David Rodney Elliot, On Behalf Of S.E. v. The Arc Of The United States, Inc., And The Association For Retarded Citizens Of Sabrine, Inc.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 25, 2025
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
DAVID RODNEY ELLIOT, ON BEHALF OF
S.E.
VS.
THE ARC OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.,
AND THE ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED
CITIZENS OF SABRINE, INC.
No. 2025-CC-01059
_ _
_ _ _ _
IN
RE: David Rodney Elliot, on Behalf of S.E. - Applicant Plaintiff; Applying For
Writ Of Certiorari, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Number(s) 70,268,
Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Number(s) CW 25-00364;
_ _ _ _ _ _
November 25, 2025
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and would grant and docket and assigns reasons.
Guidry, J., dissents and would grant and docket.
JDH
WJC
JBM
PDG
CRC
11/25/2025 "See News Release 052 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2025-CC-01059
DA VID RODNEY ELLIOT, ON BEHALF OF S.E.

VS.

THE ARC OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., AND THE ASSOCIATION
FOR RETARDED CITIZENS OF SABRINE, INC.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Sabine

PER CURIAM
Writ granted. This case involves alleged sexual assaults by a bus driver for the
Association of Retarded Citizens of Sabine, Inc., a local chapter of the ARC of the
United States, Inc. The alleged victim is an intellectually disabled woman, and the
sexual assaults allegedly occurred between 2017 and 2018. Suit was filed in January
2020, alleging ARC’s negligence , specifically its failure to implement proper
oversight, safety policies, and accountability measures to protect the victim.
ARC filed an exception of prescription, arguing plaintiff’s claims are
prescribed pursuant to the one-year prescriptive period applicable to delictual actions
at all times pertinent herein. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492 (repealed by 2024 La. Acts
No. 423) .1 The trial court denied the exception, applying Louisiana Civil Code
article 3496.2, which provides a three-year prescriptive period for a “delictual action
against a person for any act of sexual assault as defined in R.S. 46:2184.”
Reversing the trial court, t he court of appeal found t he claims against ARC
allege acts of general negligence, not sexual assaults , so Article 3496.2 is not
applicable. See Elliot v. The Arc of The United States, Inc., 25-00364 (La. App. 3 Cir.

1 See now La. Civ. Code art. 3493.1 , establishing two-year liberative prescription for
delictual actions arising after July 1, 2024. See 2024 La. Acts No. 423 §3.

2

7/24/25) (unpublished writ action). The court of appeal held the claims are subject
to the one-year prescriptive period in former Article 3492 and had prescribed . See
Id. We disagree.
Article 3496.2 applies to an action “against a person for any act of sexual
assault.” The article does not specify if the person must be the actual perpetrator of
the sexual assault, or, as in this case, another person allegedly liable for the sexual
assault. The legislature could have limited the article’s application to the perpetrator
or offender, but instead used the broader term “person,” which includes both natural
and juridical persons. See La. Civ. Code art. 24. Notably, Article 3496.2 uses the
more limited term “offender” only for purposes of determining a potential trigger of
the prescription: “the day the victim is notified of the identity of the offender by law
enforcement or a judicial agency.” See La. Civ. Code art. 3496.2.
The legislature can draft, and has drafted, laws relating to recovery for sexual
assaults that limit their application to the individual assailant. Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315.11 allows exemplary damages for injuries caused by sexual assaults in
the workplace. The article references the prescriptive period in Article 3496.2 and,
like that provision, adopts the definition of sexual assault in L ouisiana Revised
Statutes 46:2184. However, unlike Article 3496.2, Article 2315.11 states: “The
provisions of this Article shall be applicable only to the perpetrator of the sexual
assault.” La. Civ. Code art. 2315.11B (emphasis added). Similar restrictive language
is not in Article 3496.2. The legislature is “presumed to act deliberately and with full
knowledge of existing laws on the same subject, with awareness of court cases and
well-established principles of statutory construction.” Borel v. Young, 07-0419 (La.
11/27/07), 989 So. 2d 42, 48, on reh’g (July 1, 2008). While the legislature chose to
limit Article 2315.11 to the individual assailant, the legislature chose not do so in
Article 3496.2.

3

Further, in the context of sexual abuse torts, this Court recently applied special
prescriptive provisions to corporate defendants. Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2800.9,
provides that “[a]n action against a person for sexual abuse of a minor . . . does not
prescribe.” (Emphasis added.) In Bienvenu v. Defendant 1 , 23-1194 (La. 6/12/24),
386 So. 3d 280 (on rehearing) , we found an action under this statute against
corporate defendants did not prescribe. Id., 386 So. 3d at 284.
The legislature enacted Article 3496.2 to expand the prescriptive period for
sexual assault survivors by giving them additional time to seek redress. A narrow
reading of the article undermines that purpose and this Court’s directive that
“prescription statutes are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the
claim sought to be extinguished by it.” Wells v. Zadeck, 11-1232 (La. 3/30/12), 89
So. 3d 1145, 1149. We reinstate the trial court’s judgment applying the three-year
prescriptive period.
REVERSED AND REMANDED