State of Louisiana v. Gilbert v. Robinson Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-KA-0061

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
GILBERT V. ROBINSON JR. *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 559-287, SECTION “F”
Honorable Robin D. Pittman, Judge
******
Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Rosemary Ledet,
Judge Paula A. Brown)

Jason R. Williams
District Attorney
Brad Scott
Chief of Appeals
Blaise C. D’Antoni
Assistant District Attorney
Patricia Amos
Assistant District Attorney
PARISH OF ORLEANS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLANT

Aspen Steib Murphy
Sylvia E. Taylor
Alicia I. McDowell
TAYLOR MCDOWELL STEIB MURPHY LAW LLC
1935 W. Airline Highway
LaPlace, LA 70068

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

REVERSED AND RENDERED
JUNE 18, 2025

RLB

RML

PAB

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of the State’s motion for

judgment of bond forfeiture. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and render

judgment in favor of the State.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 1, 2023, Gilbert Robinson (“Defendant”) was arrested for theft,

unauthorized entry of critical infrastructure, and criminal damage to infrastructure.

The trial court set Defendant’s total bail at $5,500.00. Defendant was granted an

unsecured (ROR) bond for the theft and criminal damage charges; however, he

remained detained due to his inability to pay the remaining $2,500.00 of his bail.

On August 10, 2023, Operation Restoration’s Safety & Freedom Fund (“Operation

Restoration”), a community bail fund that posts bonds on behalf of individuals

unable to afford them, posted the $2,500.00 bond to secure Defendant’s release.

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On September 7, 2023, the State filed a bill of information charging

Defendant with theft, unauthorized entry of critical infrastructure, and simple

criminal damage, in violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3), La. R.S. 14:61, and La. R.S.

14: 56(B)(2). Defendant failed to appear for his arraignment, and the trial court

issued an alias capias on October 12, 2023. On January 9, 2024, the clerk’s office

mailed notice of the failure to appear and the alias capias to the address on the

bond. The next day, the clerk’s office filed the alias capias certificate into the

record.

On August 15, 2024, the State filed a motion for rule to show cause why the

bond should not be forfeited. Although Operation Restoration did not receive

formal notice of the forfeiture proceedings, it appeared at the initial hearing in

September 2024, which was continued to October.

At the October 2024 hearing, Operation Restoration objected to the

judgment of bond forfeiture, arguing the State failed to comply with La. C.Cr.P.

art. 336 because Operation Restoration did not receive notice of the warrant of

arrest. The State responded that Operation Restoration is a cash depositor, not a

surety, and therefore, not entitled to notice. Following the hearing, the trial court

denied the State’s motion for judgment of bond forfeiture on November 19, 2024.

The State timely filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The State raises three interrelated assignments of error: (1) whether a cash

depositor is entitled to the benefits of suretyship; (2) whether an entity providing a

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cash deposit for bail qualifies as a bondsman or surety; and (3) whether a cash

depositor is entitled to notice as a party against whom a judgment is sought. The

central question before us is whether a cash depositor is entitled to the same

procedural due process protections afforded to sureties under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 334

and 336. As the issue concerns a question of law, it is subject to de novo review.

State v. Sampy, 18-877, p. 2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/5/19), 274 So.3d 171, 173 (citations

omitted).

DISCUSSION

This appeal presents a relatively novel issue for the Court in that it has only

recently come under judicial scrutiny. According to Operation Restoration, it has

posted bonds in Orleans Parish for individuals who cannot afford them for more

than seven years, and during that time, it has routinely received notice of the

forfeiture proceedings. The State alleged at the hearing that as part of a broader

effort to streamline operations and limit services not explicitly required by law, it

ceased providing such notice. This Court has had limited opportunity to address

the legal implications of this practice, having done so only once before in State v.

Cortez-Miranda, 24-0693 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/30/25), -- So.3d --, 2025 WL

1248635.

Criminal bail bonds are contractual and civil in nature but are subject to

special rules in the Code of Criminal Procedure. La. R.S. 15:83(A); State v. Brown,

11-0804, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/11/12), 80 So.3d 1288, 1290 (citation omitted). “If

a defendant fails to appear, the State must strictly comply with statutory provisions

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to obtain a judgment of bond forfeiture.” State v. Nellon, 12-1429, p. 5 (La. App. 4

Cir. 9/4/13), 124 So.3d 1115, 1118 (citing Brown, supra).

To obtain a judgment of bond forfeiture, the State, at a contradictory

hearing, must provide proof of the following: (1) the bail undertaking; (2) the

power of attorney, if any; (3) notice to the defendant and surety as required by La.

C.Cr.P. art. 334; and (4) proof that more than 180 days have elapsed since the

notice of warrant for arrest was sent. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 336.

On appeal, the State asserts the trial court erred in its interpretation of La.

C.Cr.P. arts. 334, 335, and 336 to find Operation Restoration is entitled to notice.

The State contends that Operation Restoration is a cash depositor and therefore not

entitled notice and service in the same way as a surety.

Operation Restoration, on the other hand, advances a two-pronged argument

for its entitlement to notice. First, it contends that, like a surety, it holds a property

interest in the cash bond because it is the sole entity authorized to reclaim the funds

upon disposition of the case. Second, Operation Restoration argues that because

the State’s motion for judgment of bond forfeiture is directed at the funds it

deposited, it is the party against whom the adverse judgment on bond forfeiture is

sought pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 335. Therefore, despite its status as a cash

depositor, Operation Restoration claims it should be afforded the same procedural

due process as a surety.

“Bail is the security given by a person to assure a defendant’s appearance

before the proper court whenever required.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 311(1). La. C.Cr.P.

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art. 321(A) recognizes five types of bail in Louisiana. Important to our discussion

are two of those mechanisms by which a defendant’s release may be secured: bail

through a suretyship agreement (La. C.Cr.P. arts. 322-24) and bail by cash deposit

in lieu of surety (La. C.Cr.P. art. 326). We examine bail through suretyship

agreement first.

“When a party posts an appearance bond for release of a defendant pending

criminal proceedings, a suretyship agreement with the state is created.” Sampy,

18-877, p. 3, 274 So.3d at 173 (quoting State, City of Bossier City v. Miller,

40,492, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/06), 920 So.2d 408, 412). This agreement is

contractual in nature, and pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3038, “[s]uretyship must be

express and in writing.” The surety thereby assumes the obligation to ensure the

defendant’s appearance at each stage of the proceedings and compliance with all

court orders. Miller, 40,492, p. 7, 920 So.2d at 412 (citing State v. McCart, 627

So.2d 761, 763 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993)). Breach of that obligation “will lead to a

money judgment against the surety.” Id., 40,492, pp. 6-7, 920 So.2d at 412 (citing

State v. Shief, 534 So.2d 513, 514 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988)).

In contrast, La. C.Cr.P. art. 326 governs cash bail deposits. It allows a

defendant to deposit cash “in lieu of a surety” to secure release. La. C.Cr.P. art.

326(A)(1)(a). The statutory distinction is important when evaluating whether a

third-party cash depositor, like Operation Restoration, is entitled to notice of bond

forfeiture.

In Miller, a family friend deposited cash on behalf of the defendant and later

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sought to be treated as a surety in order to contest the bond forfeiture. The court

acknowledged that the possibility of a “hybrid” arrangement is not prohibited

under the code, but made clear that such treatment is determined by compliance

with the codal requirements for suretyship. Miller, 40,492, p. 8, 920 So.2d at 412.

The court emphasized that for a third party to be considered a surety, there must be

an express and written agreement between the third party and the state or city. In

Miller, no such agreement existed. The appearance bond did not name the family

friend nor was there any indication that the City had consented to treat him as a

surety. The cash deposit was therefore deemed full security for the bail amount

authorized by Article 3261 and understood to be “a bail arrangement solely

between [the City] and the defendant.” Id., 40,492, p. 9, 920 So.2d at 413.

Without evidence of a written suretyship agreement, the family friend in Miller

was deemed a cash depositor and not entitled to the same procedural protections

afforded sureties.

Here, the appearance bond states that the “Defendant acknowledges

himself/herself to owe to the State of Louisiana the sum of the above-stated Bond

Amount.” “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no

absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made….” La. C.C. art.

2046. The bond obligation does not name or otherwise recognize Operation

Restoration as a surety. As in Miller, Operation Restoration made a cash deposit on

behalf of the Defendant but did not enter into a suretyship contract with the State.

1 Miller cites the prior version of the code article governing cash deposits, La. C.Cr.P. art. 324.

Effective January 1, 2017, that provision was renumbered as La. C.Cr.P. art. 326.

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The bond obligation does not reflect any agreement to treat Operation Restoration

as a surety, nor is there evidence that the State accepted such an arrangement.

Moreover, the notice requirements set forth under La. C.Cr.P. art. 334

require that notice be sent to a bail agent, bondsman, personal surety and/or

commercial surety. Operation Restoration does not qualify as any of these and no

evidence has been presented that it is licensed to conduct business in the State of

Louisiana as a bail agent, bondsman, or commercial surety. Operation Restoration

defines itself, as it did on the bond obligation, as a cash depositor. Cash deposits

pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 326, are its own distinct type of bail, and the notice

requirements under La. C.Cr.P. art. 334 make no mention of notice to cash

depositors. Similarly, La.C.Cr.P. art. 336(A)(3), which outlines the proof

necessary to obtain a judgment of bond forfeiture, mirrors the language of La.

C.Cr.P. art. 334 by referring only to “[n]otice to the defendant and the surety.”

Although Operation Restoration seeks to invoke the protections afforded

sureties, those protections do not automatically apply to all parties who fund bail.

As the Miller court explained, absent written evidence of a suretyship agreement,

no such legal status is presumed. In the absence of a formal suretyship agreement,

Operation Restoration is not entitled notice.

The State fully complied with La. C.Cr.P. art. 336 in this case. The State

submitted proof of the bail undertaking, notice provided to the Defendant as

required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 334, and proof that the Defendant failed to appear

within 180 days after mailing the notice of warrant of arrest to the Defendant.

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Accordingly, the State was entitled to bond forfeiture. Therefore, we find the trial

court erred in denying the State’s judgment of bond forfeiture.

DECREE

For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s November 19, 2024 judgment

and render judgment of bond forfeiture against Defendant and in the State’s favor

in the amount of $2,500.00.

REVERSED AND RENDERED

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