State Of Louisiana v. Mitch Bratton

Supreme Court of Louisiana
September 16, 2025
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MITCH BRATTON
No. 2025-K-00404
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Mitch Bratton - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Writ Of Certiorari,
Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Number(s) 99,763, Court of Appeal,
Second Circuit, Number(s) 56,080-KA;
_ _ _ _ _ _
September 16, 2025
Writ application granted in part. See per curiam.
Crain, J., dissents and would deny.
McCallum, J., dissents and would deny.
Cole, J., dissents and would deny.
JLW
JDH
PDG
JMG
09/16/2025 "See News Release 041 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No.
2025-K-00404
STA
TE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MITCH BRATTON
On W
rit of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caldwell
P
ER CURIAM:
G
ranted in part, otherwise denied . For the reasons discussed below, we
grant defendant’s writ for the limited purpose of reversing his conviction and
vacating his sentence for possession of alprazolam.
Defendant was initially charged with possession of flualprazolam, but the
State amended the charge to possession of alprazolam before trial. Alprazolam was
listed among the scheduled substances when the pills were found in defendant’s
vehicle. But the forensic analyst who testified at trial said the pills she received and
tested were flualprazolam, which was not added to the CDS schedule until after it
was found in defendant’s vehicle in June of 2020. See La. R.S. 40:964. “The identity
of the drug is an essential element of the charged offense.” State v. Broome, 49,004,
p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So.3d 979, 985, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15),
157 So.3d 1127. Thus, the question on review is whether the jury could have
rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that by possessing flualprazolam,
defendant also possessed alprazolam. See State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471, 474 (La.
1983).
Defendant cites the testimony of forensic analyst Leona Summerville, the
State’s expert witness, explaining that from a chemical standpoint flualprazolam is
distinct from alprazolam and that the two drugs cannot be viewed interchangeably.

In particular, he emphasizes Ms. Summerville’s testimony that “on the GC-MS [gas
chromatograph mass spectrometer] instrument, alprazolam and flualprazolam [are]
not the same structure” and that she did not detect the presence of alprazolam in her
analysis of the substance retrieved from his vehicle. Relying upon these aspects of
her testimony, defendant contends that the jury could not have rationally found him
guilty of possessing alprazolam.
To support its opposing position, the State also cites Ms. Summerville’s
testimony. It urges that on re -direct she explained that the chemical structure of
flualprazolam contains alprazolam. As the State sees it, the jury reasonably credited
Ms. Summerville’s testimony indicating the “parent drug” alprazolam was
necessarily present within the flualprazolam defendant possessed.
Thus, the parties dispute whether the two compounds can be reasonably
viewed as interchangeable under the law. Significantly, we note that the legislature’s
subsequent inclusion of them each as separate items on the controlled substance
schedules indicates that the legislature determined that they are and should be
deemed distinct for purposes of a criminal prosecution.1
We have recognized that a single witness’s testimony, if credited by the trier
of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion, but only “in the absence of
internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence.” State v.
Legrand, 02-1462, p. 5 (La. 12/3/03), 864 So.2d 89, 94, as supplemented on denial
of reh’g (Feb. 6, 2004) . Here, Ms. Summerville testified to prove possession of
alprazolam; however, her testimony contain ed internal contradictions with respect
to whether the substance she tested contains alprazolam. Thus, the evidence is
insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possessing alprazolam.

1 Although not directly implicated in our analysis, we note that the principle of lenity “directs
that a court construe a criminal statute in favor of the most narrow application when there are
serious doubts concerning a meaning of a term.” State v. Ritchie, 590 So.2d 1139, 1149 n.6 (La.
1991), as supplemented on reh’g (Dec. 12, 1991); see State v. Boowell, 406 So.2d 213, 216 (La.
1981).

Accordingly, the writ is granted in part to reverse the defendant’s conviction
for possession of alprazolam and to vacate the corresponding sentence. Because the
court of appeal correctly affirmed the defendant’s remaining convictions and
sentences, the application is denied in all other respects.