State of Louisiana v. Jermaine Brisco

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-KA-0230

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
JERMAINE BRISCO *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 552-969, SECTION “B”
Honorable Tracey Flemings-Davillier
******
Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott
******
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott, Judge
Monique G. Morial)

Jason R. Williams
District Attorney
Brad Scott
Chief of Appeals
Zachary M. Phillips
Assistant District Attorney
Parish of Orleans
619 S. White St.,
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE

Christopher A. Aberle
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P.O. Box 8583
Mandeville, LA 70470-8583

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
January 20, 2026

NEK
RML
MGM

Defendant, Jermaine Brisco, appeals his convictions of second degree

murder, first degree feticide, and attempted obstruction of justice. For the

following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and remand with further

instructions.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the evening of November 9, 2016, Raven Veal was shot in the face and

run over multiple times by her own vehicle. At the time of her gruesome murder,

Ms. Veal was nine months pregnant.

On December 9, 2021, the grand jury charged Defendant with the following:

• Count 1: Second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1;

• Count 2: First degree feticide in violation of La. R.S. 14:32.6;

• Count 3: Cruelty to a juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:93; and

• Count 4: Obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence in a

second degree homicide investigation in violation of La. R.S.

14:130.1.

1

Defendant’s case proceeded to a jury trial on November 4, 2024, and ended

November 8, 2024.1 At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Defendant guilty as

charged on Counts 1 and 2, guilty of the lesser offense of attempted obstruction of

justice on Count 4, and not guilty on Count 3.

Thereafter, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial and for Post-Verdict

Judgment of Acquittal. The district court denied the motion and sentenced

Defendant on December 13, 2024. He received a life sentence on Count 1, a fifteen

year sentence on Count 2, and a twenty year sentence on Count 4. This timely

appealed followed.

ERRORS PATENT

Prior to reviewing the merits of this appeal, we are tasked with examining

the record for any errors patent in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920.2 Our

review of the record reveals two errors patent, one of which is raised by Defendant

as an assignment of error.

First, we note an error with Defendant’s sentences for Counts 2 and 4—the

feticide and attempted obstruction of justice convictions. The district court

sentenced Defendant to fifteen years for the crime of first degree feticide and

twenty years for the crime of attempted obstruction of justice. The district court

specified that both of these sentences were to be served without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. However, neither of the statutes for

those crimes authorize the restriction of benefits. See La. R.S. 14:32.6 and La. R.S.

14:130.1. When a lower court imposes a sentence beyond the limits of what the

1 Defendant’s case was tried before a jury twice prior to the trial subject to this appeal. His first

trial ended in a hung jury on all counts on October 7, 2022. His second trial ended in a mistrial
on November 2, 2023 because of a juror’s misconduct during deliberations.
2 An error patent is an error “that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and

proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2).

2

legislature has authorized, the appellate court should correct the illegal sentence.

State v. Sanders, 2004-0017 (La. 5/14/04), 876 So. 2d 42; see also State v. Harris,

2023-233, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So. 3d 152, 159. Additionally, as

noted by Defendant’s appellate counsel, there is a discrepancy between the minute

entry and the transcript on the jury’s verdict for Count 3, cruelty to a juvenile. The

minute entry notes that Defendant was found guilty on Count 3, whereas the

transcript provides that the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Whenever there is

a discrepancy between a minute entry and the transcript, the transcript rules. State

v. Bailey, 2012-1662, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/23/13), 126 So. 3d 702, 706 (citing

State v. Lynch, 441 So. 2d 732, 734 (La. 1983)).

In light of these errors, we amend Defendant’s sentences on Counts 2 and 4

to remove the restriction on benefits. We remand this case back with instructions

for the district court to (1) edit the minute entry to reflect Defendant was found not

guilty on Count 3; (2) edit the minute entry to remove the restrictions on

Defendant’s sentences for Counts 2 and 4; and (3) transmit notice of the amended

sentences for Counts 2 and 3 to the appropriate authorities pursuant to La. C.Cr.P.

art. 892(B)(2) and the Department of Corrections’ legal department.

We now turn to the errors raised by Defendant on this appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Counsel Assigned Errors:

1. There is a discrepancy between the minute entry and the trial transcript
regarding the verdict on Count 3.

2. The evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions on Counts 1
and 4.

3. The evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction on Count 2.

3

Pro Se Assigned Errors:

1. The district court erred in permitting the admission of the first forensic
interview of R.R. 3, through the testimony of a law enforcement officer.

2. The district court erred in permitting the second forensic interview of R.R.
through the testimony of a law enforcement officer.

3. The district court erred in allowing a law enforcement officer to present
hearsay-based and speculative opinion testimony regarding the surveillance
video timestamps.

4. The district court violated Defendant’s constitutional rights by allowing the
State to use an undisclosed law enforcement database and out-of-court
statements at trial.

5. The district court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion for Post-Verdict
Judgment of Acquittal because the State failed to prove the Defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence at trial left substantial
reasonable doubt as to Defendant’s identity as the perpetrator.

6. The district court erred in allowing a detective to offer lay opinion testimony
regarding the presence or availability of DNA evidence.

7. The district court erred in allowing the prosecutor to mislead the jury during
closing argument by suggesting that a co-defendant had exclusive
knowledge of the evidence.
DISCUSSION

Counsel Assigned Errors Nos. 2-3; Pro Se Error No. 5: Whether the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to convict Defendant

We first address Defendant’s counsel assigned errors nos. 2-3 and pro se

error no. 5 as these deal with the sufficiency of the evidence admitted during trial.

Defendant’s counsel assigned errors challenge the evidence used to convict him of

murder, attempted obstruction of justice, and feticide. Defendant’s pro se error

3 R.R. was approximately four years old when she witnessed her mother’s murder. Given R.R.’s

minor status, and in accordance with La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(1)(a), we will refer to her by her
initials.

4

additionally challenges whether the evidence on all these counts was sufficient to

identify him as the perpetrator of the crimes.4

If a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal, the

appellate court must address that assignment of error first. State v. McDonough,

2022-0628, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/27/23), 376 So. 3d 1003, 1019 (citation

omitted). In reviewing such a claim, the appellate court must view all of the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any

rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the crime to have been

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., p. 21, 276 So. 3d at 1020 (quoting State v.

Groves, 2020-0450, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So. 3d 957, 971). The

appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations in

its review. State v. Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So. 3d

745, 752 (citing State v. McGhee, 2015-2140, p. 2 (La. 6/29/17), 223 So. 3d 1136,

1137). Any conflicting evidence or testimony as to a factual matter is a question of

the weight of that evidence, not its sufficiency. Id. (quoting State v. Scott, 2012-

1603, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/13), 131 So. 3d 501, 508). “Absent [an] internal

contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, a single

witness’s testimony, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to support a factual

conclusion.” State v. De Gruy, 2016-0981, p. 11 (La App. 4 Cir. 4/5/17), 215 So.

3d 723, 729 (quoting State v. Marshall, 2004-3139, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d

362, 369).

4 Defendant’s pro se assignment of error no. 5 asserts the district court’s denial of his motion for

post-verdict judgment of acquittal was erroneous because the evidence was insufficient to
identify him as the perpetrators of the crimes.

5

i. Count 1: Second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1

Second degree murder occurs when the perpetrator kills a person while

having the specific intent to either kill or inflict great bodily harm upon the victim.

La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). A perpetrator is deemed to have specific intent when the

circumstances and actions of the perpetrator indicate that he actively desired the

prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act. State v. Gary, 2016-0714, pp.

2-3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/3/17), 220 So. 3d 117, 119 (citations omitted).

Duvuri Devall, a former co-defendant in this case, was a direct witness to the

crimes committed by Defendant on November 9, 2016.5 Devall attested that he and

Defendant were high school friends and worked together as deckhands on the

Mississippi River. He confirmed that he was with Defendant the night of Ms.

Veal’s murder, riding as a passenger in Defendant’s vehicle, a black Chevy

Malibu. The two went to Walmart where Defendant met with Ms. Veal to shop for

baby clothes.6 Eventually, after making one other stop, Defendant drove them

down Patterson Drive along the river while Ms. Veal followed behind in her blue

Ford sedan. After turning on to Sullen Place, Defendant stopped his vehicle and

went to talk with Ms. Veal by her car. Devall stayed in Defendant’s car. At some

point, Defendant came back to his car, and Devall heard him remove an object

from the backseat before returning to Ms. Veal. Soon thereafter, Devall heard a

gunshot, and he exited the vehicle to see Defendant with a gun in his hand and Ms.

Veal bleeding. He witnessed Ms. Veal try to fight off Defendant and Defendant

follow Ms. Veal into her car as she attempted to escape the situation. Ms. Veal’s

5 Devall admitted to the jury that he had been given a plea deal in exchange for his testimony at

trial.
6 Devall did not accompany the two inside Walmart, opting to stay in Defendant’s car. Ms.

Veal’s young daughter followed her and Defendant into the Walmart.

6

car pulled away, and, after a moment, Devall pursued the two in Defendant’s

vehicle. Devall attested that when he had caught up to the two, he saw Ms. Veal

lying on the ground and bleeding as if she had been struck by a car. Defendant,

while still in Ms. Veal’s car, ran over her again before fleeing the scene. Dr.

Cynthia Gardner, who performed the autopsy of Ms. Veal, confirmed to the jury

that Ms. Veal’s cause of death was internal bleeding due to multiple crush injuries

to the pelvic area. 7

Sergeants Daniel Hiatt and Robert Barrere both testified at trial regarding

their investigation into Ms. Veal’s murder. Both investigated the crime scene after

the murder. Sgt. Hiatt attested that Ms. Veal’s bloody car was found approximately

a neighborhood away from where the crime had occurred. Both Sgts. Hiatt and

Barrere witnessed the forensic interview the Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”)

conducted with R.R., Ms. Veal’s minor daughter who was with her the night of the

murder. During the first interview, R.R. said “Jaycee’s daddy” was the person who

had harmed her mother. Through his investigation, Sgt. Barrere found evidence

linking Defendant as “Jaycee’s daddy,” and, during the second forensic interview,

R.R. identified Defendant as “Jaycee’s daddy” in a photographic line-up.

Surveillance video collected by Sgt. Barrere was also shown to the jury. The video

depicted a black Chevy Malibu following behind a blue Ford sedan moments after

the murder, lending credence to Devall’s testimony. Moreover, Charles Dionne, a

crime analyst assisting with the investigation, conducted an analysis of the data

received from Defendant’s and Devall’s phones. He testified that both Defendant’s

and Devall’s phones pinged phone towers that encompassed the crime scene.

7 Dr. Gardner also testified that Ms. Veal had a superficial gunshot wound on her face, but the

gunshot wound did not cause her death.

7

Finally, the State introduced the testimony of Michaela Anthony, the

regional vice president of Primerica Financial Services (“Primerica”). Ms. Anthony

attested that she trained Defendant to be a life insurance agent for the company. In

September 2016, Defendant attempted to obtain a $250,000.00 life insurance

policy on Ms. Veal. Initially, Ms. Anthony refused to issue the policy, but

Defendant went behind her back and attempted to have other agents issue the

policy to him.

After Ms. Veal reinstated her personal life insurance policy with Primerica,

she transferred ownership of that policy to Defendant. Defendant went to the office

with Ms. Veal on a day Ms. Anthony was away, and the couple filled out a policy

change form that named Defendant both owner and beneficiary of Ms. Veal’s

policy. Thereafter, Defendant attempted to increase the limits on Ms. Veal’s policy

twice, with a final request to increase the policy limit to $400,000.00. Ms. Anthony

testified that she was never able to verify with Ms. Veal if she wanted those policy

increases. Further, when she discussed the budget for Ms. Veal’s policy with

Defendant, Defendant indicated that he did not have a budget for her policy,

despite having a budget for his own policy.

Ms. Anthony learned about Ms. Veal’s death the morning after the murder

when Defendant called one of her employees and indicated he would be in touch

with her about Ms. Veal’s policy. Defendant texted Ms. Anthony a few days later

on November 12 with a news article about Ms. Veal’s murder. After telling

Defendant she would look into the matter, Ms. Anthony reported Defendant and

the policy to the police as suspicious.8

8 Ultimately, Defendant would not be able to collect on Ms. Veal’s policy because the policy was

not active the night of the murder. The payment Defendant had made toward her policy was

8

We find the above, collective evidence to be more than sufficient to convict

Defendant of second degree murder. Mr. Devall witnessed Defendant attack and

run over Ms. Veal the night of the murder, and his testimony was corroborated by

the evidence collected by the NOPD during its investigation. Further, Ms.

Anthony’s testimony established a clear motive for the murder—financial gain

through the life insurance policy.

In his counsel’s brief, Defendant argues that Devall’s testimony was not

credible given the fact he testified as part of a plea deal to lessen the culpability of

his own involvement. The record reflects the jury was aware that Devall was

testifying as part of a plea deal. The jury heard testimony about Devall’s plea deal,

and defense counsel addressed the plea deal during cross-examination. Defendant’s

argument goes to the weight the jury afforded to Devall’s testimony, not its

sufficiency. Moreover, as outlined above, Devall’s testimony, while sufficient, was

not the only evidence presented to the jury in order to prove Defendant’s crimes. In

light of the record as a whole, the jury’s finding was not unreasonable, and we

affirm Defendant’s second degree murder conviction.

ii. Count 2: First degree feticide in violation of La. R.S. 14:32.6

First degree feticide is defined as the killing of an unborn child when the

perpetrator had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:23.6(A)(1). The perpetrator’s specific intent does not need to be directed at the

unborn child. So long as the perpetrator intended to kill or harm the mother, that

intent is attributed to the fetus as well. State v. Houston, 2025-145, p. 20 (La. App.

3 Cir. 11/5/25), ___ So. 3d ___, 2025 WL 3085386 at 11 (discussing the doctrine

redirected to his policy because his own policy had to be active before he could have a policy on
another person. Defendant failed to send additional payment for Ms. Veal’s policy.

9

of transferred intent for first degree feticide); State v. Chatman, 2023-187, pp. 22-

23 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/6/23), 376 So. 3d 301, 316, writ denied, 2024-00030 (La.

9/17/24), 392 So. 3d 631 (discussing whether a defendant’s intent must be directed

at the fetus). As discussed earlier, the evidence is more than sufficient to convict

Defendant of the murder of Ms. Veal. Therefore, the evidence is also sufficient to

establish he had the intention to commit first degree feticide as well.

On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that

he caused the unborn child’s death. This argument does not have merit. At trial,

Dr. Gardner testified that Ms. Veal died due to internal bleeding from multiple

crush injuries to the pelvic area. This is the same area of the body where the uterus

and the unborn child were located. Further, a fetus’ life is dependent on the well-

being of its mother. Thus, the jury could reasonably find that the murder of Ms.

Veal caused her unborn child’s death. Given this, we affirm Defendant’s

conviction of first degree feticide.

iii. Count 4: Obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence in a
second degree homicide investigation in violation of La. R.S.
14:130.1.

Defendant was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice on Count 4.

Obstruction of justice is generally defined as the “[t]ampering with evidence with

the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or

proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or

proceeding.” La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1). This includes the alteration or removal of

substances from the scene of the crime as well as the alteration, destruction, or

concealment of possible evidence. La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1)(a). In order to convict a

defendant of this crime, the State only needs to show that the defendant knew that

an act may reasonably affect a potential or future criminal proceeding. State v.

10

Powell, 2015-0218, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 179 So. 3d 721, 728 (citing

State v. Jones, 2007-1052, p. 9 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So. 2d 95, 101). Moreover, if the

defendant possessed the requisite knowledge and intent, then “[n]othing beyond

movement of the evidence is required” to obtain a conviction. Id. (internal

quotation omitted). Finally, a defendant may be convicted of attempting to commit

a crime if he had the specific intent to commit the prescribed crime and commits an

action for the purpose of accomplishing that crime, regardless of whether he

actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

In this case, the evidence presented shows that Defendant removed Ms.

Veal’s car and the gun from the scene of the crime. This was established through

Devall, who witnessed Defendant driving from the scene, and the investigating

officers, who confirmed that the vehicle was found in a different neighborhood

from where the crime had occurred. Immediately after the murder, Devall assisted

Defendant in cleaning the victim’s car and wiping it down with bleach in an

attempt to remove evidence. The next morning, Devall witnessed Defendant throw

a suitcase containing his bloody clothes and the gun he used to shoot Ms. Veal into

the Mississippi River, depriving the police from finding and using those items

against him. Sgt. Barrere confirmed that he never recovered the gun that shot Ms.

Veal. Finally, Defendant further attempted to distort the investigation by giving

false information to the police on his whereabouts the night of the murder and

telling Devall to do the same. Although he was ultimately unsuccessful in

preventing the police from discovering his involvement, the evidence clearly

establishes that Defendant attempted to disrupt the investigation into Ms. Veal’s

murder. Therefore, we find the evidence sufficient to convict Defendant of

attempted obstruction of justice, and we affirm this conviction.

11

Pro Se Errors Nos. 1-2: Whether the district court erred in admitting the forensic
interviews of R.R. through the testimony of a law enforcement officer

Defendant asserts in his pro se brief that the district court erred in admitting

the two recordings of the CAC’s forensic interviews with R.R. through the

testimony of Sgts. Hiatt and Barrere. Defendant contends his Sixth Amendment

right was violated by the introduction of the footage without either the interviewer

or R.R. present for cross-examination. We review the district court’s decision to

admit this evidence for an abuse of discretion. E.g. State v. Wright, 2011-0141, pp.

10-11 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So. 3d 309, 316.

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:440.5 deems the video recording of a

statement made by a protected person to be admissible if, among other things, the

person who conducted or supervised the recorded interview is available to testify at

trial and can be cross-examined. See La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(6). In his pro se brief,

Defendant argues that Sgts. Hiatt and Barrere were not qualified under the statute

to admit the footage because they did not conduct the interview. This is not a novel

argument. The jurisprudence on this issue dictates that an investigating officer can

serve as the supervisor within the meaning of La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(6). State v.

Hawkins, 2011-0193, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/16/11), 78 So. 3d 293, 298-99;

see also State v. Duong, 2013-763, pp. 27-30 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/8/14), 148 So. 3d

623, 639-41. As both Sgts. Hiatt and Barrere observed the interviews, they were

qualified as supervisors within the meaning of La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(6). Thus,

Defendant’s rights were not violated, and the district court did not err in admitting

the video recordings of the interviews.9

9 Louisiana Revised Statute 15:440.5(A)(8) also requires that the protected person who gave the

interview be available to testify as a prerequisite for admissibility. Although R.R. did not testify
at trial, the State indicated she was available for the defense to call to testify if it chose to do so.

12

Pro Se Error No. 3: Whether the district court erred by allowing a law
enforcement officer to present testimony regarding the surveillance video
timestamps

Defendant’s third pro se assignment of error relates to Sgt. Barrere’s

testimony about the video surveillance footage of Jerred Griffin on the night of Ms.

Veal’s murder. Mr. Griffin was Ms. Veal’s boyfriend and was originally believed

by investigators to be the father of her unborn child. Both Sgts. Hiatt and Barrere

testified that the investigation looked into Mr. Griffin as the potential perpetrator of

Ms. Veal’s murder. However, Mr. Griffin was excluded based on his alibi, which

was confirmed by video surveillance footage depicting him at the locations he

relayed to the investigators around the time of the murder. On appeal, Defendant

argues that Sgt. Barrere could not testify regarding the time stamps on the video

surveillance footage because his testimony about the footage was inadmissible

hearsay and because he was not qualified as an expert in time stamp verification.

A prerequisite to admitting evidence is for it to be authenticated. E.g. State v.

Pollard, 2014-0445, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/15), 165 So. 3d 289, 301 (citing

La. C.E. art. 901); see also Groves, 2020-0450, p. 29, 323 So. 3d at 975. That is,

the court must find that the evidence in question is what its proponent claims it to

be. La. C.E. art. 901(A). The district court is afforded great discretion in

determining whether a sufficient foundation has been laid to authenticate evidence.

Pollard, 2014-0455, p. 17, 165 So. 3d at 301 (citation omitted). On review, the

appellate court must determine whether the proponent established sufficient facts

from which a reasonable juror could find the evidence to be authentic. Groves,

2020-0450, p. 29, 323 So. 3d at 976 (citation omitted).

One way evidence can be authenticated is through “the testimony of a

witness with knowledge that the matter is what it claims to be.” Groves, 2020-

13

0450, p. 29, 323 So. 3d at 975 (citing La. C.E. art. 901(B)(1)). The jurisprudence

on this issue holds that the person who authenticates video footage does not have

to be the same as the one who recorded the video so long as that person has

knowledge that the video is what he claims it to be and can provide information

about its contents. State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir.

9/26/23), 372 So. 3d 864, 879, writ denied 2023-01421 (La. 4/3/24), 382 So. 3d

106. Herein, Sgt. Barrere testified that he personally went to each of the locations

identified by Mr. Griffin and collected the surveillance footage from the respective

areas as part of his investigation. He also was able to identify the contents of the

footage, including each location and Mr. Griffin’s “distinctive” vehicle. Given this,

we find that a reasonable juror could have found the evidence to be authentic.

Evidence that is authenticated can be admitted as non-hearsay, substantive

evidence. Pollard, 2014-0445, p. 17, 165 So. 3d at 301 (citing La. C.E. art.

801(D)(1)). Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of

the matter asserted.” La. C.E. art. 801(C). An officer testifying at trial regarding

the sequence of events that led him to the arrest of a perpetrator, for the purpose of

explaining the course of his investigation and actions, is not hearsay. State in

Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 32, 372 So. 3d at 885 (citation omitted). As the

surveillance footage was properly authenticated by Sgt. Barrere, and because his

testimony about the footage was for the purpose of describing how he eliminated a

suspect, we do not find his testimony to constitute inadmissible hearsay. Therefore,

the district court did not err in admitting the footage or allowing Sgt. Barrere to

testify about its contents.

14

Similarly, we do not find that the district court erred in allowing Sgt. Barrere

to testify about the timestamps depicted in the footage. At trial, Sgt. Barrere

testified that the murder had occurred the week Daylight Savings Time ended and

that some of the surveillance footage he collected had not been adjusted to

represent the time change. He explained his process for determining the correct

timestamps for the footage, which involved calculating the time based on other

evidence he collected during his investigation. Based on the gathered evidence and

his calculations, Sgt. Barrere concluded that Mr. Griffin could not have been the

perpetrator because he was nowhere near the crime scene at the approximate time

the murder occurred. Again, an officer can testify about the actions he took in his

investigation of a crime. State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 32, 372 So. 3d at

885. Further, the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine Sgt. Barrere about

his calculations on the timestamps. Given all this, we find this assigned error to be

meritless.

Pro Se Error No. 4: Whether the district court erred in allowing the State to use
an undisclosed law enforcement data base and out-of-court statements at trial

Defendant’s fourth pro se assignment of error attacks Sgt. Barrere’s

testimony regarding the use of the GeoTime software and TLO database to locate

Defendant’s and Devall’s location around the time of Ms. Veal’s murder. At trial,

Sgt. Barrere testified that the cell phone records received during his investigation

were placed into GeoTime, and the program produced a report depicting which cell

towers were pinged by the phones at various times throughout the night. From this

report, Sgt. Barrere was able to determine that Defendant’s and Devall’s phones

were near the location of the murder. On appeal, Defendant objects on the basis

that he was deprived of the right to confront the analyst who generated the

15

database results and because the State did not disclose the use of the database to

the defense prior to trial, rendering his counsel ineffective in preparing a defense.

As this involves an evidentiary matter, we review the district court’s ruling

for an abuse of discretion. Wright, 2011-0141, pp. 10-11, 79 So. 3d at 316.

Defendant’s argument requiring the person who used the databases and generated

the results to testify rings similar to previously rejected arguments. See State v.

Morgan, 2012-2060, pp. 13-15 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13), 119 So. 3d 817, 826-27

(holding that a detective could give lay opinion testimony regarding the cell phone

location data he received from third-party cellular service companies); see also

State v. Jackson, 2015-0809, pp. 20-22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/25/16), 193 So. 3d 425,

437-39 (holding that a detective did not need to be an expert to testify regarding

the location of various calls made by the defendant based on the information he

received from third-party cellular providers); State v. Stewart, 2024-0454, pp. 23-

25 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), ___ So. 3d ___, 2025 WL 1414856 at *11-12

(rejecting the argument that a detective had to be qualified as an expert or have

analyzed the raw cellular data in order to testify about the contents of a report on a

phone’s location). Further, as already discussed, officers are allowed to testify

regarding the information they receive in the course of their investigation. State in

Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 32, 372 So. 3d at 885. In keeping with the

jurisprudence, and given the fact Sgt. Barrere was testifying about his

investigation, we do not find the district court abused its discretion in allowing him

to testify about the cellular location data results.

In regards to Defendant’s argument about the State’s failure to disclose the

report to his defense counsel, this argument was made before the district court at

trial. While the State admitted it had not produced the GeoTime report itself, it

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represented that the police report, which had been provided prior to trial, contained

all the information used. The district court allowed the State to lay a foundation as

to how Sgt. Barrere received the report and the factual information the report

provided. Defense counsel also questioned Sgt. Barrere about the GeoTime and

TLO databases on cross-examination. Thus, we do not find the district court

abused its discretion in allowing Sgt. Barrere to testify about the report.10

Pro Se Error No. 6: Whether the district court erred in allowing a detective to
offer lay opinion testimony regarding the presence or availability of DNA
evidence

Defendant’s sixth pro se error concerns Sgt. Hiatt’s testimony on re-direct

examination as to the collection of DNA evidence from the crime scene. On re-

direct, the State questioned Sgt. Hiatt as to why some ballistic evidence may or

may not have been tested for DNA. Defense counsel objected on the basis that Sgt.

Hiatt is not an expert on DNA testing.

The district court has the discretion to determine whether opinion testimony

will be received into evidence as lay or expert testimony. State v. Handy, 2016-

1071, p. 23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/13/17), 226 So. 3d 1182, 1198 (citation omitted). On

appeal, the reviewing court must determine (1) whether “the testimony [was]

speculative opinion evidence or simply a recitation of or inferences from facts

based upon the witness’ observations; and (2) if erroneously admitted, [whether]

the testimony [was] so prejudicial to the defense as to constitute reversible error.”

Id. (citation omitted). Generally, a witness who is not testifying as an expert may

give an opinion on matters that are rationally based on his perception and helpful

in facilitating a clear understanding of his testimony or determining a fact in issue.

10 We pretermit any substantive discussion regarding Defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel argument, as such a claim is best addressed in a post-conviction proceeding and not on
an appeal. State v. Watson, 2000-1580, p. 4 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So. 2d 81, 84.

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La. C.E. art. 701. Furthermore, “[i]t is well-settled that a law officer may testify as

to matters within his personal knowledge acquired through experience without first

being qualified as an expert.” Handy, 2016-1071, p. 23, 226 So. 3d at 1198 (citing

Jackson, 2015-0809, p. 20, 193 So. 3d at 437-38).

A review of Sgt. Hiatt’s testimony reveals that he did not offer an expert

opinion on DNA evidence or testing. When defense counsel objected, the district

court ruled that Sgt. Hiatt could testify as to why certain evidence was not

submitted for DNA testing. Sgt. Hiatt’s final answer was that he did not know why

certain evidence was not submitted. Sgt. Hiatt’s testimony was based on his

knowledge as an officer about the investigation and did not stray into the realm of

an expert opinion. Therefore, we find Defendant’s argument to be meritless.

Pro Se Error No. 7: Whether the district court erred in allowing the prosecution
to suggest in closing argument that a co-defendant had exclusive knowledge
about the case

Defendant’s last pro se assignment of error relates to the State’s closing

rebuttal argument. Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly implied that,

because Devall knew about certain evidence, he had exclusive, personal

knowledge about the crime.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 774 confines closing

arguments “to [the] evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of

fact that the [S]tate or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to

the case.” Prosecutors are typically allowed a wide latitude in choosing their

closing argument tactics, and the district court has broad discretion in controlling

the scope of the parties’ closing arguments. State v. Casey, 1999-0023, p. 17 (La.

1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022, 1036. As such, an appellate court cannot reverse a

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conviction unless it is thoroughly convinced that the improper argument influenced

the jury and contributed to the jury verdict. Id. (citation omitted).

A review of the closing argument reveals that the prosecutor did not lie

when he argued Devall had knowledge about a piece of information about the night

of the murder. This information was that Devall and Defendant had cleaned Ms.

Veal’s car after the murder. The record shows that in 2018 Devall had relayed to

the police that he had made a call to his cousin so that he and Defendant could get

supplies to clean Ms. Veal’s car. Sgt. Barrere testified at trial that the discovery

packet given to Devall in 2018 did not contain the police’s suspicions that the car

had been cleaned. The police did not obtain footage of Devall and Defendant

cleaning the car until 2022. Thus, the prosecutor did not lie or mislead the jury in

his closing argument, and this assigned error lacks merit.

DECREE

For the above reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions. We remand this

case back with instructions for the district court to (1) edit the minute entry to

reflect Defendant was found not guilty on Count 3; (2) edit the minute entry to

remove the restrictions on Defendant’s sentences for Counts 2 and 4; and (3)

transmit notice of the amended sentences for Counts 2 and 3 to the appropriate

authorities pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2) and the Department of

Corrections’ legal department.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

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