2026 CJ 0218 Nonprecedential Processed

State of Louisiana in the Interest of J.B., M.B., T.B., and R.B

Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit · Filed August 25, 2026

Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 1st Cir., September 23, 2026; La. Ct. App. 1st Cir., August 20, 2026

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Opinion text

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT

2026 CJ 0218

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF J.B., M.B., T.B. AND R.B.

Judgment Rendered:

On Appeal from
The Juvenile Court
In and f6r the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
No. JU13206, Division A

The Honorable Adam J. Haney, Judge Presiding

D.B. Self r-epresented litigant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Defendant/Appellant

Hillar C. Moore, III Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

District Attorney State of Louisiana
Otha Nelson
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Laura E. Richardson Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Department of Children

and Family Services

Joaquin Johnson Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellees
Kimberly Avery J. B., M.B., T.B. & R.B.

Mental Health Advocacy
Service, Child Advocacy Program
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Tiffany Sanders Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee
Alexandria, Louisiana Father/Monrico Jones

BEFORE: McCLENDON, C.J., GREENE, and STROMBERG, JJ.

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p. 2

STROMBERG, J.

In this appeal, the motlaer of four children previously adjudicated as children

in need of care challenges a juvenile court' s judgment terminating her parental

rights and freeing the children for adoption.' Although the minor children did not

appeal or answer the appeal, they filed a brief joining with the mother' s position as

to the oldest child. For the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
31
D.B. is the mother of -four minor children: J. B. ( born on December
X,
2013), R.B. ( born on July 8, 2019), M.B. ( born on December 25, 2020), and T.B.

born on December 28, 2021).' The State of Louisiana, Department of Children

and Family Services ( DCFS), filed a petition for the termination of parental rights

and certification for adoption. regarding the children on August 25, 2025.

According to the petition, the children entered foster care and DCFS custody on or

about July 13, 2024, after DCFS validated allegations of abuse and neglect, and

they were adjudicated as children in need of care on September 10, 2024.

DCFS asserted that D,13." s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to

La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3) and ( 5). According to the petition, as to La. Ch.C. art.

1015( 5), at least one year had elapsed since the children had been placed in DCFS

custody, there had been no substantial parental compliance with DCFS case plans

as necessary for reunification with the children, and there was no reasonable

expectation of significant improvement in D.B.' s condition in the near future. The

1 The same judgment terminated the parental rights of the minor children' s fathers; however, the
fathers have not appealed. The judgment is final as it relates to the termination of their parental
rights. See State in Interest of L.J., 2023- 1357 ( La. App. I Cir. 12/ 26/ 24), 404 So. 3d 956, 959
n. L Because only the mother is appealing the termination judgment, we will not discuss the
allegations and evidence pertaining to the fathers.

2 In this termination proceeding, the children and parents are referred to by their initials to
preserve their privacy in these confidential proceedings. See Uniform Rules — Louisiana Courts
of Appeal, Rules 5- 1( A)(4) and 5- 2.

p. 3

petition further alleged that as to La. Ch. C. art. 1015( 3)( 1), D.B. committed

extreme abuse and neglect ol" the children.3

The juvenile court conducted the termination of parental rights trial on

November 20, 2025. At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court ruled that it

was terminating the parental rights of D.B. ( and the fathers) as to the children and

certifying the children as free for adoption. On December 9, 2025, the juvenile

court signed a judgment in accordance with its rulings, terminating D.B.' s parental

rights to the children pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( 1) and ( 5); terminating the

fathers' parental rights to the children; continuing the children in DCFS custody

and accepting DCFS' s case plan goal of adoption pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1040;4

freeing the children for adoption; and decreeing that DCFS had made reasonable

efforts to reunite the parents and the children, but that reunification was not

possible.

D. B. has appealed the juvenile court' s judgment. D.B. is representing

herself on appeal after being represented by counsel in the juvenile court. In her

assignments of error, D.B. contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the

termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children; in

concluding that DCFS made reasonable efforts toward reunification; in terminating

her parental rights without sufficient clear and convincing evidence; and by

violating her constitutional due process rights. In her reply brief, D.B. contends

that DCFS addressed the tennination of her parental rights as to the children

3 DCFS also alleged in the petition that D.B.' s parental rights should be terminated under La.
Ch.C. art. 1015( 3) 0), which concerns abuse or neglect after the child is returned to the parent' s
care and custody while under DCFS supervision, when the child had previously been removed
for his safety from the parent pursuant to a disposition judgment in a child in need of care
proceeding. However, DCFS later dropped its claims under La. Ch. C. art. 1015( 3) 0) and

focused on La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( i) and ( 5).

4 Louisiana Children' s Code a, lticle 1040( A) states: " Following a judgment terminating all
parental rights pursuant to this Title, when [ DCFS] is the legal custodian of the child, [ DCFS]
shall report to the court in detail concerning the child' s permanent placement."

p. 4

collectively and not as to each child individually, thereby not meeting its burden of

proof.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

It is well settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a juvenile court' s

findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly

wrong. State in Interest of KB, 2025- 0212 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 19/ 25), 420 So. 3d

rror review, it is important that the appellate court not
12009 1204. In its manifest €:,

substitute its own opinion when it is the juvenile court that is in the unique position

to see and hear the witnesses as they testify. Id. Where there is conflicting

testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact

should not be disturbed upon review, even when the appellate court may feel that

its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable as those of the juvenile court.

Id. If the juvenile court' s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in

its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse, even though convinced that had it

been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id.

at 1204- 05.

In order to reverse a fact finder' s determination of fact, an appellate court

must review the record in iv, entirety and find that a reasonable factual basis does

not exist for the finding, and if such a basis does exist, further determine that the

record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.

State in Interest of K13, 420 So. 3d at 1205. If there are two permissible views of

the evidence, the fact finder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous

or clearly wrong. Id. wever, where documents or objective evidence so
H(,,)

contradict a witness' s story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or

implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness' s

p. 5

story, the appellate court may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a

finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Id.

When a legal error occurs and a juvenile court applies incorrect principles of

law, the appellate court is required, if it can, to render judgment on the record by

applying the correct law and determining the essential material facts de novo. In

re C.L.A.C., 2017- 1703 ( La. App. I Cir. 10/ 24/ 18), 266 So. 3d 302, 309; In re

D.M., 2005- 2046 ( La. App.:. Cir. 2/ 10/ 06), 928 So. 2d 624, 632.

Termination of Parental Rights

Termination of the legal relationship between natural parents and children is

one of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens. State in

Interest of A.L.D., 2018- 1271 ( La. 1/ 30/ 19), 263 So. 3d 860, 863. The interests of

the parents and children must be balanced; however, the paramount consideration

is the best interest of children. See State in Interest of C.F., 2017- 1054 ( La.

12/ 6/ 17), 235 So. 3d 1066, 1075. Thus, rather than simply protecting parental

rights, our judicial system must protect the rights of children to thrive and survive

in a safe, secure environment and to be reared by someone capable of caring for

them. See Id. To protect children whose parents are unwilling or unable to

provide safety and care adequate to meet their physical, emotional, and mental

health needs, the Louisiana Children' s Code provides a judicial process for

terminating the parents' rights and responsibilities and certifying the children as

free for adoption. La. Ch.C. art. 1001.

Louisiana Children' s Code article 1015 enumerates the grounds for the

involuntary termination of parental rights. The State must prove the elements of at

least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing

evidence. See La. Ch. C. art. 1035( A);5 State in Interest of C.F., 235 So. 3d at

5 Louisiana Children' s Code article 1035( A) provides that "[ t] he petitioner bears the burden of

establishing each element of a ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing
evidence."

p. 6

1072. If the juvenile court finds that the State has met its burden of proving one of

the grounds for termination 1.) y clear and convincing evidence, the court must then

determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child. See La. Ch.C.

art. 1039; State in Interest of A.L.D., 263 So. 3d at 863.

To summarize, involuntary termination of parental rights is a two- pronged

inquiry. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence

of at least one of the eight statutory grounds for termination under La. Ch.C. art.

1015. Second, after a ground for termination is found, the juvenile court must

determine whether the termination is in the child' s best interest. La. Ch.C. arts.

1037( B)6 and 1039.

In this matter, DCFS alleged grounds for termination of D.B.' s parental

rights pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 10 15 (3)( i) and ( 5), which provide:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

3) Misconduct of' the parent toward this child or any other
child of the parent or any other child which constitutes extreme abuse,
cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a
reasonable standard of human decency, including but not limited to
the conviction, commission, aiding or abetting, attempting,
conspiring, or soliciting to commit any of the following:

i) Abuse or neglect which is chronic, life-threatening, or results
in gravely disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement.

5)
Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has
elapsed since a child was removed from the parent' s custody pursuant
to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance
with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the

6 Louisiana Children' s Code article 1037( B)( 1) provides, in pertinent part:

When the court finds that the alleged grounds set out in any Paragraph of Article
1015 ... are proven by the evidentiary standards required by Article 1035 and that
it is in the best interest of the child, it shall order the termination of the parental
rights of the parent against whom the allegations are proven. The court shall enter
written findings on both issues. The consideration of the best interest of the child
shall include consideration. of the child' s attachment to his current caretakers.

7 Louisiana Children' s Code article 1039( B)( 1) provides for dispositions other than termination
i] f the court finds that the alleged grounds are not proven in accordance with the evidentiary
standards set forth in Article 1035 or if the court finds that termination of parental rights is not in
the best interest of the child...."

p. 7

department and appro=ved by the court as necessary for the safe return
of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent' s condition or
conduct in the near future, considering the child' s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home. $
Footnote added.)

Louisiana Children' s Code article 1036( C)( 6) and ( 7) provide, respectively,

that lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by the parent' s

lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing

reunification or by the persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar

potentially harmful conditions.

According to the jurisprudence, " reformation" of a parent, for purposes of

determining whether parental rights should be terminated, means more than mere

cooperation with agency authorities. State in Interest of R.M., 2025- 0622 ( La.

App. 1 Cir. 11/ 7/ 25), 424 ScOd 841, 846. A showing of a significant, substantial

s Louisiana Children' s Code article 603( 2) defines " abuse," in pertinent part, as:

2) " Abuse" means any one of the following acts that seriously endanger the
physical, mental, or emotional health, welfare, and safety of the child:

a) The infliction, attempted infliction, or, as a result of inadequate supervision,
the allowance of the infliction or attempted infliction of physical or mental injury
upon the child by a parent or any other person.

Louisiana Children' s Code article 1003( 1)( 2)( a) defines " abuse" similarly. Louisiana Children' s
Code article 603( 18) defines " neglect" as follows:

Neglect" means the refi,.sal or unreasonable failure of a parent or caretaker to
supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, care, treatment, or
counseling for any injury, illness, or condition of the child, as a result of which
the child' s physical, mental, or emotional health, welfare, and safety is
substantially threatened or impaired. Neglect includes prenatal
neglect.
Consistent with Article 606( 13), the inability of a parent or caretaker to provide for
a child due to inadequate financial resources shall not, for that reason alone, be
considered neglect. Whenever, in lieu of medical care, a child is being provided
treatment in accordance with the tenets of a well-recognized religious method of
healing that has a reasonable, proven record of success, the child shall not, for that
reason alone, be considered to be neglected or maltreated. However, nothing in
this Subparagraph shall prohibit the court from ordering medical services for the
child when there is substantial risk of harm to the child's health, welfare, or safety.

Louisiana Children' s Code article 1003( 10) defines " neglect" similarly, but adds the language,
Disagreement by the parent regarding the need for medical care shall not, by itself, be grounds
for termination of parental rights."

p. 8

indication of reformation is required, such as altering or modifying in a significant

way the behavior which served as a basis for the State' s removal of the child from

the home. Id. at 846- 47. Moreover, the lack of any reasonable expectation of

significant improvement in the parent' s conduct in the near future may be

evidenced by "[ a] ny other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the

parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child,

based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior." La.

Ch.C. art. 1036( D)( 3).

Termination of Parental Rights Hearing

At the termination hearing, DCFS called D.B., three DCFS employees, a

foster parent, a Court Appointed Special Advocate ( CASA) employee, and a case

facilitator to testify. DCFS also introduced documentary evidence, including the

children' s birth certificates; a list of pretrial inserts; a plea agreement form; and a

DCFS TIPS client program inquiry.' For her case, D.B. testified on her own behalf

and introduced documentary evidence, including photographs; a psychological

evaluation; a copy of an email thread; a mental health assessment; a substance

abuse assessment; emergency department notes; and certificates of completion for

a parenting course and anger management.

At the beginning of the hearing, DCFS requested that the juvenile court take

judicial notice of the child in need of care records involving the children, identified

as docket numbers 116049, - 116902, and 120395 in the Juvenile Court. The other

parties did not object, and the juvenile court took judicial notice of the child in

need of care records. The parties then stipulated that in docket number 116049, the

three oldest children, J.B., M.B., and R.B., were taken into DCFS custody in

August 2021, adjudicated as children in need of care in November 2021, and

9 The remainder of the evidence DCFS introduced concerned the fathers.

ri -

p. 9

returned to D.B.' s custody on March 12, 2024. As to the youngest child, T.B., the

parties stipulated that in docket number 116902, T.B. was taken into DCFS

custody in April 2022, later adjudicated as a child in need of care, and returned to

D.B.' s custody on March 12, 2024. The parties also stipulated that in docket

number 120395, the children were removed from D.B.' s custody on July 12, 2024;

were adjudicated children in need of care on September 10, 2024; and had

continued as such since that disposition.

We summarize here that part of the trial testimony regarding the timeline for

the children' s custody with DCFS. Kimberly Allen, the DCFS supervisor of the

family' s case manager from August 2021 until April 2023, testified about the

children being placed in care and about the 2021 case plan approved by the court.

Kelly Deedon, the family services case manager supervisor assigned to D.B.' s case
when it was moved to Livingston Parish on April 17, 2024, testified that the

children were with D.B. under a court- ordered safety plan, and they were returned

to DCFS custody on July 13, 2024. Shaunna Stevens, who was assigned to work

with J.B. in August 2025 in her job as a facilitator with Choices Coordinating Care

Solutions, Region 3, was questioned about the number of placements for J. B.

Kathlin Julien, the foster care case manager assigned to the case in September

2024, testified that the children came into DCFS custody due to lack of adequate

supervision. 10 Ms. Julien testified she helped develop case plans for January 6,

2025 and July 2, 2025, whie;:h were substantially the same as previous case plans.

Ms. Julien testified that the basis for the termination of D.B.' s parental rights was

the failure to comply with the case plans and her chronic abuse and neglect of the

children. She further testi i red
- that DCFS believed that termination was in the

10 Ms. Julien identified a four-page document from DCFS labeled " TIPS CLIENT PROGRAM
INQUIRY," which showed a timeline of D.B.' s DCFS history. Ms. Julien testified the DCFS
document included five valid family services investigations; a family services case from April
17, 2024 to July 12, 2024; and two previous foster care cases from April 1, 2024 to April 11,
2024, and from August 23, 2021 to March 12, 2024.

p. 10

children' s best interest. DCFS called D.B. to testify as a witness and she also

testified on her own behalf for her own case. 11

In its reasons for judgment, the juvenile court stated that D.B. loved her

children. The juvenile court then said that in the beginning of this case, D.B. and

the DCFS representatives had an adversarial relationship and that DCFS' s conduct

fell short." The juvenile court stated that it initially returned custody of the

children to D.B. because she had completed much of the case plan requirements

and because the children' s placements were " not the best," such that the children' s

best interest were satisfied b;y returning them to D.B. The juvenile court then set

forth what happened next, which was the pattern in this case: the children were

removed from D.B.' s custody and returned to DCFS custody, D.B. received

additional services, the children returned to D.B., and a couple of months later,

D.B.' s same conduct caused the children' s return to DCFS custody. The juvenile

court commented that by its count J.B. was in foster care four times and the other

children three times. The juvenile court noted that D.B. completed the

requirements of her case plan each time, yet the subsequent history indicated that

D.B. did not change her behavior. The juvenile court stated that the children' s

removal was based on issues not " easily fixed" by DCFS because they involved

D.B.' s continued poor decision-making concerning the children' s welfare. The

juvenile court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the

requirements of a lack of compliance was satisfied under La. Ch.C. art. 1036( C)( 6)

and ( 7). The juvenile court determined that termination was in the best interest of

the children, stating that although J. B., T.B., and M.B. were not in the secure

adoptive placements it would like to see, keeping them in limbo was not healthy

11 Other witnesses at the hearing=; included Tony Pryer and Robert Beamon. Mr. Pryer, the
advocate supervisor with CASA working on the case from September 2021 to May 2024,
testified about the relationship between D.B. and DCFS. Mr. Beaman, R.B.' s foster parent since
April 15, 2022, testified that R.B. was two and a half years old when she entered his and his
wife' s care, and that half of her life: had been with them.

SO]

p. 11

for them either. The juvenile court found that termination would allow the parties

the best opportunity to move forward and be successful.

Analysis

On appeal, D.B. contends that DCFS failed to prove its case with clear and

convincing evidence, asserting that that its evidence was inconsistent, incomplete,

and disputed, and it failed to present clear and convincing evidence of ongoing

neglect, drug abuse, or child endangerment. D.B. further contends that more

weight should be given to the testimony and evidence showing that she completed

the case plan requirements. D.B. also challenges the juvenile court' s consideration

of the best interest of the children collectively, rather than individually.

In the children' s appellate brief, they joined with D.B. as to J.B., contending

that the termination of D.B.' s parental rights was not in the best interest of J.B.; as

to all other matters, the children joined with DCFS. Regarding J. B., the children

argue that the juvenile court erred in failing to discuss the likelihood of adoption in

considering J.B.' s best interest. The children contend that the juvenile court should

have considered alternative placements for J.B., referring to La. Ch.C. arts. 718, et

seq. concerning guardianship, and La. Ch.C. art. 1051, which is a motion to restore

parental rights for children over fifteen years old who are in foster care.

DCFS responds by asserting that it does not need to prove ongoing abuse

and neglect under La. Ch.(.-. art. 1015( 3)( 1) and ( 5). It also contends that it

established a pattern of the children' s removal from D.B., progress by D.B., the

children' s return to D.B., and then repeated removal from D.B. and return to

DCFS. DCFS contended that termination was in the best interest of children based

on D.B.' s established pattern of behavior, the history of the case, and the children' s

need for permanency. DCFS alleged that due process and proper procedure were

followed in the case, citing La. Ch.C. arts. 1019. 2, 1025. 1, and 1025. 4.

p. 12

Stipulations and Child in Need of Care Suit Records

In considering this matter on appeal, we must initially consider an

evidentiary issue. The child in need of care records are not part of the appellate

t in its brief, DCFS states that it " offered, filed, and
record in this case, althougt,.

introduced into evidence the entire suit record of the multiple cases [ D.B.] had in

Court, into evidence without objection." However, the child in need of care

records were not specifically offered, introduced, and admitted into evidence."

The record in this case contains a trial index at the beginning of the transcript,

which includes the language, " JUDICIAL NOTICE OF CHILD IN NEED OF

CARE CASES STIPULATION CASE 116049, STIPULATION CASE 116902

AND STIPULATION CAST; 120395" before the list of witnesses and exhibits in

the case. The case management order was filed into evidence and it shows as

potential evidence "[ a] ny filings under prior CINC proceedings ( EBR Juvenile

Court docket # 120395, # 116902, and # 116049)."

The Children' s Code contains an article providing for judicial notice of a

prior child in need care adjudication. Louisiana Children' s Code article 1036. 1

entitled " Proof of prior c-hild. in need of care judgment, stipulation; record"

provides for judicial notice as follows:

A. Evidence of a prior adjudication or a parent' s prior stipulation
that a child is in need of care and an instanter order or disposition
judgment removing the child from the parent' s custody shall be
admissible in proceedings brought under this Title. If the prior
adjudication judgment was entered by the same court, it may take
judicial notice of its own records. If the prior order or judgment was
entered by another court, a certified copy of the order or judgment or

12 We note that the parties may leave used the child in need of care records when questioning
witnesses. For example, when D. B.' s then -counsel questioned the CASA worker, she asked him
about a February 10, 2022 CASA report that she stated was already submitted into the court
record, but out of an abundance of caution, she would introduce it. DCFS objected on the basis
of hearsay and the juvenile court sustained the objection. D.B.' s counsel did not introduce the
report into evidence, but she stated she thought it was part of the court record. The CASA report
is not in the appellate record, but could have been part of the child in need of care suit records.
The CASA employee was also asked about a February 9, 2024 letter he wrote to the judge, but as
with the report, his letter is also not in the record.

p. 13

certified copy of the rninute entry shall be admissible in accordance
with the Louisiana Code of Evidence.

B. The court record of a prior child in need of care proceeding
involving the child who is the subject of the termination
proceeding may be introduced into evidence at the hearing on the
termination of parental rights.

Emphasis added.)

La. Ch.C. art. 1036. 1 allows the juvenile court to take judicial notice of its own

records in subsection A, and in subsection B provides that the court record of a

prior child in need of care proceeding may be introduced into evidence at the

termination hearing. In this case, the juvenile court took judicial notice of the prior

child in need of care proceec[ings, but the court records of those proceedings were

not introduced into evidence.

Under La. C. E. art. 2f 2, while a court may take judicial notice of its own

proceedings, the article does not allow, nor has it ever been interpreted to allow,

courts to take judicial notice of suit records in other courts. See Hospital Service

District No. I of Parish of Terrebonne, State v. Hospital Service District No. 3

of Parish of Lafourche, State, 2024- 0999 ( La. App. I Cir. 8/ 4/ 25), 421 So. 3d

977, 983, writ denied sub nom. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Parish of

Terrebonne v. Hospital Service District No. 3 of Parish of Lafourche, 2025-

01617 ( La. 3/ 25/ 26), 428 So. 3d 266, on reconsideration, 2025- 01617 ( La. 5/ 27/ 26),

and writ denied sub nom. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Parish of

Terrebonne v. Hospital Service District No. 3 of Parish of Lafourche, 2025-

01609 ( La. 3/ 25/ 26), 428 So. 3d 678, on reconsideration, 2025- 01609 ( La. 5/ 27/ 26);

KJMonte Investments, LLC v. Acadian Properties Austin, LLC, 2020- 0204

La. App. I Cir. 12/ 30/ 20), 319 So. 3d 354, 362. Documentation of other courts'

proceedings must be offered into evidence in the usual manner. See Uniform

p. 14

Rules — Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2- 1. 7; 13 KJMonte Investments, LLC,

319 So. 3d at 362.

The law is clear that e-,,,idence not properly and officially offered, introduced,

and admitted into evidence cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in

the record. See Denoux v. Vessel Management Services, Inc., 2007- 2143 ( La.

5/ 21/ 08), 983 So. 2d 84, 88. A court of appeal is a court of record, which must

limit its review to evidence in the record before it and render its judgment upon the

record on appeal. Touchet v. McGehee, 2024- 1283 ( La. App. I Cir. 7/ 15/ 25), 418

So. 3d 438, 445 n.4. Appellate courts may not review evidence that is not in the

appellate record or receive new evidence. See La. C. C. P. art. 2164; Denoux, 983

I. .

Without the records of the child in need of care cases, we conclude that

DCFS did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

there has been no substantial compliance with the case plan and that there is no

reasonable expectation of significant improvement in D.B.' s condition or conduct

in the future under La. Ch.C. arts. 1015( 5), 1035( A), and 1036( C)( 6) and ( 7).

Although the judgment refers to both La. Ch.C. arts. 10 1 5( 3)( i) and ( 5) as grounds

for termination, the juvenile court in its reasons for judgment only discussed

termination under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5), for which DCFS must show a lack of

substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services that was previously

filed by DCFS and approved by the juvenile court. Ms. Allen, Ms. Julien, and

D.B. testified about the case plans, but without the actual case plans in evidence,

we are left to rely on their testimony about the case plan requirements for multiple

case plans for four different children and about whether D.B. met the case plan

13 No record of another case ( or prior record in the same titled and numbered case) shall be
included in the record, unless such other record has been introduced into evidence at the trial
court in the case on appeal, or on writs, and such other record shall accompany the record as an
exhibit. Uniform Rules —Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2- 1. 7.

p. 15

requirements. 14 While the issue of the absence of the case plans in the records has

not been raised in this court, a review of termination cases based on La. Ch.C. art.

1015( 5) before this court shows that in most cases, the case plans have been

reviewed by the lower count and that this court has them in the record for its

appellate review of the termination.' 5

In State in the Interest of B.H., 24- 46 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 5/ 1/ 24), 433 So. 3d

48, 57, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court' s termination of parental rights for

failure to comply with a case plan under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5) because the record

did not contain a case plan created or filed by DCFS and " the procedure outlined

by the Louisiana Children' s Code with respect to filing and obtaining court

approval of a case plan [ undr;r La. Ch.C. art. 677 16] was not followed." In a more

14 Moreover, at the trial, DCFS did not submit evidence or testimony to support the following
allegations in its petition: that on March 8, 2020, D.B. was arrested and charged with child
desertion; that on August 23, 20211, 1B., R.B., and M.B. were placed in DCFS custody after it
received and validated a report ofF neglect as to the three children ( T.B. had not yet been born)
and also physical abuse as to J. B.; and that D.B. was charged with " Cruelty to Juvenile," and the
criminal court issued protective orders on behalf of the children. Additionally, DCFS did not
clearly establish the basis under which it regained custody of the children in March 2024 or in
July 2024.

15 See State in Interest of L.S., 2026- 0068 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 28/ 26), _ So. 3d , _; State
in Interest of N.J., Jr., N.J., and A.J., 2025- 0278 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 19/ 25), 2025 WL 2741870,
6 ( unpublished); State in Interest of C.W., 2025- 0257 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 19/ 25), 421 So. 3d
570, 578; State in Interest of C.S., 2025- 0017 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 17/ 25), 2025 WL 2670612, * 4
unpublished), writ denied, 2025- 01222 ( La. 11/ 5/ 25), 420 So. 3d 38; State in Interest of
K.C.N., 2023- 1144 ( La. App. 1 C;.r. 5/ 29/ 24), 2024 WL 2746505, * 4 ( unpublished), writ denied,
2024- 00837 ( La. 9/ 4/ 24), 391 So -3d 1. 059, cert. denied sub nom. A.N. v. Louisiana Department
of Children and Family Services:, 1. 45 S. Ct. 2708, 221 L.Ed.2d 970 ( 2025); State in Interest of
I.K., 2022- 0927 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 22), 358 So. 3d 56, 63, writ denied, 2023- 00089 ( La.
3/ 7/ 23), 357 So. 3d 349; State in Interest of T.L., 2021- 0728 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 21), 340
So. 3d 4, 11, writ denied, 2022- 00170 ( La. 3/ 2/ 22), 333 So. 3d 827; State in Interest of E. O.,
2018- 1093 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 6/ 19), 272 So. 3d 552, 558; State in Interest of M.F., 2017- 0545
La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 21/ 17), 241 So. 3d. 316, 321.

16 Louisiana Children' s Code artic. e 677 states, in pertinent part:

A. At the disposition hearing, the court shall consider the content or

implementation of the case plan and any response filed concerning it. At any
other hearing held subsequent: to the filing of the case plan, on its own motion or
upon motion of any party for good cause shown, the court may consider the
content or implementation of the case plan or of any response filed concerning it.

B. If no party files a written response objecting to the case plan and the court
finds that the plan protects the health, welfare, and safety of the child and is in the
best interest of the child, the court shall render an order approving the plan.

p. 16

recent Third Circuit case, where the record did not contain a case plan that was

properly approved by the trial court and the record did not show that the trial court

considered and approved a case plan as required by La. Ch.C. art. 677, the Third

Circuit reversed the termination of both parents' rights. State in Interest of P. G.,

2025- 494 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 1/ 21/ 26), 433 So. 3d 68, 72. 17

In the absence of the crucial documentation of the case plans, the portion of

the judgment terminating D.B.' s parental rights based on La. Ch.C. art. 10 15( 5) is

vacated. Without the case plans, DCFS did not meet its burden of proof and the

juvenile court manifestly erred in finding that D.B.' s parental rights should be

terminated under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5). See State in Interest of A.L.D., 2018-

1271 ( La. 1/ 30/ 19), 263 So. 3d 860, 867. However, because DCFS need only prove

one ground for termination and the judgment also based the termination of D.B.' s

parental rights on La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( 1), we must consider whether DCFS met

its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that D.B. engaged in the

following:

3) [ m] isconduct . m.

toward this child or any other child of the
parent or any other child which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and
inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable
standard of human de(:;ency, including ... the ... commission [ of] any
of the following:

i) [ a] buse or t eglect which is chronic,
life-threatening, or
results in gravely disabling physical or psychological injury or
disfigurement.

17 We note an earlier Third Circuit case where the Third Circuit denied motions to strike as to
child in need of care proceeding...;that were not introduced at the termination trial, nor did the
trial court comment that it was taking judicial notice of them; the Third Circuit found that the
trial court' s statement in its reasons for judgment that the children came into care on October 24,
2011, showed that the court took judicial notice of its own records. State in Interest of B. C.,
15)),
2014- 1043 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 4/ 1/ 2015 WL 1513994, ** 3, 5 ( unpublished). In a recent Fourth

Circuit case, the trial court in its ,judgment terminating the mother' s parental rights stated that it
was taking judicial notice of the underlying Child in Need of Care ( CINC) case. On appeal, the
mother filed a motion to strike two court reports that were submitted directly to the court, but
which were not referred to or admitted into evidence at the termination proceedings, arguing they
were inadmissible hearsay. The :Fourth Circuit referred to La. Ch.C. art. 1036. 1( A) in denying
the motion to strike, stating that when the trial court took judicial notice of the underlying CINC
case in the termination of parental rights proceedings, this notice included the court reports.
State in Interest of Z.B., 2025- 0771 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 2/ 13/ 26), 430 So. 3d 1261, 1267.

p. 17

We have carefully reviewed the testimony and evidence submitted at the

termination hearing concerning abuse or neglect as to the children. The testimony

and evidence submitted at trial concerning abuse and neglect established that in

2021, the children came into DCFS care after DCFS received reports of alleged

physical abuse, including reports that D.B. drug J.B. down the street with a bloody

nose and had hit J.B. with a 2 by 4. Ms. Allen testified that, at that time, the family

home had no water, appliances, or furniture, and that the children had inadequate

clothing. Ms. Allen further testified that in 2022, D.B. refused surgery for J.B. for

a ruptured appendix, which D.B. denied. Ms. Allen further testified about an

incident on April 14, 2022, where D.B. took the children from the home of their

maternal grandmother, with whom they had been placed, and law enforcement

ultimately located them in Lake Charles. D.B. was arrested and charged criminally

with kidnapping, and DCFS obtained a protective order prohibiting D.B. from

visiting the children.

When D.B. testified, she was asked about specific incidents involving her

three oldest children after she moved to Louisiana, and she either denied or did not

recall them. '$ D.B. acknowledged that she was arrested for neglect and a

protective order was put in place for the children. D.B. admitted that her children

were taken into DCFS custody in August 2021. She also admitted she was charged

with the kidnapping of her children in April 2022, but she testified that the charge

was ultimately dismissed. D.B. was asked about the children' s removal from her

custody in July 2024, to which she testified that she was gone for several hours or

18 When asked about a report about leaving J. B. and R.B. home alone in August 2020, D.B.
denied it. When asked about a cal accident with J. B., R.B., and M.B., where she left them inside
the hospital while she went into the parking lot to argue with their father, she testified that she
did not remember. Later questioning by DCFS indicates that D.B. was charged with cruelty to a
juvenile, possibly based on this incident. D.B. denied being verbally or physically abusive
toward J. B., but testified that she did punish her children with time out or by taking a toy away
and she did spank her children, by which she meant " a tap on the hand." D.B. denied the
allegations surrounding her removal of J. B. from the hospital when J. B.' s appendix ruptured,
testifying that J. B. was in pain and the hospital was taking too long, so she took her to another
hospital.

p. 18

more and her children " ended up at Checkers."" When asked why she did not take

the children with her, she testified that her plan was to run to the grocery store and

come back, and when she returned, the children were gone. D.B. testified that she

was only in the grocery store for " maybe like [ an] hour and something." D.B.

testified that she had left her children before, stating that she had " hard times, and

my kids just came home. I didn' t have a stable job, I just got a place...."

In its brief, DCFS contends that it proved by clear and convincing evidence

that the abuse the children sustained was chronic because they were adjudicated as

children in need of care multiple times. DCFS also points out that D.B. was

charged twice while the children were in foster care with kidnapping her children,

and she was convicted in criminal court of at least one count of simple kidnapping.

DCFS also relies on D.B.', s testimony acknowledging child protection service

cases in Texas and Louisiana, and the stipulations regarding the children' s removal

from D.B.' s care to establish chronic abuse or neglect. Yet again, DCFS is relying

on evidence in the prior case! records to establish its case. Without that evidence,

DCFS has not met its burden of proving chronic abuse and neglect by clear and

convincing evidence, and the juvenile court manifestly erred in terminating D.B.' s

parental rights on that basis. See State in Interest of A.L.D., 263 So. 3d at 867.

Therefore, similar to our ruling on that portion of the judgment concerning La.

Ch.C. art. 10 15( 5), the portion of the judgment terminating D.B.' s parental rights

based on La. Ch.C. art. 10 1 5( 3)( i) is vacated. 20

This matter is remanded with instructions to the juvenile court to complete

the record and, if neces,.,,ary, to allow DCFS to present the necessary

19
Apparently, there were two instances where D.B.' s children were left unattended in 2024.
D.B. was asked about a DCFS allegation that she left her children home alone for twelve hours
in July 2024, but she denied it, stating that she left them with someone and that person left them
alone. DCFS counsel stated that the incident D.B. described happened in April 2024.

20 We pretermit review of D.B.' s contention that she was denied due process based on our ruling
in this matter.

p. 19

documentation and evidence establishing D.B.' s mental condition and capacity.

See State ex rel. B.J., 2000- 1434 ( La. App. I Cir. 7/ 27/ 00), 767 So. 2d 869, 877

Whipple, J., concurring). Moreover, because we base our decision herein in part

on the record deficiencies, our action this date should not be construed to mean that

DCFS is pre- empted from initiating termination proceedings as may be warranted

and legally supportable. See Id.

CONCLUSION

Considering the foreg,,.)ing, the December 9, 2025 judgment of the juvenile

court, terminating the parental rights of D.B. as to J.B., R.B., M.B., and T.B., is

vacated, and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.21

The four minor children are to remain in foster care with DCFS services and

controlled, supervised visitation with their mother, D.B. Costs of this appeal in the

amount of $ 1, 562 are to be paid by the State of Louisiana, Department of Children

and Family Services.

21 Although we reverse the termination of D. B.' s parental rights and the certification of the
children for adoption, the record reflects that reunification is not in the children' s best interest at
this time.

p. 20

KqUft' J,

FIRST CIRCUIT

KOT-Taffly-
W.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
IN THE INTEREST OF J. B. f MB., T.B. AND R. B.

McClendon, C.J., concurring.

I concur with the majority's decision to remand. However, I would remand for the

sole purpose of allowing the juvenile court to supplement the appellate record with any

records that the juvenile court took judicial notice of in accordance with LSA- Ch. C. art.

1036. 1.