Bayou Construction & Trucking Co., L.L.C. v. Ohio Security Insurance Company, West American Insurance Company, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Bosco Trucking, LLC, and Quiana Washington

BAYOU CONSTRUCTION & * NO. 2025-CA-0599
TRUCKING CO., L.L.C.
*
VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
*
OHIO SECURITY INSURANCE FOURTH CIRCUIT
COMPANY, WEST *
AMERICAN INSURANCE STATE OF LOUISIANA
COMPANY, LIBERTY *******
MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, BOSCO
TRUCKING, LLC, AND
QUIANA WASHINGTON

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2021-06497, DIVISION “D-12”
Honorable Monique E. Barial, Judge
******
Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase,
Judge Monique G. Morial)

Randall A. Smith
Andre M. Stolier
Reagan R. Wilty
John C. Walsh
SMITH & FAWER, LLC
201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3702
New Orleans, LA 70170

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Pamela Croft
LAW OFFICE OF BRAD J. BRUMFIELD
P.O. Box 7217
London, KY 40742

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES

REVERSED AND REMANDED
MARCH 9, 2026

TGC
JCL
MGM

Bayou Construction & Trucking Co., LLC (hereinafter “Bayou

Construction”) seeks review of the trial court’s May 21, 2025 judgment granting

the motion for summary judgment filed by West American Insurance Company,

Bosco Trucking, LLC and Quiana Washington (hereinafter collectively

“Defendants”). After consideration of the record before this Court and the

applicable law, the May 21, 2025 judgment of the trial court is reversed and the

case remanded for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

On December 31, 2020, a motorist reported a fire in a trucking parking lot in

Port Sulphur, Louisiana between three commercial dump trucks. One truck was

owned by Bosco Trucking, LLC (hereinafter “Bosco”) and two trucks were owned

by Bayou Construction. All three trucks were completely destroyed in the fire.

There were no surveillance cameras in the lot and the trucks were parked in the lot

for approximately one week without being moved or started.

On January 4, 2021, the Office of State Fire Marshal lead investigator,

Deputy Lewis Frost (hereinafter “Deputy Frost”) reported to the scene to

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investigate the fire. In conjunction with the investigation, Deputy Frost conducted

interviews of the following: (1) Chad Jarreau (hereinafter “Mr. Jarreau”), owner

and insured of Bayou Construction; (2) Quiana Washington, owner and insured of

Bosco; (3) Dante Harris, driver of the Bosco truck; and (4) Ralph Brooks, the

motorist who reported the fire. Deputy Frost’s report explained the investigation,

including fire patterns and flammables involved. He determined that he was unable

to conclusively establish the “initial ignition sequence.” Deputy Frost concluded

that the origin of the fire was “undetermined.”

Gary Jones (hereinafter “Mr. Jones”) a fire investigator with EFI Global,

Inc. was hired to investigate the fire by Custard Insurance Adjusters, an insurer for

Bayou Construction. In his report, Mr. Jones noted that “[t]he directional burn

patterns do show that the [Bayou Construction truck] was the first to be

extinguished supporting the hypothesis it was damaged by exposure to the [other]

burning [Bayou Construction truck].” He observed that the Bosco truck was

“disproportionately affected” on the driver side, compared to the passenger side,

“with increased burning to the tires and the fuel tank” on the left side. He found

two working hypotheses as the origin of the fire based on the evidence: (1) “[a]n

adverse electrical event in a non-protected or safety circuit that remains energized

absent the ignition switch being engaged” or (2) “[s]ome form of human

involvement either deliberate or unintentional.” Mr. Jones concluded that the

origin of the fire could not be established due to the extent of the damage.

Van Joffrion (hereinafter “Mr. Joffrion”), a fire investigator with New

England Fire Cause and Origin, was hired to investigate the fire by Bosco’s

insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. He examined the Bosco truck but, did

not receive authorization to examine the Bayou Construction trucks. During his

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deposition, Mr. Joffrion testified that the Bosco truck was positioned to the left,

with the two Bayou Construction trucks immediately adjacent to the Bosco truck.

As part of his investigation, Mr. Joffrion reviewed the Office of State Fire

Marshal’s report and the EFI Global report. While noting that human activity could

not be ruled out as the cause of the fire, Mr. Joffrion concluded that “neither the

point of origin nor the cause could be determined based on the fire patterns and the

firewall and battery compartment” of both trucks.

On July 23, 2021, Bayou Construction filed a petition for damages against

Defendants asserting that the fire originated in the Bosco truck and spread to the

Bayou Construction trucks, causing the total loss of the trucks. Bayou Construction

contended that the Bosco truck had a well-documented history of mechanical and

electrical issues. Bayou Construction asserted claims for negligence and failure to

exercise reasonable care, maintaining that, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,

Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the fire.

On November 25, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment

arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the origin of the

fire because the investigations revealed that the origin of the fire could not be

determined due to the extensive damage to the trucks. Therefore, according to

Defendants, Bayou Construction would be unable to establish the origin of the fire

and thus fail to meet its burden of proof as to the causation element of negligence.

To its motion for summary judgment, Defendants attached the deposition

transcripts of Deputy Frost and Mr. Joffrion. Bayou Construction opposed the

motion asserting that a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding whether

the fire originated in the Bosco truck. Bayou Construction argued that the

cumulative circumstantial evidence raised a triable issue of fact that the fire could

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have been caused by an internal electrical malfunction in the Bosco Truck. To its

opposition, Bayou Construction attached the affidavit and EFI Global report of fire

investigator, Mr. Jones; deposition transcripts of Mr. Jarreau, Deputy Frost and Mr.

Joffrion; and the Office of State Fire Marshal incident report completed by Deputy

Frost. By judgment dated May 21, 2025, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment and found that because all reports indicate that the cause of

the fire is “not determinable,” no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the

origin of the fire. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for

summary judgment de novo. Reddick v. State, 2021-0197, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir.

9/29/21), 328 So.3d 504, 507. We have stated the applicable standard of review as

follows:

Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to
determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. This standard of
review requires the appellate court to look at the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, to determine if they show that no genuine
issue as to a material fact exists, and that the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material when its existence or
nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under
the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially
insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or
determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as
to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons
could reach only one conclusion, no need for trial on that issue exists
and summary judgment is appropriate. To affirm a summary
judgment, we must find reasonable minds would inevitably conclude
that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of the applicable law
on the facts before the court.

Id., 2021-0197, p. 5, 328 So.3d at 507-08 (quoting Chatelain v. Fluor Daniel

Const. Co., 2014-1312, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/10/15), 179 So.3d 791, 793).

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Discussion

On appeal, Bayou Construction asserts that a genuine issue of material fact

remains as to whether the Bosco truck caused the fire which damaged Bayou

Construction’s trucks. It maintains that the circumstantial evidence it presented

creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the origin of the fire and that the

trial court erred by weighing evidence.

“The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy,

and inexpensive determination of every action… . The procedure is favored and

shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). A motion

for summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

discovery, admissions on file, and affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Reddick, 2021-0197, p. 6, 328 So.3d at 508.

“A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if

reasonable persons could only reach one conclusion, there is no need for trial on

that issue, and summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. “A fact is material when its

existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under

the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially insures or

precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome

of the legal dispute.” Id. (citations omitted). Whether a fact is material is a

determination that must be made based upon the applicable substantive law.

Roadrunner Transp. Sys. v. Brown, 2017-0040, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/10/17), 219

So. 3d 1265, 1270. La. C.C.P. art 966(D)(1) provides that:

The burden of proof rests with the mover [on a motion for
summary judgment]. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear
the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court

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on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden on
the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements
of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to
point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or
more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual
support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

If the adverse party fails to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of

material fact, summary judgment shall be rendered against the adverse party if

appropriate. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B).

Bayou Construction maintains that summary judgment is not appropriate

because circumstantial evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the

origin of the fire. In civil cases, “the plaintiff must prove [his] case by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Tomlinson v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2015-0276,

p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), 192 So.3d 153, 159. The plaintiff’s burden of proof

may be met with either direct or circumstantial evidence and circumstantial

evidence may be used to defeat summary judgment. Id., 2015-0276, pp. 7-8, 192

So.3d at 159. “When circumstantial evidence is relied on, the evidence taken as a

whole must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis with a fair amount of

certainty but does not have to negate every other possible hypothesis.” Id., 2015-

0276, p. 7, 192 So.3d at 159 (citation omitted). This Court has stated the following

regarding summary judgment and circumstantial evidence:

In determining when circumstantial evidence leaves an issue ripe for a
jury or other trier of fact, this Court acknowledges that the question of
“whether one of the proposed alternative [causes] presents a
sufficiently reasonable hypothesis and the question of whether the
circumstantial evidence did not exclude these [causes] with a fair
amount of certainty are factual ones, which are not appropriate for
summary judgment.”

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Id., 2015-0276, p. 8. 192 So.3d at 159 (quoting Wood v. Becnel, 2002-1730, p. 6

(La.App. 4 Cir. 2/26/03), 840 So.2d 1225, 1228) (citation omitted). As the mover

on the motion for summary judgment, the initial burden rests with Defendants to

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bayou Construction’s

claims are based in negligence and therefore, it is required to prove that

Defendants were negligent under La. C.C. art. 2315.1 Since Defendants will not

bear the burden of proof at trial, they are only required to identify a lack of factual

support as to one or more elements essential to Bayou Construction’s claims. The

standard negligence analysis used in determining whether to impose liability under

La. C.C. art. 2315 is the duty-risk analysis.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment focuses on the causation element

of the duty-risk analysis. Bosco contends that it does not bear responsibility for the

fire because all three fire investigators concluded that the origin of the fire could

not be determined. The EFI Global report indicates that the Bosco truck was

“disproportionately affected” on the driver side, compared to the passenger side,

“with increased burning to the tires and the fuel tank” on the left side. The report

explains that the physical burn patterns correspond with the statement of the

witness who reported the fire was between the Bosco truck and one of the Bayou

Construction trucks. Additionally, it provides that the battery system and cables in

the Bayou Construction truck exhibited no evidence of an adverse event to initiate

combustion but, noted the Bosco truck battery compartment and cables were too

1 “The Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a ‘duty-risk’ analysis for assigning tort liability

under a [La. C.C. art. 2315] negligence theory. This theory requires a plaintiff to establish that
(1) the plaintiff suffered an injury; (2) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (3) the
duty was breached by the defendant; (4) the conduct in question was the cause-in-fact of the
resulting harm; and (5) the risk of harm was within the scope of protection afforded by the duty
breached.” Doe v. McKesson, 2021-00929, p. 7 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So.3d 524, 531 (citations
omitted).

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damaged to render an opinion. The EFI Global report also does not exclude human

interaction as a cause which could have contributed to the fire. Further, Mr.

Jarreau testified that the Bayou Construction trucks had no history of electrical

problems and that he witnessed Dante Harris working on the Bosco truck, in the

area where the fuse box is located, approximately one week before the fire. Mr.

Joffrion also testified that due to the damage, electrical failure by either the Bosco

truck or the Bayou Construction truck could not be ruled out.

A review of the record demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of material

fact regarding whether Bosco’s truck was the origin of the fire. While the fire

investigators all concluded that the origin of the fire could not be determined

because of the extensive damage to the trucks, this conclusion does not completely

absolve Defendants from liability. There are a chain of reasonable inferences

which suggest that the origin of the fire could not be conclusively determined. All

the investigators also concluded that human involvement could not be definitively

ruled out. The circumstantial evidence submitted by Bayou Construction, in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment, sufficiently creates a genuine

issue of material fact as to the origin of the fire and thus, causation. A trier of fact

“should determine whether the circumstantial evidence excludes with a fair, but

not absolute, amount of certainty all reasonable hypotheses” for the cause of the

fire. See Wood, 2002-1730, p. 8, 840 So.2d at 1229. Summary disposition is not

appropriate based on the facts of this case as a genuine issue of material fact

remains regarding the origin of the fire. We find the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

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Decree

For the foregoing reasons, the May 21, 2025 judgment of the trial court is

reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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