Stanley R. Palowsky, III Versus Allyson Campbell

STANLEY R. PALOWSKY, III, ET AL. NO. 21-C-279

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

ALLYSON CAMPBELL COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF OUACHITA, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 15-2179
HONORABLE JEROME J. BARBERA, III, JUDGE AD HOC PRESIDING

August 26, 2021

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Stephen J. Windhorst

WRIT DENIED
JGG
FHW
SJW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR,
STANLEY R. PALOWSKY, III, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALTERNATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS, INC.
Joseph R. Ward, Jr.
Sedric E. Banks

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
ALLYSON CAMPBELL
Jeffrey M. Landry
Lawrence W. Pettiette
Brian E. Crawford

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
JUDGE CARL V. SHARP, JUDGE H. STEPHENS WINTERS,
JUDGE BENJAMIN JONES, JUDGE J. WILSON RAMBO, AND
JUDGE FREDERIC C. AMMAN
Jon K. Guice
Justin N. Myers

GRAVOIS, J.

Plaintiff/relator, Stanley R. Palowsky, III,1 seeks this Court’s supervisory

review of an Order of the trial court dated September 18, 2020 which ruled on

discovery matters and granted a limited Protective Order in favor of

defendants/respondents. For the following reasons, we find no error in the trial

court’s interpretation of the statute at issue (La. C.E. art. 519), and further find no

abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion in its rulings on the discovery matters at

issue. We accordingly deny the writ application.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter has a lengthy procedural history. On July 22, 2015, plaintiff-

relator, Stanley R. Palowsky, III, filed this suit (Docket No. 15-2179) in the Fourth

Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, against Allyson Campbell, a law clerk

employed by the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging among other things that

Ms. Campbell committed certain acts in the course of her employment that

damaged relator in a previous lawsuit that was pending in the same court:

Palowsky v. Cork, Docket No. 13-2059, Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of

Ouachita (the underlying shareholder derivative/racketeering suit). In his first

supplemental, amended, and restated petition for damages filed on July 31, 2015,

plaintiff alleged that he suffered damages as a result of Ms. Campbell’s “fraud,

conspiracy to commit fraud, abuse of process, destruction or concealment of public

records, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of his rights

under the Louisiana Constitution to due process and access to courts.”2 In his first

1
Mr. Palowsky filed this suit “individually and as a 50-percent shareholder and director
of Alternative Environmental Solutions, Inc.” For the sake of simplicity, the terms “relator” and
“plaintiff” as used herein shall refer jointly to Mr. Palowsky and to Alternative Environmental
Solutions, Inc., to the extent of its interest herein.
2
More specifically, plaintiff alleged that Ms. Campbell “maliciously and intentionally
harmed [plaintiff] and willfully violated his constitutionally-protected rights to both due process
and access to courts in Palowsky v. Cork when she spoliated, concealed, removed, destroyed,
shredded, withheld, and/or improperly ‘handled’ court documents such as memoranda of law,
orders, pleadings, sealed court documents, and chamber copies of pleadings filed with the clerk

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supplemental, amended, and restated petition for damages, plaintiff also added as

defendants several current or former judges presiding in the Fourth Judicial District

Court, Parish of Ouachita (Judge H. Stephens Winters, Judge Carl V. Sharp, Judge

Benjamin Jones, Judge J. Wilson Rambo, and Judge Frederic C. Amman,

hereinafter “the defendant judges”), alleging that they were aware of Ms.

Campbell’s actions, failed to control her actions, and conspired to conceal her

actions.3 After the entire bench of the Fourth Judicial District Court recused itself,

the Louisiana Supreme Court appointed Judge Jerome J. Barbera, III, as judge ad

hoc, to preside over the case.

In response to the first supplemental, amended, and restated petition,

defendant Ms. Campbell filed, among other things, an exception of no cause of

action based on judicial immunity and a motion to strike certain allegations found

in specifically enumerated paragraphs of the petition as redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, and/or scandalous. The defendant judges also filed, among other

things, an exception of no cause of action, also arguing that judicial immunity

applied to render them immune from suit, as well as a similar motion to strike. In

due course, the motions to strike were granted, striking 46 specifically enumerated

paragraphs and 3 subparagraphs from plaintiff’s petition. Further, the exceptions

of no cause of action were granted, on the basis of absolute judicial immunity,

dismissing plaintiff’s suit against Ms. Campbell and the defendant judges with

prejudice.

Plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal. After briefing, but

prior to oral argument, seven of the nine judges of that court recused themselves,

and hand-delivered to Defendant [Judge] Rambo’s office,” and “maliciously withheld and
concealed documents and pleadings in the trial court as well as from the record that was sent to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeal for its review of an application for supervisory writs filed by
Cork.” (Footnotes omitted.)
3
More specifically, plaintiff alleged that the defendant judges “aid[ed] and abett[ed]
[Ms.] Campbell by allowing her free rein to do as she pleased and then conspir[ed] to conceal
[Ms.] Campbell’s acts which compounded the adverse effects of her acts on [plaintiff].”

21-C-279 2

preventing the composition of a three-judge appellate panel. In due course, the

Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeal. On

appeal, a divided en banc panel of the First Circuit reversed the motions to strike in

part, affirming the striking of the allegations contained in 26 specifically

enumerated paragraphs and 2 specifically enumerated subparagraphs from

plaintiff’s petition.4 The court also reversed the granting of the exception of no

cause of action as to the law clerk, but affirmed the granting of the exception of no

cause of action as to the defendant judges, finding they were entitled to absolute

judicial immunity from suit. Palowsky v. Campbell, 16-1221 (La. App. 1 Cir.

4/11/18), 249 So.3d 945, 959-60.

In response to a writ of certiorari taken by plaintiff to the Louisiana Supreme

Court, in a short per curiam opinion, which included several concurring and

dissenting opinions, the court reversed the judgment of the First Circuit in part,

insofar as it dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the defendant judges with

prejudice. The high court held that “[c]onsidering the highly unusual and specific

facts of this case, the court of appeal erred in finding the judges were entitled to

absolute judicial immunity. Accepting the facts as alleged in the petition as true

for purposes of the exception of no cause of action, we find plaintiff’s allegations

regarding the judges’ supervision and investigation of the law clerk’s activities

arise in the context of the judges’ administrative functions, rather than in the

course of their judicial or adjudicative capacities.” Palowsky v. Campbell, 18-1105

(La. 6/26/19), 285 So.3d 466, 467, reh’g denied, 18-1105 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So.3d

358, and cert. denied sub nom. Winters v. Palowsky, 140 S.Ct. 2570, 206 L.Ed.2d

4
The First Circuit reversed in part the December 11, 2015 judgment of the trial court
insofar as it granted the motions to strike by the judges and by Ms. Campbell with regard to
Paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 52C, 58, 61, 63, 68, 69, 71, 80, and 81
of plaintiff’s amended petition, and affirmed the judgment striking Paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 39, 42, 52A, 52E, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 79, and 82 of
the amended petition.

21-C-279 3

499 (2020). In all other respects, the high court found no error in the court of

appeal’s judgment and affirmed the remaining portions of that judgment. Thus, the

First Circuit’s judgment regarding the stricken paragraphs is now final. The matter

was remanded to the Fourth Judicial District Court for further proceedings.

Upon remand, relator filed a “Motion to Fix and Notice Depositions of

Defendant Judges.” The motion was opposed by the judges and the law clerk.

After considering the oppositions to the motion filed by the defendants, the trial

court “converted” the matter to a “Limine Motion to consider a Protective Order

and to hold an Article 519 [Code of Evidence] hearing,” over plaintiff’s objections.

The motion was heard on August 21, 2020. A judgment which granted the

particular relief described below was signed on September 18, 2020, of which

relator now seeks review.

Relator thereupon filed in the trial court a notice of intention to apply for a

supervisory writ to the First Circuit Court of Appeal and requested a return date,

which was granted on September 18, 2020, giving relator until October 19, 2020

within which to file the writ application. The writ application was filed in the First

Circuit on October 19, 2020. On October 29, 2020, the First Circuit transferred the

writ to the Second Circuit, finding that it had no jurisdiction over a writ application

arising out of Ouachita Parish. On February 5, 2021, the Second Circuit set the

writ “to docket” for preparation of the record and a briefing schedule. The record

was lodged in the Second Circuit on April 21, 2021. However, on May 26, 2021,

the Supreme Court issued an Order transferring the writ application from the

Second Circuit to this Court, apparently after enough judges on the Second Circuit

recused themselves from the matter so as to prevent convening a three-judge panel

21-C-279 4

to hear the writ application.5 The writ application, including the record, was filed

with this Court on June 2, 2021.6

The trial court’s September 18, 2020 Order allowed the depositions of the

judges and Ms. Campbell to go forward with the following qualifications. First,

the trial court found that La. C.E. art. 519 applied to the judges being deposed in

this suit, and held that as per that Article, plaintiff’s counsel would be required to

provide timely written notice to each judge setting forth, with reasonable

particularity, the designated areas of inquiry upon which that judge is to be

deposed, at least 10 days prior to that judge’s deposition.

Further, within its September 18, 2020 Order, the court granted a Protective

Order, declaring that no discovery would be allowed related to the subject matter

contained in the allegations that were stricken from plaintiff’s petition. The

Protective Order further protected from discovery the personnel files of Ms.

Campbell and the proceedings of any judges’ meetings, except to the extent that

the personnel file or the meeting documents contain information related to

plaintiff’s allegations of Ms. Campbell’s having destroyed official documents or

concerns about her alleged wrong doings in relation to her handling of pleadings

filed with the Fourth Judicial District Court. Subject to the foregoing, the parties

were allowed to conduct discovery in accordance with the Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure.

The Protective Order further limited the depositions’ attendees to only those

persons who are involved in the case and who have a legitimate need to be present,

5
According to filings in this Court, six judges recused themselves individually on
November 18, 2020, and a seventh judge recused on January 12, 2021.
6
On June 8, 2021, counsel for the defendant judges filed a Motion to Dismiss the writ
application, arguing that the writ was untimely because relator initially filed it in the First
Circuit, a court with no jurisdiction, and thus the transfer of the writ to the Second Circuit on
October 29, 2020, more than 30 days after the ruling at issue, made the writ untimely filed.
Counsel for Ms. Campbell also raised the timeliness issue in her Opposition filed in this Court on
June 7, 2021. By Order dated this date, this Court denied the Motion to Dismiss.

21-C-279 5

such as the attorneys for the parties, their paralegals, and the court reporter.

Finally, the Protective Order protected the transcripts of the depositions,

documents produced through discovery requests in this case, and videotapes of the

depositions, from disclosure or release to the general public, with the proviso that

this protection would not restrict the ability of the parties to file legitimate exhibits

to pleadings which are needed in the proceedings in this case.

Herein, relator argues the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court abused its discretion in ruling that La. C.E. art. 519 is
applicable to the depositions of the defendant judges, and further, that
under said Article, plaintiff must give each defendant judge notice “with
reasonable particularity” of the designated areas of deposition inquiry 10
days prior to his deposition.

2. The trial court abused its discretion in ruling that all deposition videos
and transcripts and all “documents produced through discovery requests”
are “protected and should not be released to the general public,”
especially given that this ruling went beyond the relief requested by
defendants.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the only persons
allowed to attend depositions are those who are “involved in this case and
have a legitimate need to be present, such as the attorneys for the parties,
their paralegals, and the court reporter.”

4. The trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the personnel file of
defendant Ms. Campbell and documents related to Fourth Judicial
District Court judges’ meetings are protected from discovery, unless the
personnel file or meeting documents contain information related to
plaintiff’s allegations of Ms. Campbell’s destruction of court documents
or mishandling of pleadings filed at the Fourth Judicial District Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed under a de

novo standard of review. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 17-1518

(La. 6/27/18), 252 So.3d 431, 444-45.

The trial court has broad discretion in regulating pretrial discovery, and its

decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. H.

D. Graphics, L.L.C. v. It’s Permanent, L.L.C., 49,405 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/1/14),

21-C-279 6

150 So.3d 936, 941, citing Bell v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 06-1538 (La.

2/22/07), 950 So.2d 654.

La. C.C.P. art. 1426 provides that a party or other person from whom

discovery is sought may obtain a protective order to protect the person from

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden. Such a protective order

may be fashioned to preserve the confidentiality of the information disclosed. The

granting or not of a protective order, and the extent of protection, are within the

discretion of the trial court; and the court of appeal will not ordinarily modify or

reverse the trial court in such matters absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Cerre v. Cerre, 96-2328 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/15/97), 687 So.2d 601, 603.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Relator first argues herein that the trial court interpreted La. C.E. art. 519 too

broadly, and that it should not apply to suits where judges are parties. He also

argues that the requirement that he give the judges “notice with reasonable

particularity” of the designated areas of deposition inquiry is prejudicial to his

ability to prosecute his case.

This Court could find no jurisprudence interpreting Article 519. The trial

court noted the same at the hearing. Accordingly, the following guidelines

pertaining to interpretation of legislation are applicable, as discussed previously by

this Court:

Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and,
therefore, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for
the legislative intent. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied
as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of
legislative intent. La. Civ. Code art. 9. However, if a statute is
ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation,
statutory construction is necessary.

The function of statutory interpretation and the construction to
be given legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of government.
When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it
must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the

21-C-279 7

purpose of the law. La. Civ. Code art. 10. Louisiana Rev. Stat. § 1:3
also provides that, when interpreting the revised statutes, courts shall
read and construe statutory words and phrases in their context and in
accordance with the common and approved usage of the language.
See also La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 5053.
Accordingly, the starting point for the interpretation of any
statute is the language of the statute itself, while being mindful that
the paramount consideration for statutory interpretation is always the
ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which
prompted the legislature to enact the law. Therefore, when the
apparent meaning of the statute appears doubtful or the language can
reasonably be interpreted in more than one manner, courts must
search deeper to discover the legislative intent. (Internal citations
omitted.)

Oubre v. St. Charles Par. Sheriff’s Off., 16-409 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16), 209

So.3d 302, 306-07, citing BellSouth Telcoms., Inc. v. Bennett Motor Express,

L.L.C., 13-438 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/12/13), 131 So.3d 236, 242-43.

La. C.E. art. 519 provides:

A. General rule. Neither a subpoena nor a court order shall be issued
to a judge or his representative to appear or testify in any civil,
criminal, or juvenile proceeding, including pretrial discovery or an
administrative hearing, unless, after a contradictory hearing, it has
been determined that the information sought is not protected from
disclosure by the judicial deliberative process privilege,7 and all of
the following:

(1) The information sought is essential to the case of the party
seeking the information and is not merely peripheral,
cumulative, or speculative.

(2) The purpose of seeking the information is not to harass the
judge, nor for the mere purpose of seeking recusal of the judge.

(3) With respect to a subpoena, the subpoena lists the information
sought with particularity, is reasonably limited as to subject
matter and period of time, and gives timely notice.

(4) There is no practical alternative means of obtaining the
information.

B. Waiver. Failure to object timely to a party’s non-compliance with
the provisions of this Article constitutes a waiver of the procedural
protections of this Article, but does not constitute a waiver of any
privilege.

7
We note, as explained above, that the matter of whether the defendant judges could
invoke judicial immunity in this suit based on the judicial deliberative process privilege was
previously decided by the Supreme Court against the judges.

21-C-279 8

C. The procedural provisions of and the protections afforded by
Paragraph A of this Article shall extend to any judge of any court
provided for by Article V of the Constitution of Louisiana and to
any commissioner or special master of such court.

The trial court’s September 18, 2020 Order was issued following a

contradictory hearing on the applicability of Article 519. In its oral reasons for

judgment given at the hearing, the trial court, applying the rules of statutory

interpretation, found that the language in the Article was clear. The court found

that it applies “in any civil proceeding,” whether or not the judge is a party to the

proceeding or merely a witness. Upon de novo review, we find no error in the trial

court’s interpretation of the statute. “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its

application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written and

no further interpretation may be made in search of legislative intent.” Louisiana

Civ. Code art. 9. We find that the trial court utilized the correct analysis in

interpreting Article 519. The trial court’s interpretation of Article 519 does not

lead to absurd results. The Article’s clear language places no limits or

qualifications on its terms, such as exempting a judge who is a party to the suit,

from the provisions of the Article, as relator argues the Article should be

interpreted. The legislature could have excluded judges who are parties to suits

from the effects of the Article, but instead chose not to do so.

Paragraph A of the Article clearly applies to judges called “to appear or

testify in any civil, criminal, or juvenile proceeding, including pretrial discovery or

an administrative hearing, unless, after a contradictory hearing, it is determined

that the information sought is not protected from disclosure by the judicial

deliberative process privilege,” and further if the four parameters listed therein are

met. (Emphasis added.) Likewise, Paragraph C of the Article broadly extends the

procedural provisions and protections afforded by Paragraph A of the Article to

“any judge of any court … .” (Emphasis added.) In the instant matter, the trial

21-C-279 9

court properly conducted the required contradictory hearing and properly

determined that the discovery depositions requested by plaintiff could properly go

forward subject to the requirements imposed by Article 519 and the limitations

provided for in the subject Protective Order. Contrary to relator’s arguments in the

writ application, the provisions of the Order do not provide a “back door” to the

invocation of judicial immunity.

The Order’s provision that the judges be given notice of the designated areas

of inquiry, with reasonable particularity, generally tracks the language contained in

paragraph B(3) of the Article.8 Relator also argues that because the Code of Civil

Procedure does not require one party to subpoena another party to appear for a

deposition, Article 519 has no application to the instant case. We find no merit to

relator’s argument in this regard, based upon the clear language of Paragraphs A

and C of the Article, as discussed above. Further, Article 519, which is more the

specific law applying only to judges who are called to appear, testify, or provide

pretrial discovery in any civil case, applies under the facts of this case over the

more general articles on discovery in the Code of Civil Procedure that apply to

witnesses (non-judges) in general.

While relator argues that these protections hamper his ability to prosecute

his case, his arguments in this regard fall woefully short. Neither Article 519’s

clear language nor the terms of the Order purport to deny relator reasonable inquiry

into the specific remaining allegations of his suit. At the hearing, the trial court

specifically stated that there was no restraint on discovery as long as discovery was

restricted to the remaining allegations of the petition while inside the bounds of the

8
Relator’s argument in brief that the trial court’s Order forces him to “go through the
time and expense of proving his right to obtain deposition testimony from Defendant Judges” is
inaccurate. No party at the hearing disputed relator’s right to depose the defendant judges.
Further, the trial judge stopped short of requiring relator to issue subpoenas to the defendant
judges for the depositions, noting the time and expense involved therein, and holding that the
aforementioned written notice served on the defendant judges at least 10 days prior to the
depositions would suffice.

21-C-279 10

Code of Civil Procedure. Further, the Order’s provision requiring that the judges

be given timely notice of the depositions’ areas of inquiry, with reasonable

particularity, is reasonable given the fact that numerous particular allegations have

been stricken from plaintiff’s petition, and that discovery has been limited only to

the allegations that have not been stricken.9 The Order’s provisions thus safeguard

that the trial and appellate courts’ prior judgments in this regard will be followed,

and help insure the rights of every party to a fair trial.

In light of the above, we find no merit to relator’s arguments that Article 519

does not apply to these proceedings or that the provisions of the Order in this

regard are unreasonable.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Next, relator argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that all

deposition videos and transcripts and all “documents produced through discovery

requests” are “protected and should not be released to the general public,”

especially given that this ruling went beyond the relief requested by defendants.

As previously stated, the trial court has broad discretion in regulating pretrial

discovery, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of

that discretion. H. D. Graphics, LLC v. It’s Permanent, LLC, supra. La. C.C.P.

art. 1426(A) provides that a party or other person from whom discovery is sought

may obtain a protective order “to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” This statute further

provides “[t]hat certain matters be not inquired into, or that the scope of the

discovery be limited to certain matters” (paragraph (A)(4)), and “[t]hat discovery

be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court”

9
Respondents also point out in opposition to the writ that the designation of “areas of
inquiry” is substantially similar to the process for deposing a corporate representative under La.
C.C.P. art. 1442.

21-C-279 11

(paragraph (A)(5)). Such a protective order may also be fashioned to preserve the

confidentiality of the information disclosed. Cerre v. Cerre, supra. The granting

or not of a protective order and the extent of protection extended are within the

discretion of the trial court, and the court of appeal will not ordinarily modify or

reverse the trial court in such matters absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Id. Thus, the fashioning of a protective order applying to pre-trial discovery is

within the broad discretion of the trial court, and is not limited by the particular

relief affirmatively requested by the parties.

In this assignment of error, relator also argues that the judge abused his

discretion with respect to this paragraph of the September 18, 2020 Order:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that transcripts of depositions, documents produced through discovery
requests in this case, and video tapes of depositions are protected and
should not be released to the general public. This protection does not
restrict the ability of the parties to file legitimate exhibits to pleadings
which are needed in the proceedings in this case.
Relator appears to argue in this regard that the Order “essentially sealed” the

judges’ deposition testimony. We find, however, that this assertion inaccurately

characterizes the terms of the Order. The Order does not seal any deposition

testimony. In fact, the word “seal” does not appear in any form in the Order. The

Order “protects” the transcripts of the depositions and the videotapes of any video

depositions, and prohibits their release to members of the “general public” during

the discovery phase of this case. Contrary to relator’s arguments, merely because

the defendant judges are elected officials who are paid with public funds does not

allow their discovery responses to be disseminated to the general public at this

juncture of the proceeding. Recognizing that there is a fundamental difference

between discoverable information and admissible evidence, the Order facilitates an

orderly discovery process in this highly newsworthy case, and balances relator’s

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right to discovery of evidence to support the unstricken allegations in his petition

with the rights of every party to a fair trial.10

Importantly, this Order only applies to the specific discovery matter of the

defendant judges’ depositions. The Order does not purport to regulate any aspect

of future court hearings or the eventual trial of this matter. By inaccurately

characterizing the clear language of the Order, arguing that these matters were

sealed when they clearly were not, relator fails to support his claim that the trial

court abused its broad discretion in fashioning this part of the Order.

This assignment of error is without no merit.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Next, relator argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the

only persons allowed to attend depositions are those who are “involved in this case

and have a legitimate need to be present, such as the attorneys for the parties, their

paralegals, and the court reporter.”

Herein, relator again argues that because these claims are against elected

public officials and a law clerk, all of whom are paid with public funds, this part of

the Order somehow violates “society’s right to be informed about legitimate

subjects of public interest.” Relator fails to support this claim, however. As noted

above, the scope of this provision of the Order is clearly allowed under La. C.C.P.

art. 1426(A)(5). At the hearing, the parties discussed that it is very uncommon for

members of the general public to attend discovery depositions in any case.

Further, as previously noted, this Order does not apply to future court hearings or

the trial of this matter. Relator has failed to show that this portion of the Order is

an abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion in fashioning protective orders that

10
At the hearing, the newsworthiness of this case in its community and that the parties
desire to prevent any further trial of the case in the local media was fully discussed within the
context of fashioning an appropriate protective order for the handling of discovery. Further, this
part of the Order does not prevent the discovery of “potentially embarrassing” information.

21-C-279 13

facilitate orderly discovery in this particular case and in helping insure the rights of

every party to a fair trial. Accordingly, this assignment of error is also without

merit.

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Finally, relator argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that

the personnel file of defendant Ms. Campbell and evidence related to the Fourth

Judicial District Court judges’ meetings are protected from discovery unless the

personnel file or meeting documents contain information related to plaintiff’s

allegations of Ms. Campbell’s destruction of court documents or mishandling of

pleadings filed at the Fourth Judicial District Court.

Herein, relator argues that discovery of evidence is broader than the

admissibility of evidence, and that discovery statutes are supposed to be “liberally

and broadly construed” to afform all parties a fair opportunity to obtain pertinent

facts. Relator argues that this portion of the Order allows “defendants themselves”

to decide which of those personnel file documents or meeting documents “contain

information related to plaintiffs’ allegations of Ms. Campbell having destroyed

official documents or concerns about her alleged wrong doings in relation to her

handling of pleadings filed with the Fourth Judicial District Court.” Instead,

relator argues, without facts, the Order will allow defendants to thwart discovery of

admissible evidence. Relator argues, without authority, that all documents from

Ms. Campbell’s personnel file should be discoverable, as well as all documents

evidencing and relating to the judges’ meetings, with the trial court later

determining which evidence would be admissible at trial.

This section of the Order limited discovery in that no discovery would be

allowed related to the subject matter contained in the allegations that have been

stricken from relator’s petition, and that discovery from Ms. Campbell’s personnel

file as well as the judges’ meetings would be limited to information relevant to

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those allegations in relator’s petition that have not been stricken. While relator is

correct that discovery statutes are to be broadly construed, the discovery articles

and jurisprudence do not hold that discovery is unfettered. Courts have established

that while relevance in discovery is broader than that required for admissibility at

trial, “the object of inquiry must have some evidentiary value before an order to

compel disclosure of otherwise inadmissible material will issue.” Dabezies v.

Trelo, 18-0278 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So.3d 498, 501, citing Indus. Pipe,

Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Council, 12-1348 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/14/12), 100 So.3d

896, 901. In other words, relator must still show that discovery may lead to

relevant evidence, which is defined by La. C.E. art. 401 as “evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.”

Against this legal backdrop, relator fails to show, at this time, that the trial

court abused its broad discretion in limiting discovery of Ms. Campbell’s

personnel file and evidence relating to the judges’ meetings to evidence relevant

only to those allegations that have not been stricken from relator’s petition. When

and if relator feels aggrieved by any specific discovery response in this regard,

relator may seek appropriate legal recourse as provided for in the Code of Civil

Procedure. This assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned herein, we find that relator’s assignments of error

are without merit. The trial court correctly found that La. C.E. art. 519 is

applicable with respect to plaintiff’s proceeding with the depositions of the

defendant judges herein. Further, the terms of the subject Order limiting discovery

in other respects and regulating the conduct of discovery in this case as described

21-C-279 15

herein are well within the trial court’s broad discretion in regulating pretrial

discovery. Accordingly, this writ application is denied.

WRIT DENIED

21-C-279 16

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
AUGUST 26, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

21-C-279
E-NOTIFIED
4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HON. JEROME J. BARBERA, III (DISTRICT JUDGE)
JOSEPH R. WARD, JR. (RELATOR) SEDRIC E. BANKS (RELATOR) LAWRENCE W. PETTIETTE (RESPONDENT)
JUSTIN N. MYERS (RESPONDENT)

MAILED
JON K. GUICE (RESPONDENT) HONORABLE JEFFREY M. LANDRY BRIAN E. CRAWFORD (RESPONDENT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW (RESPONDENT) ATTORNEY AT LAW
1881 HUDSON CIRCLE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 14600
MONROE, LA 71201 LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MONROE, LA 71207-4600
1885 NORTH 3RD STREET
6TH FLOOR, LIVINGSTON BUILDING
BATON ROUGE, LA 70802