State of Louisiana v. Ronald Brooks

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-K-0503

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

RONALD BROOKS * FOURTH CIRCUIT

* STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 390-582, SECTION “I”
Honorable Leon T. Roche, Judge
******
Judge Rachael D. Johnson
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge
Monique G. Morial)

Jason R. Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Brad Scott
CHIEF OF APPEALS
Peter J. Vesich
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
PARISH OF ORLEANS
619 S. White St.
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

WRIT GRANTED; JUNE 17, 2025
ORDER VACATED; POST-
CONVICTION APPLICATION
DISMISSED; AUGUST 14, 2025
ORDER OF STAY LIFTED
SEPTEMBER 30, 2025

RDJ
JCL Relator, the State of Louisiana, seeks review of the district court’s June 17,
MGM
2025 order overruling the State’s procedural objections to Respondent, defendant

Ronald Brook’s (“Defendant”), post-conviction application. Finding the district

court erred, we grant the State’s writ application, vacate the June 17, 2025 ruling

and dismiss Defendant’s application for post-conviction relief. Lastly, this Court’s

August 14, 2025 order of stay is lifted.

Procedural History

On July 3, 1997, a bill of indictment was filed charging Defendant with

second-degree murder. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged and

was later sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole or

suspension of sentence. On the same date as his sentencing, Defendant filed a

motion to reconsider sentence and a motion for appeal. The district court granted

the motion for appeal, appointing the Louisiana Appellate Project as appellate

counsel and denying reconsideration of sentence.

Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See State v.

Brooks, 98-1124, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/20/99), 745 So.2d 129, 135. The

Louisiana Supreme Court later denied his writ application, thereby rendering his

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conviction and sentence final. See State v. Brooks, 99-3504 (La. 5/26/00), 762

So.2d 1102.

Since that time, Defendant has filed five applications for post-conviction

relief in the district court, which denied them all. Defendant previously sought

supervisory relief to the Court from the denial of his first four post-conviction

applications. Each of those writs were denied by this Court and upheld by the

Louisiana Supreme Court as follows:

• In 2002, following the denial of Defendant’s first
application for post-conviction relief, both this Court and
the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs. See State v.
Brooks, 02-0524 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/18/02) (unpub’d
order); State ex rel. Brooks v. State, 02-1585 (La.
5/16/03), 843 So.2d 1121.

• In 2006, the district court denied Defendant’s second
post-conviction application.1 Defendant filed a writ
application to this Court, asserting an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because his attorney allegedly
failed to perform an investigation to reveal that he
suffered from, inter alia, mental health problems at the
time of the offense, rendering him incapable of forming
the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm to
sustain a second-degree murder conviction. This Court
denied writs. See State v. Brooks, 06-1551 (La. App. 4
Cir. 1/11/07) (unpub’d order). The Louisiana Supreme
Court likewise denied relief. See State ex rel. Brooks v.
State, 07-0382 (La. 11/16/07), 967 So.2d 527.

• Defendant’s third application for post-conviction relief
was denied by the district court in March 2009.
Subsequently, this Court and the Louisiana Supreme
Court again denied relief. See State v. Brooks, 09-0408
(La. App. 4 Cir. 4/17/09) (unpub’d order); see also State
ex rel. Brooks v. State, 09-1216 (La. 4/5/10), 31 So.3d
359.

• In April 2013, the district court denied Defendant’s
fourth application for post-conviction relief. Defendant
re-raised claims denied by this Court in writs 06-1551
and 09-0408, in his fourth writ application to this Court.

1 The docket master does not reference the district court’s ruling.

2

However, Defendant asserted his claims were not time-
barred because he was not appointed counsel to assist
him with his first application for post-conviction relief.
This Court denied writs, State v. Brooks, 13-0721 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 6/12/13), and the Supreme Court also denied
relief. See State ex rel. Brooks v. State, 13-1666 (La.
1/27/14), 131 So.3d 56.

In Defendant’s fifth post-conviction application, at issue here, he resurrected

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the district court and averred his

mandatory life sentence is excessive. Defendant alleged his trial counsel failed to

perform an investigation that would have revealed Defendant, at the time of the

offense, suffered from mental health problems and had experienced childhood

trauma, rendering him incapable of forming the specific intent necessary to sustain

a second-degree murder conviction. Defendant asserted that this post-conviction

application is not procedurally barred because it is based on new evidence,

specifically, “newly discovered evidence about the effects of trauma on an

adolescent’s brain,” and a recent psychiatric report evaluating the effects of his

mental health problems and childhood trauma on his ability to form the requisite

specific intent necessary to support his conviction for the 1997 murder.

The State opposed the application, arguing that Defendant’s post-conviction

application was procedurally barred because it was untimely and repetitive.2 In its

June 17, 2025 order, the district court overruled the State’s procedural objections.

The Court reasoned that, pursuant to La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.8, it had “the

discretion in the interest of justice to hear repetitive, untimely or supplemental

applications, even when filed outside of the prescriptive periods, if [the untimely

petition is] predicated on new facts submitted to the Court within two years of

2 The State also contended that Petitioner’s excessive sentence claim was not a valid ground for

post-conviction relief.
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discovery.” The district court determined that the instant post-conviction

application fell within the above-described exception as it was predicated on

“newly discovered evidence by way of an expert report authored by a practicing

psychiatrist and newly discovered science regarding adolescent brain

development….” The State timely filed the instant writ application and requested a

stay of district court proceedings until appellate proceedings are concluded. This

Court stayed all proceedings on August 13, 2025, and again on the following day.

Statement of Facts

The facts of this matter are set forth Brooks, 98-1124, pp. 2-7, 745 So. 2d at

130-133. The underlying facts that served as the basis for Defendant’s second-

degree murder conviction are irrelevant to this matter.

As previously noted, Defendant’s instant claim for post-conviction relief is

based on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure

to present evidence of Defendant’s alleged mental health issues at the time he

murdered victim Stephen Dillion, and that the mandatory life sentence he received

was excessive. Defendant’s conviction was based primarily on the testimony of

witnesses James Moses Sterling and Carl Odoms, who both knew Defendant and

the victim and were also aware that the two had been involved in an altercation

approximately two weeks prior to the shooting. Id.

Mr. Sterling testified that he heard five gunshots in the vicinity where the

victim’s vehicle was parked and soon thereafter, saw Defendant run alongside Mr.

Sterling’s residence and jump over a fence. Id., 98-1124, p. 2, 745 So.2d at 130-31.

Mr. Sterling stated that Defendant was holding his waistband when he jumped over

the fence and a black revolver fell out of Defendant’s waistband. Id., 98-1124, p.

2, 745 So.2d at 131.
4

Mr. Odoms testified that he saw Defendant shoot the victim. Id., 98-1124, p.

3, 745 So.2d at 131. He explained that Defendant fired one shot at the victim and

then fired a second round after the victim fell. He then witnessed Defendant run

away and “jump[] over a gate.” Id.3

DISCUSSION

The State contends that the district court erred in failing to find Defendant’s

fifth post-conviction application barred as untimely and repetitive pursuant to La.

Code Crim. Proc. arts. 930.8 and 930.4. Defendant counters that his application

for post-conviction relief should be considered given that his claims are based on

newly discovered evidence which, as this Court recognized in State v. Finch, 17-

0658, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/20/17), 410 So.3d 240, 242, “is an exception to

arts. 930.8 and 930.4.” We disagree, finding that Defendant’s claims are time-

barred and prohibited as successive and repetitive.

In La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.8(A)(1), entitled Time limitations;

exceptions; prejudicial delay, a general two-year time-limitation is set forth for

filing post-conviction applications as well as an exception for newly discovered

facts:

No application for post-conviction relief, including applications which
seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than
two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become
final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922, unless any of the
following apply:

The application alleges, and the petitioner proves or the
state admits, that the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were not known to the petitioner or his prior
attorneys. Further, the petitioner shall prove that he
exercised diligence in attempting to discover any post-
conviction claims that may exist. “Diligence” for the

3 In the instant application for post-conviction relief, Defendant does not deny that he shot and

killed the victim; he makes no claim of actual innocence.
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purposes of this Article is a subjective inquiry that must
take into account the circumstances of the petitioner.
Those circumstances shall include but are not limited to
the educational background of the petitioner, the
petitioner's access to formally trained inmate counsel, the
financial resources of the petitioner, the age of the
petitioner, the mental abilities of the petitioner, or whether
the interests of justice will be served by the consideration
of new evidence. New facts discovered pursuant to this
exception shall be submitted to the court within two years
of discovery. [Emphasis added.]

In an effort to fall under the above-emphasized exception, Defendant relies

on a new report authored by a psychiatrist, Dr. Denese Shervington, calling into

question his mental state at the time of the 1997 murder and presents “newly

discovered science regarding adolescent brain development,” neither of which

were presented in any of his prior post-conviction petitions.4

In a factually similar case, State v. Finch, 17-0658 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/20/17),

410 So.3d 240, the defendant filed his second post-conviction application years

after the expiration of the two-year time limitation of La. Code Crim. Proc. art.

930.8(A)(1). Defendant asserted in his post-conviction application that his trial

counsel was ineffective due to his failure to investigate defendant’s mental

capacity at the time of the murder. Id., 17-0658, pp. 2-3, 410 So.3d at 241. The

State procedurally objected to the defendant’s application as untimely and

repetitive. Id., 17-0658, p. 3, 410 So.3d at 241 The defendant asserted that his

untimely post-conviction application fell under the exception to the two-year time

limitation of art. 930.8(A)(1) because it was based on a new expert report from a

psychiatrist reflecting that at the time of the murder the defendant “suffered from

multiple mental illnesses.” Id., 17-0658, p. 4, 410 So.3d at 242. The district court

4 See exhibit D, Petitioner’s reply to the State’s procedural objections, p. 4.

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denied the State’s procedural objections and the State filed an application for

supervisory review with this Court. Id., 17-0658, p. 3, 410 So.3d at 242.

This Court granted the State’s writ and reversed the district court’s ruling,

reasoning:

An allegation that a defendant suffered from mental health issues at
the time of the murder, which occurred sixteen years ago, is not the
type of evidence the legislature contemplated when it authorized
substantive consideration of otherwise time-barred post-conviction
applications based on “facts upon which the claim is predicated were
not known to the petitioner or his prior attorneys.”

Id., 17-0658, p. 5, 410 So.3d at 243.

Based upon this Court’s decision in Finch, we find Dr. Shervington’s

report— calling into question Defendant’s mental state at the time of a murder he

committed over twenty-five years ago—is insufficient for the purpose of

overcoming the statutory two-year time bar of art. 930.8(A)(1). Defendant’s

reliance, for purposes of overcoming the two-year time limitation, upon “newly

discovered science regarding adolescent brain development” is misplaced.

Evidence regarding adolescent brain development; how an adolescent brain

differs from an adult brain is not a novel discovery. It was recognized as early as

2010, when the United States Supreme Court, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,

68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026, 176 L.Ed.2d 825, recognized the difference.5 Once

again, as with Dr. Shervington’s psychiatric report, newly discovered science

regarding Defendant’s brain development over twenty-five years ago, when he

committed the murder, is “not the type of evidence the legislature contemplated

5 In his reply to the State’s procedural objections, Defendant notes his lack of education and

financial resources which left him “wholly reliant on the limited and inadequate legal resources
available within the Louisiana State Penitentiary, commonly known as Angola.” However,
seminal Supreme Court decisions, such as Graham, are arguably available to Angola counsel
and, in turn, to the prisoners they assist.
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when it authorized substantive consideration of otherwise time-barred post-

conviction applications based on ‘facts upon which the claim is predicated were

not known to the petitioner or his prior attorneys.’” Finch, 17-0658, p. 5, 410

So.3d at 243. Therefore, Defendant’s alleged newly discovered evidence does not

provide a valid basis upon which to overcome the two-year time limitation set forth

in Article 930.8.

Moreover, Defendant’s alleged newly discovered evidence does not provide

a valid basis to overcome the prohibition against a successive application set forth

in La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.4(D) and La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.4(E).

Article 930.4(D) provides that “[a] successive application shall be dismissed if it

fails to raise a new or different claim.” Defendant, in his second post-conviction

application, asserted, as he does in the instant application, that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to perform an investigation that would have revealed that at

the time of the offense he suffered from, inter alia, mental health problems, which

mitigated the necessary specific intent element of second-degree murder. As

discussed above, the alleged “new evidence” supporting his claim in this regard

does not excuse the delay in presenting it. Additionally, Article 930.4(E) provides

that “[a] successive application shall be dismissed if it raises a new or different

claim that was inexcusably omitted from a prior application.” Defendant’s reliance

on alleged new scientific evidence regarding adolescent brain development does

not excuse his failure to set forth his claim earlier since, as discussed above, such

evidence was available earlier and any “new” studies in this regard are cumulative.

We additionally note that “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the

proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
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having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.

Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Here, Defendant fails to show any error

his counsel committed “undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process [such] that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”

Id.

Lastly, Defendant’s claim that the mandatory life sentence imposed upon

him was excessive is not cognizable procedurally on collateral review. See State v.

Brown, 24-00467 (La. 9/4/24), 391 So.3d 1046 (per curiam) (citing La. Code

Crim. Proc. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665

So.2d 1172) (per curiam). This procedural barrier precludes this Court’s review.

Thus, considering that Defendant’s fifth application for post-conviction

relief lacks merit and is procedurally barred, we vacate the district court’s grant of

the Defendant’s post-conviction application and dismiss his application for post-

conviction relief.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the State’s writ application is granted. The June

17, 2025 district court ruling is vacated and this matter is dismissed. This Court’s

August 14, 2025 order of stay is lifted.

WRIT GRANTED; JUNE 17, 2025
ORDER VACATED; POST-
CONVICTION APPLICATION
DISMISSED; AUGUST 14, 2025
ORDER OF STAY LIFTED

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