State of Louisiana in the Interest of A.B..

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2025-CA-0595
THE INTEREST OF A.B.
* COURT OF APPEAL

* FOURTH CIRCUIT

* STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

APPEAL FROM
JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2024-204-04-DQ, “SECTION C”
Honorable Candice Bates Anderson, Judge
******
Judge Karen K. Herman
******
(Court composed of Judge Karen K. Herman, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott, Judge
Monique G. Morial)

Justin Caine Harrell
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE
1100 Poydras Street
Suite 2900
New Orleans, LA 70163

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, A.B.

Jason R. Williams
ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Brad Scott
CHIEF OF APPEALS
Zachary M. Phillips
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA

REVERSED AND MODIFIED; REMANDED
DECEMBER 17, 2025

KKH
NEK
MGM
The juvenile in this matter, A.B.,1 appeals the April 28, 2025 judgment of

the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court adjudicating him delinquent of one count of

simple arson and one count of simple burglary. A.B. also appeals the July 29,

2025 judgment placing him on active probation for a period of twelve months. For

the reasons that follow, we reverse the delinquency adjudication and disposition

for simple arson and simple burglary and enter an adjudication for unlawful entry

of a place of business. The matter is remanded for resentencing on that offense.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PERTINENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.B. appeared in court for a continued custody hearing on July 22, 2024.

The court found probable cause for his arrest as to the charges for simple burglary

(La. R.S. 14:62), simple arson (La. R.S. 14:52), and simple criminal damage to

property (La. R.S. 14:56). On August 22, 2024, A.B. was petitioned with one

count of simple arson and one count of simple burglary. A.B. appeared for an

answer hearing, pleading not guilty to the charges.

An adjudication hearing was held on April 22, 2025. The court heard

testimony from investigating officer, Mercedes Limeaux (“Officer Limeaux”), and

1 The juvenile, was 14 years old at the time of the hearing.He is therefore referred to in this
opinion by his initials. See Rules 5-1 and 5-2 of the Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal.

1

considered certain video evidence. Judgment was rendered on April 28, 2025,

adjudicating A.B. delinquent of one count of simple arson and one count of simple

burglary. In connection with the July 28, 2025 Disposition Hearing, Judgment was

rendered on July 29, 2025, placing A.B. on active probation for twelve (12) months

under the supervision of the Office of Juvenile Justice, subject to certain general

and special conditions.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, A.B. asserts the following assignments of error: 1) whether

evidence of A.B.’s mere presence at the scene of the alleged burglary and arson is

sufficient to sustain an adjudication; 2) whether A.B.’s rights as secured by the

Confrontation Clause were violated by the presentation of testimonial hearsay

statements by an uncalled and unnamed third-party witness; and 3) whether

surveillance footage was improperly admitted without proper authentication as

required by La. C.E. art. 901.

In opposition, the State first raises two errors patent, namely: 1) the

adjudication hearing was held beyond the expiration of the ninety-day time

limitations period by which the State is required to bring the juvenile defendant not

in continued custody to an adjudication hearing;2 and 2) the juvenile court failed to

sentence A.B. separately on both counts of simple burglary and simple arson.

Additionally, the State asserts that the evidence presented was sufficient to

adjudicate A.B. delinquent of the charged offenses.3

2 The record reflects that A.B. never raised this issue below or in this appeal.
3 For the reasons explained below, this argument is rendered moot.

2

Sufficiency of Evidence

It is well settled that “[w]hen issues are raised on appeal both as to the

sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court

should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence.” State in Interest of A.M.,

2024-0699, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/17/25), 414 So.3d 839, 843 (citing State v.

Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992)). Therefore, we begin by addressing the

issue of sufficiency of evidence.

La. C.C. art. 883 provides that, “[i]n order for the court to adjudicate a child

delinquent, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child

committed a delinquent act alleged in the petition.” As this Court held in State in

Interest of W.S., 2018-0070, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/5/18), 250 So.3d 1060, 1063:

Although juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal in
nature, due process requires that the State prove every element of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Due process also requires
that the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial be reviewed under
the well-settled standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

“Appellate courts review the sufficiency of evidence by determining

whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that all of the elements of

the offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Groves, 2020-

0450, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d 957, 971 (citing Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 2001-

1658, p. 4 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 928).

Regarding circumstantial evidence, this Court has held:

[W]hen circumstantial evidence forms the basis of [a]
conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be

3

inferred according to reason and common experience.” State in
Interest of J.W., [20]12-0048, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/6/12), 95 So.3d
1181, 1186. However, we have also recognized that “the elements
must be proven such that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is
excluded.” Id.

State in Interest of P.M., 2015-0834 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/15), 186 So.3d 693,

696.

Pursuant to the above, we therefore review the record to ascertain whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier

of fact could have found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the

elements of simple arson and simple burglary.

Trial Testimony and Introduction of Evidence

Officer Limeaux was the only witness called to testify before the trial court.

She stated that on July 18, 2025, she responded to a call reporting that a group of

juveniles entered into and damaged certain vacant units at an apartment complex.

Officer Limeaux explained that the leasing agent/manager previously called to

report the events on June 29, 2025, but officers were unable to contact her until

July 18, 2025.

Upon arrival at the apartment complex, Officer Limeaux interviewed the

manager4 who reported that she reviewed a surveillance video from June 29, 2025,

which showed A.B. (known to her as a resident of the complex) and other youths

entering into some vacant units. She further relayed to Officer Limeaux that the

units had been renovated and were move-in ready.

Counsel for A.B. objected to the manager’s statements as hearsay. The

State countered that the information was obtained by Officer Limeaux in the

course of her investigation. The objection was overruled.

4 The manager is unnamed in this record, and she was not called to testify.

4

The State also introduced Officer Limeaux’s body camera footage, which

captured her interaction with the manager as they viewed the June 29, 2025

surveillance video of the interior courtyard of the apartment complex. Officer

Limeaux testified that she assisted the manager with getting to the date and time

stamp of when the incident occurred. The surveillance video can be seen on

Officer Limeaux’s body camera footage.

Officer Limeaux testified that the surveillance video revealed approximately

five youths, including A.B., congregating in the courtyard. The manager identified

A.B. as a known resident of the apartment complex. The video also shows A.B.

and the other youths entering one of the downstairs vacant units that sustained

property damage. It does not show A.B. entering any of the other damaged units

and it does not show the damage being sustained.

Counsel for A.B. objected to the surveillance video, asserting that it was not

properly authenticated. The State countered, arguing that Officer Limeaux had

personal knowledge of the surveillance video, having viewed it at the scene and

actually captured it on her body camera footage. The exhibit was accepted over

the objection.

Finally, the State introduced the body camera footage of Officer Limeaux

and the manager walking through and examining the vandalized units. The footage

reflects extensive damage including multiple holes in walls, doors and blinds

ripped off, a small amount of fire damage, along with trash and mattresses left on

the floor (evidencing the likelihood of squatters).

Simple Arson

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:52:

A. Simple arson is either of the following:

5

(1) The intentional damaging by any explosive substance or the
setting fire to any property of another, without the consent of the
owner and except as provided in R.S. 14:51.

(2) The starting of a fire or causing an explosion while the
offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
another felony offense even though the offender does not have the
intent to start a fire or cause an explosion.

Simple arson is a general intent crime. State v Martin, 2024-0924, p.

6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/25/05), 895 So.2d 55, 59 (citing State v. Simmons, 443

So.2d 512, 521 (La.1983)). General criminal intent exists “when the

circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human

experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as

reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(2).

Simple Burglary

Simple burglary is “the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle,

watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, or any cemetery, with the

intent to commit a felony or any theft therein.” La. R.S. 14:62(A). As this Court

held in State in Interest of J.P., 2019-0542, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/25/19), 280

So.3d 245, 249:

The intent required for simple burglary is “the specific intent to
commit either a felony or a theft at the time of his unauthorized
entry.” State v. Marcello, 385 So.2d 244, 245 (La. 1980). Specific
criminal intent is “that state of mind which exists when the
circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”
La. R.S. 14:10(1). Absent an admission by the defendant, specific
intent “must necessarily be proven by inferences from surrounding
facts and circumstances.” State v. Duncan, 390 So.2d 859, 861 (La.
1980).

“Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the crime and the

Defendant’s actions or activities.” State v. Robinson, 2023-0058, p. 22 (La. App. 4

6

Cir. 9/4/24), 401 So.3d 809, 824-25 (quoting State v. Smith, 94-2588, p. 5 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 3/27/96), 672 So. 2d 1034, 1037).

To reiterate, A.B. was adjudicated delinquent on one charge of simple

arson and one charge of simple burglary. Based on our review of the record,

we find that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove the charged

offenses. Regarding simple arson, the State presented no evidence that the

fire(s) were set on the one day that A.B. was seen going into a unit in which

he did not reside. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to show that A.B.

entered the unit with the specific intent to commit a felony, which is part of

the element of the crime of simple burglary.

The manager did not state specifically when the units were renovated

and considered “move-in ready.” She did not provide the date(s) when any

of the damage actually occurred or when she first noticed the damage. It is

undisputed that approximately nineteen days passed between the date of the

surveillance video at issue here and the date when Officer Limeaux viewed

the damage. Moreover, it does not appear that the manager identified (or

that Officer Limeaux requested) any other surveillance videos that would

have provided more information. These very pertinent facts could have been

ascertained had the manager been called to testify.

Even viewing the evidence—direct and circumstantial—in the light most

favorable to the State, we conclude that the State failed to prove the charged

offenses.5 However, as we recognized in State in Interest of J.P., 2019-0542, 280

So.3d at 251, n. 3:

5 Considering our finding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the

elements of the charged offenses, we pretermit discussion of the remainder of A.B.’s
assignments of error.

7

When the charged offense is among the crimes for which lesser
included offenses are statutorily enumerated in La. C.Cr.P. art. 814, an
appellate court has the authority to enter a conviction for the next
highest offense supported by the evidence. La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(E); see
also State v. Higgins, [20]03-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1232
(observing that, “under State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 248 (La. 1980), and
La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 821(E), discharge of the defendant is neither
necessary nor proper when the evidence presented at trial does not
support the verdict returned but does support a responsive verdict or
lesser included grade of the offense”). This exception has been
applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., State in
Interest of Pigott, 413 So.2d 659, 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982)
(finding “no reason why the rationale and justification used in Byrd
should not apply to juvenile cases on appeal”).

Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 814(A)(38), the responsive verdicts for simple

arson are: guilty of simple arson where the damage done amounted to five hundred

dollars or more; guilty of simple arson where the damage done amounted to less

than five hundred dollars; and not guilty. Because we find that the State failed to

present any evidence to connect A.B. to the fire damage, the only available

responsive verdict on the charge of simple arson in this instance is not guilty.

Regarding simple burglary, La. C.Cr.P. art 814(A)(50) sets forth the

following responsive verdicts: guilty of attempted simple burglary; guilty of

unauthorized entry of a place of business; guilty of attempted unauthorized entry of

a place of business; and not guilty.

Here, the surveillance video clearly shows A.B. entering one of the vacant

units in question. The manager identified A.B. as a known resident of the

apartment complex and confirmed that the entry into that unit was unauthorized.

Additionally, we note that this assertion is undisputed by A.B.’s counsel. In sum,

although we find insufficient evidence for the charge of simple burglary, we find

that the State did offer sufficient evidence to support a conviction for the lesser and

included offense of unauthorized entry of a place of business.

8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate A.B.’s adjudication of delinquency for

simple arson, finding insufficient evidence for the charge or any of the responsive

verdicts set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 814(A)(38). We vacate the adjudication of

delinquency for simple burglary, and enter an adjudication of delinquency for

unauthorized entry of a place of business. We remand to the juvenile court for

proper disposition on that offense.

REVERSED AND MODIFIED; REMANDED

9