State of Louisiana in the Interest of Z.R

STATE OF LOUISIANA

maN • ' a W."
I

FIRST CIRCUIT

2026 CJ 0215

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF Z.R.

Judgment Rendered: Et? 2 4 2026

On Appeal from the Juvenile Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 13204

Honorable Gail Grover, Judge Presiding

Terynek Grover -McGrew Attorneys for Appellant

Kimberly Avery Louisiana Department of Children
Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Family Services

Raveen Hills Attorney for Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Z.R. ( Child)

Terrell L. Dupard Attorney for Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana J. R. ( Mother)

BEFORE: THERIOT, BALFOUR, AND HAGGERTY,' JJ.

1 The Honorable Bryan D. Haggerty is serving ad hoc by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme
Court.

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HAGGERTY, J.

The Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services ( DCFS) appeals

the trial court judgment that dismissed its petition to terminate the parental rights of

J. R. to her minor child, Z.R." For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Z.R. was born on August 26, 2024, while her mother, J.R., was incarcerated

at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Z.R. entered DCFS custody on or about August

31, 2024, because there was not a suitable caretaker when Z.R. was ready for

discharge from the hospital where she was born. The record reflects that Z.R. was

adjudicated a child in need of care ( CINC) on November 21, 2024. The trial court

continued custody of Z.R. with DCFS at a case review hearing on February 20, 2025,

as well as at a case review and permanency hearing on September 30, 2025. At the

September 30, 2025 hearing, the trial court found that the permanent plan that was

most appropriate and in ZR.' s best interest was adoption concurrent with

reunification.

DCFS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on August 22, 2025,

seeking to terminate the parental rights of J.R.; the named father, D.R.; an alleged

father, C. M.;3 and any unknown father of Z.R. With respect to J.R., DCFS requested

that her parental rights be terminated pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( k), alleging

that J. R.' s parental rights to Z.R.' s siblings had been terminated due to neglect or

abuse, prior attempts to rehabilitate J.R. had been unsuccessful, and the court had

determined pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 672. 1 that current attempts to reunite the

family were not required. DCFS additionally requested that J.R.' s parental rights be

terminated pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 10 15( 5), alleging that Z.R. had been in DCFS

2 We use the initials of the minor child and the parents to ensure confidentiality and to protect the
minor' s identity. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 5- 1 and 5- 2.

3 C. M. was dismissed on DCFS' s motion at a September 30, 2025 hearing.
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custody since August 31, 2024; J.R. had been incarcerated since April of 2024, did
not have a release date, and was unable to work services during her incarceration;

and there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in J.R.' s

condition or conduct in the near future due to her parental rights having been

terminated as to her other three children.

The hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights was originally

set for hearing on November 20, 2025, but was continued to December 2, 2025.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that DCFS did not prove by

clear and convincing evidence the alleged grounds set forth in La. Ch.C. arts.

1015( 3)( k) or 1015( 5), nor that it would be in Z.R.' s best interest to terminate J.R.' s

parental rights without allowing J.R. an opportunity to make additional efforts

towards reunification. The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its ruling

on December 8, 2025, denying the petition to terminate J.R.' s parental rights.' An

amended judgment that dismissed DCFS' s petition as to J. R. was signed on June 30,

2026. 5

DCFS appeals, contending the trial court committed manifest error by finding

it failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to terminate J.R.' s parental rights

pursuant to La. Ch.C. arts. 1015( 3)( k) and ( 5), and by finding DCFS did not meet its

burden of proof that the termination of J.R.' s parental right as to Z.R. was in the best

interest of Z.R.

In a case to involuntarily terminate parental rights, there are two private

interests involved: those of the parents and those of the child. State ex rel. L.B. v.

4 The same December 8, 2025 judgment terminated the parental rights of D.R., who did not appeal
the judgment. The judgment is final as it relates to termination of his parental rights. See State in
Interest ofA.B., 2023- 0655 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1/ 19/ 24), 383 So. 3d 933, 935 n.2, writ denied, 2024-
00221 ( La. 3/ 7/ 24), 380 So. 3d 552.

5 This court issued an interim order on June 15, 2026, noting the absence of appropriate decretal
language dismissing the petition as to J. R.
3

G.B.B., 2002- 1715 ( La. 12/ 4/ 02), 831 So. 2d 918, 921. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455

U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct- 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 ( 1982), the United States Supreme

Court recognized parents have a natural, fundamental liberty interest to the

and management of their children. These
continuing companionship, care, custody,

interests warrant great deference and require full, vigilant due process protection that

fair procedure be followed when the State seeks to terminate the parent-child legal

relationship. Balanced against those protections is the child' s profound interest in

terminating parental rights which prevent adoption and hamper the establishment of
secure, stable, long-term, and continuous relationships found in a home with proper
parental care. State ex rel. L.B., 831 So. 2d at 921. In balancing the parents' and the

child' s interests, the courts of this state have consistently found the interests of the

child to be paramount over those of the parents. Id.

Title X of the Louisiana Children' s Code governs the involuntary termination

of parental rights. Louisiana Children' s Code article 1015 provides the statutory

grounds by which a court may involuntarily terminate the rights of parents. In order

to terminate a person' s parental rights, the court must find the State has established

at least one of the statutory grounds contained in Article 1015 by clear and

convincing evidence. See La. Ch.C. art. 1035( A); State in Interest of CE, 2017-

1054 ( La. 12/ 6/ 17), 235 So. 3d 1066, 1072. Even upon finding the State has met its

evidentiary burden, a court may not terminate parental rights unless it determines
that to do so is in the child' s best interest. See La. Ch.C. art. 1037( B). Whether

termination of parental rights is warranted is a question of fact, and a trial court' s

factual determinations will not be set aside in the absence of manifest error. State in

Under
Interest ofE.0., 2018- 1093 ( La. App. I Cir. 2/ 6/ 19), 272 So. 3d 552, 556.

the manifest error standard, this Court does not decide whether the factfinder was

right or wrong; rather, we are required to consider the entire record to determine
whether a reasonable factual basis exists for the finding, and whether the finding is

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manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. State in Interest of H.R., 2021- 1328 ( La.

App. I Cir. 2/ 25/ 22), 341 So. 3d 592, 598. If the conclusion is reasonable in light of

the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if

convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the

evidence differently. State in -Interest ofH. M R., 22- 176 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 1/ 11/ 23),

356 So. 3d 1179, 1184.

Grounds for Termination Under La. Ch. C. art. 1015(3)( k)

In the instant case, D( -,'
FS sought termination of J.R.' s parental rights under

La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( k), which provides, in pertinent part:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

3) Misconduct of the parent toward this child or any other child of the
parent or any other child which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and
inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable
standard of human decency, including but not limited to the conviction,
commission, aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to
commit any of the following:

k) The parent' s parental rights to one or more of the child' s siblings
have been terminated due to neglect or abuse, prior attempts to
rehabilitate the parent have been unsuccessful, and the court has
determined pursuant to Article 672. 1 that current attempts to reunite the
family are not required.

Louisiana Children' s Code art. 672. 1 provides, in pertinent part:

A. At any time in a child in need of care proceeding when a child is in
the custody of the department, the department may file a motion for a
judicial determination that efforts to reunify the parent and child are not
required.

B. The department shall have the burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that reunification efforts are not required,

considering the health, welfare, and safety of the child and the child' s
need for permanency.

C. Efforts to reunify the parent and child are not required if a court of
competent jurisdiction has determined that:

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4) The parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated
involuntarily.

D. If the court determines that reunification efforts are not required, it
shall document that determination by written findings of fact. A
permanency hearing, which considers in- state and out- of-state

permanent placement options for the child,
may be conducted
immediately and shall be conducted within thirty days after the
determination.

Thus, in order to satisfy its burden under Article 10 1 5( 3)( k) in this case, DCFS

was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence: ( 1) J.R.' s parental rights to

one or more of Z.R.' s siblings were terminated due to neglect or abuse; ( 2) prior

attempts to rehabilitate J.R. were unsuccessful; and ( 3) the court has determined,

pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 672. 1, that current attempts to reunite the family are not

required. See State in Interest ofG.K, 2024- 0163 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 6/ 26/ 24), 399 So.

3d 433, 438- 39, writ denied, 2024- 00947 ( La. 9/ 17/ 24), 392 So. 3d 891.

At the termination hearing, the DCFS case worker testified that she became

involved with the case on May 27, 2025, while J.R. was incarcerated at East Baton

Rouge Parish Prison. The case worker testified that in her review of the case record,

she learned that J.R.' s parental rights to three of her children had previously been

terminated. In connection with her testimony, DCFS submitted into evidence a

February 12, 2024 judgment that terminated J. R.' s parental rights to three of her

children, Ho. B., Hi.B., and Ha.B., and freed them for adoption. The judgment

indicated that J.R. was not present for the hearing. According to the case worker,

the judgment terminating J.R.' s parental rights to Ho.B., Hi.B., and Ha.B., along

with J.R.' s incarceration, " opened the door" for DCFS to file the petition for

termination.

According to the case worker, she first met with J.R. at the courthouse in June

or July of 2025 and provided J.R. with a copy of the case plan, but did not discuss

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J. R.' s ability to complete services while incarcerated.' The case worker testified that

she received a call from J. R. on October 31, 2025, when J. R. was released from

prison. J.R. advised the case worker that she was going to Apollo Behavioral Health

Hospital. According to the case worker, she received a voice message from J.R. on

either November 4 or 5, 2025, but when the case worker called back, J.R. had been

discharged from Apollo. According to the case worker, she next spoke to J.R. at the

November 20, 2025 court date. The case worker testified that J.R. was living with

her brother, who was the subject of an open DCFS investigation, and that the

brother' s house would not be safe housing for Z.R.

According to the case worker, while J.R. was incarcerated, J.R. participated

in video visitation with Z.R. J. R. participated in her first in-person visitation with

Z.R. the week before the termination hearing. The case worker testified that Z.R.

was " a little bit hesitant at first," but started to play with J.R. The case worker further

testified that Z.R. was placed with a certified foster parent when she came into

DCFS' s care, had been with the same foster parent throughout the case, and was in

an adoptive placement.

J.R. testified that she was incarcerated when Z.R. was born, and she had

contacted her own foster mother, T.P., to care for Z.R., but T.P. would not take Z.R.

because T.P. was caring for Ho.B., Hi.B., and Ha.B. J.R. testified that she had been

staying with T.P. in 2014, after one of J.R.' s children died of SIDS.' According to

J.R., she had a nervous breakdown and went into rehab because she was grieving

over the loss of her baby. J. R. testified that when she was in the hospital, T.P. was

taking care of Ho.B., Hi.B., and Ha.B. J. R. further testified that she was not aware

that her parental rights to Ho.B., Hi.B., and Ha.B. were terminated and that T.P.

adopted them until J.R. came to court in the instant case. According to J. R., she was

6 The record does not contain a copy of the case plan.

7 J. R. testified another of her children had also died of SIDS.
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in the hospital in a coma, knew her children were with T.P., in a role that J.R.

assumed was as their grandmother, went to jail, and then learned that she had lost

her rights to Ho.B., Hi.B., and Ha.B.

J.R. testified that she was arrested for outstanding charges dating from 2010

to 2023, was incarcerated for four months, and was released on March 15, 2023. She

went to jail again on April 7, 2024, and was released on October 30, 2025. One of

the charges for which she was incarcerated was attempted second degree murder

involving Z.R.' s named father. J. R. testified that she was given a case plan while

she was in jail and attended parenting and anger management classes and underwent

mental health evaluations. One of the conditions of her release on October 30, 2025

was that she go to Apollo for counseling. She was released from Apollo after seven

days. According to J.R., she was diagnosed with depression and bipolar disorder

when she was a child in foster care, but she did not believe that she had either

disorder. She testified she is on medication, which she takes daily, and continues to

follow-up with Apollo.

J.R. further testified that upon her release from Apollo, she began living with

her brother. She testified that she was approved for housing through the YMCA, but

needed Z.R.' s birth certificate in order to receive the correct housing placement.

According to J.R., she did not receive a copy of Z.R.' s birth certificate while she was

in jail and had requested one from her DCF S case worker, but the case worker had

not responded to the request. J.R. testified that she received social security but had

been placing applications for employment and would likely start a new job soon.

J.R. testified she wanted an opportunity to have Z.R. with her and believed she had

the ability to provide a safe and stable environment for Z.R. if she was given more

time. J. R. testified that she loved Z.R. but had not had a chance to get to know her.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that after listening to

and observing J. R., it found her to be a credible witness. The trial court noted that

J.R. testified she attended parenting and anger management classes and cooperated

with mental health evaluations while she was in jail, even though she did not yet

have a case plan. The trial court further noted that J.R. was present at the CINC

hearings concerning Z.R., had virtual communication and visits with Z.R. while she

was incarcerated, and upon her release, attended in-person visitation with Z.R. when

the opportunity was made available. The trial court also noted that upon her release,

J.R. followed the recommendation that she stay seven days at Apollo for her mental

health.

The trial court addressed DCFS' s request to terminate J. R.' s parental rights

under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( k). It found DCFS proved that J. R.' s parental rights to

three of Z.R.' s siblings were terminated due to neglect and that it had previously

granted DCFS' s motion under La. Ch.C. art. 672. 1, relieving DCFS of making

additional efforts for reunification. However, the trial court determined DCFS failed

to prove that prior attempts to rehabilitate J. R. were unsuccessful. The trial court

noted that the case worker testified that the termination of J.R.' s parental rights to

her other three children " opened the door" to terminate J.R.' s rights to Z.R. While

agreeing that the prior termination did " open the door," the trial court found DCFS

had a burden to show previous efforts at rehabilitation were unsuccessful, but failed

to present testimony or other evidence of a prior unsuccessful attempt to rehabilitate

J. R., as required by La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( k). Thus, the trial court concluded DCFS

failed to establish each of the elements of La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( k), and denied its

petition to terminate J. R.' s parental rights on these grounds.

On appeal DCFS argues that because the trial court acknowledged J. R.' s

parental rights to Z.R.' s siblings were terminated due to neglect and granted DCFS' s

motion pursuant to La. Ch. C, art. 672. 1,' a judicial finding of reasonable efforts to

The record does not contain a copy of the motion for a judicial determination that reunification
efforts are not required.

s1

reunify at the time of the termination hearing is not necessary. DCFS further argues

that the disposition judgment (signed January 14, 2025) and the judgment following

the case review and permanency hearing (signed October 10, 2025) in the CINC case

related to Z.R. identify that the trial court found DCFS had made reasonable efforts

to reunify J.R. and Z.R. DCFS argues that it has provided evidence that previous

efforts to rehabilitate J.R. had been made to no avail.

As noted above, for La. Ch.C. art. 10 1 5( 3)( k) to apply, DCFS must prove that

1) J.R.' s parental rights to Z.R.' s siblings were terminated due to neglect or abuse;

2) prior attempts to rehabilitate JR. have been unsuccessful; and ( 3) the court has

determined, pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 672. 1, that current attempts to reunite the

family are not required. See State in Interest of G.K, 399 So. 3d at 438- 39. In this

case, DCFS did not introduce any evidence regarding the circumstances that led to

the prior termination of J. R.' s parental rights to Z.R.' s siblings. DCFS did not

introduce the record of the prior termination case, the case worker testified that she

did not become involved with Z.R.' s case until after the judgment terminating J.R.' s

parental rights to Z.R.' s siblings, and the case worker provided no testimony

regarding services offered to J.R. in the prior termination case. Cf.State ex rel. L.B.

v. G.B.B., 2002- 1715 ( La. 12/ 4/ 02), 831 So. 2d 918, 924- 25 ( finding prior attempts

to rehabilitate a mother were unsuccessful considering the previous termination

record of the child' s sibling, which established a poor prognosis based on the

mother' s longstanding history of mental illness); State in Interest ofL.J, 2023- 1357

La. App. I Cir. 12/ 26/ 24), 404 So. 3d 956, 964 ( finding rehabilitation efforts

relating to a prior termination were unsuccessful based upon testimony by the case

worker that the parents' rights to the child' s siblings were terminated because the

parents were not successful with their substance abuse and parenting services); and

State in Interest ofG.K, 399 So. 3d at 439 ( finding prior attempts to rehabilitate the

parents were unsuccessful considering the record of the prior case involving the

M]

child' s siblings and evidence in the current case, which was consolidated with the

prior case, that due to the parents' substance abuse issues and periodic

incarcerations, they failed to make substantial compliance with their case plans).

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial

court manifestly erred in finding that DCFS failed to establish each of the elements

of La. Ch.C. art. 10 1 5( 3)( k) and denying the petition for termination pursuant to La.

Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( k).

Grounds for Termination Under La. Ch. C. art. 101 5( 5)

DCFS also sought to terminate JR.' s parental rights under La. Ch.C. art.

1015( 5), which provides the following grounds for termination of parental rights:

5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed
since a child was removed from the parent' s custody pursuant to a court
order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case
plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and
approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and
despite earlier intervention., there is no reasonable expectation of
significant improvement in the parent' s condition or conduct in the near
future, considering the child' s age and his need for a safe, stable, and
permanent home.

Additionally, La. Ch.C. art. 1036 provides, in pertinent part:

C. In accordance with Article 1015( 5), lack of parental compliance with
a case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

5) The parent' s repeated failure to comply with the required program
of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan.

6) The parent' s lack of substantial improvement in redressing the
problems preventing reunification.

7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar
potentially harmful conditions.

D. In accordance witli Article 1015( 5), lack of any reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent' s conduct in the
near future may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

1) Any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance abuse,
or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable or incapable of

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exercising parental responsibilities without exposing the child to a
substantial risk of serious harm, based upon expert opinion or based
upon an established pattem-of behavior.

2) A pattern of repeated incarceration of the parent that has rendered
the parent unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or
emotional needs of the child for extended periods of time.

3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the
parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home
for the child, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established
pattern of behavior.

The trial court found that DCFS did not meet its burden of proof under La.

Ch.C. art. 1015( 5) because it failed to submit evidence of insufficient parental

compliance with a case plan or lack of a reasonable expectation of significant

improvement in the parent' s condition or conduct in the near future. In finding lack

of evidence of insufficient parental compliance with a case plan, the trial court

reviewed several factors contained in La. Ch.C. art. 1036( C), noting that J.R.

completed some of the case plan and had received a housing voucher, but DCFS

failed to provide J.R. with a copy of Z.R.' s birth certificate despite her request,

thereby creating a barrier to J.R. obtaining housing. See La. Ch.C. art. 1036( C)( 5).

The trial court further recognized that, as J.R. had been released from prison, she

had redressed the problem that prevented reunification, i.e., the lack of a caretaker

for Z.R., as set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 1036( C)( 6). The trial court noted that DCFS

provided no evidence of any harmful condition. See La. Ch.C. art. 1036( C)( 7).

With regard to DCFS' s failure to prove lack of a reasonable expectation of

significant improvement in the parent' s condition or conduct in the near future, the

trial court considered the factors set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 1036( D). The trial court

noted that although J.R. did not agree that she was bipolar or depressed, she took the

medicine that was prescribed and testified she was willing to continue to do so. See

La. Ch.C. art. 1036( D)( 1). The trial court further noted that while J.R. had been

incarcerated twice, it did not find a pattern of incarceration. See La. Ch.C. art.

12

1036( D)( 2). Thus, the trial court denied DCFS' s petition to terminate J.R.' s parental

rights pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5).

On appeal, DCFS disputes the factual findings made by the trial court. DCFS

argues there is no proof of compliance with a case plan other than the testimony of
J.R., and further argues that J.R. has a pending criminal matter that has not been

resolved and outstanding mental health recommendations that she has not addressed.

In this case, the trial court made a number of factual findings regarding J.R.' s

compliance with her case plan and the expectation of significant improvement in her

condition and conduct.
As stated previously, such factual findings are subject to a

manifest error standard of review.
Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we

cannot say that the trial court manifestly erred in finding that DCFS failed to prove

each of the elements of La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5) and denying the petition for

termination pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 10 15( 5).

Best Interest of the Child

Finally, the trial court observed that the last court -approved goal was adoption

concurrent with reunification, and found that it would not be in Z.R.' s best interest

to terminate J.R.' s parental rights without additional efforts by J. R. to reunification.

On appeal, DCFS argues that JR. does not know Z.R., has not demonstrated an

ability to meet Z.R.' s needs, and has failed to demonstrate a substantive change in

behavior such that she could safely parent Z.R. in the near future.

We preterrnit discussion of this issue based upon our previous findings that

the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in concluding that DCFS failed to prove

a statutory ground for termination. See La. Ch.C. art. 1037; State in Interest of

A.L.D., 2018- 1271 ( La. 1/ 30/ 19), 263 So. 3d 860, 863.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court

judgment dismissing the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services'

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petition to terminate the parental rights of J.R. to her minor child, Z.R. Costs of this

appeal in the amount of $ 879. 00 are assessed to the Louisiana Department of

Children and Family Services.

AFFIRMED.

14

STATE OF LOUISIANA

FIRST CIRCUIT

2026 CJ 0215

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF Z.R.

THERIOT, J., dissenting and assigning reasons.

Although the State could have done a better job presenting its evidence, I find

the State provided sufficient evidence to prove that prior attempts to rehabilitate J.R.

were unsuccessful. I believe that the testimony at the trial, combined with the

February 12, 2024 judgment terminating J.R.' s rights to three of her children under

La. Ch.C. art. 10 15( 5), clearly proved that prior attempts to rehabilitate J.R. were

unsuccessful. Since termination under La. Ch.C. art. 10 15( 5) requires a showing that

there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan and despite earlier

intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the

parent' s condition or conduct in the near future. I find it is in the best interest of the

Z.R. not to be with the mother.