Russell Maurice Brue v. Le Tu Tran Brue

Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 25, 2025
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
RUSSELL MAURICE BRUE
VS.
LE TU
TRAN BRUE
No. 2025-CJ-01260
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_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Le Tu Tran Brue - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Number(s) 202215936, Court
of Appeal, First Circuit, Number(s) 2025 CW 0562;
_ _ _ _ _ _
November 25, 2025
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and would deny.
Hughes, J., dissents and would deny.
Griffin, J., dissents and would deny.
WJC
JBM
JMG
CRC
11/25/2025 "See News Release 052 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-CJ-01260

RUSSELL MAURICE BRUE

VS.

LE TU TRAN BRUE

On Supervisory Writ to the Juvenile Court, Parish of St. Tammany

PER CURIAM

In this child custody matter, the parties were granted joint custody of the two
minor children, with the mother designated as domiciliary parent. The mother
homeschooled the children five days per week and had them attend a small private
school for several mornings each week for additional tutoring. The father challenged
this arrangement.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment ordering the children to attend
a public school for the next school year. In support, the trial court found the mother
was using the home schooling schedule to adversely impact the father’s custody and
ability to see the children consistently. The court further determined that the children
may be dyslexic , and the current schooling arrangement may not address this
condition.
The mother sought supervisory review. The court of appeal denied the writ.
One judge dissented, finding the trial court “abused its discretion because it did not
apply the proper presumption to the domiciliary parent’s decision as to school
choice.”
Pursuant to La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3), the domiciliary parent is given authority to
make all decisions affecting the child unless an implementation order provides
otherwise. Upon motion of the non-domiciliary parent, all major decisions made by
the domiciliary parent concerning the child, including choice of schools, are subject

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to review by the court. The statute expressly provides that “[i]t shall be presumed
that all major decisions made by the domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the
child.” Therefore, t he burden of proving th at such decisions are not in the best
interest of the child is placed on the non -domiciliary parent who opposes the
decision. See Lawson v. Lawson, 48,296 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/24/13), 121 So. 3d 769,
773; see also Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 2025-00972 (La. 8/6/25), 415 So. 3d 932,
933.
In the case before us, we find the trial court failed to give proper effect to the
presumption that the mother’s choice of schooling was in the children’s best interest.
Rather than finding any fundamental defects in the current arrangement, the trial
court acknowledged in its reasons for judgment that there was “ no issue that the
children have done well in their education to date . . . .” This finding reveals the
father failed to rebut the presumption of best interest accorded to the mother’s major
decisions.
The trial court’s primary focus was on certain aspects of the current
arrangement, such as its effect on the father’s custody and whether it included
adequate resources to address the children’s dyslexia. While these concerns are
reasonable, they d o not indicate the mother’s schooling decision is not in the
children’s best interest. Rather, these concerns can be addressed through narrow
rulings which do not impact the mother’s school decision, such as explicitly defining
the time periods when the mother must make the children available to the father.
Applying this reasoning, we find the trial court erred in ordering the children
to attend a different school for the next school year. We will vacate this ruling and
remand the case to the trial court to fashion a remedy that addresses the concerns
raised by the father while maintaining the mother’s educational decision.

DECREE

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For the reasons assigned, the writ is granted and made peremptory. The April
23, 2025 judgment of the trial court is vacated and set aside insofar as it orders the
minor children to attend public school for the next school year. The case is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.