State of Louisiana v. Donald Briggs, III A/K/A Donald Briggs C/W State of Louisiana v. Stefan Jermaine Briggs

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #018

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 1st day of May, 2026 are as follows:

BY Penzato, J.:

2025-K-00529 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. DONALD BRIGGS, III A/K/A DONALD
BRIGGS C/W STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. STEFAN JERMAINE
BRIGGS (Parish of Vermilion)

REVERSED AND REMANDED. SEE OPINION.

Griffin, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-K-00529

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

DONALD BRIGGS, III A/K/A DONALD BRIGGS

C/W

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

STEFAN JERMAINE BRIGGS

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Vermilion

PENZATO, Justice Pro Tempore1

This case involves a drive-by shooting, which resulted in the death of Jazaylon

Levy. A unanimous jury convicted brothers, Donald Briggs, III and Stefan Briggs,

of second degree murder in connection with the shooting.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed defendants’ convictions,

concluding the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Finding that the court of appeal erred in

substituting its verdict for that of the jury, we reverse, reinstate defendants’

convictions and sentences, and remand to the appellate court for consideration of the

pretermitted assignments of error.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Approximately a year-and-a-half before the murder of Mr. Levy, there was an

eruption of gun violence between two rival groups in Abbeville, Louisiana. The

Briggs brothers were affiliated with one group, while Ronald Bernard, III, was

1
Judge Allison H. Penzato of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, appointed Justice pro tempore,
sitting for the vacancy in the First District.
1

affiliated with the other. In late 2020, Stefan was shot in two separate incidents. Mr.

Bernard became a suspect, but police never confirmed his involvement in the

shootings.

On the night of July 14, 2022, after 9:00 p.m., Mr. Levy was shot during a

drive-by shooting in the parking lot of the Stone Bridge Apartment complex, located

off Rodeo Road, in Abbeville. Mr. Levy, Gavin Garnica, a known associate of

Bernard’s group, and one other teenager were walking Kashawna Preston and her

sister to their respective cars in the parking lot of the complex. As the group walked,

Ms. Preston noticed a silver Mercedes-Benz backed into a parking space. Shortly

after Ms. Preston and her sister departed in their vehicles, Mr. Levy was shot while

standing near one of the empty parking spaces, a few parking spaces down from

where Ms. Preston observed the silver Mercedes-Benz.

Detective Lon Hargrave, a courtesy officer who resided at Stone Bridge and

worked with the Vermillion Parish Sheriff’s Office SWAT team, treated Mr. Levy

at the scene. Mr. Levy and Mr. Garnica were later transported to the hospital, where

Mr. Levy expired from his injuries. While at the hospital, Mr. Garnica was

apprehended on other charges and interviewed by Detective Hargrave. At that time,

Mr. Garnica relayed that he sustained a gunshot graze wound to the leg. Mr. Garnica

further admitted that he was “out there ‘when them boys started shooting.’”

Otherwise, he was uncooperative with the investigation.

Detective Trent Guidry, the Abbeville Police Department lead investigator,

retrieved video surveillance from a Walmart store located one half mile from Stone

Bridge. At 9:15 p.m., prior to the shooting, defendants exit a light-colored sedan

and enter Walmart. After leaving Walmart, defendants’ vehicle turns onto Rodeo

Road in the direction of Stone Bridge. Thereafter, a light-colored sedan, consistent

with defendants’ sedan, enters Stone Bridge. Between nine to eleven minutes later,

video footage of a Stone Bridge exit driveway captures audio of ten gunshots being

2

fired. Video footage from a neighboring apartment complex shows a light-colored

sedan overtaking a white Ford F-150 truck and another vehicle2 leaving Stone Bridge

shortly after the shooting. Almost immediately after the sedan exited the complex,

video surveillance from a Motel 6 records a light-colored sedan traveling eastbound

on Highway 14. Subsequent footage from a Texaco station located at the

intersection of Highways 14 and 89, in Delacambre, depicts a Toyota Camry

followed by a light-colored Mercedes-Benz arriving at the station. Donald Briggs

exits the Mercedes and enters the Camry, while Stefan exits the passenger side of

the Mercedes, enters its driver’s side, and drives away.

At the conclusion of the investigation, defendants were charged by grand jury

indictment with the second degree murder of Mr. Levy. The defendants were tried

together, and a unanimous jury found both defendants guilty as charged. Thereafter,

defendants received life sentences at hard labor without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence.3 After the trial court denied post-verdict

motions, defendants appealed.

On appeal, defendants each asserted three assignments of error, one of which

pertained to the sufficiency of the evidence. After consolidating defendants’

separate appeals, the appellate court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to

convict defendants of second degree murder and reversed the jury verdict.4 The

court of appeal reasoned that because the evidence was circumstantial, the State was

required, but failed, to negate every reasonable hypothesis of misidentification,

2
Neither the State nor the defendants submit that the shooting could have come from this third
vehicle, which, according to Detective Hargrave, was already visible in the driveway when the
shots were fired.
3
The appellate court noted the same patent error in each of defendant’s sentences, which ordered
defendants’ sentences to run concurrently to any other sentence absent such a statement in the
transcript. However, given it reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence, it found the errors
patent to be moot.
4
The court of appeal pretermitted defendants’ remaining assignments of error, deeming them
moot.
3

finding: “[e]ven if the jury reasonably inferred from the video evidence that the

brothers were in the vicinity of the shooting at the time of the shooting and left

shortly afterwards, the jury was required to speculate as to whether the shots were

fired from the brothers’ car.” The court noted the lack of any evidence connecting

defendants to the shooting or the victim, and the “ambiguous” evidence connecting

them to Mr. Garnica, who was wounded in the shooting which killed Mr. Levy.

Thus, the court concluded the jury’s determination was based on speculation rather

than reasonable inferences. The appellate court further found that the evidence was

insufficient to prove Donald Briggs, the driver of the Mercedes, possessed specific

intent to kill.

We granted the State’s writ application to review the correctness of the

appellate court’s decision. State v. Briggs, 2025-00529 (La. 10/1/25), 420 So.3d 22.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The sole issue presented is whether the evidence was sufficient to support

defendants’ convictions. The State asserts that the appellate court erred in finding it

did not negate every reasonable hypothesis of misidentification or prove Donald’s

specific intent to kill. In particular, the State contends that the appellate court

improperly weighed the evidence and substituted its own judgment for that of the

jury. We agree.

Appellate review for constitutional sufficiency of evidence is limited by the

due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. See State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965,

968 (La. 1986). Under that standard, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

4

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560

(1979).5

Donald is alleged to have participated solely as the driver of the vehicle, not

as the individual who shot Mr. Levy. Although not included in the jury instructions,6

our statutory scheme recognizes that an individual who did not personally discharge

a weapon may nevertheless be held liable as a principal. Under La. R.S. 14:24,

“principals” encompass:

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present
or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel
or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.

Here, the charged crime is second degree murder, which is defined, in part, as

“the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to

inflict great bodily harm[.]” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Thus, the State was required to

prove that defendants killed Mr. Levy “with specific intent to kill or to inflict great

bodily harm[.]” In order to prove defendants guilty as principals to second degree

murder, the State was required to prove defendants either directly committed or

5
Regarding appellate review under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, the United States Supreme
Court has emphasized:

Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether “the government’s case was so
lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury.” On sufficiency
review, a reviewing court makes a limited inquiry tailored to ensure that a defendant
receives the minimum that due process requires: a “meaningful opportunity to
defend” against the charge against him and a jury finding of guilt “beyond a
reasonable doubt.” The reviewing court considers only the “legal” question
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” That limited review does not intrude on the jury’s
role “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”

Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243, 136 S.Ct. 709, 715, 193 L.Ed.2d 639
(2016) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
6
The parties did not challenge the jury instructions.
5

aided or abetted in the killing of Mr. Levy when each had a specific intent to kill or

to inflict great bodily harm.7

Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances

indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to

follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). Because specific intent is a state

of mind, it need not be proven as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances

of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126,

1127 (La. 1982).

Guided by these principles, and following a thorough review of the record, we

conclude the State presented sufficient evidence of specific intent and negated the

defense’s hypothesis of misidentification. Detective Guidry testified that defendants

harbored a vendetta against a rival group. Mr. Bernard, who was affiliated with the

rival group, became a suspect in two shootings targeting Stefan Briggs. Mr. Garnica,

who was also associated with this rival group, was rumored to be staying in the 300

building of Stone Bridge. In September 2020, Stefan was shot in the hand while he

and Donald were traveling in a vehicle. Thereafter, Donald dropped Stefan off at the

hospital and pursued the shooter. Detective Guidry stated that Stefan was

uncooperative during the investigation of that shooting. He opined that, in his

experience, a victim’s lack of cooperation usually signals “potential retaliation.”

While the police never positively identified a shooter, Mr. Bernard was a suspect.8

Detective Guidry further related that Mr. Bernard’s father was killed in his driveway

in November 2020, and that the evidence indicated that there were two shooters.

7
Not all principals are automatically guilty of the same grade of offense as the main offender
because the mental state of the offenders may be different. State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 337, 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987). “Thus, an individual may
only be convicted as a principal for those crimes which he personally has the requisite mental
state.” Id., 505 So.2d at 717. The intent of the accomplice cannot be inferred to the accused. State
v. Holmes, 388 So.2d 722 (La. 1980).
8
On cross-examination, Detective Guidry admitted that the police never confirmed Mr. Bernard
shot Stefan.

6

Detective Guidry also described another shooting incident in December 2020,

wherein Stefan sustained a gunshot wound to the face while he and Donald were

traveling in a vehicle. Stefan, whose facial scar was visible in court, was, again,

uncooperative with that investigation. Additionally, Detective Guidry testified that

he learned there was an altercation between Stefan and another associate of Mr.

Bernard, while Stefan was in jail.

In addition, Detective Guidry testified relative to the video surveillance he

reviewed in connection with his investigation. While the video footage was played

for the jury, he described what he observed. In particular, Detective Guidry

explained that, first, a light-colored sedan enters the parking lot of a Walmart store,

which was directly adjacent to Stone Bridge. Then, two individuals — one wearing

a white shirt and one wearing a black shirt — exit the vehicle and enter Walmart at

9:15 p.m.9 He identified Donald Briggs, III as the individual in the white shirt and

Stefan Briggs as the individual in the black shirt. The brothers walk around

Walmart, without making a purchase, then return to the sedan, at which time Donald

entered the driver’s seat and Stefan the passenger’s seat. The sedan exits the parking

lot and turns on Rodeo Road heading toward Stone Bridge.

Next, Detective Guidry described a light-colored sedan entering Stone Bridge,

as revealed from the video footage from the entrance of the complex. 10 Nine to

eleven minutes after the sedan enters the complex, Stone Bridge’s exit camera

records audio of ten gunshots.

Significantly, immediately prior to the shooting, Ms. Preston walked to her

car with a group of people, including Mr. Levy and Mr. Garnica. She testified she

noticed a silver Mercedes-Benz backed into a parking space, and identified its

location as only a few parking spaces down from where the shooting occurred. She

9
Detective Guidry verified the time-stamp from the Walmart footage was accurate.
10
Detective Guidry stated that the time-stamp on the footage from the entrance was not accurate.
7

stated she was “positive” that it was a Mercedes and that she could clearly see it.

She revealed the vehicle was turned off and she did not see anyone inside. After

leaving the apartment complex and only traveling to the gas station right down the

street, Ms. Preston learned of the shooting and returned to the scene.

After the shooting, surveillance video from the neighboring complex, the

Havens, captures a light-colored sedan overtake a Ford F-150 truck, and another

vehicle, as it travels through the exit of Stone Bridge toward Rodeo Road. Detective

Guidry further reviewed footage from a Motel 6, which reveals a light-colored sedan

traveling eastbound on Highway 14 in the direction of the Texaco station on

Highway 14 “almost immediately” after the light-colored sedan exits Stone Bridge.

Finally, footage from the Texaco station, located on Highway 14 in

Delacambre, records a light-colored Mercedes-Benz entering the station, wherein

two individuals exit the vehicle.11 Detective Guidry identified Donald exiting the

driver’s seat and Stefan walking around from the passenger’s seat to the driver’s

seat. Donald enters a neighboring Toyota Camry, driven by his girlfriend, Nyesha

Mouton. The vehicles later depart in opposite directions.

The State also admitted a photograph, confirmed by Detective Guidry to be

the silver Mercedes driven by Donald on the night of the murder. Notably, the

vehicle is consistent in appearance with the light-colored silver sedan observed by

Detective Guidry in the video footage.

In connection with the meeting at the Texaco station, Ms. Mouton testified

that she drove the brown Toyota Camry to the gas station. Initially, Donald asked

11
On cross-examination, Detective Guidry acknowledged that the Texaco video did not have a
time or date stamp. However, on re-direct, he stated when he originally viewed the footage at the
Texaco station, there was a time stamp that he used to establish a timeline of events. He further
recreated the route and confirmed it took him roughly the same amount of time as the light- colored
sedan to exit Stone Bridge and arrive at the Texaco station. Specifically, approximately ten to
eleven minutes elapsed between the sound of the gunshots and the arrival of the light-colored sedan
at the Texaco station. Similarly, approximately nine-and-a-half minutes elapsed when he drove
the route from Stone Bridge to the Delacambre Bridge, which was a quarter of a mile to a half mile
away from the Texaco station.

8

her to meet him at a furniture store but, later, changed the location to the gas station.

She confirmed Donald arrived in a silver Mercedes with Stefan in the vehicle. She

stated that when Donald entered her vehicle, he was “upset, talking to himself” for

about twenty-minutes. She stated that they drove to IHOP in Lafayette, and

afterward she dropped Donald off at Willowind Apartments, where his cousin lived.

She testified that Donald did not speak to her in the car.

Detective Hargrave, who heard the gunshots while taking out his trash,

conducted an on-scene investigation after the shooting. He testified that based on

his experience and training, he believed the ten gunshots came from one vehicle

traveling at a moderate, constant speed. He further stated it was rumored that Mr.

Garnica was staying in Apartment 322 in Stone Bridge. After the shooting, Mr.

Garnica relayed to Detective Hargrave that he was “out there ‘when them boys

started shooting[,]’” and he received a graze wound to his leg. Otherwise, Mr.

Garnica refused to cooperate with the investigation.

Dr. Christopher Tape, an expert in the field of forensic pathology, performed

the autopsy, identifying a single, fatal gunshot wound to Mr. Levy’s right buttock.

He concluded that the bullet entry, which proceeded in a level trajectory through the

pelvic/hip area, was around three to four feet (36-48 inches) from the ground, about

half of Mr. Levy’s height (35.5 inches) from the ground.

In connection with the only two vehicles recorded leaving the complex at the

time of the shooting,12 Detective Hargrave further testified that he reviewed the

video surveillance and measured the windowsills of the light-colored sedan and the

Ford F-150. Specifically, he measured multiple models of F-150 trucks and

concluded the average height of the windowsill was anywhere from 52-57 inches

(approximately 4 ½ feet). By contrast, the windowsill of defendants’ vehicle, a

12
As already discussed, Detective Hargrave ruled out a third exiting vehicle, because it was
already visible in the video footage of the exit driveway during the shooting.
9

2009 Mercedes-Benz C300, measured around 37 inches (between 3-4 feet). Finally,

when questioned about whether a vehicle that remained at the scene, rather than ones

that exited the complex, could have been responsible for the shooting, he

acknowledged that other vehicles were in the general area, but “he did not see the

ability for any other vehicle that was currently parked there to have been involved

in the shooting.”

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury rationally found that

defendants were active principals in the killing of Mr. Levy and possessed the

requisite specific intent to kill. The evidence further supports the jury’s reasonable

inference that Donald as the driver, and Stefan as the shooter, directly committed, or

aided and abetted in, the killing: they drove to and waited at the crime scene for their

intended victim and executed a drive-by-shooting firing ten shots at three people,

intending to hit Mr. Garnica. Deliberately aiming and firing a weapon at close range

suffices to establish specific intent. State v. Tassin, 536 So.2d 402, 411 (La. 1988).

The doctrine of transferred intent provides that when a person intends to kill or

inflict harm upon another but instead kills or injures a third person, the law considers

the actor just as guilty as if he had actually killed or injured his intended

victim. See State v. Tyler, 342 So.2d 574 (La. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917, 97

S.Ct. 2180 (1977) (shooting indiscriminately into a crowd with the intent to kill

someone constitutes an assault with intent to kill upon each person in the

crowd); State v. Jordan, 1997-1756, pp. 18-19, (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/98), 719 So.2d

556, 568 (intentionally firing into an area where children are playing, killing 12-

year-old bystander, supports verdict for first degree murder and life sentence for

drive-by shooter); State v. Jasper, 28,187, p. 18 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/96), 677 So.2d

553, 566-567 (bystander killed when defendant and cohorts shot at car containing

person who murdered defendant’s relative; charge on transferred intent proper). For

10

these reasons, we find the appellate court erred in finding the evidence was

insufficient to prove Donald had the requisite specific intent to kill.13

Nevertheless, when the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator,

rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any

reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Hughes, 2005-0992, p. 5 (La.

11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051.

Here, the State’s case rested largely on circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence is “evidence of one fact, or a set of facts, from which the

existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred.” State v. Chism,

436 So.2d 464, 468 (La. 1983). When circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the

conviction, “the evidence, assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends

to prove, in order to convict, [the circumstantial evidence] must exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La. R.S. 15:438; State v. Toups, 2001-1875, p.

3 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, 912 (La. R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter

standard of review than the more general rational juror’s reasonable doubt formula;

rather it serves as a helpful evidentiary guide for jurors).

The Jackson standard “leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what

inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors

‘draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v.

Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012).

Importantly, the Jackson due process standard does not allow a jury to speculate on

the probabilities of guilt where rational jurors would necessarily entertain a

reasonable doubt. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La. 1988). The

requirement that jurors reasonably reject the hypothesis of innocence advanced by

the defendant in a case of circumstantial evidence presupposes that a rational

13
Notably, defendants were tried under La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1), which requires proof of specific
intent to kill, rather than (A)(2), which does not require proof of specific intent when a killing
occurs during the course of enumerated felonies, including assault by drive-by shooting.
11

rejection of that hypothesis is based on the evidence presented, not mere speculation.

State v. Quinn, 2019-0647, p. 7 (La. 9/9/20), 340 So.3d 829, 834 (citation omitted).

Summarily stated, the jury is the ultimate factfinder of whether a defendant

presented a reasonable hypothesis of innocence and the state negated that hypothesis.

See La. R.S. 15:438; and State v. Mitchell, 1999-3342 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78.

The reviewing court “must not impinge on the jury’s factfinding prerogative in a

criminal case except to the extent necessary to guarantee constitutional due process.”

Mitchell, 772 So.2d at 83.

The court of appeal concluded that the jury could only speculate the shots

were fired from defendants’ vehicle, thus the State did not negate any reasonable

probability of misidentification. In support of its theory of misidentification, the

defense presented two hypotheses: 1) the Ford F-150 truck also seen leaving after

the shooting fired the shots; or 2) another vehicle fired the shots and parked in the

complex to avoid detection.

Both of these arguments were made to the jury. Relying on Detective

Hargrave’s and Dr. Tape’s testimony, the jury rejected the defense’s theory that the

shots came from the F-150 or another vehicle which was parked elsewhere in the

complex after the shooting. As to the F-150, there was some potentially conflicting

testimony regarding where the bullet would have hit a person of Mr. Levy’s height,

5’11” (71 inches), based on Detective Hargrave’s 6’2” height. However, direct

evidence from Dr. Tape revealed that the bullet, which traveled in a level trajectory,

created a wound that was approximately three to four feet from the ground, which

was about half of Mr. Levy’s height (35.5 inches). The windowsill of the F-150

measured around four-and-a-half feet (52-57 inches) from the ground, several inches

higher than Mr. Levy’s wound. This evidence is inconsistent with the perpetrator

shooting from the window of the F-150 truck, as the bullet would have traveled in a

downward trajectory. Meanwhile, the evidence is consistent with the perpetrator

12

having shot from the window of a Mercedes, which measures approximately three

feet (37 inches), traveling in an even trajectory, and hitting Mr. Levy in the right

buttock between three and four feet above the ground.

Furthermore, the video footage captures the light-colored sedan bypassing the

F-150 to exit the complex just after the shooting. From this footage, the jury could

have attributed the shooting to the occupants of the sedan, accepting the State’s

suggestion that the sedan hurriedly escaped to avoid detection, over the defense’s

suggestion that the sedan was simply leaving for safety reasons after hearing the

gunshots. Based on this evidence, the jury was free to reject the defense’s theory

that an occupant of the F-150 truck was responsible for the shooting.

The jury further rejected the defense’s hypothesis that a different vehicle was

responsible for the drive-by shooting; however, instead of leaving the scene, it

remained parked in the complex just after the shooting occurred. Again, the jury

relied on the video surveillance of the light-colored sedan hurriedly overtaking two

vehicles after the shooting, and Detective Hargrave’s testimony that he did not

believe another vehicle parked in the parking lot could have been involved in the

shooting. The hypothesis of innocence offered by a defendant to overcome

circumstantial evidence must be a reasonable one. Hughes, supra. In rejecting this

theory, the jury apparently did not find it reasonable that perpetrators of a drive-by

shooting would park in the vicinity of the shooting, risking retaliation or

apprehension.

A reviewing court cannot assume a reasonable alternative hypothesis exists

where the jury has heard and accepted evidence of specific intent to kill and

identification that negates the defense’s hypothesis. “The actual trier of fact’s

rational credibility calls, evidence weighing, and inference drawing are preserved …

by the admonition that the sufficiency inquiry does not require a court to ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

13

doubt.” Mussall, 523 So.2d at 1311. The reviewing court is not called upon to

determine whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to

the weight of the evidence. Id. Rather, the court must assure that the jurors did not

speculate where the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have a reasonable

doubt. Id. (citing 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d, § 467,

at 465-466 (1982)). The reviewing court cannot substitute its idea of what the verdict

should be for that of the jury. Id. Finally, the “appellate court is constitutionally

precluded from acting as a ‘thirteenth juror’ in assessing what weight to give

evidence in criminal cases; that determination rests solely on the sound discretion of

the trier of fact.” State v. Mitchell, 1999-3342, p. 8 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83

(quotation omitted).

Here, defendant does not identify any reasonable hypothesis remaining after

the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The jury

rejected the defense’s hypotheses that an occupant of another vehicle was

responsible for the shooting based on the evidence presented by the State in response

to the defense’s theories of innocence. The court of appeal departed from the

Jackson v. Virginia standard, substituting its judgment for that of the jury, when it

found an otherwise unspecified reasonable hypothesis of innocence remained.

Simply because there was no eyewitness testimony as to the shooting, jurors were

not foreclosed from reasonably inferring from the circumstantial evidence that

defendants, acting in concert, entered the apartment complex after leaving Walmart;

backed up into a parking spot in the parking lot waiting for Mr. Garnica due to his

association with the rival group; within ten minutes of entering, shot and killed Mr.

Levy in a drive-by shooting targeting Mr. Garnica; and drove to the Texaco station

to separate. The undisputed animus between the rival groups provides the backdrop

to the element of intent. Moreover, there is a direct temporal relationship between

14

defendants’ coordinated movements before, during, and after the shooting, which

strongly supports the jury’s inferences.

In reaching the conclusion that the jury should have had reasonable doubt

concerning defendants’ identification as the shooters and Donald Briggs’ specific

intent to kill, we find the appellate court impermissibly substituted its own judgment

for that of the jury. The collaborative and meticulous police work presented by the

State provided a coherent narrative found compelling by the jury. On review of the

record, we find that the jury’s determination was certainly supported.

CONCLUSION

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find

a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the

exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that defendants were guilty

of second degree murder of Mr. Levy. For these reasons, the judgment of the court

of appeal is reversed. Defendants’ convictions and sentences are reinstated, and the

case is remanded to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal to address defendants’

remaining assignments of error.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

15

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-K-00529

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

DONALD BRIGGS, III A/K/A DONALD BRIGGS

C/W

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

STEFAN JERMAINE BRIGGS

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Vermilion

GRIFFIN, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Despite the testimony of the detective and the witness present on the day of

the incident, there is no concrete evidence establishing that the defendants either

drove the vehicle involved in the drive-by shooting or discharged any firearm. The

jury’s determination rests on speculation and does not rise to the level of reasonable

inference required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See La.

R.S. 15:438; State v. Toups, 01-1875, p. 3 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, 912.

The conclusion that the defendants acted in retaliation based on prior exposure

to gang violence and related injuries is unsupported. This is especially true because

the witness was unable to identify either defendant as the driver or shooter and

because there was no definitive evidence which tied the defendants to the specific

vehicle or license plate involved. Such speculation is insufficient to sustain a

conviction for second degree murder. While circumstantial evidence may support a

conviction, it must do so by leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion of guilt.

Here, it fails to meet that standard.

The due process principles articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979), do not permit a jury to base the finding of guilt on mere probabilities where

rational jurors would necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mussall,

523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La. 1988). Accordingly, the evidence presented by the State

is insufficient to support the conviction.

I respectfully dissent.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-K-00529

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

DONALD BRIGGS, III A/K/A DONALD BRIGGS

C/W

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

STEFAN JERMAINE BRIGGS

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Vermilion

GUIDRY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates due

process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. 1, § 2. While the Jackson

standard leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the

evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts, see Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655, 132

S.Ct. 2060, 2064, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012), importantly, the Jackson standard does

not allow a jury to speculate on the probabilities of guilt where rational jurors would

necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311

(La. 1988). Further, when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction,

La. R.S. 15:438 provides that such evidence must exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence. State v. Toups, 01-1875, p. 3 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d

910, 912. That jurors reasonably reject the hypothesis of innocence advanced by the

defendant in a case of circumstantial evidence presupposes that a rational rejection

of that hypothesis is based on the evidence presented, not mere speculation. State v.

Quinn, 19-0647, p. 7 (La. 9/9/20), 340 So.3d 829, 834, citing State v. Schwander,

345 So.2d 1173, 1175 (La. 1977).

Applying these precepts to the present matter, I would conclude that no

rational trier of fact, even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, could find the evidence established the essential elements necessary

to support the defendants’ convictions. That is, no rational trier of fact could

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants had any involvement in

the shooting herein, and thus, were guilty of second degree murder. Most starkly in

this case, there is no evidence tying the defendants to the actual shooting, and no

evidence tying the defendants to the victim, Mr. Levy. Even if the trier of fact

reasonably inferred from the evidence that the defendants were in the vicinity of the

shooting at the time it occurred and left quickly thereafter, the trier of fact was

required to speculate as to whether the defendants were at the actual scene of the

crime and in the vehicle from which the shots were fired.

No evidence places the defendants specifically at the scene of the shooting.

While the basic facts establish that an unoccupied silver Mercedes Benz was backed

into a parking space prior to the shooting, according to the witness testimony, that

Mercedes Benz “was turned off,” and the witness did not see anyone inside the

vehicle. A rational trier of fact is bound to have reasonable doubt given the lack of

corroboration in this case.1 The fact that several individuals were outside, on the

scene prior to the shooting, but did not see the defendants enter the scene with their

vehicle, park the vehicle, exit any vehicle, or reenter any vehicle, from my view,

further contributes to the creation of a reasonable doubt in the mind of any rational

trier of fact. Not to mention that the State produced no evidence to demonstrate the

defendants knew of any alleged target’s whereabouts and that the target would be

1
In addition, there is no evidence of a weapon, and no weapon was observed on either defendant
in any of the video footage.
2

outside when defendants arrived on the scene. See State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d at

1311 (concluding that “unusual coincidences” and “lack of corroboration” can create

reasonable doubt).

The court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the jury, but at the same

time, the jury cannot be permitted to speculate if the evidence is such that reasonable

jurors must have a reasonable doubt.2 I would find the circumstantial evidence in

this case insufficient, failing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

The determination that defendants were involved in a drive-by shooting was based

upon speculation rather than reasonable inferences. In order for a jury’s inferences

to be permissible, they must flow from facts and circumstances proven in the record

that are of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence.

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. at 655, 132 S.Ct. at 2064. No such facts or

circumstances are proven in the record here. I therefore dissent.

2
I further note that “mere presence” at the scene is not enough to concern an individual in the
crime. See generally State v. Pierre, 93-0893 (La. 1994), 631 So.2d 427, 428.
3