State of Louisiana v. Arial Valencia-Lacayo

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-K-0541

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
ARIAL VALENCIA-LACAYO *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 565-888, SECTION “F”
Honorable Robin D. Pittman
******
Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins
******
(Court composed of Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott,
Judge Monique G. Morial)

Caylin Grosse
Orleans Public Defenders
2601 Tulane Avenue, Suite 700
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR

Liz Murrill
Louisiana Attorney General
J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
J. Taylor Gray
Louisiana Department of Justice
Post Office Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED;
JUDGMENT REVERSED
OCTOBER 6, 2025

SCJ
NEK
MGM Relator, Arial Valencia-Lacayo, seeks review of the district court’s July 23,

2025 judgment which denied Relator’s motion to suppress evidence and

statements. For the reasons that follow, we grant Relator’s writ application and

reverse the judgment of the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 3, 2025, Louisiana State Troopers Cory Himel and Austin Vigurie

(collectively, the “Troopers”) were assigned to “Troop NOLA” to patrol the

Bourbon Street area during Mardi Gras festivities. Louisiana State Police Sgt.

Jack Uhle was conducting surveillance in the area. Sgt. Uhle contacted the

Troopers on his police radio. Sgt. Uhle identified Relator “as a known drug

dealer” and said Relator was “soliciting” to sell drugs, so he wanted the Troopers

to detain him. Sgt. Uhle described Relator as tall, and “wearing a black jacket with

white lettering on the sleeves and the back,” with “a gray hoodie underneath.”

After observing someone who matched the description, Trooper Himel and

other officers in the area detained Relator “off the street” and secured him in

handcuffs. Trooper Himel conducted a pat-down for weapons and felt what he

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described as “blister packs” in Relator’s front right pocket. Trooper Himel

recovered a total of twenty-six pills, all of which later tested positive for

Tapentadol.

Trooper Vigurie administered Miranda warnings to Relator.1 Relator

subsequently stated to Trooper Vigurie that a “pickpocket” had inserted the

contraband in Relator’s pocket. A search incident to Relator’s arrest recovered

$210.00 in cash from Relator’s right rear pants pocket.

Relator was charged with one count of possession with the intent to

distribute a controlled dangerous substance, to wit, Tapentadol, a violation of La.

R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a). On April 25, 2025, Relator filed an omnibus motion, which

included, inter alia, a motion to suppress evidence and statements.

Following a hearing, the district court denied Relator’s motion to suppress

the evidence and statements and found probable cause. Thereafter, Relator timely

noticed his intent to seek a writ to set aside the judgment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Relator contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence and statements because (1) the Troopers lacked reasonable suspicion to

conduct an investigatory stop; and (2) the Troopers performed a warrantless,

unlawful search of Relator’s person.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, an appellate

court reviews the district court’s determinations of fact for abuse of discretion, and

legal decisions are reviewed de novo. See State v. Candebat, 2013-0780, pp. 6-7

(La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d 304, 308 (citations omitted).

1 Trooper Vigurie did not participate in the initial stop of Relator.

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DISCUSSION

Investigatory Stop/Reasonable Suspicion

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 215.1 provides:

A. A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public
place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit an offense and may
demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of
his actions.

B. When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for
questioning pursuant to this Article and reasonably
suspects that he is in danger, he may frisk the outer
clothing of such person for a dangerous weapon. If the
law enforcement officer reasonably suspects the person
possesses a dangerous weapon, he may search the person.

See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)

(“A police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner

approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even

though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”).

The reasonable suspicion standard required for an investigatory stop “is

considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1

(1989). A reviewing court must look to the facts and circumstances of each case to

determine whether a detaining officer had sufficient facts within his knowledge to

justify an infringement of the suspect’s rights. State v. Williams, 2007-0700, p. 11

(La. App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977 So.2d 1101, 1111. This Court discussed the balance

between the invasion of an individual’s privacy rights and the reasonableness of an

investigatory stop in State v. Marzett, 2009-1080, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/9/10),

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40 So.3d 1204, 1208 (quoting Williams, 2007-0700, pp. 11-12, 977 So.2d at 1111)

as follows:

In assessing the reasonableness of an investigatory stop,
the court must balance the need for the stop against the
invasion of privacy it entails and consider the totality of
the circumstances in determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists. The detaining officers must have
knowledge of specific articulable facts, which, if taken
together with rational inferences from those facts,
warrant the stop. The officer's past experience, training
and common sense may be considered in determining if
his inferences from the facts at hand were reasonable,
and deference should be given to the experience of the
officer’s present at the time of the incident.

The determination of whether probable cause exists for an arrest or

reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop is an objective inquiry that considers

all of the information known collectively to the law enforcement personnel

involved in the investigation. State v. Elliott, 2009-1727, p. 5 (La. 3/16/10), 35

So.3d 247, 251. As amplified in State v. McClendon, 2013-1454, p. 4 (La. App. 4

Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d 239, 244, reasonableness dictates the balance between

legitimate law enforcement concerns and an individual’s protected privacy

interests. In applying these precepts to the totality of circumstances which

triggered Relator’s stop, on balance, we find the investigatory stop in this matter

was not reasonable.

Here, both Troopers testified that the extent of their knowledge of Relator’s

alleged criminal activity was based on Sgt. Uhle’s representation that he knew

Relator to be a drug dealer and had reportedly observed Relator “soliciting the sale

of narcotics” at some point. When questioned on direct examination as to the

activities observed to show Relator was “soliciting to sell drugs,” Trooper Himel

responded, “I didn’t see those activities ma’am. That would be Trooper, I mean,

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Sergeant Uhle, but he - - I don’t know if he wrote a supplement on this, but that

would be on him as far as what he exactly saw him doing.” On cross-

examination, Trooper Himel reiterated, “I did not see what Mr. Ariel, Mr.

Valencia, had done prior to my interaction with him. Sergeant Uhle notified us

that he recognized him, he’s aware of him, he knows him as a drug dealer, and said

he was soliciting.” Trooper Himel admitted that he did not remember Sgt. Uhle

“going into that much detail” about what he saw; instead, “[i]t was more like an

order. Like, here’s your orders, and here you go.” Trooper Himel had no

independent familiarity with Relator or personal knowledge of Relator engaging in

any past transactions. His testified that “[I] [n]ever seen him before in my life that

I can recall, ma’am.” Similarly, Trooper Vigurie testified that Relator was only

brought to his attention because “[w]e received a tip from Sergeant Jack Uhle that

Mr. Valencia was a known drug dealer in the area.” Trooper Vigurie also did not

observe Relator conduct any hand-to-hand drug transactions and did not see

Relator handle any cash prior to the stop.

Although the district court found the Troopers’ testimony credible, the

Troopers failed to provide with any specificity articulable facts describing

Relator’s observed actions from which the district court could objectively

determine the reasonableness of the stop or support the reliability of Sgt. Uhle’s

“tip.” In particular, the Troopers offered no testimony to substantiate Sgt. Uhle’s

contention that Relator was a known drug dealer. Notably, Sgt. Uhle did not

testify at the hearing on the suppression motion and the Troopers admitted they did

not independently observe conduct that showed Relator engaged in “soliciting the

sale of narcotics.” Although a district court may consider an officer’s experience,

training, and common sense in determining whether his or her conclusions are
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reasonable based on the underlying facts, here, the Troopers supplied no

corroborating facts or first-hand observations to show they had a reasonable basis

to stop and investigate Relator for drug solicitation.

Accordingly, based on the totality of the testimony offered at the hearing, we

find the district court abused its discretion in finding reasonable suspicion existed

to support Relator’s investigatory stop.

As a result of our finding that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify

the investigatory stop, we agree with Relator’s argument that the Tapentadol seized

and his statements were unlawfully obtained, and therefore should be suppressed.

“Absent reasonable suspicion, an investigatory stop is illegal, and the evidence

seized as a result is inadmissible.” State v. Abrego, 2021-166, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 5

Cir. 12/1/21), 334 So.3d 883, 889. Thus, the physical evidence seized and

Relators’ statements acquired herein as a result of the unlawful stop must also be

suppressed.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment

denying Relator’s motion to suppress evidence and statements and grant Relator’s

writ application.

WRIT GRANTED;
JUDGMENT REVERSED

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