State of Louisiana v. Jerroy Holden

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-K-0778

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
JERROY HOLDEN *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 564-756, SECTION “K”
Judge Marcus DeLarge
******
Judge Karen K. Herman
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Sandra Cabrina
Jenkins, Judge Karen K. Herman)

Elizabeth Baker Murrill
LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
Stephanie May Bruno
J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
J. Taylor Gray
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA. 70804

COUNSEL FOR RELATORS/STATE OF LOUISIANA

+ WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED
DECEMBER 30, 2025

KKH
RLB
SCJ
The State of Louisiana (“State”) seeks supervisory review of the district

court’s October 24, 2025 ruling finding no probable on the charge of Introducing

Contraband into a Correctional Facility. For the following reasons, the State’s writ

application is granted and the district court’s ruling is reversed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 6, 2025, the State filed a bill of information charging Jerroy

Holden (“defendant”) with one count each of: Unauthorized Use of a Motor

Vehicle, in violation of La. R.S. 14:68.4(B); Illegal Possession of Stolen Things, in

violation of La. R.S. 14:69(B)(2); Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance

Schedule I – Marijuana, in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(C)(2)(a)(i); and

Introducing Contraband into a Correctional Facility, in violation of La. R.S. 14:402

(D)(2).

On January 28, 2025, defendant filed an omnibus motion for discovery;

motion to preserve evidence; motion for suppression of statements, evidence and

identifications; and motion for preliminary hearing. On October 24, 2025, the

district court presided over a hearing with respect to defendant’s motion to

suppress evidence and for a preliminary hearing. The district court found probable

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cause on the following charges: Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, Illegal

Possession of Stolen Things, and Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance

Schedule I – Marijuana charges. No probable cause was found for the Introducing

of Contraband into a Correctional Facility charge. This writ application followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PERTINENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper Henry Kirsch (“Tpr.

Kirsch”) testified that he was employed by the Louisiana State Police and assigned

to the criminal investigations division, FBI violent crime task force. He had over

nine years of law enforcement experience, including two years with the Louisiana

State Police.

Tpr. Kirsch was involved in an investigation of defendant regarding

defendant’s alleged unauthorized use of a Black Hyundai Sonata. Defendant was

taken into custody and Mirandized. He was searched by another officer. The

search yielded a cell phone and 11.9 grams of marijuana in defendant’s pocket.

The vehicle’s Vehicle Identification Number matched a vehicle which had been

reported stolen. Defendant was detained at Troop NOLA for about two hours.

Defendant was then brought to the Orleans Justice Center where he was

booked on various charges for the stolen vehicle and drug possession. Shortly

thereafter, Tpr. Kirsch received a phone call informing him that a firearm was

located in defendant’s groin area by an Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Deputy.

Additionally, Tpr. Kirsch learned noted that the “firearm was loaded.”

On cross examination, Tpr. Kirsch confirmed that other officers patted down

defendant. Tpr. Kirsch described the pat down procedure as “start from the head

down, left to right.” including the groin area “briefly” and “not all the way

through.” Tpr. Kirsch confirmed defendant was in handcuffs the entire time. The

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other officers did not locate the firearm. Rather, the firearm was identified by “the

body scanner.”

Following argument of counsel, the district court found no probable cause

for the charge of Introducing Contraband into a Correctional Facility, reasoning:

defendant “intended to conceal” the gun but “[t]hat doesn’t mean that he had the

intent to bring that into the jail.” The district court further explained the sequence

of events and its ruling as follows:

[Defendant] gets searched incident to an arrest. He’s in police custody
for another two hours or something. And then, like, this gun has been
on him the whole time and then he goes to the jail. Like, he had no
criminal intent to introduce that gun into that penal facility. Like, I
don't know how y’all charged him with that. Like, he has to have
some criminal intent.

In a per curiam opinion, the district court stated that “[a]fter a careful review

of the applicable statute La. R.S. 14:402(D)(2) and the state’s writ application, this

court has incorrectly required the state to prove the element of intent. However,

this court maintains its finding of no probable cause.” The trial court further

determined:

[t]here is no testimony that suggests that Mr. Holden was notified by
the arresting officers or asked whether he possessed weapons before
entering the facility. Therefore, this Court concluded that Mr. Holden
was not put on notice, nor given the opportunity to alert officers of the
weapon on his person before entry to the facility. Thus, there is no
voluntary act on the part of Mr. Holden, and this Court did not find
probable cause for violation of La. R.S. 14:402(D)(2).

DISCUSSION

It is well-established in our jurisprudence that:

The primary function of the preliminary examination is to
determine if there is probable cause to believe a defendant has
committed a crime in order to hold him on his bond obligation for
trial. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances are
sufficient to justify a man of average caution in the belief that the

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person has committed a crime. At a preliminary hearing, the State
need not present all its evidence, but only a prima facie case.

State v. Baham, 2013-0901, p. 3 (La. 6/28/13), 117 So.3d 505, 507 (internal

citations omitted).

In this case, defendant is charged with Introducing Contraband into a

Correctional Facility, in violation of La. R.S. 14:402(A), which provides that

“No person shall introduce or attempt to introduce contraband into or upon

the grounds of any correctional facility.” Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:402(D)(2),

contraband includes:

A dangerous weapon, or other instrumentality customarily used or
intended for probable use as a dangerous weapon or to aid in an
escape, unless authorized by the warden of the facility or his designee.

Finally, La. R.S.14:402(H) provides: “For purposes of this Section,

“correctional facility” means any jail, prison, penitentiary, juvenile

institution, temporary holding center, or detention facility.”

Our courts have held that “La. R.S. 14:402 does not require the

presence of either general or specific intent.” State v. McMillan 2002-0181,

p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/12/02); 819 So.2d 503, 507 (quoting State v.

Converse, 529 So.2d 459, 466 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988).

In the present case, defendant had possession of the firearm before he

was brought to the Orleans Justice Center. Furthermore, the firearm was

located on his body, not found by multiple searches during his detention and

arrest, and later discovered by a body scanner. The firearm qualifies as a

dangerous weapon, and is therefore contraband enumerated by La. R.S.

14:402(D). Furthermore, the Orleans Justice Center qualifies as a

correctional facility per La. R.S. 14:402(H)’s broad definition of

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“correctional facility” including “any jail, prison, penitentiary, juvenile

institution, temporary holding center, or detention facility.” Even conceding

defendant involuntarily entered the correctional facility due to his arrest, the

State was not required to establish specific intent for this charge. In

conclusion, the State met its burden of establishing the requisite elements for

the La. R.S. 14:402 charge for the purposes of the preliminary hearing.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred in

finding no probable cause for the charge of Introducing Contraband into a

Correctional Facility. Accordingly, the State’s writ application is granted

and the district court’s October 24, 2025 ruling is reversed.

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED

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