State of Louisiana v. Jamarkus Ardoin

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-K-0084

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
JAMARKUS ARDOIN *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 557-822, SECTION “J”
Honorable Darryl A. Derbigny, Judge
******
Judge Rosemary Ledet
******
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge
Dale N. Atkins)

Jason R. Williams
District Attorney
Parish of Orleans
Brad Scott
Assistant District Attorney
District Attorney's Office
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/RELATOR

Jacob McCarty
Orleans Public Defenders
2601 Tulane Avenue, Seventh Floor
New Orleans, LA 70117

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED IN PART;
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
February 26, 2025

RML Relator—the State of Louisiana—seeks review of the district court’s
TGC
January 15, 2025 ruling, granting the motion to suppress evidence and statement
DNA
filed by defendant—Jamarkus Ardoin—and finding no probable cause. We grant

the State’s writ, and we reverse the district court’s rulings suppressing the evidence

and finding no probable cause. But, we do not disturb the portion of ruling granting

the motion to suppress statement; rather, we remand with instructions that the

district court revisit that issue.

Factual and Procedural Background

In April 2023, the State charged Mr. Ardoin with illegal carrying of a

weapon while in the possession of a controlled dangerous substance. In June 2023,

Mr. Ardoin filed an omnibus motion for discovery; to preserve evidence; for

suppression of statement, evidence and identification; and for a preliminary

examination. Following a hearing conducted in January 2025, the district court

granted the motion to suppress evidence and statement and found no probable

cause. This writ followed.

At the hearing, veteran New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) officer

John Huntington testified that he was on proactive patrol, on November 26, 2022,

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on Bourbon Promenade when he arrested Mr. Ardoin. The State then introduced

bodycam footage depicting the stop and the arrest. Officer Huntington explained

that he conducted the stop because he was told that Mr. Ardoin was in possession

of a concealed firearm. Continuing, Officer Huntington testified that “[t]he State

Police were monitoring the [Real Time Crime Center (“RTCC”)] cameras, alerted

us, via radio, to [Mr. Ardoin] who was wearing a bright multi-colored jacket.

Myself and my partner were on the corner with our lieutenant. We saw the

individual. My lieutenant saw the firearm and we made the stop.” The officers also

recovered Adderall (containing methamphetamine) from Mr. Ardoin after seizing

the concealed weapon.

On cross-examination, Officer Huntington conceded that he did not

personally view the RTCC footage that allegedly depicted Mr. Ardoin carrying a

concealed weapon. The state police officers monitoring the RTCC footage

apparently described the suspect as a black male, wearing a multi-colored hoodie

in the 300 block of Bourbon Street. After being alerted by his Lieutenant to Mr.

Ardoin, who apparently matched the description, Officer Huntington conceded that

he did not witness Mr. Ardoin “screaming,” “making a scene,” “consuming drugs”

or “waiving [sic] a gun around.” Officer Huntington also conceded that it was

crowded on that block of Bourbon Street when he made the stop and that almost

everybody was wearing a jacket that night. Finally, he conceded that he did not

know the state police troopers who were monitoring the RTCC that night and that

he failed to identify those troopers in his police report.

On redirect, Officer Huntington provided additional details relating the

circumstances precipitating the stop; he testified as follows:

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I did not see anything. My lieutenant is the one who saw the
bulge in the defendant’s pants, that [sic] he stated “That’s him with
the firearm[.]” We were already looking for a Black male in a multi-
colored jacket, who State police believed was in possession of a
firearm. My lieutenant was the one that made the spot.

Finally, Officer Huntington testified that less than ten minutes elapsed between the

time he detained Mr. Ardoin for possession of the firearm and his discovery of the

narcotic pills at the police station approximately a block away.

Bodycam footage depicts the officers conducting the stop of Mr. Ardoin—

who is wearing a very colorful and distinctive jacket—and immediately removing

a firearm from his waistband. In response to the officers’ inquiries, Mr. Ardoin

claims that the weapon belongs to his girlfriend (who is licensed to carry the gun)

and admits that he does not possess a concealed-carry permit. Mr. Ardoin is then

transported to the nearby NOPD station. At approximately eight minutes into the

footage, Mr. Ardoin is administered Miranda warnings; and he continues to

explain that the weapon belongs to his girlfriend who had dropped it.

At the hearing, defense counsel argued that the officer lacked reasonable

suspicion to conduct the stop because of testimony reflecting “that this officer did

not personally observe any facts supporting [p]robable cause.” For this reason,

defense counsel maintained that there existed no basis for stopping Mr. Ardoin and

that the firearm seized derivative of the allegedly suspicion-less stop should be

excluded. Defense counsel then turned to Mr. Ardoin’s statements, arguing that

there was “zero testimony or evidence in the [r]ecord that” Mr. Ardoin had been

administered Miranda warnings. The State responded and requested that the matter

be left open because it was unaware that the admissibility of the statements would

be addressed at the hearing. Defense counsel responded that the “[t]he state can’t

mess up its case and then ask to reopen [m]otions.”

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The district court then issued its ruling in open court as follows:

I will not agree to reopen the [h]earing and keep it open in order
to elicit additional testimony in favor, or in support of that position by
the [s]tate.

Instead, I’m prepared to [r]ule on [s]uppression of [s]tatement,
[p]robable [c]ause, as well as any other issues relative to [p]re-trial
[m]otions that I think are appropriate. I think I’m going to address that
particular argument. I’m ready to proceed as to the balance of the
[h]earing, based upon what the testimony showed. The [c]ourt will
find [n]o [p]robable [c]ause as the arrest of this defendant. I’ll also
grant the [m]otion to suppress [s]tatement, also the [m]otion to
[s]uppress [e]vidence. I’ll note the [s]tate’s objection.

Discussion

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions recognize the rights of

persons to be secure in their person, property, and effects, and to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; La. Const. art. I § 5.9.

Reasonableness dictates the balance between legitimate law enforcement concerns

and an individual’s protected privacy interests. State v. McClendon, 13-1454, p. 4

(La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d 239, 244 (citation omitted). A search or

seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it can be

justified by one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. State

v. Surtain, 09-1835, p. 7 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1037, 1043. A “reviewing court

must look to the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether the

detaining officer had sufficient facts within his knowledge to justify an

infringement of the suspect’s rights.” State v. Guillot, 12-0726, p. 4 (La. App. 4

Cir. 4/17/13), 115 So.3d 624, 628 (citations omitted).

La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1 (A) provides in pertinent part:

A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom
he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to

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commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an
explanation of his actions.1

The reasonable suspicion standard required for an investigatory stop “is

considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1

(1989).

In assessing the reasonableness of an investigatory stop, the court
must balance the need for the stop against the invasion of privacy it
entails and consider the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists. The detaining officers must have
knowledge of specific articulable facts, which, if taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, warrant the stop. The officer’s
past experience, training and common sense may be considered in
determining if his inferences from the facts at hand were reasonable,
and deference should be given to the experience of the officers present
at the time of the incident.

State v. Marzett, 09-1080, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/9/10), 40 So.3d 1204, 1208

(internal citation omitted); see also State v. Pratt, 08-1819, pp. 2-3 (La. 9/4/09), 16

So.3d 1163, 1165 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (observing that

“[p]olice may draw on their own experience and specialized training to make

inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them

that ‘might well elude an untrained person”).“Furthermore, a reviewing court must

give due weight to factual inferences drawn by resident judges and local law

enforcement officers.” State v. Morgan, 09-2352, p. 5 (La. 3/15/11), 59 So.3d 403,

406 (citation omitted).

1 See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)

(observing that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him”).

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Additionally, a warrantless search incident to a valid arrest may be

conducted on the person of the arrestee in order to remove any weapons that could

be used to endanger the officer’s safety, and to seize any evidence to prevent its

concealment or destruction. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768, 89 S.Ct.

2034, 2043, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); State v. Anthony, 98-0406, pp. 199-20 (La.

4/11/00), 776 So.2d 376, 389.

Finally, in State v. Caliste, 12-1548, p. 7 n.7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/14/13), 131

So.3d 902, 907 (alteration in original), this Court recognized that “the collective

knowledge doctrine, or ‘fellow officer rule[,’] provides that in certain

circumstances, several officers’ observations can be aggregated to establish the

probable cause needed for a warrantless search or seizure, or to obtain a search or

arrest warrant under the Fourth Amendment.” Relatedly, this Court has recognized

that “hearsay testimony is admissible in a suppression hearing.” State v. Bentley,

12-1106, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/15/13), 116 So.3d 891, 896 (citations omitted);

see also State v. Shirley, 08-2106, pp. 5-7 (La. 5/5/09), 10 So.3d 224, 228-29

(observing that hearsay rules do not apply in a hearing on a motion to suppress

evidence).

Applying these principles here, we conclude that the officer possessed

reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop and frisk of Mr. Ardoin that yielded the

(then)2 illegally-concealed weapon. The basis for our conclusion is the collective

knowledge of the officers, including that provided by the state police officers

monitoring the RTCC footage coupled with that provided by Officer Huntington’s

lieutenant who observed the “bulge” in Mr. Ardoin’s waistband. See State v.

2 The permitless concealed carrying of firearms became legal in New Orleans on August 1, 2024.

See https://www.wdsu.com/article/new-louisiana-concealed-carry-law-goes-into-
effect/61508844. This stop and arrest occurred in November 2022.

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Dupart, 19-0521, pp. 13-14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/16/19), 280 So.3d 1214, 1223-24

(observing that police officers possessed reasonable suspicion to justify the

investigatory stop of the defendant when they observed a large bulge in his

shoulder sling bag which led them to believe that the defendant possessed a

firearm). Certainly, Officer Huntington could not have been expected either “to

turn a blind eye to the circumstances,” or to ignore what both the state police

officers monitoring RTCC footage and his lieutenant described as what they

suspected was an illegally-concealed firearm in Mr. Ardoin’s waistband. State v.

Fearheiley, 08-0307, p. 2 (La. 4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 489; see also State v.

Greenberry, 14-1126, p. 1 (La. 4/10/15), 164 So.3d 824, 825 (observing that “[a]

reviewing court should give deference to the inferences and deductions of a trained

police officer ‘that might well elude an untrained person’”) (citation omitted).

For these reasons, we find persuasive the State’s argument that the officer

possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on

information learned from a remote officer monitoring RTCC footage that Mr.

Ardoin was armed and the testifying officer’s supervisor’s live observation of a

bulge in Mr. Ardoin’s waistband. We, thus, reverse the portion of the district

court’s ruling suppressing the evidence seized resulting from the stop. Given the

legal stop of Mr. Ardoin and seizure of the (then) illegally-concealed firearm, the

district court’s determination of no probable cause is likewise reversed. But, we

decline to disturb the district court’s ruling suppressing Mr. Ardoin’s statement.

The bodycam footage reflects that Miranda warnings were not provided to

Mr. Ardoin before he made the statement admitting that he did not possess a

concealed-carry permit. Although that admission was seemingly provided in

response to the officer’s inquiry, it is unclear whether Mr. Ardoin was subject to a

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custodial interrogation at that juncture such that the requirement for Miranda

warnings attached.3 Nonetheless, the State’s complaint at the hearing and in its writ

application was not so much that the district court erred as a substantive matter

when it excluded the statement, but rather that the State was not on notice that the

issue would be considered at the hearing. Given the circumstances presented here,

we decline to disturb the district court’s ruling regarding the statement; rather, we

remand to the district court for reconsideration of the admissibility of the

statement.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the State’s writ application is granted. The district

court’s January 15, 2025 ruling is reversed insofar as the granting of the motion to

suppress evidence and finding of no probable cause. The district court’s ruling is

not disturbed insofar as the granting of the motion to suppress the statement;

rather, this matter is remanded with instructions that the district court revisit the

issue of the admissibility of the statement.

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS

3 “Miranda only applies if three conditions are met: (1) the defendant is in ‘custody’ or

significantly deprived of freedom, (2) there is an ‘interrogation,’ and (3) the interrogation is
conducted by a ‘law enforcement officer’ or someone acting as their agent.” State v. Bernard,
09-1178, p. 5 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1025, 1029. “Custody is decided by two distinct inquiries:
an objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether
there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of the degree associated with formal arrest; and,
second, an evaluation of how a reasonable person in the position of the interviewee would gauge
the breadth of his freedom of action.” State v. Hankton, 12-0466, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/30/14),
140 So.3d 398, 407 (citations omitted). “As such, Miranda warnings are not required when
officers conduct preliminary, non-custodial, on-the-scene questioning to determine whether a
crime has been committed, unless the accused is subjected to arrest or a significant restraint short
of formal arrest.” Shirley, 08-2106, p. 8, 10 So.3d at 229 (citations omitted).

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