625 Labarre Road, LLC and Jim Hall Versus Parish of Jefferson, American Alternative Insurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Safety National Casualty Corporation

625 LABARRE ROAD, LLC AND JIM HALL NO. 21-CA-133

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON, AMERICAN COURT OF APPEAL
ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY,
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE STATE OF LOUISIANA
COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH,
PENNSYLVANIA, SAFETY NATIONAL
CASUALTY CORPORATION

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 801-707, DIVISION "A"
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. STEIB, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

November 03, 2021

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and Stephen J. Windhorst

AFFIRMED
SMC
JGG
SJW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
625 LABARRE ROAD, LLC AND JIM HALL
Jim S. Hall
Matthew B. Moreland
Jennifer L. Crose

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON
Guice A. Giambrone, III
Craig R. Watson
Carolan D. Luning

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE CORPORATION
David F. Bienvenu
Joshua D. Ecuyer

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA
Robert J. David, Jr.

CHEHARDY, C.J.

Plaintiffs-appellants, 625 LaBarre Road, LLC and Jim Hall, as a member of

625 LaBarre, seek review of the trial court’s rulings granting exceptions of no

cause of action filed by defendants-appellees, the Parish of Jefferson and its

insurers, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and

American Alternative Insurance Corporation.1 For the reasons that follow, we

affirm the trial court’s rulings.

Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiffs intended to develop a six-story condominium in the Elvis Court

Subdivision in Jefferson Parish on five lots. Accordingly, on October 17, 2017,

plaintiffs sought to have the five lots re-designated as one lot, and re-zoned from

Zone R-1A, single family residential and C-1, neighborhood commercial district,

to R-3, multiple family residential district. Plaintiffs met with members of the

Jefferson Parish Planning Department and also notified everyone within 300 feet of

the proposed change.

The Parish advertised the proposed changes and held a Public Hearing on

December 21, 2017. The Planning and Advisory Board voted unanimously to

approve the subdivision modification and re-zoning change, and on January 10,

2018, the Parish Council unanimously approved the ordinances codifying those

changes.

Plaintiffs then began working on the property. Plaintiffs allege that they

spent more than $250,000 to hire contractors who performed asbestos testing and

removal, soil testing, tree removal, demolition and removal of the existing

structure, and surveying to address drain line issues. Eleven months later, however,

1
American Alternative Insurance Corporation was incorrectly named American Alternative
Insurance Company in plaintiffs’ petition. Safety National Casualty Corporation was also named
as a defendant in this matter but was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on January 28,
2020.

21-CA-133 1

plaintiffs allege that they learned from a Parish Council member that the Parish

ordinances passed in January 2018, approving the property re-designation and

zoning changes, “will be reconsidered and revoked at the next Parish Council

meeting, currently scheduled for January 16, 2019.” Plaintiffs’ Petition alleges that

“the exact cause for this reconsideration is disputed but appears to be a result of

residents in the area now, at this late date, expressing concerns about the height of

the development.” According to allegations in the Petition, the Parish Planning

Department disseminated incorrect information regarding the development’s height

when the Parish advertised the proposal before the January 2018 Council meeting

at which the ordinances were approved.

Plaintiffs allege that once the Council passed the ordinances in January

2018, plaintiffs acquired constitutionally protected vested property rights, and any

repeal of the ordinances would constitute a taking in violation of Louisiana

constitutional law. But before the January 16, 2019 Council meeting to consider

revoking the already passed ordinances, plaintiffs negotiated a settlement with the

objecting neighbors and the Council, agreeing to a reduced and revised project

that, according to plaintiffs, also reduced their earning potential. Plaintiffs further

allege that they were forced to spend an additional $350,000 to redesign the project

as a result of the settlement.

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Parish and its insurers, initially asserting two

causes of action.2 First, plaintiffs alleged that the Parish Council violated

2
The relevant factual portions of the original Petition provide as follows (emphasis added):
16.
Petitioner believes and alleges that the opposition is as a result of partial
misinformation negligently disseminated by and through an internal staff report of
the Planning Department, Parish of Jefferson, wherein the report describes the
development as a three-story, fifteen unit condominium building, with parking on
the first floor, as opposed to a six-story building, which has been proposed from the
beginning. …
18.
Should the Jefferson Parish Council proceed to revoke the re-zoning,
petitioners will suffer irreparable harm, injury, loss and damage as a result of

21-CA-133 2

unspecified State Constitutional provisions and laws by threatening to repeal the

ordinances that had already changed the subdivision and zoning designations for

the property in question. The second cause of action alleged violations of the

Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act, La. R.S. 51:1401 et seq. (“LUTPA”).

The Parish and National Union separately filed dilatory exceptions of

vagueness and peremptory exceptions of no cause of action. The trial court

sustained defendants’ exceptions of vagueness and no cause of action and granted

plaintiffs 30 days’ leave to amend their Petition.

Plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental and Amended Petition, which adopted

and reasserted all factual allegations contained in the original Petition, restated

their causes of action for violations of LA. CONST. Art. I, §§ 2 and 4, and LUTPA,

the action to revoke the subject ordinances. Petitioners have incurred significant
expenses due to their reliance upon the legal actions of the Planning and Advisory
Board and the Jefferson Parish Council in their subdivision and re-zoning
ordinances passes in January of 2018.
19.
The counsel’s [sic] Internal Planning Report and Recommendation, which was not
prepared by petitioners, was partially incorrect as to how many stories [it] would
have, and the planning department itself is to blame for the incorrect and misleading
information given to residence [sic] who contacted the planning department. Even
though the Internal Planning Report stated the project as a three story building, it
correctly listed the maximum at sixty (60) feet. …
21.
Once these ordinances were properly voted and passed by Jefferson Parish Council,
petitioners acquired constitutionally protected vested property rights in [these]
ordinances [and] any repeal of the ordinances would have amounted to an
illegal taking of petitioners’ vested property rights and violation of Louisiana
constitutional laws and protection.
22.
The acts of the Jefferson Parish Council in threatening to revoke [or] change the
ordinances in question were acts that were arbitrary and capricious and based on
no legal cause.
23.
Because of the threat of repeal of the acts and in order to mitigate petitioners[’]
losses, petitioners entered into a compromise agreement with the objecting
property owners and the Jefferson Parish Council agreeing to a reduced
revised project and thus greatly reducing petitioners’ earning potential in the
project as was originally approved.
24.
As a result of the compromise, petitioners were forced to spend additional sums
in the amount of $350,000 in redesigning the project in question [and] such sums
were incurred as a direct result of the arbitrary and capricious threat of the council
to revoke the ordinances in question.

21-CA-133 3

and added a claim for detrimental reliance. The detrimental reliance cause of action

alleged that plaintiffs relied to their detriment upon the Parish’s actions of passing

the re-zoning ordinances because plaintiffs incurred expenses to prepare for the

development of the project; that the Parish knew or should have known that its

action would induce plaintiffs to rely on those ordinances to their detriment; and

that the Parish’s threatened revocation of the ordinances resulted in a change of

position and significant losses. Plaintiffs also alleged that their constitutional rights

were violated because they were “deprived and denied property rights without due

process in that the Jefferson Parish Council indicated their intent to unequivocally

revoke” the ordinances; they “were denied the right to use and enjoy their private

property without being subject to unreasonable statutory restrictions and

unreasonable exercise of police power”; and the “threat of revocation of the

ordinance” was an “unreasonable exercise of police power[.]” Finally, plaintiffs

alleged that the “described acts” were “egregious actions which involved

misrepresentation, fraud, deception and other unethical conduct on the part of the

Parish,” in violation of LUTPA.

The Parish and National Union again filed exceptions of no cause of action.

At an October 26, 2020 hearing, the trial court sustained the exceptions and

dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against the Parish and National Union. American

Alternative Insurance Corporation filed its own exception of no cause of action on

November 2, 2020, which was submitted on briefs. The trial court granted

American Alternative’s exception in a January 19, 2021 Judgment. Plaintiffs

appeal the trial court’s rulings on the exceptions of no cause of action, which

dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims against the Parish and its insurers.

Analysis

The purpose of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the

legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy

21-CA-133 4

on the facts alleged in the petition. Gaudet v. Jefferson Parish, 12-707 (La. App. 5

Cir. 3/27/13), 116 So.3d 691, 693. No evidence may be introduced to support or

controvert an exception of no cause of action. Id. (citing La. C.C.P. art. 931).

Consequently, the court reviews the petition and accepts well-pleaded allegations

of fact as true. Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118. “A

petition must set forth the material facts upon which a cause of action is based; the

allegation must be ultimate facts; conclusions of law or fact and evidentiary facts

will not be considered.” Saxena v. Saxena, 518 So.2d 1098, 1100 (La. App 5th Cir.

1987). Mere conclusions, unsupported by the facts, do not set forth a cause of

action. Kitziger v. Mire, 19-87 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/24/19), 280 So.3d 302, 306, writ

denied, 19-1858 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So.3d 1055.

When reviewing a trial court ruling that sustained an exception of no cause

of action, courts of appeal conduct a de novo review, because the exception raises a

question of law, and the trial court’s decision is based only on the sufficiency of

the petition. Cleco Corp. v. Johnson, 01-175 (La. 9/18/01), 795 So.2d 302, 304.

Allegations of Detrimental Reliance

A detrimental reliance theory of recovery emanates from La. Civ. Code art.

1967, which provides:

Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.

A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or
should have known that the promise would induce the
other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party
was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to
the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result
of the promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is
not reasonable.

Three elements are necessary to establish a claim for detrimental reliance: (1)

representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in

position to one’s detriment because of the reliance. Suire v. Lafayette City-Par.

21-CA-133 5

Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 59; Luther v. IOM Co., LLC,

13-353 (La. 10/15/13), 130 So.3d 17, 25. Claims of detrimental reliance must be

examined strictly and carefully. Kitziger, 280 So.3d at 308.

In the Petition and First Supplemental and Amended Petition, plaintiffs

allege that after the Parish Council approved the re-designation and re-zoning

ordinances in January 2018, plaintiffs incurred “over $250,000” in expenses to

prepare the property by engaging architects and civil, mechanical, and electrical

engineers. For example, plaintiffs hired a surveyor to address drain line issues and

hired other professionals to perform asbestos testing and removal, soil testing, tree

removal, and demolition and removal of the existing structure on the property. 3

The Petition then alleges that the “threat of repeal of the acts” caused

plaintiffs to enter into a compromise agreement “with the objecting property

owners and the Jefferson Parish Council” resulting in a “reduced revised project”

that “greatly reduced petitioners’ earning potential in the project as originally

approved.” According to plaintiffs, “[a]s a result of the compromise,” they were

3
Specifically, plaintiffs’ Petition alleges at paragraph 12 that they undertook the following work:

a. Performed asbestos testing;
b. Recorded site plan with Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court;
c. Capped off severe [sic] pipes as per demolition permit requirements;
d. Had site plan and report done on all trees as per the demolition permit requirements.
e. Hired individuals to remove trees off power lines;
f. Filed for and received tree removal permit from Jefferson Parish;
g. Applied for and received a demolition permit from Jefferson Parish;
h. Did the required DEQ testing for removal of asbestos and removed the asbestos;
i. Demolished the three-story wooded structure and mason brick house on the lot and
removed truckloads of demolished materials;
j. Put fill and leveled the lots to grade;
k. Removed trees from the property line;
l. Hired surveyors to workout drain line issues with Jefferson Parish;
m. Repaired a fence in the back and side of the property;
n. Removed the trees on the back, right side of the property including stumps and filling
stump holes with sand;
o. Performed required soil testing;
p. And other actions and expenses.

21-CA-133 6

“forced to spend additional sums in the amount of $350,000 in redesigning the

project in question[.]”

A careful review of the Petition shows that the listed activities occurring

before the Parish’s “threat to revoke the ordinance[s]” are activities that would

have been necessary for nearly any construction project, including the project as

later modified. The Petition and First Supplemental and Amending Petition

establish that the project proceeded, albeit with modifications to which plaintiffs

ultimately agreed. Plaintiffs never allege that the listed activities were specific to

the original plans, or that any of those activities would not have been performed if

plaintiffs had known the project would be reduced in scope. Consequently, the

third prong of detrimental reliance – a change in position to one’s detriment

because of the reliance – has not been pled with respect to the $250,000 of

expenses plaintiffs allegedly incurred before learning of the potential revocation of

the ordinances.

In addition, plaintiffs clearly allege that they settled with the Parish and

agreed to modify the scope of the project.4 The additional $350,000 that plaintiffs

claim to have spent as a result of the alleged “threatened action” of the Council

were incurred after entering into a compromise agreement with the Council,

according to the Petition. Further, plaintiffs do not allege that the compromise

agreement reserved plaintiffs’ right to pursue damages against the Council through

litigation. Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to state a detrimental-reliance cause of action

against the Parish.

Allegations of Constitution Violations through State Action

Plaintiffs allege at paragraph 21 of their Petition that “[o]nce these

ordinances were properly voted and passed by Jefferson Parish Council, petitioners

4
A copy of the compromise agreement was not attached to the Petition or First Supplemental
and Amending Petition and is not included elsewhere in the record.

21-CA-133 7

acquired constitutionally protected vested property rights in [these] ordinances

[and] any repeal of the ordinances would have amounted to an illegal taking of

petitioners’ vested property rights and violation of Louisiana constitutional laws

and protection.” The First Supplemental and Amending Petition alleges that

plaintiffs’ rights “pursuant to Article 1, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution

were violated in that petitioners were denied the right to use and enjoy their private

property without being subject to unreasonable statutory restrictions and

unreasonable exercise of police power.”5 In their briefing, plaintiffs argue that the

Parish’s “intent to unequivocally revoke the previously passed” ordinances

constitutes an action of the State in violation of their rights.

In State, Through Dep’t of Transp. and Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co., Inc., 595

So.2d 598, 603 (La. 1992), the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth a three-pronged

test for determining whether a constitutional taking has occurred: (1) whether a

person’s legal right with respect to a thing or object has been affected; (2) whether

the property, either a right or a thing, has been taken or damaged in a constitutional

sense; and (3) whether the taking or damaging was for a public purpose.

Here, plaintiffs obtained from the Parish the remedy they sought—the

property was re-designated and re-zoned with the passage of the applicable

ordinances in January 2018. The Petition and First Supplemental and Amending

Petition consistently allege only a “threat” of repeal that “would have amounted”

to an illegal taking; the facts stated in the Petition and First Supplemental and

Amending Petition do not specifically allege that an illegal taking has occurred.

The project proceeded, though plaintiffs agreed to a change in size or scope

through a compromise with the Council and complaining residents. Mere

5
LA. CONST. Art. 1, § 4 (A) provides: “Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use,
enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory
restrictions and the reasonable exercise of police power.” LA. CONST. Art. 1, § 2 provides: “No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.”

21-CA-133 8

allegations of a “threat” of taking, followed by allegations that plaintiffs willingly

compromised their plans, are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

Because plaintiffs have not specifically alleged that their property was taken or

damaged in any constitutional sense, plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action

on this basis.

Allegations under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act

The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) declares unlawful

“[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the

conduct of any trade or commerce[.]” La. R.S. 51:1405(A). The purpose of

LUTPA is to protect consumers and to foster competition by halting unfair

business practices and sanctioning the businesses which commit them, preserving

and promoting effective and fair competition, and curbing business practices that

lead to a monopoly and unfair restraint of trade within a certain industry.” Monroe

v. McDaniel, 16-214 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/7/16), 207 So.3d 1172, 1179.

There is no indication the Parish was engaged in the conduct of trade or

commerce when it allegedly “threatened” to revoke the ordinances, nor is there any

allegation that the Parish was restraining trade, promoting monopolistic conduct, or

otherwise conducting unfair business practices. But even if the Parish were

somehow involved in trade or commerce, plaintiffs’ LUTPA claim fails on the face

of the Petition and First Supplemental and Amended Petition.

To succeed on a LUTPA claim, a plaintiff must prove “some element of

fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or other unethical conduct” on the part of the

defendant. Dufau v. Creole Engineering, Inc., 465 So.2d 752, 758 (La. App. 5

Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1207 (La. 1985). The range of practices prohibited by

LUTPA is “extremely narrow.” Cheramie Services, Inc. v. Shell Deepwater

Production, Inc., 09-1633 (La. 4/23/10), 35 So.3d 1053, 1060. Allegations of

“mere negligence” are insufficient to state a claim under LUTPA. Quality Envir.

21-CA-133 9

Processes, Inc. v. I.P. Petroleum Co., Inc., 13-1582 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 1011,

1025.

Plaintiffs contend at paragraph 19 of the Petition that the Parish is liable

because “the planning department itself is to blame for the incorrect and

misleading information given to residence [sic] who contacted the planning

department.” At best, this statement alleges negligence, not “egregious actions

involving elements of fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or other unethical

conduct[.]” Cheramie Services, 35 So.3d at 1060. Although the language of the

First Supplemental and Amended Petition tracks Cheramie when it states that “the

described acts amount to egregious actions which involved misrepresentation,

fraud, deception and other unethical conduct,” plaintiffs fail to enunciate any

additional facts to support this conclusory statement, and thus have failed to state a

LUTPA claim against the Parish as a matter of law.

DECREE

The trial court properly granted defendants’ exceptions of no cause of action

to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against the Parish of Jefferson, National Union Fire

Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and American Alternative

Insurance Corporation. Accordingly, the trial court’s rulings are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

21-CA-133 10

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
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JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
NOVEMBER 3, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

21-CA-133
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HON. RAYMOND S. STEIB, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
JIM S. HALL (APPELLANT) CAROLAN D. LUNING (APPELLEE) CRAIG R. WATSON (APPELLEE)
GUICE A. GIAMBRONE, III (APPELLEE) JOSHUA D. ECUYER (APPELLEE)

MAILED
DAVID F. BIENVENU (APPELLEE) ROBERT J. DAVID, JR. (APPELLEE) JENNIFER L. CROSE (APPELLANT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW ATTORNEY AT LAW MATTHEW B. MORELAND (APPELLANT)
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