28th hearing, R.W. filed a

motion for release and dismissal of petition. Id. He further changed his plea to

guilty and the juvenile court adjudicated him a delinquent and sentenced him to six

months, following his verbal and written waiver of his constitutional rights and

admission to petition. Id., 18-0069, pp. 2-3, 246 So.3d at 620. On December 6,

2017, the juvenile court denied his motion for release and dismissal of the petition.

Id., 18-0069, p. 3, 246 So.3d at 620.

On appeal, R.W. asserted that the 90-day limitation period, pursuant to La.

Ch.C. art. 877, transferred to a 30-day limitation period under the same article

when he was re-arrested on October 24, 2017, and held in continued custody. Id.,

18-0069, pp. 4-5, 246 So.3d at 621. Thus, R.W. argued that at the time of the

November 28, 2017 hearing, 35 days elapsed. Id., 18-0069, p. 5, 246 So.3d at 621.

This Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion for release and

dismissal of the petition, reasoning that R.W. acquiesced in the delay when he

failed to object to the delay in the juvenile court’s signing the pleadings nor to

setting the hearing date. Id., 18-0069, p. 6, 246 So.3d at 621-22. Thus, his

acquiescence served as the functional equivalent of a good cause extension of the

time limits pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 877(D). Id., 18-0069, p. 6, 246 So.3d at 622.

The State, citing R.W., avers here that A.N. waived any future objections to

delays in limitation period by not adhering to the initial statutory limitation period.

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The State notes A.N. proceeded to acquiesce in and seek further delays of the 90-

day limitation period.

A.N. responds that the juvenile court properly dismissed the delinquency

petition for failure to timely prosecute because under the facts presented the

adjudication hearing should have been held by June 11, 2025. Thus, the juvenile

court was required to dismiss the petition when the 90-day statutory period expired

due to the State’s failure to timely seek an extension or attempt to set A.N.’s

adjudication hearing pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 877(C) and State ex rel. J.M., 13-

2573 (La. 12/09/14), 156 So. 3d 1161.

A.N. maintains that the statutory 90-day time period set forth in art. 877,

elapsed over two time periods: a 20-day time period between May 3, 2023 and

May 23, 2023; and a 70-day time period passing between April 2, 2025 and June

11, 2025, where the juvenile court continued the adjudication hearing due to a

court reporter’s absence. We agree, finding the State’s argument unpersuasive.

A.N. appeared in court on May 3, 2023, and answered the delinquency

petition. Twenty days later, on May 23, 2025, the juvenile court granted his request

to reset a scheduled pre-trial conference, which counted as a “good cause” delay.

See State in the Interest of K.K., 14-479, p. 5, n. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/17/14), 153

So.3d 1280, 1283. The record is silent on what transpired at the August 30, 2023

hearing, other than a pre-trial conference was again reset for November 6, 2023.

As noted above, from November 2023 to September 26, 2024, there were several

settings where A.N. again requested pre-trial hearings to be reset and waived art.

877 deadlines. The lower court also closed once due to severe weather. Good

cause was found to delay these settings.

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On September 26, 2024 and December 3, 2024, the juvenile court found

good cause, sua sponte, to continue trial dates due to the Court’s own availability

and on the State’s motion due to the unavailability of a witness, respectively, both

over A.N.’s objection. A.N. did not seek supervisory review of these lower court

rulings.

Trial was set for January 21, 2025, but the Court was forced to close due to

severe winter weather on that date. Thus, “good cause” again existed to toll the

limitation period. The juvenile court later reset the matter for a February 12, 2025

pre-trial conference, where an April 2, 2025 adjudication hearing was set and A.N.

again waived the statutory time limit. However, as noted above, when the court

reporter did not appear, the juvenile court reset the adjudication hearing for June

17, 2025.

As the juvenile court noted on the record, the remaining 70 days of the

statutory limitation period passed from April 2, 2025— when the juvenile court

erroneously found “good cause” to extend the limitation period due the court

reporter’s absence— to June 11, 2025, the day prior to A.N. moving for dismissal.

A.N. correctly notes the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State in the Int. of C.G., 19-

01653 (La. 11/5/19), 281 So.3d 657, reversed this Court’s finding that the absence

of a court reporter constituted a “good cause” delay under art. 877(D), reasoning:

The legislature has made it clear that if an adjudication hearing has
not commenced timely, upon motion of the child, the court shall
dismiss the petition. La. Ch.C. art. 877(D); State in the Interest of
R.D.C., Jr., 93-1865 (La. 2/28/94), 632 So.2d 745. See also State in
the Interest of J.M., 156 So.3d 1161 (La. 2014). While the juvenile
court is afforded discretion in finding good cause to extend the
mandatory La. Ch.C. art. 877 adjudication deadline, this Court has
found that “in the context of adult criminal proceedings, ‘[t]he court
system cannot excuse itself from affording an accused a trial within
the delay required by law, simply by relying upon internal operating
procedures which result in noncompliance with the statutory

9

mandate.’ ” State in the Interest of L.D., 2014-1080 (La. 10/15/14),
149 So.3d 763, 765 (quoting State v. Driever, 347 So.2d 1132, 1134
(La. 1977)). Further, “[t]his observation applies with even greater
force in the context of juvenile proceedings in which ... the provisions
of the Children's Code ‘shall be construed to ... secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in adjudication and administration, *658 and the
elimination of unjustifiable delay.’ La. Ch.C. art. 102.” Id.

Id., 19-01653, p. 1, 281 So.3d at 657-58.

Accordingly, by June 12, 2025, at least 90 days lapsed since A.N. answered

the State’s petition. Thus, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in

dismissing this matter for untimely prosecution. The State failed to prove that a

showing of “good cause” was made on the record at the April 3, 2025 hearing

and/or that an extension of time was granted therefor before June 11, 2025.

Lastly, we find the State’s argument that A.N. acquiesced to scheduling an

adjudication hearing beyond the initial expiration of the art. 877 time limitation in

this matter and thus, waived the 90-day limitation period altogether, to be

meritless. The State’s reliance upon R.W., supra, in support of this argument is

misplaced. The R.W. Court’s holdings do not stand for the proposition that

acquiescence to one extension of time past art. 877’s limitation period bars

juveniles from raising future motions for dismissal for untimely prosecution.

Accordingly, the 90-day limitation period can only be extended for “good cause”,

not waived. Moreover, under the unique facts presented, when the adjudication

hearing was set—for June 17, 2025 a date beyond the statutory limitation period—

at the April 2, 2025 hearing, A.N. was unable to object on the record because a

court reporter was not present.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the July 10, 2025 juvenile court judgment

granting Appellee, juvenile A.N.’s, Motion to Dismiss Petition for Failure to

Timely Prosecute, is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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