State of Louisiana v. Jordan Mitchell Zaykis Bolden Dylan Johnson

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-KA-0074

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
JORDAN MITCHELL *
ZAYKIS BOLDEN FOURTH CIRCUIT
DYLAN JOHNSON *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 555-643, SECTION “E”
Judge Rhonda Goode-Douglas,
******
Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins
******
(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge
Tiffany Gautier Chase)

Mary Constance Haynes
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P.O. Box 4015
New Orleans, LA 70178-4015

Holli Herrle-Castillo
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P. O. Box 2333
Marrero, LA 70073-2333

Sherry Watters
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P. O. Box 58769
New Orleans, LA 70158

Jordan A. Mitchell, #766872
David Wade Correctional Center
670 Bell Hill Road
Homer, LA 71040

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

Jason R. Williams
District Attorney, Parish of Orleans
Brad Scott
Chief of Appeals, Parish of Orleans
Zachary M. Phillips
Assistant District Attorney, Parish of Orleans
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE- STATE OF LOUISIANA

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED
FEBRUARY 9, 2026

SCJ
DLD
TGC
This appeal arises from the convictions and sentences of Defendants, Jordan

Mitchell (“Mitchell’), Zaykis Bolden (“Bolden”), and Dylan Johnson (Johnson),

for the attempted murder, rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery of two minors, I.P.

and D.E.1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Late in the evening of June 8, 2022, Mitchell, Johnson, and Bolden

(collectively, “Defendants”), I.P., and D.E. left I.P.’s Pearl River home to go out

together. Each Defendant was armed. Their drive took them Through Slidell,

Louisiana, a gas station, a mall, and the residence of an acquaintance Mitchell.

After leaving the acquaintance’s residence, Mitchell refused I.P.’s request to take

her home. Instead, he drove towards New Orleans where he forced I.P., at

gunpoint, to engage in oral and vaginal sex. D.E. was forced to watch. Mitchell

took I.P.’s cell phone; and thereafter, Mitchell shot I.P. and D.E. several times.

Bolden and Johnson dumped I.P. and D.E. on Chef Menteur Highway near a

1 Pursuant to La. 46:1844(W)(1), to protect the identity of minors under the age of eighteen (18)

who are the victims of sex-offenses or sex-trafficking offenses, we shall employ the initials of
the juveniles instead of their names. At the time of the offenses herein, I.P. was fifteen and D.E.
was fourteen.

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marina. I.P. was able to get assistance from the harbormaster of the marina. A

paramedic, on his way to work, stopped and called 911 when he saw D.E. lying on

the side of the road. I.P. sustained gunshot wounds to her left eye, back of her

head, and her ear, resulting in the loss of her left eye. D.E. was shot in her arm,

back, stomach, and head, and was left unable to walk and with memory loss.

A grand jury indicted each Defendant on the following charges: two counts

of attempted first degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27/30; first degree rape

of I.P., a violation of La. R.S. 14:42; two counts of second degree kidnapping, a

violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1; and armed robbery of I.P., a violation of La. R.S.

14:64. Each Defendant pled not guilty to the charges.

Pre-trial Proceedings

Mitchell was found incompetent to proceed with trial on January 26, 2023,

and was ordered committed. Thereafter, on January 11, 2024, the court found

Mitchell competent to proceed and subsequently, set a March 25, 2024 trial date.

After the trial date was fixed, Mitchell filed a motion to sever from the other

Defendants. The trial court granted the motion; however, this Court reversed.2

The trial date was later reset to April 1, 2024. On the day of trial, Mitchell filed a

notice of defense based upon mental condition, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 726, to

introduce evidence of his voluntary intoxication as a defense to the pending

charges. The trial court granted the motion, and the State applied for supervisory

review. This Court reversed, finding the motion untimely.3

2 See State v. Mitchell, 2024-0159 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/24), 385 So.3d 740, writ den. 2024-

00378 (La. 3/28/24), 382 So.3d 105.
3 See State v. Mitchell, 2024-K-0182 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/1/24).

2

Bolden’s pre-trial proceedings included a motion to quash filed on March

14, 2023, and a motion to recuse the District Attorney’s Office filed on September

5, 2023. The trial court denied both motions.

Johnson filed a motion to determine counsel after his Private Counsel was

suspended from the practice of law and withdrew as his attorney. Although

Johnson expressed a desire to retain Private Counsel, the trial court appointed

another attorney who had assisted Private Counsel during her representation of

Johnson.

Trial

After the trial on the merits, the jury found Mitchell guilty as charged on

each attempted first degree murder count; guilty of the first degree rape of I.P.;

guilty of I.P.’s second degree kidnapping; not guilty of the second degree

kidnapping of D.E.; and guilty as charged of the armed robbery of I.P.

With respect to Bolden and Johnson, the jury found each guilty of two

counts each of the lesser included offenses of attempted manslaughter of I.P. and

D.E.; however, not guilty of the remaining counts.

Sentencing

Prior to sentencing, the trial court denied Defendants’ motions for post-

verdict judgment of acquittal and new trial. Defendants waived all sentencing

delays. After testimony, the trial court sentenced Mitchell to fifty years at hard

labor on each of the attempted first degree murder counts; life without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on the first degree rape count; forty

years at hard labor on the second degree kidnapping count; and fifty years at hard

labor on the armed robbery count, and ordered that the sentences be served

concurrently.

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Bolden and Johnson were each sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor on the

two attempted manslaughter counts, with the sentences to run concurrently.

The trial court denied Mitchell’s motion to reconsider sentence.

Thereafter, the trial court granted each Defendant’s motion for appeal.

DISCUSSION

Defendants raise the following assignments of error:

Jordan Mitchell

1. Mitchell contends his convictions for attempted first degree murder
and for the other felonies—first degree rape, second degree
kidnapping, and armed robbery—upon which he alleges the
attempted murder convictions were based- violated his right
against double jeopardy.

2. The evidence was insufficient to support his first-degree rape
conviction and his armed robbery conviction.

3. This Court erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment which had
granted Mitchell’s notice of voluntary intoxication defense.

Zaykis Bolden

1. The evidence was insufficient to support his attempted
manslaughter conviction;

2. The sentences imposed were excessive.

Dylan Johnson

1. The evidence was insufficient to support his attempted
manslaughter conviction;

2. The sentences imposed were excessive.

3. The trial court denied his right to retained counsel.

Standard of Review; Sufficiency of the Evidence

Each Defendant raises errors regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to

convict.

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In reviewing this error, an appellate court uses the standard set forth in

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2187 (1979), that all evidence, both

direct and circumstantial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, must be sufficient to prove each element of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477, pp. 5-6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d

517, 520-21. An appellate court may substitute its own evaluation of the evidence

for that of the factfinder “only to the extent necessary to guarantee due process of

law.” Pigford, 2005-0477, p. 5, 922 So.2d at 521. “A reviewing court should not

disturb the factfinder’s credibility determination unless the determination is clearly

contrary to the evidence presented.” State v. Rickmon, 2023-0766, p. 3 (La. App. 4

Cir. 2/18/25), 409 So.3d 284, 288.

Our jurisprudence is well established that where a defendant raises a claim

of insufficiency of the evidence as well as other claims, a reviewing court must

first address the sufficiency claim before considering the remaining assignments of

error. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992).

Mitchell: Sufficiency of the Evidence

We begin our review of the sufficiency of the evidence claims with the two

claims raised by Mitchell, namely, his counseled claim that the evidence was

insufficient to convict for first degree rape and his pro se claim that the evidence

was insufficient to convict him of armed robbery.

Mitchell’s First Degree Rape Conviction

With reference to his first degree rape conviction, Mitchell asserts that other

than I.P.’s testimony, there was no evidence that she was vaginally or anally raped.

Mitchell suggests his sexual interactions with I.P. were consensual; she was not

“substantially harmed;” and at best, the evidence was only sufficient to convict for

5

second degree rape. Upon review of the applicable statutes and the evidence, we

disagree.

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:41(A) defines rape as “the act of anal, oral, or

vaginal sexual intercourse with a male or female person committed without the

person’s lawful consent.” Paragraph B provides that with respect to vaginal or

anal sexual intercourse, any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete

the crime. Paragraph C(2) defines oral sexual intercourse in part as: “[t]he

touching of the anus or genitals of the offender by the victim using the mouth or

tongue of the victim.”

Louisiana Revised Statute14:42(A) defines first degree rape, in part, as

follows:

A. First degree rape is a rape committed upon a person sixty-five
years of age or older or where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual
intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim
because it is committed under any one or more of the following
circumstances:

(1) When the victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose resistance
is overcome by force.

(2) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of
great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of
execution.

(3) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act because the
offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.

I.P. acknowledged in her testimony that she and D.E. agreed to go out with

Defendants. She stated they drove to a gas station in Slidell, where Defendants

exited the car, dancing while toting firearms. Thereafter, Mitchell drove them to a

residence in Slidell. She testified that while at the residence, Defendants

consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana. She stated she did not drink, but

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admitted that she smoked marijuana with them. After they left the residence, she

repeatedly asked Mitchell to take her home, but he refused.

I.P. testified that at some point after they arrived in New Orleans, Mitchell

demanded that she perform oral sex. She said “no.” He became enraged, pointed

his gun at her, and threatened to shoot and kill her if she did not comply. She

testified that Bolden and Johnson also told her to comply because Mitchell would

shoot her if she did not. Based on her fear of getting shot, she complied with

Mitchell’s demand for vaginal sexual intercourse. During this time, she maintained

that D.E. was outside of the car with Bolden and Johnson and that neither Bolden

nor Johnson tried to help her. Instead, she testified that Bolden and Johnson just

watched and told her that this was “gangsta shit.”

I.P. said that her hospital examination included a sexual assault kit. She told

the nurse what happened to her and also gave a statement to the treating physician

and to a social worker.

To rebut I.P.’s testimony as the sole basis to convict, Mitchell points out that

although there was evidence of seminal fluid in the swabs taken from her vaginal

and anal areas, there was no spermatozoa found in them. He also notes that I.P.

initially failed to tell the police and failed to tell the Sexual Assault Nurse

Examiner (“SANE”) nurse that she had been vaginally raped. Further, Mitchell

emphasizes that D.E. could not remember him having vaginal sex with I.P.

However, we find that none of Mitchell’s arguments disproves that an oral

or vaginal rape occurred. As to Mitchell’s claim that I.P. did not tell a SANE nurse

regarding the vaginal rape, Heidi Martin, the SANE nurse who conducted the

forensic exam of I.P., testified that survivor mechanisms to trauma can cause a

victim to purge from memory what occurred. Likewise, Heidi Tujague, the SANE

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nurse who conducted the forensic exam of I.P., testified that I.P. was drowsy and

slow to answer questions during her examination. Ms. Tujague explained that the

trauma I.P. experienced after having been sexually assaulted and shot multiple

times could have affected her memory of the details of the incident. Ms. Tujague

also testified that sometimes a victim’s memories will come back in fragments, and

it did not surprise her if I.P. remembered more details, such as the vaginal rape,

later. In addition, Angela Maher, the DNA expert, testified that while the vaginal,

genital, anal, and perianal swabs did not show spermatozoa, they were positive for

seminal fluid.

Moreover, Mitchell’s reliance on D.E.’s testimony that she did not recollect

a vaginal rape is not dispositive as to whether Mitchell raped I.P. Notably, D.E.

also testified there were gaps in her memory of that night and I.P. testified that

D.E. may not have seen everything because she was not in the car during part of

the rape(s).

Most importantly, Mitchell’s attack on I.P.’s credibility is undermined by the

fact that the jury clearly credited I.P.’s testimony and rejected any argument that

her sexual encounters with Mitchell were consensual. In conjunction therewith,

the jury also rejected Mitchell’s contention that although I.P. may have been

verbally threatened during the sexual acts, she nevertheless was released

“substantially unharmed.” “It is well-settled in the jurisprudence that the

testimony of a single witness is enough to support a conviction and that the trier of

fact’s credibility determination regarding a witness’ testimony should not be

disturbed unless such testimony is clearly contrary to the evidence.” Rickmon,

2023-0766, pp. 7-8, 409 So.3d at 290. In this matter, I.P.’s testimony supports that

she was substantially harmed by being forced to submit to oral and vaginal rape at

8

gunpoint and fearing for her life, a fear that was realized when Mitchell shot I.P.

and D.E. See State v. Lagarde, 2003-0606 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/10/03), 861 So. 2d

871, where this Court upheld the defendant’s first degree rape conviction because

he had a gun in his possession throughout the incident.

Therefore, based on the jury’s favorable credibility determination of I.P.’s

testimony, the State met the elements pursuant to La. R.S. 14:42A(2) and (3) to

convict Mitchell of first degree rape. Specifically, I.P was forced to engage in oral

and vaginal sex under the threat of immediate bodily harm accompanied by power

of execution and could not resist because Mitchell was armed with a dangerous

weapon. The jury’s findings were not clearly contrary to the evidence. Hence,

Defendant’s counseled assignment of error that the evidence was not sufficient to

convict of first degree rape has no merit.

Mitchell’s Armed Robbery Conviction

In Mitchell’s pro se assignment of error, he alleges the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of armed robbery, maintaining that I.P.’s cell phone was

not found in his car or residence and was never recovered. Mitchell also cites

alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of I.P and D.E. He alleges both

were under the influence of alcohol and marijuana. Additionally, Mitchell

represents that because the jury found Bolden not guilty of armed robbery, it could

not have found him guilty of armed robbery. However, upon review, we find the

trial evidence supports the jury’s verdict to convict Mitchell of armed robbery.

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:64 defines armed robbery as “the taking of

anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the

immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a

dangerous weapon.” While I.P. testified that Mitchell instructed Bolden to

9

confiscate her cellphone so that she could not call the police after the rape, she also

stated that Mitchell actually took the cellphone from her. Therefore, we find the

evidence was sufficient to support Mitchell’s armed robbery conviction. This pro

se assignment of error has no merit.

Bolden/Johnson: Sufficiency of the Evidence/Attempted First Degree
Manslaughter

Both Bolden and Johnson allege that there was insufficient evidence to

support their attempted manslaughter convictions. Both argue that the evidence

was insufficient to show that they had the specific intent to kill either victim and

were not principals to the shootings committed by Mitchell. Accordingly, as their

arguments are intertwined, we shall address this error jointly.

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:27(A) states the following:

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or
omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the
accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the
offense intended; and it is immaterial whether, under the
circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

La. R.S. 14:10(1) defines specific intent as “that state of mind which exists when

the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed

criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” Specific intent may be

inferred from a defendant’s actions and the circumstances of the case. State v.

Scott, 2023-0022, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 51.

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:24 defines a principal as “all persons

concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether

they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid, and abet in its

commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit a crime

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. . .” A person must knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime

to be considered a principal. State v. Pierre, 1993-0893 (La. 2/3/94).

In this case, the State maintained that Bolden and Johnson were principals in

the shooting of I.P. and D.E. However, Bolden and Johnson argue that the State

presented no evidence that they directly threatened or intended to shoot I.P. or D.E.

In support, Bolden and Johnson rely on D.E.’s testimony. D.E. testified that

Bolden and Johnson tried to protect her that night, however, they did not try to

protect I.P. Bolden and Johnson also note that D.E. denied that they were laughing

during the rape, contrary to assertions made by I.P.

The State counters with I.P.’s testimony. I.P. testified that Bolden and

Johnson told her to comply with Mitchell’s demand for sex because he would

shoot her if she did not. She stated that as Mitchell was forcing himself on her at

gunpoint, Bolden and Johnson were outside of the car with D.E., and neither tried

to help her. Instead, she testified, they just watched and told her this was “gangsta

shit.” After Mitchell drove to the Chef Menteur location where the shootings took

place, Mitchell told Bolden and Johnson to get out of the car and they complied,

while laughing. Mitchell then shot I.P. three times and shot D.E. She said she

pretended to be dead, and Johnson grabbed her arms, Bolden grabbed her legs, and

they threw her out of the car. Defendants, including Bolden and Johnson, then fled

and left both I.P. and D.E. on the side of the road.

In reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding I.P.’s rape and the

subsequent shootings, I.P.’s testimony established that Bolden and Johnson

knowingly aided and abetted Mitchell in procuring I.P.’s rape. They coerced her

into submission under the threat that Mitchell would shoot her; and concomitantly,

failed to offer I.P. any assistance to prevent the rape. I.P.’s testimony also

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supported that Bolden’s and Johnson’s laughter throughout the offenses

demonstrated a willingness to participate with Mitchell’s criminal endeavors as

“gangsta shit.” Although Bolden and Johnson argue on appeal that they were afraid

of Mitchell, no evidence was introduced at trial to document their fear. Instead, the

evidence revealed that Bolden and Johnson also were armed with firearms

throughout the entire evening. Moreover, there was no evidence that Mitchell

threatened Bolden or Johnson to obtain their cooperation. Instead, I.P.’s testimony

showed Bolden and Johnson were also armed, and they laughingly “concerned”

themselves with Mitchell’s offense. They complied, under no threat by Mitchell,

with his instructions. Although Bolden and Johnson contend their alleged efforts

to “protect” D.E. illustrated they lacked the specific intent to kill, it is undisputed

that they offered no protection to I.P. Additionally, closer scrutiny of their so-

called protection of D.E., indicated no tangible help was extended on the scene.

Bolden and Johnson did not intervene on D.E.’s behalf to prevent her from being

forced to watch I.P.’s rape or prevent her from being shot. To the contrary, Bolden

and Johnson threw D.E. and I.P. out of the car after the shootings and left each for

dead.

As referenced in Scott, 2023-0022, p. 9, 372 So.3d at 51, specific intent may

be inferred from a defendant’s actions and the circumstances of the case. I.P.’s

testimony substantiated that Bolden and Johnson acted on their own accord and

were under no threat or duress from Mitchell when they chose to assist Mitchell

after the shootings. As established in Rickmon, 2023-0766, pp. 7-8, 409 So.3d at

390, the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to convict and a reviewing

court should not disturb the jury’s credibility determination unless clearly contrary

to the evidence presented.

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Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, supra, in viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, a jury could find that Bolden’s and Johnson’s

willingness to engage in actions in furtherance of I.P.’s rape and the shootings

provided sufficient evidence of a specific intent to kill in their capacity as

principals. Accordingly, we find Bolden’s and Johnson’s claims that the evidence

was insufficient to convict them of attempted manslaughter lack merit.

We now return to review Mitchell’s, Bolden’s and Johnson’s remaining

assignments of error.

Mitchell: Double Jeopardy

In this error, Mitchell alleges his convictions for attempted first degree

murder and his separate convictions on first degree rape, second degree

kidnapping, and armed robbery subjected him to double jeopardy. He suggests

the possibility exists that his rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery convictions

improperly served as the predicate to convict him of attempted first degree murder.

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in part: “No person

shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb.” Likewise, Art. I, Section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution provides in part:

“No person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, except on his

application for a new trial, when a mistrial is declared, or when a motion in arrest

of judgment is sustained.” In determining whether double jeopardy exists, the

seminal decision of Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182

(1932), explained “[t]he applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to

determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each of the

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provisions requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”4 Louisiana courts

employ the “same act” test set forth in Blockburger to determine whether

convictions of more than one offense arising out of the same act subject a

defendant to double jeopardy. See State v. Frank, 2016-1160, p. 10 (La. 10/18/17),

234 So.3d 27, 33-34.

In support of his double jeopardy argument, Mitchell relies on State v.

Holley, 53,405, 53-406, 53,407 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/22/2o), 297 So.3d 180 and State

v. Romero, 2021-173 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/15/210, 331 So.3d 44. In Holley, the

defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder and one

count of aggravated arson while attempting to kill a husband and wife by

detonating two pipe bombs. In finding the possibility of a double jeopardy

violation, the Holley Court noted that “the verdict form [did] not preclude the

possibility that the jury found Holley guilty of attempted first degree murder only

by reason of his specific intent to kill while engaged in aggravated arson. 53,405,

p. 9, 297 So.3d at 186. (Emphasis supplied). Similarly, in Romero, the defendant

was convicted of attempted first degree murder and armed robbery when the victim

was shot during the robbery. The Third Circuit, noting that the trial court had

instructed the jury it must find that defendant was engaged in the perpetration or

attempted perpetration of an armed robbery in order to convict of attempted first

degree murder, opined that “double jeopardy precludes the conviction and

punishment of the defendant for both first degree murder and the underlying

felony.” Romero, 2021-173, p. 23, 331 So.3d at 462. However, we find

4 In State v. Frank, 2016-1160 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 27, the Court held that the earlier “same

evidence” test employed in Louisiana jurisprudence no longer applied to a double jeopardy
determination.

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Mitchell’s double jeopardy argument is fundamentally flawed and his reliance on

Holley and Romero is misplaced.

Blockburger has established that the first prong to consider if double

jeopardy attaches is whether “the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of

two distinct provisions.” 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. In Holley and Romero,

the defendants’ attempted first-degree murder convictions and the predicate

offenses arose out of the same event: in Holley, the defendant attempted to kill his

victims while engaged in detonating a pipe bomb; and the Romero defendant’s

attempt to kill his victim arose out of an armed robbery. Here, unlike Holley and

Romero, Mitchell’s convictions on the rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery

charges do not constitute double jeopardy under Blockburger as those offenses did

not arise out of the same act or transaction as the attempted first degree murder

convictions. Particularly, Mitchell was not simultaneously actively engaged in any

of the alleged predicate offenses of first degree rape, second degree kidnapping, or

armed robbery at the time he attempted to kill I.P. and D.E. Rather, Mitchell

engaged in a series of separate criminal offenses of kidnapping, rape, armed

robbery, and then, the attempted murders. The fact that the jury separated and

distinguished the other felonies from the attempted murders is underscored by the

fact that Mitchell was found not guilty of the second degree kidnapping of D.E.

The facts of this case do not show that Mitchell was twice placed in

jeopardy for the same offense. Rather, the record supports that independent of the

aggravated kidnapping, first degree rape, and armed robbed charges, the State

proved that Mitchell had the specific intent to kill both I.P. and D.E. That proof of

an intent to kill two or more people satisfied the statutory elements to convict

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Mitchell of attempted first degree murder under La. R.S. 14:30(2). Accordingly,

we find this error is not meritorious.

Mitchell: Intoxication Defense

Mitchell’s final assignment of error contends this Court erred in its pretrial

reversal of the trial court’s judgment which had granted Mitchell’s request to

present a voluntary intoxication defense. Mitchell filed notice of the defense on

the first day of trial to contest whether he had the requisite mental state to commit

the crimes with which he was charged.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 726(A) provides the following

guidelines for a defendant to raise a mental defect defense:

If a defendant intends to introduce testimony relating to a mental
disease, defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of whether
he had the mental state required for the offense charged, he shall not
later than ten days prior to trial or such reasonable time as the court
may permit, notify the district attorney in writing of such intention and
file a copy of such notice with the clerk. The court may for cause
shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the
parties to prepare for trial or make such other orders as may be
appropriate. (Emphasis added). 5

The trial court granted Mitchell’s motion, finding that he had shown good

cause for the late filing. However, this Court reversed the trial court’s judgment,

finding “[n]otice was untimely given under La. C.Cr.P. art. 726, no good cause for

the late filing of notice was presented.” State v. Mitchell, 2024-0182 (La. App. 4

Cir. 4/1/24), unpub.

Mitchell’s “good cause” reasons for the delayed notice included the State’s

alleged late discovery filings; this Court’s reversal of his motion to sever; and his

5 For purposes of La. C.Cr.P. art. 726, intoxication is an “other condition” considered in
determining whether the defendant had the mental state for the offense charged. See State v.
Trahan, 576 So.2d 1, 5 (La. 1990).

16

counsel’s inability to meaningfully consult with him until Mitchell was deemed

competent to proceed. Upon review, however, Mitchell does not show how any of

these purported reasons precluded Mitchell’s ability to raise voluntary intoxication

as a defense and to provide timely notice thereof. We especially note that Mitchell

was declared competent to proceed almost three months prior to trial.

This Court recognizes that a defendant has a constitutional right to present a

complete defense and offer relevant evidence arising out of that defense. See State

v. Trahan, 576 So.2d 1, 6 (La. 1990). In Trahan, as in the present matter, the

appellate court found the defendant did not give timely notice of his intent to raise

a voluntary intoxication defense as required pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 726(A),

emphasizing that the purpose of the article is to “eliminate unwarranted prejudice

that could arise from surprise testimony.” Id., quoting State v. Toomer, 395 So.2d

1320, 1329 (La. 1981). Nevertheless, the Trahan Court determined that the

defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense was not impaired where other

evidence was introduced to support the defendant’s claim that he had been

drinking. Id. Likewise, in the case sub judice, the jury was aware that Mitchell

had consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana through I.P.’s testimony. Hence,

Mitchell was not impaired in his ability to present a complete defense, especially

where Mitchell did not identify witness to support his intoxication defense.

As Mitchell fails to show this Court’s ruling was patently erroneous or

produced an unjust result, this error lacks merit.

Mitchell’s Sentences

Mitchell does not contest that his sentences were excessive. However, the

trial court failed to specify that Mitchell’s sentences for attempted first degree

murder, second degree kidnapping, and armed robbery convictions were be served

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without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as required by

statute. See La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a); 14:30(C)(2); 14:44.1(C); 14:64(B).

Notwithstanding, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides that even when the trial court fails

to so specify, the sentence “shall be deemed to contain the provisions relating to

the service of that sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence” and “shall not in any way affect the statutory requirement that all or a

portion of the sentence be served without” these benefits. Therefore, no additional

action is required and Mitchell’s sentences are to be served without benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See State v. Williams, 2000-1725, p.

10 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799.

Bolden and Johnson: Excessive Sentence

Bolden and Johnson each contend their respective sentences of fifteen years

at hard labor—to run concurrently—are excessive.

The imposition of excessive sentences is prohibited by both the Eighth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by La. Const. art. I, Section 20. In

reviewing an excessive sentence claim, La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4D, “[t]he appellate

court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the

sentence imposed.” As noted by this court in Wilson, 2014-1267, p. 23, 165 So.3d

at 1165, “[o]n appellate review of an excessive sentence claim, the relevant

question is not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate but

whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion.”

However, before we review the merits of this assignment of error, the record

reflects that neither Bolden nor Johnson lodged actual objections to the sentences

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or filed a motion to reconsider sentence pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1.6 When

that occurs, appellate review of a sentence is limited to a review for constitutional

excessiveness. See State v. Banks, 2023-0806 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/24/24), 391 So.3d

24. Therefore, we must limit our review of Bolden’s and Johnson’s excessive

sentence claims to a bare review for constitutional excessiveness only.

A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive when it “makes no measurable

contribution to acceptable goals of punishment or amounts to nothing more than

the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to

the severity of the crime.” State v. Ferguson, 2019-01247, p. 2 (La. 12/22/20), 307

So.3d 198. The matter of the excessiveness of a sentence is a question of law.

State v. Freeman, 23-0074, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/7/23), 357 So.3d 880, 885.

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the sentencing,

the trial court expressed it had never seen a more “heinous” case, describing

Defendants’ disregard for the victims lives as “mind boggling.” The trial court

noted that all Defendants were armed, and not one helped the victims.

The maximum sentences that Bolden and Johnson could have received for

their attempted manslaughter convictions on each count is twenty years.7 On its

face, the fifteen years imprisonment on each count, is not illegal. The trial court’s

reasons for the sentences show the sentences were not imposed to inflict needless

suffering as the court considered the mitigating evidence offered by Bolden and

6 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 881.1A states, “[i]n felony cases, within thirty days

following the imposition of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court may set at
sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to reconsider sentence.
7 Louisiana Revised Statute 14:31(B) states that “[w]hoever commits manslaughter shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years. Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3),
whoever attempts to commit manslaughter “shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same
manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the
largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so
attempted, or both.”

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Johnson as well as the testimonies of I., D.E. and their families. Therefore, the

sentences are not constitutionally excessive, and Bolden’s and Johnson’s claims of

an excessive sentence are not meritorious.

Dylan Johnson: Right to Choice of Counsel

In Johnson’s separate assignment of error, he asserts his right to counsel of

his choice was violated when he was forced to proceed to trial with counsel

appointed by the court after Johnson’s Private Counsel withdrew. Johnson’s

argument is without merit.

Johnson’s Private Counsel hired a local attorney, Joseph Zanetti, to assist.

Mr. Zanetti made appearances starting in December 5, 2023. Private Counsel was

suspended from the practice of law on March 19, 2024. On the same day, Private

Counsel submitted an e-mail to the trial court advising the following:

I have been placed on a 30-day suspension effective immediately. I
must withdraw from all cases. As such remove my name as counsel
of record;

State of Louisiana
Dylan Johnson #555643

I am notifying all my clients regarding this matter. I cannot file any
motions at this time to withdraw; therefore, I ask that this letter
suffices. Furthermore, Mr. Joseph Zanetti has agreed to enroll in
certain matters, and he will advise the court of such . . . .

Subsequently, a hearing to determine counsel was held. Johnson told the

trial court that he still wanted Private Counsel to represent him, and not Mr.

Zanetti. Ultimately, the trial court formally appointed Mr. Zanetti to represent

Johnson, noting that Mr. Zanetti had appeared on Johnson’s behalf since December

2023, and was prepared to represent him. Johnson now contends this appointment

violated his right to retained counsel of choice.

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The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The Court in Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153,

158, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1696 (1988), stated that the purpose of this right is to ensure

fairness in the adversarial process by allowing the assistance of counsel, by

appointment if necessary, to provide the skills in arguing law and navigating the

court system that an unaided layman would not otherwise have. The Wheat Court

noted, however, that because the goal of the right to counsel is to ensure a fair trial,

there are limitations on the right to counsel of choice. 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. at

1697. Preferred counsel must be a member of a Bar, and the defendant cannot

choose counsel he cannot afford, or who refuses to represent him. Id.

In this case, Johnson’s claim that he was denied counsel of choice fails on

two prongs. First of all, as referenced in State v. Major, 2022-00387, p. 2 (La.

3/9/22), 333 So.3d 1231, 1232, a defendant “may not insist on representation by a

person who is not a member of the bar[.]” Although Johnson complains his trial

could have been continued, his co-defendant, Bolden, had invoked his right to a

speedy trial. The right to counsel cannot be used to “obstruct the orderly procedure

of the courts and cannot be used to interfere with the fair administration of justice.”

Major, 2022-00387, p. 2, 333 So.3d at 1232 (citation omitted). Thus, Johnson’s

right to counsel was not violated when weighed against his co-defendant’s right to

a speedy trial, Johnson’s lack of entitlement to representation by an unlicensed

attorney, and the fact that appointed counsel was prepared for trial.

Next, Johnson’s right to choice of counsel fails because he required a court-

appointed counsel after Private Counsel withdrew. The Supreme Court, in State v.

Reeves, 2006-2419, p. 36 (La. 5/5/09), 11 So.3d 1031, 1056, citing Wheat, noted

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the defendant has no right of choice with respect to appointed private counsel or an

appointed public defender.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendants’ convictions and

sentences.8

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED

8 Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:301.1(A), Mitchell’s sentences for attempted first degree murder,
second degree kidnapping, and armed robbery are deemed to be served without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence as statutorily required.

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