State Of Louisiana v. Misty Dawn Roberts
State Of Louisiana v. Misty Dawn Roberts, No. 2025-KK-00572 (La. June 3, 2025).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State of Louisiana v. Rogers Lacaze 239 So. 3d 807
- State v. Daigle 241 So. 3d 999
Opinion text
Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 03, 2025
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MISTY DAWN ROBERTS
No. 2025-KK-00572
_ _
_ _ _ _
IN
RE: Misty Roberts - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Writ Of Certiorari,
Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Number(s) CR-2024-0841, Court
of Appeal, Third Circuit, Number(s) KW 25-00174;
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 03, 2025
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., concurs in the result.
WJC
JLW
JBM
PDG
JMG
CRC
06/03/2025 "See News Release 026 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2025-KK-00572
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MISTY DAWN ROBERTS
On Supervisory Writ to the 36th Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard
PER CURIAM
Writ granted. Defendant’s motion to recuse Judges Martha O’Neal and C.
Kerry Anderson was timely. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 674 (providing the motion
for recusal must be filed no later than thirty days after discovery of the facts
constituting the ground upon which the motion is based); State v. Collins, 288 So.
2d 602, 604 (La. 1974) (recognizing that in certain instances, the cumulative nature
of incidents alleged as grounds for recusal may bring the motion within the purview
of Article 674).
“[R]ecusal is required when, objectively speaking, ‘the probability of actual
bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable.’” Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 287, 137 S.Ct. 905, 907, 197 L.Ed.2d 167
(2017) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d
712 (1975)). “In a criminal cause, a judge of any trial or appellate court shall … be
recused when there exists a substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be
expected to prevent the judge from conducting any aspect of the cause in a fair and
impartial manner.” La. Code Crim. P. art. 671(B).
Under the circumstances presented, we reverse the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion to recuse Judges O’Neal and Anderson. Based on an objective
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, we find the judges would likely be
unable to conduct this criminal cause in a fair and impartial manner. See La. Code
Crim. P. art. 671(B); State v. LaCaze, 16-0234 (La. 3/13/18), 239 So. 3d 807 (citing
Rippo for the proposition that “evidence of actual bias is not necessary to require
recusal”) (emphasis added). As we have recently held, recusal may be required as
“a constitutional safeguard against the risk of bias.” State v. Daigle, 2018-0634 (La.
4/30/18), 241 So. 3d 999, 999 -1000. We add that there has been no allegation or
showing that the trial judges in this case harbor any actual bias and note that there is
no indication they are not diligent district court judges. However, based upon the
unique facts presented, the Rippo standard requires recusal here. See Daigle, 241
So. 3d at 999-1000.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.