State Of Louisiana v. Raymond L. Hart

Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 19, 2025
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
RAYMOND L. HART
No. 2025-KK-00568
_ _ _ _
_ _
IN
RE: State of Louisiana - Applicant Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Number(s)
2401F2024/2404M2024, Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Number(s) 2025 KW 0158;
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 19, 2025
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., dissents and would deny.
Griffin, J., dissents and would deny.
Guidry, J., dissents and would deny.
JLW
WJC
JBM
CRC
06/19/2025 "See News Release 029 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2025-KK-00568
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
RAYMOND L. HART
On Supervisory Writ to the 22nd Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany
PER CURIAM
Writ granted. Defendant gave an officer consent to search his vehicle
following a legal traffic stop. To the extent the district court held the officer needed
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity at the time he requested to search
defendant’s vehicle, this was legal error. As explained by this court in State v.
Strange, 04-0273, p. 6 (La. 5/14/04), 876 So.2d 39, 42, following a legal initial
traffic stop, there is nothing that precludes an officer from engaging the defendant in
conversation and asking for defendant’s consent to search the car, even on a mere
hunch. “[T]he officer did not need any degree of reasonable suspicion, as opposed
to intuition or “hunch,” to ask for, and receive, [defendant’s] consent to search the
car. Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and rendered
lawful the subsequent discovery and seizure of the [drugs].” Id. (Internal citations
omitted.)
A valid consent to search is a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202, 1206 (La. 1984). The burden is on the
state to prove that the consent was given freely and voluntarily. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); State v. Pautard, 485 So.2d 909, 912
(La. 1986). Voluntariness is a question of fact for the trial judge to determine under
the facts and circumstances of each case and the judge’s factual determinations are

entitled to great weight on review. State v. Ossey, 446 So.2d 280, 286 (La. 1984).
A district court is afforded great discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress.
When a district court makes findings of fact based on the weight of the testimony and
the credibility of the witnesses, a reviewing court owes those findings great
deference, and may not overturn those findings unless there is no evidence to support
those findings. State v. Thompson, 11-0915 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 553, 563.
Although the district court’s factual findings regarding voluntariness of consent
are entitled to great weight, we find the district court abused its discretion in finding
that defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was the result of implied duress and
coercion. Within three minutes of the legal traffic stop, the officer requested consent
to search the vehicle. The officer engaged in extended dialogue with defendant,
answering his questions regarding the search, and clearly advising defendant he could
refuse to consent. The defendant was standing outside of his vehicle and was not
handcuffed or arrested. Although other officers were present at the stop, none of the
officers had weapons drawn, nor did they engage in any behavior demonstrating
intimidation, duress, or coercion. Moreover, nothing in defendant’s testimony at the
hearing on the motion to suppress suggests he felt threatened or coerced in any way
to give consent. Rather, defendant expressed that he was hesitant at first, but
consented because he did not want to miss the event where he was going and he
believed the officers would not find anything.
Therefore, considering the district court’s legal error regarding the officer’s
ability to request consent to search the vehicle, and considering the particular facts
of this case demonstrate defendant’s consent was voluntary, the State’s writ is granted
and the district court’s order granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence is
reversed.
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