Irrael Garcia Versus Jaidy Hernandez

IRRAEL GARCIA NO. 21-CA-338

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

JAIDY HERNANDEZ COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 772-729, DIVISION "L"
HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

April 11, 2022

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

VACATED AND REMANDED
SJW
MEJ
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
IRRAEL GARCIA
M. Molly MacKenzie

WINDHORST, J.

Plaintiff-appellant, Irrael Garcia, appeals the district court’s judgment

awarding Mr. Garcia and defendant-appellee, Jaidy Hernandez, joint custody of their

minor child, and Ms. Hernandez unsupervised physical custody of the child for

certain specified periods of time. For the following reasons, we vacate the domestic

commissioner’s February 1, 2021 interim judgment and the district court’s March

11, 2021 judgment and reinstate the domestic commissioner’s November 8, 2018

judgment.1 We remand this case to the district court to reset the motion to modify

custody before the domestic commissioner.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal involves the custody of the minor child, A.G., born to Mr. Garcia

and Ms. Hernandez in 2016. Mr. Garcia and Ms. Hernandez were never married but

lived together until they permanently separated in April 2017.

The Initial Custody Proceedings

On January 25, 2018, Mr. Garcia filed a petition against Ms. Hernandez

seeking sole custody of the child and requesting that Ms. Hernandez have supervised

visitation provided she completed a domestic abuse intervention program in

accordance with the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act. In response, Ms.

Hernandez filed a petition seeking frequent and liberal visitation for herself and to

be named as the domiciliary parent of the child.

After a two-day hearing, the domestic commissioner rendered judgment dated

November 8, 2018, granting Mr. Garcia temporary sole custody of the child and Ms.

Hernandez supervised visitation conditioned upon her completing a 26-week

domestic abuse intervention program and refraining from use of alcohol and illegal

drugs. In the November 8, 2018 judgment, the domestic commissioner found a

1 This judgment became final when no timely objection was filed by Ms. Hernandez.

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history of family violence, and that Ms. Hernandez had perpetrated more than one

incident of family violence on Mr. Garcia. Having taken all matters under

advisement, he issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Ms. Hernandez from

abusing or harassing Mr. Garcia.

Thirteen months later, on December 13, 2019, Ms. Hernandez filed a rule for

modification of custody, asserting that there was a change in circumstances

warranting modification of the custody schedule set forth in the November 8, 2018

judgment. She sought a joint custody order with the parties sharing equal periods of

physical custody of the child. Ms. Hernandez asserted that she had completed the

domestic abuse intervention program, refrained from drug and alcohol use, and paid

court costs, as required by the November 8, 2018 judgment.2 She did not allege that

the judgment’s custody and visitation provisions were so deleterious to the child as

to justify a modification of the custody decree, or that the harm likely to be caused

by a change of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the

child, as required by Bergeron, infra. Because of the circumstances created by

COVID-19, the hearing on Ms. Hernandez’s rule was delayed multiple times.

The Domestic Commissioner Hearing

On November 24, 2020, the rule for modification of custody was set for

hearing on January 25, 2021. Mr. Garcia, however, was not served with notice of

the January 25, 2021 hearing date until January 22, 2021 at 6:00 P.M., the Friday

evening preceding the Monday morning hearing. A private process server appointed

pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1293 served Mr. Garcia via domiciliary service on his

“live-in girlfriend.” Mr. Garcia has limited English proficiency, and required

translation assistance to understand the notice and nature of the hearing. He was

unable to attend the hearing because he was unable to obtain the day off from work

2 The November 8, 2018 judgment provides that upon fulfilment of these conditions, Ms.
Hernandez would be allowed limited supervised visitations.

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on such short notice. Despite the record reflecting that Mr. Garcia had been served

after business hours on the Friday evening preceding the Monday morning hearing,

the domestic commissioner conducted the hearing without Mr. Garcia present on

January 25, 2021.

At the start of the hearing, the domestic commissioner questioned the

sufficiency of the service on Mr. Garcia, but only as to Mr. Garcia having been

served through his live-in girlfriend, and not relative to the date and insufficient

notice of that service. Ms. Hernandez was the only witness to testify, and the

transcript reflects that her testimony was not extensive. Ms. Hernandez testified that

she had completed the domestic abuse intervention program; that she had not seen

the minor child in two years; that she had a newborn and was living with her

domestic partner who worked while she cared for their newborn; and that the child

would have a place to sleep.

The only mention of Mr. Garcia was when Ms. Hernandez’s counsel asked,

“Would you be willing to cooperate and co-parent with the father of the child for the

benefit of the child?” In response, Ms. Hernandez stated, “Well, yes. But if they

give me the sole custody I would do that, too.” Ms. Hernandez’s counsel then asked

her, “So you would foster the relationship of your daughter with her father?” Ms.

Hernandez replied, “I don’t know. We would have to communicate with him like

this date to pick up the girl.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the domestic commissioner granted the

modification, ordering joint custody of the child with immediate unsupervised

custodial periods for Ms. Hernandez. The domestic commissioner’s interim

judgment was signed on February 1, 2021, and Mr. Garcia objected to it timely. Mr.

Garcia also filed a motion for emergency stay of the domestic commissioner’s

interim judgment, which was granted.

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The District Court Hearing

On March 11, 2021, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Garcia’s objection.

At the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Garcia’s counsel stated to the court, “I assume

that Ms. Hernandez would like to put on her case in chief since it is a Motion to

Modify and this would be a trial de novo.” The trial judge responded, “we’re here

today for you,” referring to Mr. Garcia’s objection, “[s]o put your case on.” At this

point, Mr. Garcia proceeded with his case in chief and testified before the court. Mr.

Garcia testified regarding the initial 2018 custody order and Ms. Hernandez’s lack

of interaction with the child since that order. Mr. Garcia indicated that he thought

Ms. Hernandez should still be limited to supervised visitation to protect his daughter.

After Mr. Garcia finished with his case in chief, the trial judge asked Ms.

Hernandez if she “ha[d] anything.” Ms. Hernandez’s counsel stated, “You know,

judge -- it’s not going to carry a burden because the guy said he thinks that she needs

supervised visitation but no real facts elicited today to overturn the Commissioner’s

ruling- I mean nothing.” Ms. Hernandez did not put on any witness testimony or

present any evidence.

Mr. Garcia’s counsel argued to the district court that the Commissioner’s

ruling was completely contrary to the Post Separation Family Violence Relief Act

because it failed to consider that the child’s last interaction with Ms. Hernandez was

two and a half years ago, the need for therapy and a transitional visitation schedule,

or that the Act prohibits an abusive parent from being granted sole or joint custody

of a child. Mr. Garcia’s counsel further argued that the hearing should be de novo,

and that the burden of proof remained on Ms. Hernandez, stating “Your Honor, we

do not have the burden in this case, it is a [trial] de novo,” to which the district court

judge responded, “I understand. I understand that.” Nevertheless, it is clear from the

record that the burden of proof was shifted to Mr. Garcia to show why Ms.

Hernandez’s motion to modify a considered custody decree should not be granted.

21-CA-338 4

After the hearing, the district court upheld the domestic commissioner’s

interim judgment modifying custody on the basis that Mr. Garcia did not show

“sufficient evidence to support the objection and prove why the domestic

commissioner’s judgment of February 1, 2021, should be overruled.” This appeal

followed.

LAW and ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. Garcia asserts the district court erred in: (1) failing to conduct

a de novo review of the case, and improperly shifting the burden of proof from Ms.

Hernandez, the party seeking to modify custody, to the objecting party, Mr. Garcia;

(2) maintaining the domestic commissioner’s judgment when Mr. Garcia was not

given adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to participate in the custody

modification hearing before the domestic commissioner; and (3) failing to properly

apply the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act when considering Ms.

Hernandez’s motion to modify custody.

Insufficient Notice and Service for Domestic Commissioner Hearing

In assignment of error number two, Mr. Garcia asserts the domestic

commissioner committed reversible error in conducting the hearing when he was not

given adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to prepare and participate in the

hearing. We agree.

The law provides that the failure to provide adequate notice implicates a

procedural due process concern. Clofer v. August, 14-74 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14),

139 So.3d 1245, 1248; Flemming v. Flemming, 13-22, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/5/13),

114 So.3d 1285, 1290, writ denied, 13-1624 (La. 11/15/13), 125 So.3d 1108. Due

process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place

and circumstances.” Fairbanks v. Beninate, 20-206 p. 23 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20),

308 So.3d 1222, 1232. Persons whose rights may be affected by state action are

entitled to be heard, and, in order that they may enjoy that right, they must first be

21-CA-338 5

notified. Equally fundamental to the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard

is that notice must be provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. In

re. A.J.F., 00-948 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47, 55; In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556

So.2d 545, 549 (La. 1990).

La. C.C.P. art. 1571 A(1), provides in pertinent part that district courts shall

prescribe the procedure for assigning cases for trial by rules which shall require

adequate notice of trial to all parties. Under the Louisiana District Court Rules,

“delays for filing of pleadings, briefs or memoranda and response thereto prior to

hearing shall, except where specifically addressed in these rules, conform to the

Uniform District Court Rules 9.8, 9.9, 9.10.” La. Dist. Ct. R. 24.0, App. 24th JDC C.

Although La. Dist. Ct. Rule 9.9(b) provides that all parties must be served with

notice of a hearing at least fifteen days in advance in civil cases, La. Dist. Ct. Rule

9.9(a) specifies that this rule does not apply in family law proceedings due to their

expedited nature, and that delays in these proceedings shall be at the discretion of

the court. Specific to family law proceedings, the Uniform District Court Rules

require that parties exchange their completed Family Law Affidavits and Hearing

Officer Packets with one another at least five business days before a scheduled

hearing officer conference. La. Dist. Ct. Rule 24.0 D(2).

A biological parent’s due process right to “the companionship, care, custody,

and management” of a child is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 15-1812 (La. 3/15/16), 188 So.3d

231, 242. The United States Supreme Court has declared it “plain beyond the need

for multiple citation” that a biological parent’s right to “the companionship, care,

custody, and management” of his children is a liberty interest far more important

than any property right. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388,

1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

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Taking into consideration the safety concerns of the child, the paramount

interest at stake here, as well as the above rules, we find that the notice given to Mr.

Garcia for the domestic commissioner hearing was clearly inadequate. To expect a

parent to arrange to attend a hearing, obtain counsel, and prepare for a motion to

modify custody hearing over a weekend is patently unfair. Mr. Garcia did not have

a reasonable opportunity to arrange for time off from work to attend the hearing, to

seek counsel, or to prepare for the hearing because there were no business days

between the service and the hearing. Consequently, it was clearly erroneous for the

domestic commissioner to proceed with the hearing when Mr. Garcia did not receive

meaningful notice.

During the hearing, the domestic commissioner questioned the validity of

service, commenting, “I’ve reviewed the record and I see that there’s no service on

the defendant.” (Tr. p. 5, lines 2-4). The commissioner further expressed his opinion

that service on “his girlfriend” was not sufficient. (Tr. p. 5, lines 16-17). There was

no evidence or testimony to the contrary which would support a conclusion that the

person who allegedly accepted service was a domiciliary of the residence, as

required by La. C.C.P. art. 1234.

Moreover, service was made by a private process server appointed pursuant

to La. C.C.P. art. 1293. Among other provisions, La. C.C.P. art. 1293 A requires that

“Service of process made in this manner shall be proved like any other fact in the

case.” [Emphasis added.] Both the transcript and the minute entry of the domestic

commissioner’s January 25, 2021 hearing indicate that no evidence was admitted

therein to prove the fact of service on Mr. Garcia. Unlike service by the sheriff under

La. C.C.P. art. 1292 A, a return of service by a private person filed into the record is

not considered “prima facie correct.” In the absence of any evidence formally

admitted to prove, as fact, service by a private person as required by La. C.C.P. art.

1293 A, the commissioner’s interim judgment is a nullity. See Jefferson Community

21-CA-338 7

Health Care Center, Inc. v. Roby, 15-198 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/19/15) 180 So.3d 585,

587; GR Constr. & Renovation, LLC v. White, 14-62 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/21/14),

142 So.3d 207, 209; Merial Limited v. Albert G. LaGraize, Individually and d/b/a

Airways Animal Hospital, 07-182 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/07) 971 So.2d 403, 406;

Barnett Marine, Inc. v. Van Den Adel, 96-1029 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/9/97), 694 So.2d

453, 456-457, writ denied, 97-1236 (La. 9/26/97), 701 So.2d 983.

For the reasons above, we vacate the domestic commissioner’s interim

judgment dated February 1, 2021, finding it to be a nullity and of no effect. We

therefore further conclude that evidence admitted during the domestic

commissioner’s hearing and the resulting interim judgment should not have been

subsequently considered by the district court, unless it had been formally admitted

into evidence in the district court hearing.

The Right to a De Novo Hearing and Burden of Proof

In assignment of error number one, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court

erred in not conducting a de novo hearing and in shifting the burden of proof from

Ms. Hernandez, the party seeking to modify custody, to Mr. Garcia, the objecting

party. This assignment of error has merit.

La. R.S. 13:717 created three offices of commissioner for the Twenty-Fourth

Judicial District with each to have jurisdiction over either criminal, civil or domestic

matters. The commissioners shall have all of the powers of a judge of a district

court. La. R.S. 13:717 D. La. R.S. 717 F enumerates and limits the powers and

responsibilities of the domestic commissioner, which includes the power to

implement interim child support and custody orders. Litigants may object to the

commissioner’s order pursuant to the procedure set forth in La. R.S. 13:717 F(4),

which provides in pertinent part as follows:

(b) Any party who disagrees with a judgment or ruling of a
commissioner may file a written objection thereto. The objection shall
be filed within three days of the judgment or ruling being received by

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the party either from the commissioner or by service through the clerk
of court and shall be filed in accordance with the rules of the Twenty-
Fourth Judicial District Court. The objection shall be heard by the
judge of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court to whom the matter
was originally allotted.

(c) The judge may decide the objection based on the record of the
proceedings before the commissioner or may receive further evidence
and rule based on that evidence, together with the prior evidence, or
may recommit the matter to the commissioner with instructions.

La. Dist. Ct. Rule 35.5 provides that an objection to the written recommendation of

a hearing officer or interim judgment of the domestic commissioner shall be filed

with the clerk of court within five (5) days, exclusive of legal holidays, from the

issuance of the recommendation.

La. R.S. 13:717 F(4) provides that a commissioner’s orders shall be interim:

F. The powers of the commissioners hearing domestic matters shall
include but not be limited to the power to:
⁎ ⁎ ⁎
(4) Implement interim child support and custody orders
[Emphasis added.]

It is clear that if either party files an objection, the “interim orders” of the domestic

commissioners remain interim until the district court renders its judgment.

Considering that a domestic commissioner’s interim order to which a timely

objection has been filed remains interim and is not a judgment of the court, and that

the admission of new evidence during the district court hearing is contemplated by

law, the hearing in the district court on the domestic commissioner’s interim order

of custody and visitation should be de novo, as is the district court’s consideration

of the interim orders of domestic hearing officers.

In Dugue v. Dugue, 17-525 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/18), 250 So.3d 1174, 1177-

78, this Court held that because the appellant had objected timely to the hearing

officer’s recommendations, the recommendations did not become a final judgment

and that appellant was clearly entitled to a de novo review of the hearing officer’s

findings by the district court. We recently reiterated this holding in Fairbanks v.

21-CA-338 9

Beninate, 20-206 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20), 308 So.3d 1222, 1236, writ denied, 21-

250 (La. 3/23/21), 313 So.3d 272. In addition, in Ariatti v. Plaisance, 18-84 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 9/13/18), 255 So.3d 1239, 1249, we recognized a litigant’s right to a

district court’s de novo consideration of a domestic commissioner’s interim judgment.

La. R.S. 13:717 F (4)(c) gives the district court the authority to consider an

objection to the domestic commissioner’s interim judgment based on the record of

the proceedings before the commissioner, or based on additional evidence, together

with the prior evidence, or to recommit the matter to the commissioner with

instructions. Given these specific options, it would be illogical to admit new

evidence in the district court, but not mandate a de novo hearing so that new evidence

and evidence previously admitted in the domestic commissioner’s hearing may be

considered and weighed together as a whole. In addition, a de novo hearing in the

district court on the domestic commissioner’s interim judgment is consistent with the

requirement of the district court’s consideration of a hearing officer’s interim order.

The necessity of a de novo hearing was especially critical in this case.

Because Mr. Garcia was not properly served and did not appear for the domestic

commissioner’s hearing, evidence and argument by Ms. Hernandez which should

not have been considered by the commissioner was admitted in Mr. Garcia’s

absence. It is apparent from the transcript of the district court hearing that the court

also considered evidence presented to the commissioner and the commissioner’s

resulting conclusions, and that the court gave considerable weight to them. We

conclude that evidence improperly admitted during the domestic commissioner’s

hearing and the commissioner’s consequential conclusions were improperly

considered by the district court, and should have been excluded in de novo

consideration of Ms. Hernandez’s rule to modify custody and visitation.

The record also shows that the incorrect standard was applied in considering

the motion to modify. It is well-settled that the paramount consideration in any

21-CA-338 10

determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. E.R. v. T.S., 18-286

(La. App. 5 Cir. 10/11/18), 256 So.3d 551, 557. This applies not only in actions

setting custody, but also in actions to change custody. Id. When a party seeks to

change custody rendered in a considered decree, the proponent of change not only

must show that a change of circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the

child has occurred since the prior order respecting custody, but he or she also “bears

the heavy burden of proving that the continuation of the present custody is so

deleterious to the child as to justify a modification of the custody decree, or of

proving by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a

change of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child.”

Gray v. Gray, 11-548 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1247, 1258-59; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-

0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 738; Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193, 1200

(La. 1986).

In this case, the domestic commissioner’s February 1, 2021 interim judgment,

and the district court’s March 11, 2021 judgment granted a modification of judgment

in favor of Ms. Hernandez, ordering joint custody of the child with immediate

unsupervised custodial periods for Ms. Hernandez. This was a significant modification

of the November 8, 2018 custody judgment (a considered decree under Bergeron),

which had granted sole custody to Mr. Garcia and had conditionally granted only

supervised visitation to Ms. Hernandez, if she met the conditions. The November 8,

2018 judgment did not contemplate the possibility of joint custody and unsupervised

visitations even if she met its conditions, and was significantly and materially

modified by the March 11, 2021 judgment. Nevertheless, the domestic

commissioner and the district court granted the modification without finding that

Ms. Hernandez had met her “heavy burden” of showing that the present custody

ordered by the judgment of November 8, 2018 was so deleterious to the child as to

justify a modification of the considered decree of custody and visitation, or by

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proving by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a

change of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child, as

required by Bergeron. Id.

Based on Bergeron and subsequent jurisprudence, we find the district court

erred in requiring Mr. Garcia to bear the burden of establishing that the domestic

commissioner’s interim order should be overruled. Because Ms. Hernandez sought

modification of the November 8, 2018 judgment to her benefit far beyond the

supervised visits conditionally permitted in that judgment, the “heavy burden” of

proof required by Bergeron for the modification of that considered decree was upon

Ms. Hernandez. Establishing the Bergeron standard of proof remains the burden of

the party seeking to modify a considered decree in the district court hearing, just as

it was that party’s burden during the domestic commissioner’s hearing. A de novo

hearing requires that the same party seeking to modify a considered decree proceed

first and establish the initial showing required by Bergeron, even when the moving

party prevailed before the commissioner. Here, allowing a hearing which was not

de novo effectively allowed a shifting of the heavy burden of the Bergeron standard

to the non-moving party.

The record indicates that Mr. Garcia filed a timely objection to the domestic

commissioner’s February 1, 2021 interim judgment, and that the district court had

not rendered judgment in this matter. Thus, we find that Mr. Garcia was entitled to

a de novo hearing before the district court as to the domestic commissioner’s

February 1, 2021 modified custody and visitation interim order. Because the burden

of proof was shifted to Mr. Garcia, the non-moving party, and because he was

entitled to a de novo hearing, we find the March 11, 2021 judgment was in error.

The Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act

In assignment of error number three, Mr. Garcia argues that the Post-

Separation Family Violence Relief Act applies in this case and that the district court

21-CA-338 12

erred in failing to apply this Act when considering Ms. Hernandez’s motion to

modify the initial custody order. This assignment also has merit.

La. R.S. 9:364 provides as follows:

A. There is created a presumption that no parent who has a history of
perpetrating family violence, as defined in R.S. 9:362, or domestic
abuse, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, or has subjected any of his or her
children, stepchildren, or any household member, as defined in R.S.
46:2132, to sexual abuse, as defined in R.S. 14:403, or has willingly
permitted another to abuse any of his children or stepchildren,
despite having the ability to prevent the abuse, shall be awarded sole
or joint custody of children. The court may find a history of
perpetrating family violence if the court finds that one incident of
family violence has resulted in serious bodily injury or the court finds
more than one incident of family violence.
B. The presumption shall be overcome only if the court finds all of the
following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) The perpetrating parent has successfully completed a court-
monitored domestic abuse intervention program as defined in R.S.
9:362, or a treatment program designed for sexual abusers, after the
last instance of abuse.
(2) The perpetrating parent is not abusing alcohol or using illegal
substances scheduled in R.S. 40:964.
(3) The best interest of the child or children, considering the factors
listed in Civil Code Article 134, requires the perpetrating parent's
participation as a custodial parent because of the other parent's
absence, mental illness, substance abuse, or other circumstance
negatively affecting the child or children.

The provisions of the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act become

operative if the court finds that there has been family violence and that there is a

history of family violence. Nguyen v. Le, 07-81 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/07), 960 So.2d

261, 263. In the November 8, 2018 judgment, the domestic commissioner found

that “a history of family violence exist between Irrael Farcia [sic] and Jaidy

Hernandez since there exist more than one incident of family violence perpetuated

by Jaidy Hernandez on Irrael Garcia.” As a result of this finding, the provisions of

the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act became operative in this case. The

record indicates that the district court did not fully consider the provisions of this

Act in modifying custody. Although the record contains a certificate indicating Ms.

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Hernandez completed the domestic abuse intervention program, satisfying the first

requirement of La. R.S. 9:362 B, there is nothing to reflect whether Ms. Hernandez

satisfied the second or third requirements of La. R.S. 9:362 B(2) and (3).

We further find that because the district court did not fully consider whether

Ms. Hernandez satisfied the La. R.S. 9:362 requirements, the judgment modifying

custody was in error.

DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the domestic commissioner’s

February 1, 2021 interim judgment and the district court’s March 11, 2021 judgment,

and we reinstate the domestic commissioner’s November 8, 2018 judgment. We

remand this case to the district court to reset Ms. Hernandez’s motion to modify

custody before the domestic commissioner.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
APRIL 11, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

21-CA-338
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
M. MOLLY MACKENZIE (APPELLANT) EUGENE P. REDMANN (APPELLEE)

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