State of Louisiana v. Jimmie Dixon, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-KA-0105

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
JIMMIE DIXON, JR. *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 551-347, SECTION “L”
Judge Angel Harris,
******
Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase
******
(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge
Tiffany Gautier Chase)

Jason R. Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Brad Scott
CHIEF OF APPEALS
Zachary M. Phillips
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE

Sherry Watters
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P. O. Box 58769
New Orleans, LA 70158

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

CONVICTIONS AND
SENTENCES AFFIRMED
DECEMBER 10, 2025

1

TGC
DLD
SCJ

Jimmie Dixon, Jr. (hereinafter “Defendant”) appeals his conviction and

sentences for indecent behavior with a juvenile and sexual battery. After

consideration of the record before this Court, and the applicable law, we affirm

Defendant’s convictions and sentences for indecent behavior with a juvenile and

sexual battery.

Facts Procedural History

In 2018, T.T. was an eighth-grade student at a school where Defendant was

employed as the janitor.1 Defendant’s role at the school also included mentoring

troubled students. In May 2018, T.T.’s mother dropped him off at Defendant’s

residence for a visit, at which other young boys were also supposed to be present.

After T.T. did not answer his mother’s phone calls, she returned to Defendant’s

residence to retrieve T.T. Upon her return, she discovered that no other children

were present. She retrieved T.T. and they left Defendant’s residence.

In 2020, T.T.’s mother contacted the New Orleans Police Department and

reported that her son recently divulged that he was molested in 2018 by Defendant.

1 In accordance with La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(1)(a), to keep confidential the identity of the person

who was a minor at the time of the offense, initials have been used in place of a name.

1

After an investigation, Defendant was charged by bill of indictment with one count

of indecent behavior with a juvenile, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:81, and one count of

sexual battery, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:43.1. Defendant was arraigned and pled not

guilty to both counts. A two-day jury trial commenced, at the conclusion of which

the jury unanimously found Defendant guilty as charged on both counts.2

Defendant subsequently filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, which the district court denied. The district court sentenced Defendant to

seven years, at hard labor, for the indecent behavior with a juvenile conviction and

ten years, at hard labor, for the sexual battery conviction—each count to run

concurrently. This appeal followed.

Relevant Trial Testimony

The following testimony was adduced at Defendant’s trial:

Victim’s Mother

T.T.’s mother testified that when she and T.T. arrived at Defendant’s

residence, no other children were present and Defendant advised that the other

young boys were en route. She told T.T. to call her if no other children arrived.

Upon arriving at her next destination, she attempted to call T.T. numerous times to

no avail. Since he was not answering his phone, she returned to Defendant’s

residence where she observed T.T. and Defendant walking down the street, holding

hands, returning from getting food. She testified that she was angry about the

situation and ordered T.T. to get in the car. She stated that T.T.’s behavior

significantly changed after this day and a couple of years later he ran away from

home. She testified that once she located him, T.T. told her about an incident with

Defendant. T.T. told her that Defendant played pornographic material on the

2 Defendant’s trial consisted of a six-person jury.

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television, undressed and began to masturbate in front of him. T.T. said that the

Defendant coerced him into undressing and also masturbating. She testified that

T.T. told her that Defendant placed T.T.’s hand on his penis and that Defendant

placed his hand on T.T.’s penis. After ejaculating, Defendant went to the restroom

and the two left his house to get food.3

T.T.

T.T. testified that he was an eighth grader in 2018 and attended the school

where Defendant was employed as a janitor. When children would exhibit

disciplinary problems, the school would have them work alongside Defendant and

complete janitorial duties. T.T. testified that Defendant asked him to obtain

permission from his mother to visit Defendant at his residence. T.T. was under the

impression other young boys would be at Defendant’s residence but, upon arrival,

no other children were present. After being dropped off, T.T.’s mother advised him

to call her if no other children arrived. T.T. stated that Defendant mirrored

pornographic material from his cellular phone onto the television, began to

masturbate and coerced T.T. to do the same. T.T. further testified that Defendant

placed T.T.’s hand on Defendant’s penis, placed Defendant’s hand on T.T.’s penis

and ejaculated. T.T. and Defendant then left the house and walked to get Chinese

food. Upon their return, he saw his mother’s car, went back into the residence to

obtain his cellular phone and left. T.T. testified that, approximately two years later,

he saw Defendant at a school alumni picnic. Defendant inquired as to whether T.T.

3 In his brief to this Court, Defendant references a pending civil lawsuit against himself and the

Orleans Parish School Board, filed by T.T. and his mother. At trial, both T.T. and his mother
acknowledged participating in a deposition regarding a separate related case. While defense
counsel did not attempt to introduce the deposition testimony or proffer it for review, he was
allowed to question T.T. and his mother about any inconsistencies between their trial and
deposition testimony.

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told anyone about the incident and asked T.T. why he had not maintained contact.

In 2020, T.T. reported the incident to his mother, after running away from home,

and later provided a statement to the police after they were contacted by his

mother. T.T. conducted an interview with the New Orleans Advocacy Center

detailing the incident.

Maria Isabella Pontoriero

Maria Isabella Pontoriero (hereinafter “Ms. Pontoriero”), formerly employed

with the New Orleans Children’s Advocacy Center, was qualified as an expert in

conducting forensic interviews. Ms. Pontoriero explained that it was not the

purpose of her interview to determine whether T.T. was truthful about the

allegations. She testified that forensic interviews are conducted with a victim in

order to obtain information for investigation purposes. Ms. Pontoriero explained

that delayed disclosure about abuse is common and asserted that T.T.’s statements

were consistent with a child being groomed by an adult. She noted that, during the

interview, T.T. recounted several different instances of abuse by different people,

which occurs when a victim recounts a present allegation of abuse. The jury

watched the video of T.T.’s interview with Ms. Pontoriero.

Defendant

Defendant testified that he knew T.T. from the school where he was

employed as a janitor. He stated that his residence was near the school and students

would visit his home after school for snacks. Defendant denied the allegations

asserted by T.T. and stated that they listened to the radio and talked for a while,

after which they walked to get Chinese food. Defendant denied telling T.T.’s

mother that other boys would be present on the day she dropped T.T. off at his

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residence. He testified that he kept in contact with T.T. for approximately one year

after the day T.T. was at his residence.

Discussion

Defendant asserts three assignments of error:

1. The State failed to prove the defendant was guilty of indecent behavior
with a juvenile and sexual battery beyond a reasonable doubt;

2. The district court erred in prohibiting the defense from using
impeachment, res gestae and other non-hearsay evidence, including direct
testimony, text messages and a stay away order, and curtailing cross-
examination, all in violation of the constitutional right to present a
defense;

3. The district court erred in imposing the excessive maximum sentences on
the first-time offender. 4

We will discuss each argument under its relevant topic.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends the evidence presented

was insufficient to support his convictions. The State charged Defendant with

indecent behavior with a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S. 14:81, and sexual battery,

a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1.

La. R.S. 14:81 provides, in pertinent part,

A. Indecent behavior with juveniles is the commission of any of the
following acts with the intention of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desires of either person:

(1) Any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of
any child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age
difference of greater than two years between the two persons. Lack
of knowledge of the child's age shall not be a defense.

La. R.S. 14:81(A)(1). Thus, to support a conviction for indecent behavior of a

juvenile, “the State must prove three elements, namely (1) an age difference of

4 While not listed as an assignment error, Defendant also asserts an ineffective assistance of

counsel at sentencing claim in his argument regarding excessive sentencing.

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more than two years between the defendant and the victim, who was not yet

seventeen; (2) the defendant committed a lewd or lascivious act upon the person or

in the presence of a child; and (3) the defendant intended to arouse or gratify either

his own or the victim’s sexual desires.” State v. Robinson, 2021-0254, pp. 25-26

(La.App. 4 Cir. 2/18/22), 336 So.3d 567, 582 (citations omitted). Our Supreme

Court has defined “‘lewd [or] lascivious conduct” in the context of La. R.S.

14:81(A) as an act which is ‘lustful, obscene, indecent, tending to deprave the

morals in respect to sexual relations, and relating to the sexual impurity or

incontinence carried on in a wanton manner.’” State v. Jones, 2010-0762, p. 4, n. 1

(La. 9/7/11), 74 So.3d 197, 200 (quoting State v. Interiano, 2003-1760 (La.

2/13/04), 868 So.2d 9, 15) (citation omitted).

La. R.S. 14.43.1 defines sexual battery, in pertinent part, as follows:

[T]he intentional touching of the anus or genitals of the victim by the
offender using any instrumentality or any part of the body of the
offender, directly or through clothing, or the touching of the anus or
genitals of the offender by the victim using any instrumentality or any
part of the body of the victim, directly or through clothing, when any
of the following occur:

***

(2) The victim has not yet attained fifteen years of age and is at least
three years younger than the offender.

La. R.S. 14:43.1(A)(2). Thus, to support a conviction of sexual battery, the State is

required to prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) In May 2018, T.T.

was under fifteen years of age at the time of the offense; (2) T.T. was at least three

years younger than Defendant; and (3) Defendant touched T.T.’s genitals, directly

or through clothing, using any instrumentality or any part of his body.

It is well settled that when sufficiency of the evidence, and one or more trial

errors, are raised on appeal, this Court should first determine the sufficiency of the

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evidence. State v. Groves, 2020-0450, p. 21 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d

957, 971 (quoting State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992)). We review

sufficiency of the evidence first because “if there is not sufficient evidence to

support a conviction, an accused is not entitled to a new trial; rather, an accused is

entitled to an acquittal. If an accused is entitled to an acquittal, this prevents the

need for a retrial.” Groves, 2020-0450, p. 21, 323 So.3d at 971 (citation omitted).

This Court has previously set forth the applicable standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence:

In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support
a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781,
61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 588 So.2d 757 (La.App. 4
Cir.1991). However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty
simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each
fact necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d
1305 (La. 1988). The reviewing court must consider the record as a
whole since that is what a rational trier of fact would do. If rational
triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the
rational trier’s view of all the evidence most favorable to the
prosecution must be adopted. The fact finder’s discretion will be
impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the
fundamental protection of due process of law. Mussall; Green; supra.
“[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes
the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of
the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La. 1992) at 1324.

State v. Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So.2d 1093, 1111

(citation omitted).

Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d

560 (1979), this Court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, “was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that

all the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.

Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657 (quoting State v.

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Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984)). The elements must be proven such that

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438. The

statutory test of La. R.S. 15:438 “works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency

test to evaluate whether all evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to

prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury.” Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9,

796 So.2d at 657 (citation omitted). “When circumstantial evidence forms the basis

of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according

to reason and common experience.” State v. Brown, 2012-0626, p. 7 (La.App. 4

Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 564, 571 (citation omitted). “[A] reviewing court is not

called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is

contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32, 809 So.2d at

1111 (quoting State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319, 1324 (La. 1992)). As an appellate

court we must review the record as a whole, just as the trier of fact would do. State

v. Wilson, 2022-0346, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/22), 353 So.3d 389, 393 (citation

omitted).

Defendant asserts that T.T. and his mother’s testimony contained numerous

inconsistencies from their statements to the police and T.T.’s interview with the

New Orleans Children’s Advocacy Center. Defendant contends that T.T. and his

mother’s testimony is therefore unreliable. Defendant further maintains that due to

the lack of forensic and corroborative evidence, his convictions cannot stand on

inconsistent testimony alone. Thus, the State’s witnesses failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes for which he was charged.

The State presented the testimony of T.T. and his mother. T.T. testified that

Defendant played pornographic material on the television, masturbated in front of

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T.T., encouraged T.T. to also masturbate, placed T.T.’s hand on the Defendant’s

genitals, placed his hand on T.T.’s genitals and ejaculated. Both T.T. and his

mother testified that T.T. was fourteen years old at the time of the incident. The

testimony elicited also demonstrates that Defendant intended to gratify his own,

and T.T.’s, sexual desires. It is not the role of this Court to assess the credibility of

witnesses or re-weigh the evidence submitted at trial. See State v. Brown, 2016-

0965, p. 28 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/3/17), 219 So.3d 518, 536 (concluding that “[t]he

credibility of witnesses presenting conflicting testimony on factual matters is

within the sound discretion of the trier of fact.”) (citation omitted). Credibility

determinations are matters of weight, not sufficiency, and does not cause the

evidence to be insufficient to convict. State v. Woods, 2000-2712, p. 6 (La.App. 4

Cir. 5/29/02), 828 So.2d 6, 10 (citation omitted). Additionally, “[i]n cases

involving sexual offenses, the testimony of the victim alone may be sufficient to

establish the elements of a sexual offense, even where the State does not introduce

medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense.”

State v. Barbain, 2015-0404, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/4/15), 179 So.3d 770, 778

(citation omitted). While we recognize that conflicting testimony exists, we find

the testimony was sufficient to support a finding of indecent behavior with a

juvenile and sexual battery. A jury heard the testimony of the witnesses. They

listened to the trial testimony and watched T.T.’s interview with Ms. Pontoriero;

ultimately finding Defendant guilty as charged. The testimony of a single witness,

if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v.

Campbell, 2015-0017, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/24/15), 171 So.3d 1176, 1182

(citation omitted).

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“Appellate review for constitutional sufficiency of evidence is limited by the

due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. Under that standard, ‘the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Toby, 2023-00722, p. 3 (La. 10/25/24),

395 So.3d 831, 833, reh’g denied, 2023-00722 (La. 12/12/24), 397 So.3d 424

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d

560 (1979)) (internal citation omitted). Viewing the evidence presented by the

State, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the trier of fact was

presented with sufficient evidence to determine that Defendant committed the

crimes of indecent behavior with a juvenile and sexual battery. Accordingly, we

find no merit to this assignment of error.

Admissibility of Evidence

By his second assignment of error, Defendant asserts the district court

violated his constitutional right to present a defense by not allowing him to

introduce certain evidence. The right of a defendant to present evidence of a

defense is provided by both the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art.

1, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution. This includes the right to full

confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410

U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920

(1967); State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074 (La. 1989); State v. Clark, 2023-0717

(La.App. 4 Cir. 6/10/24), 401 So.3d 171. While generally the introduction of

evidence must comply with evidentiary rules, these rules “may not supersede the

fundamental right to present a defense.” State v. Van Winkle, 1994-0947, p. 5 (La.

6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198, 202. A district court’s ruling on the admissibility of

10

evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. State v.

Wright, 2011-0141, pp. 10-11 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So.3d 309, 316 (citation omitted).

In the matter sub judice, Defendant contends that the district court’s rulings

prevented him from presenting evidence that the accusations against him were

false. Specifically, Defendant contends he should have been allowed to present

evidence that contradicted T.T.’s mother’s testimony concerning how the visit was

arranged and when it occurred; showed an on-going relationship with T.T. after the

incident; and contradicted T.T. and his mother’s testimony that she did not have a

propensity for violence.

Defendant argues the district court erred in excluding text messages from

T.T. and his mother regarding T.T.’s visit to his residence. Defendant also

contends that the district court erred in not allowing text messages between

Defendant and T.T. after the incident to be admitted into evidence. He avers that

the ongoing communication with T.T. creates reasonable doubt on the reliability of

the accusations and he should have been allowed to introduce the text messages for

impeachment purposes. The district court did not allow the introduction of the text

messages between T.T. and Defendant after the incident because they were

presented for the first time on the second day of trial. Defendant acknowledges that

he was allowed to ask questions about the text messages on cross-examination but,

asserts that being prevented from entering the text messages into evidence did not

allow the jury “fair consideration” of all the facts. The record reflects that

Defendant was able to extensively question both T.T. and his mother regarding the

text messages on the day of the visit and text messages between T.T. and

Defendant after the incident. While each individual’s recollection regarding the

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text messages varies, we find that Defendant was not prohibited from exploring the

issue during cross-examination.

Defendant also maintains the district court erred by ruling that he could not

introduce evidence of a domestic stay-away order issued against T.T.’s mother.5

He argues this evidence was necessary to prove his theory that T.T.’s mother had a

propensity towards violence and coerced T.T. into accusing Defendant of sexual

misconduct. Prior to the start of trial, the district court advised the State that

defense counsel intended to cross-examine T.T.’s mother about a domestic stay-

away order issued against her in municipal court. Citing to La. C.E. art. 609.1, the

district court determined that because the charges were refused by the State, and

thus no conviction resulted, the defense could not question her about the order in

an attempt to impeach her credibility. Defendant contends that this ruling

impinged on his ability to present a defense. As noted by the district court, this

evidence was not admissible for impeachment purposes under the code of

evidence. La. C.E. art. 609.1(B), provides: “[g]enerally, only offenses for which

the witness has been convicted are admissible upon the issue of his credibility, and

no inquiry is permitted into matters for which there has only been an arrest, the

issuance of an arrest warrant, an indictment, a prosecution, or an acquittal.” The

protective order Defendant sought to introduce arose out of a criminal case for

which T.T.’s mother was not convicted and thus, it was inadmissible for

impeachment purposes.

Absent an abuse of discretion, a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of

evidence will not be disturbed on review. Wright, 2011-0141, pp. 10-11, 79 So.3d

5 The domestic stay-away order issued against T.T.’s mother did not involve Defendant and was

unrelated to the incident that forms the basis of Defendant’s convictions.

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at 316 (citation omitted). The record before this Court demonstrates that the district

court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. The decision to exclude certain evidence

did not prevent Defendant from presenting a defense. Accordingly, we find no

merit to this assignment of error.

Excessive Sentence

By his final assignment of error, Defendant contends the district court

imposed constitutionally excessive sentences for his two convictions. The district

court sentenced Defendant to serve seven years at hard labor on the indecent

behavior with a juvenile conviction and ten years at hard labor on the sexual

battery conviction, the sentences are to run concurrently.6 He argues that

imposition of the maximum sentences violated his constitutional rights. “A [district

court] has broad discretion when imposing a sentence and a reviewing court may

not set a sentence aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” State v. Bethley,

2022-0849, p. 14 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 1148, 1158 (quoting State v.

Smith, 2001-2574, p. 7 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1, 4) (internal citation omitted).

When reviewing a claim of excessive sentence, this Court must “consider the

punishment and the crime in light of the harm to society caused by its commission

and determine whether the penalty is so disproportionate to the crime committed as

to shock our sense of justice.” State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355, 358 (La. 1980)

(citation omitted). In an excessive sentence claim, the relevant question presented

before this Court is not whether another sentence would be more appropriate, but

6 Under this assignment of error, Defendant also asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim arguing that failure of his defense counsel to file a motion to reconsider sentence or request
a pre-sentencing investigation constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. While this Court may
consider such claims on direct review, in general an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
properly raised in an application for post-conviction relief, in the district court, where a full
evidentiary hearing on the matter may be conducted. See Brown, 2016-0965, p. 17, 219 So.3d at
531; see also State v. Seiss, 428 So.2d 444, 449 (La. 1983). We find the record before this Court
does not contain sufficient evidence to decide the issue.

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whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. State v.

Cook, 1995-2784, p. 3 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 959 (citation omitted). Where,

as here, a defendant fails to object to a sentence or file a motion for reconsideration

of sentence per La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1, appellate review of a sentence is limited to a

review for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Banks, 2023-0806, p. 5 (La. App.

4 Cir. 5/24/24), 391 So.3d 24, 28.

Defendant contends that his sentences are constitutionally excessive due to

his lack of criminal record and his good reputation in the community. He notes

that the charges for which he was convicted were based on a single incident and

the imposition of the maximum sentences is unconstitutionally excessive. While

this Court may consider a different sentence more appropriate, given the record

presented, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in the imposition of

Defendant’s sentences.7 See Cook, 1995-2784, p. 3, 674 So.2d at 959. Accordingly,

we find no merit to this assignment of error.

Errors Patent Review

In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, this Court reviews all criminal

appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. An error patent is one “that is

discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without

inspection of the evidence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). A review of the record reveals

one error patent. In sentencing Defendant, the district court failed to specify that

his sentence for the sexual battery conviction was to be served without benefit of

parole, probation or suspension of sentence as required by the statute. See La. R.S.

14.43.1. However, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides,

7 We note that Defendant’s right to seek post-conviction relief remains as to any and all
appropriate issues. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 930.3 and 930.8.

14

When a criminal statute requires that all or a portion of a sentence
imposed for a violation of that statute be served without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, each sentence which is
imposed under the provisions of that statute shall be deemed to
contain the provisions relating to the service of that sentence without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The failure of
a sentencing court to specifically state that all or a portion of the
sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence shall not in any way affect the statutory
requirement that all or a portion of the sentence be served without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

La. R.S. 15:301.1 cures the district court’s failure to “specifically state that

all or a portion of the sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole,

or suspension of sentence… .” Accordingly, we deem this error patent warrants no

action by this Court.

Decree

After a review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and

sentences for indecent behavior with a juvenile and sexual battery.

CONVICTIONS AND
SENTENCES AFFIRMED

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