State of Louisiana v. Tavione Gustave

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-K-0673

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
TAVIONE GUSTAVE *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
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APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 565-736, SECTION “I”
Honorable Leon T. Roche,
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Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano
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(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano,
Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)

Liz Murrill
Louisiana Attorney General
J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
J. Taylor Gray
Assistant Attorneys General
Louisiana Department of Justice
Post Office Box 94005
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/RELATOR

Simone Lonas
Orleans Public Defenders
2601 Tulane Avenue, Suite 700
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED
AND REMANDED

DECEMBER 19, 2025

JCL This writ involves the question of whether Louisiana State Police had

RLB reasonable suspicion to detain Tavione Gustave (“Defendant”) after Lt. Troy

NEK Pichon observed what he recognized, based on his training and experience, as a

concealed weapon in Defendant’s front waistband while patrolling Bourbon Street

during Mardi Gras weekend at approximately 1:00 a.m.1 The district court granted

Defendant’s motion to suppress. After review of the testimony, the statutory

framework, and the totality of the circumstances as they existed prior to the

detention, we reverse.

Louisiana’s statutory framework changed in 2024 with enactment of

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:95(M), often referred to as constitutional carry. That

statute allows adults who are not prohibited persons to carry concealed firearms

without a permit. But constitutional carry is not absolute. The Legislature expressly

retained the duties and restrictions governing the manner of carrying a concealed

weapon, including those found in Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1379.3(I), (L), (M),

(N), and (O). Those statutory provisions continue to regulate how a concealed

1 Specifically, Defendant was arrested in the early morning of March 2, 2025, hours after the

Endymion parade, and hours before the Bacchus parade.

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firearm may be carried, and they authorize law enforcement intervention when the

manner of carry presents safety concerns.

Negligent carrying remains a criminal offense under Louisiana Revised

Statute 40:1382. That statute prohibits carrying a concealed weapon when, based

on observable circumstances, it is foreseeable that the firearm may discharge, or

when the manner of carrying creates reasonable apprehension in the mind of law

enforcement or the public that a crime is being committed or about to be

committed. The statute does not require brandishing, threats, or active

manipulation of the firearm. In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to

justify an investigatory stop, an officer may assess foreseeable hazards arising

from how the weapon appears to be carried based on the officer’s training and

experience. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889

(1968) (noting that in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, “due

weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer]

is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience”); United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (noting

that an officer may perceive patterns that the untrained person cannot). Courts have

recognized that officer safety and safety of others, which would include prevention

of accidental discharge, are legitimate governmental interests justifying limited

investigative intrusions. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883; Pennsylvania

v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).

In the case sub judice, the pre-detention record establishes that Trooper Stahl

and Lt. Pichon were patrolling Bourbon Street during Mardi Gras, a setting

characterized by large crowds, close physical proximity, and frequent jostling

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among pedestrians. While on proactive patrol, Lt. Pichon observed a “unique

bulge” in Defendant’s front waistband.

Trooper Stahl testified that Lt. Pichon recognized the bulge, based on his

training and experience, as consistent with a concealed firearm. The record does

not include testimony that the trooper noticed the absence of a belt or holster, or

any other specific unsafe characteristic prior to the detention. But nothing in Terry

requires visible manipulation of the firearm or direct observation of unsecured

conditions when the perceived risk arises from the location, shape, and appearance

of the object under the circumstances. Officers may assess danger based on

“common sense conclusions about human behavior” informed by their training.

Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695.

Although Defendant was standing still, the context matters. Bourbon Street

at 1:00 a.m. during Mardi Gras presents a setting where physical contact between

pedestrians is frequent and unpredictable. Officers patrolling such an environment

are trained to recognize that firearms carried in the front waistband are often placed

there without stabilizing support. An officer may reasonably infer that a firearm

carried in that position could become dislodged if bumped. Louisiana’s negligent-

carrying statute specifically addresses foreseeable risks of accidental discharge

arising from observable circumstances. The Legislature did not limit its application

to situations in which the weapon is already slipping or exposed. It encompasses

situations where the manner of carry, combined with surrounding circumstances,

creates foreseeable hazard.

The district court concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion

because Defendant was merely standing on the sidewalk and because concealed

carry is lawful. That analysis isolates the bulge from the accompanying

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circumstances and overlooks the combined significance of (1) the distinctive shape

consistent with a firearm in the front waistband, (2) the officer’s training-supported

recognition of that placement, and (3) the high-risk environment of Bourbon Street

during Mardi Gras. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:95(M) permits concealed carry,

but it does not insulate all manners of carrying from reasonable inquiry. See

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1690, 188 L.Ed.2d 680

(2014) (holding that reasonable suspicion is evaluated under a nontechnical,

“commonsense” analysis). When a weapon appears to be carried in a manner that

presents a foreseeable risk under the conditions present, officers may investigate

whether that manner of carry violates Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1382.

The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to rule out all lawful

explanations before initiating a brief stop. It requires only a “particularized and

objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity, in this case, negligent carrying.

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740

(2002) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. at 695). Reasonable

suspicion may be based on the officer’s ability to draw inferences that would not

be apparent to the untrained eye. Id., 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. at 750-51 (citing

Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695). The record establishes that standard.

The setting is very relevant. It was approximately 1:00 a.m. during Mardi

Gras on Bourbon Street. While the Legislature chose not to make the French

Quarter a gun-free zone, it likewise did not limit law enforcement’s authority to

address unsafe and negligent manner of carry that threatens public safety. Courts

have long recognized that context matters in assessing reasonable suspicion. See

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570

(2000) (context and location are proper factors in Terry analysis). The foreseeable

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risk of a firearm falling or discharging is heightened in such conditions. Officers

are not required to wait for the firearm to fall, for someone to bump into the

defendant, for someone to reach for the firearm, or for an injury to occur before

taking investigative action. See Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511

F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A reasonable officer need not await the ‘glint

of steel’ before taking self-protective action; by then, it is often ... too late to take

safety precautions.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We further reject Defendant’s argument that his lack of opportunity to notify

officers negates the statutory duty imposed by Louisiana Revised Statute

40:1379.3(I)(2). That provision requires an armed individual approached by law

enforcement in an official capacity to notify the officer and submit to a temporary

disarmament for safety purposes.

Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1379.3(I)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

A permittee armed with a handgun in accordance
with this Section or a person carrying a weapon pursuant
to R.S. 14:95(M) shall notify any police officer who
approaches the individual in an official manner or with
an identified official purpose that the individual has a
weapon on his person, submit to a pat down, and allow
the officer to temporarily disarm him.

Constitutional carry did not eliminate this statutory obligation. While the

factual dispute regarding Defendant’s opportunity to notify is not dispositive of

reasonable suspicion, the statute reinforces that the Legislature expects cooperation

from armed individuals and anticipates officer interaction when a firearm is carried

in public. Defendant had an obligation to state that he was carrying a firearm and

allow the trooper to temporarily disarm him. The record does not show that

Defendant attempted to comply with this obligation.

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United States v. Wilson, 143 F.4th 647 (5th Cir. 2025), relied upon by the

district court, does not control the outcome in the case sub judice and is materially

distinguishable. Wilson held that in a constitutional-carry regime, the mere fact that

a person is carrying a concealed firearm without more does not supply reasonable

suspicion for a Terry stop. Id. at 657. The district court applied Wilson as if any

observation of a concealed firearm necessarily constitutes “mere possession.” But

the record before us reflects additional, articulable circumstances beyond

possession. These circumstances allowed the trooper to draw a reasonable

inference regarding the manner in which the firearm appeared to be carried and the

risks associated with that manner of carry. Nothing in Wilson prohibits officers

from distinguishing between lawful concealed possession and circumstances

suggesting potentially negligent carry under Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1382.

Accordingly, Wilson does not undermine the reasonable suspicion determination

here.

For these reasons, the trooper had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was

committing the offense of negligent carrying of a concealed firearm. The

subsequent seizure of the firearm and the search incident to arrest were valid. The

district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. The writ is granted, the

judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED
AND REMANDED

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