State of Louisiana in the Interest of M.N. & B.N.

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST NO. 21-CA-634
OF M.N. & B.N.
FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON PARISH JUVENILE COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20-CC-72, DIVISION "A"
HONORABLE ANN MURRY KELLER, JUDGE PRESIDING

January 07, 2022

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

REVERSED AND REMANDED
FOR NEW ADJUDICATION HEARING
SMC
FHW
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF M.N. AND B.N., JR.
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
Elizabeth B. Curren
Douglas E. Rushton

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE-2ND APPELLANT,
M.N. AND B.N., JR.
Fatmeh T. Ali

COUNSEL FOR PARENT/APPELLEE,
B.N., FATHER
Douglas L. Harville
Jennifer G. Womble

CHEHARDY, C.J.

In this Child in Need of Care (“CINC”) action, the juvenile court granted the

father’s motion for directed verdict immediately after the State rested its case, but

before the children were permitted to offer evidence. Finding error in the juvenile

court’s ruling, we reverse the judgment and remand for retrial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The minor children, M.N. and B.N.,1 are the subject of these juvenile court

proceedings that the State instigated in response to allegations that the children’s

father and his wife, the children’s stepmother, physically and emotionally abused

them, with additional allegations that the mother’s boyfriend, “Jordan,” was

sexually molesting M.N.2 The State’s petition alleged that M.N. and B.N. were

children in need of care pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 606 (A)(1) and (2).3 The

petition alleged charges against both parents as follows:

The agency is now concerned that both the mother and
father are separately coaching the child to lie out of
revenge against their former spouse or to gain ground in
domestic proceedings.

[M.N.] admitted to DCFS that her father and stepmother
forced her to say that her mother’s friend “Jordan” had put
his finger in her vagina. The child now claims the mother
does not even have a boyfriend. [M.N.] also said she was
being physically abused by [father and stepmother].
[M.N.] said that the father hit her with a wooden back

1
To protect the identity of the minor children involved, they will be referred to using initials.
U.R.C.A. 5-1, 5-2; L.R.F. v. A.A., 13-797 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/14), 133 So.3d 716, 717 n.2, writ
denied, 14-655 (La. 4/17/14), 138 So.3d 633, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 871, 135 S.Ct. 224, 190
L.Ed.2d 134 (2014). The parents will be referred to as father, mother, and stepmother.
2
Father and mother also are engaged in separate divorce proceedings in the district court,
including a battle over custody and child support. According to the record in the present case,
both the father and the mother had filed various protective orders in the district court
proceedings, which have remained contentious.
3
The relevant provisions of La. Ch. C. art. 606 provide:
A. Allegations that a child is in need of care shall assert one or more of the following
grounds:
1. The child is the victim of abuse perpetrated, aided, or tolerated by the parent or
caretaker, by a person who maintains an interpersonal dating or engagement
relationship with the parent or caretaker, or by a person living in the same
residence with the parent or caretaker as a spouse whether married or not, and his
welfare is seriously endangered if he is left within the custody or control of that
parent or caretaker.
2. The child is a victim of neglect.

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scratcher and her stepmother held her head under water in
the swimming pool several times. … Police now suspect
the mother is coaching the child to lie about the physical
abuse in retaliation for the sexual molestation claim.

Coaching a child to lie about physical and sexual abuse—
especially against a parent—has been shown to cause
extreme emotional damage to a child. Hence, the agency
immediately tried to institute a safety plan but both parents
refused. Child protection workers were also concerned
that the four-year-old son [B.N.] was being emotionally
harmed by the parents’ conduct.

The children were placed in the care of DCFS. The juvenile court

subsequently granted the State’s motion to dismiss the allegations against the

mother after determining that she was not a safety risk to her children. Custody of

the children was revoked from DCFS and returned to the mother. The State’s

allegations involving the father remained.

At a pre-adjudication hearing in January 2021, the children, through their

appointed counsel, requested a closed-court hearing, which the juvenile court

granted, stating that it would allow the attorneys to question the minors during the

adjudication in accordance with La. Ch. C. art. 661 B and that the father would not

be allowed to be present during the children’s testimony. At the same pre-

adjudication hearing, the juvenile court refused to permit the State to introduce the

forensic interview tapes of M.N. as evidence at the adjudication. The State sought

supervisory review from this Court, which granted the State’s writ application,

reversed the juvenile court’s ruling, and remanded for further proceedings. State of

La. in the interest of B.N. and M.N., 21-C-27 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/9/21) (unpub.).4

4
This Court’s ruling noted that the juvenile court “apparently relied on allegations made by
counsel for the father, which were factually disputed by the State, without taking testimony or
other evidence. Regardless, this sanction was ordered without reasonable notice and a
contradictory hearing to determine whether the State committed a sanctionable discovery
violation, and whether the exclusion of the forensic interview tape is an appropriate sanction in
this CINC proceeding, if any violation has in fact occurred.” 21-C-27, p. 2.

21-CA-634 2

Adjudication Hearing

The adjudication hearing commenced on June 17, 2020 but the juvenile

court continued the hearing to July 16, 2020. At the outset of the hearing, the

juvenile court granted the father’s request to sequester all witnesses and denied the

State’s request to exempt Dr. Ann Troy from the sequestration order. The State

then presented testimony from the mother and from a number of parties familiar

with the investigation of the abuse allegations.

The mother testified that the divorce proceedings with the father had become

contentious, and that protective orders had been filed with regard to the mother’s

child support claims. Counsel for the father objected, and the juvenile court

sustained the objection that the evidence related to child support and protective

orders was “irrelevant,” although the court indicated it would allow the State to

proffer the evidence. When the State attempted to proffer additional testimony on

this issue, counsel for the father again objected and the court sustained the

objection.

The mother further testified that M.N. told her she “had been hit” multiple

times and was “called names” while at her father’s house. The mother stated that

M.N. told her the stepmother had “plucked her vagina,” to which counsel for the

father objected on the basis that this allegation was not in the petition. The juvenile

court sustained the objection and directed the State to examine the witness as to the

physical abuse.5

5
The mother also testified that she and her ex-husband did not agree about the medical attention
M.N. should receive for her physical and emotional health in response to their divorce,
explaining that the father had cancelled a doctor’s appointment scheduled for M.N., which
required the mother to take M.N. to the emergency room to be seen for a “backed-up colon.” The
mother also learned for the first time in May 2020 that M.N. had been seeing a counselor for
more than a year. The mother indicated that M.N. and B.N. were with their father and step-
mother in March 2020 through August 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic and as a result of the
abuse allegations.

21-CA-634 3

The mother stated that she learned in May 2020 that the Department of

Children and Family Services (DCFS) had opened an investigation after M.N. told

therapists that she (M.N.) had been molested by “Jordan” while in her mother’s

care, and that her mother had abused her. The mother testified that she had been

living with her parents since the divorce and denied having a boyfriend or dating

anyone after the divorce.

The mother further testified that she was concerned for M.N.’s safety in the

father’s presence, that M.N. was afraid her father would “take” her, and that the

father does not care for M.N. properly and has physically abused her. The mother

claimed that she has to constantly reassure M.N. that her father is not going to take

her. According to the mother, M.N. said that her father made her lie, that she is

afraid he will whip her, and that she does not want to be alone with him. M.N. has

also told her mother than she has trouble sleeping because her father is “in my

head” and “in my mind.” On cross-examination, the mother testified that she did

not believe that the father should be involved with his children without

supervision. She indicated that the children do not ask to see their father and do not

say anything positive about him.

The State next questioned Ms. Quintella Carter, an investigator with DCFS,

who testified that DCFS received a report in September 2020 that the mother’s

boyfriend had been sexually abusing the six-year-old girl with his fingers.6 Ms.

Carter testified that she also was concerned about allegations of physical abuse

from the father and step-mother. Because there were allegations of abuse against

both parents, the State obtained custody of the children and placed them in foster

care until the charges against the mother were dropped and custody was returned to

her. Ms. Carter testified that she was concerned about the father coaching his

6
The agency had received a report with the same allegations in May 2020, but the agency closed
the investigation as inconclusive.

21-CA-634 4

children to make false allegations against the mother so that he could obtain full

custody, because M.N. told Ms. Carter that “her dad was trying to take her away

from her mom.” Ms. Carter testified that M.N. told her that the stepmother held her

head under water and that the father would withhold food if M.N. did not say what

she was told to say. On cross-examination, Ms. Carter testified that the police also

suspected that the mother was coaching the children to lie about the physical abuse

of their father in retaliation for the sexual molestation claims. Ms. Carter explained

that DCFS validated the case for “dependency,” based on the children being placed

in custody; the agency did not validate the allegations of emotional or physical

abuse, emotional maltreatment, or medical neglect.

Ms. Tiffany Nelson testified that she is a child welfare supervisor at DCFS,

which requires her to supervise family visits, observe parent-child interaction and

engagement, and make recorded notes of her observations. Ms. Nelson testified

that Ms. Dalton, who observed certain family visits between the father and

children, expressed to Ms. Nelson a concern that the father was whispering in the

child’s ear about the mother, and what to say.

Dr. Ann Troy, a professor of forensic nursing and a nurse practitioner at the

Audrey Hepburn Care Center who has seen M.N. previously, stated that the first

few visits to the Care Center were the result of allegations of emotional and

physical abuse at the father’s house, specifically that another member of the

father’s household had hit, pushed, and called M.N. names.7

7
On a subsequent visit to the Care Center, M.N. gave Dr. Troy detailed allegations of sexual
abuse by the mother’s boyfriend, Jordan. Dr. Troy indicated that M.N.’s body language “was an
outlier” and that Dr. Troy had never seen a child “so forthcoming and so detailed without more
prompting being required.” Dr. Troy explained that when interviewing other children who
described sexual abuse, she had not seen the body language that M.N. exhibited – talking about
sexual abuse and looking at her fingernails and very quickly giving details of the abuse. Dr. Troy
explained: “you don’t anticipate a six-year-old telling you the eye color of the person who’s put
their finger in their vagina.” Dr. Troy indicated that she did not include in her notes her opinion
that M.N. was possibly coached, and she does not include such allegations in other cases because
she does not want to influence any additional investigation of the matter.

21-CA-634 5

Sergeant Joshua Bermudez with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s office testified

that on May 20, 2020, he received from DCFS a disclosure of M.N.’s allegations

of sexual abuse. He made an appointment for M.N. at the Care Center and

observed M.N.’s interview, indicating that she had been touched on her vagina by

“Jordan.” After searching several police databases, Sgt. Bermudez could find no

proof that Jordan existed and found no other men related to the mother. He also

learned that at the time of the report of abuse, the children were living with their

father.

Detective Phillip Hedrick with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office testified

that on September 14, 2020, he received a complaint of sexual abuse of M.N.

perpetuated by her mother’s boyfriend. Over the course of his investigation, he

learned that there have been multiple reports made by the parents since 2018.

Ultimately he arrested the father and stepmother for two counts of false swearing

in violation of R.S. 14:126.1, but he made no arrests in connection with the sexual

abuse allegations. He was present when M.N. was interviewed [for the second

time] as to the sexual abuse allegations at the Children’s Advocacy Center on

October 1, 2020, and he observed M.N. “completely deny” everything that she had

said in her prior interview.

At the conclusion of Detective Hedrick’s testimony, the State rested and

counsel for the father moved for a directed verdict on the basis that the State had

failed to prove its case. The Court indicated that the evidence presented by the

State “does not warrant an adjudication of child in need of care or family in need

of services” and dismissed the petition. The juvenile court stated: “There’s no

question in my mind that this court doesn’t belong in this case. It needs to stay in

the 24th [JDC],” and further stated: “the Court does not find that the State proved

anywhere close to a preponderance of the evidence that this gentleman is guilty of

anything.… Or, well, not guilt. That there would be any risk of the child - - to the

21-CA-634 6

child to return the whole case to the 24th J.D.C., which is where it should have been

and where it should have stayed, in this Court’s humble opinion.” In written

Reasons for Judgment, the juvenile court stated:

[T]he State did not meet its burden of proving, even by
the comparatively low burden of a mere preponderance of
the evidence, that the children B.N., Jr. and M.N. are in
need of care as to their father. … There was no evidence
presented that the children had been harmed by their father
or that there was a risk of harm to the children from their
father. … The State did not prove its allegation that the
father had coached the children; on the contrary, this Court
found the testimony of the child [in the second forensic
interview] when she stated that her father had instructed
her to lie to be less sincere, and more rehearsed, than her
testimony in her previous [forensic] interview. The only
evidence the State presented against the father was
testimony by the mother, who had much to gain from
doing so.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The State assigns three errors on appeal. First, the State argues that the

juvenile court erred in granting the father’s motion for a directed verdict and

dismissing the State’s petition when there was sufficient evidence that the father

coached M.N. to fabricate a sexual molestation claim, withheld food, and whipped

the children to force them to lie. Second, The State argues that the juvenile court

erred in (i) preventing the State from proffering evidence of the underlying legal

dispute between the father and mother, and (ii) invoking the “four corners rule” to

exclude testimony of medical neglect and of the father’s coaching on the basis that

those allegations were not included in the State’s petition. Third, the State argues

that the court erred in sequestering the State’s forensic child abuse expert, Dr. Ann

Troy, because the Code of Evidence exempts experts from sequestration.

The minor children, M.N. and B.N., also appealed, arguing that the juvenile

court applied the wrong standard on directed verdict, and the court erred in

preventing them from introducing evidence at the adjudication hearing, including

the children’s own testimony through a Watermeier hearing. Pursuant to La. Ch. C.

21-CA-634 7

art. 662, a child in a CINC proceeding may introduce evidence, call and cross-

examine witnesses, and be heard on his or her own behalf. Counsel for the children

indeed participated in the examination of witnesses who were called in the State’s

case. The children argue that the juvenile court’s consideration of their plight

should be foremost in a CINC hearing, but the court did not have all the evidence

before it when it granted the father’s motion for a directed verdict. The children

argue that at the very least, M.N. was being emotionally abused by being forced to

lie about being molested. Additionally, the children argue that the evidence offered

at trial shows that the father emotionally and physically abused the children.

The father, as appellee, argues in response to the appellants’ arguments that

the conclusory findings of DCFS – that the “only valid” finding against the father

was for dependency – obviate the need for the juvenile court to admit any

additional evidence. According to the father, the juvenile court correctly

determined that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that M.N. and B.N.

are children in need of care. The father contends that “it was reasonable” for the

juvenile court to grant a directed verdict/involuntary dismissal and dismiss the

State’s CINC petition.8 Finally, the father contends that the children waived their

right to present evidence at the adjudication hearing because their attorney did not

object when the court granted the father’s motion for a directed verdict.

Child in Need of Care (CINC) Proceedings

Child in Need of Care proceedings are governed by La. Ch. C. arts. 601 et

seq. and commenced by the State to “protect children whose physical or mental

health and welfare is substantially at risk of harm by physical abuse, neglect, or

exploitation and who may be further threatened by the conduct of others, by

providing for the reporting of suspected cases of abuse, exploitation, or neglect of

8
The father also makes a number of additional allegations that are not supported by the evidence
in the record before this Court.

21-CA-634 8

children; by providing for the investigation of such complaints; and by providing,

if necessary, for the resolution of the child in need of care proceedings in the

courts.” La. Ch. C. art. 601; State in Interest of C.C., 20-307 (La. App. 5 Cir.

3/17/21), 316 So.3d 154, 168-69. The health, safety, and best interest of the child

are the paramount concern. State ex rel. D.A., 10-1040 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/14/11),

70 So.3d 960, 963.

La. Ch. C. art. 662, entitled “Right to present evidence and examine

witnesses,” states: “The child and his parents may introduce evidence, call

witnesses, be heard on their own behalf, and cross-examine witnesses called by the

state.” Pursuant to the relevant provisions of La. Ch. C. art. 661 B, a child may

choose to testify as to his wishes, and the court shall consider his testimony in the

matter:

… A child below the age of twelve years shall be present
in court upon the request of counsel for the child or the
court. If the child is present in court, he may choose to
testify as to his wishes, and the court shall consider his
testimony in the matter. Any testimony given by a child
may be taken by a videotaped interview or by close-circuit
television, as authorized by Chapter 8 of Title III of this
Code, or by an in-chambers conference attended only by
the judge and court reporter and by counsel for the child,
for the petitioner, and for the parents.

(Emphasis added).

Directed Verdict/Involuntary Dismissal

At the close of the State’s case, counsel for the father moved for a directed

verdict. We treat the father’s motion for a directed verdict as a request for

involuntary dismissal, which applies to a bench trial, rather than a directed verdict,

which applies when trial is conducted before a jury. See State in the Interest of

J.A., 99-2905 (La. 1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806, 809 n.5 (“Although counsel for L.A.

termed the oral motion as a directed verdict, being a bench trial, the trial court

properly treated the motion as an involuntary dismissal.”); Wise v. J.E. Merit

21-CA-634 9

Constructors, Inc., 97-0684 (La. 1/21/98), 707 So.2d 1214, 1217 n.2 (“Defense

counsel actually moved for a directed verdict. However, since this was a non-jury

trial, it is clear that counsel’s procedural intent was to move for an involuntary

dismissal under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1672 B.”).

The appropriate standard in determining whether an involuntary dismissal

should be granted is whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence in his

case-in-chief to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Machado

v. Baker Concrete Constr., 13-273 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128 So.3d 477, 481.

An appellate court may not reverse a ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal

unless it is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Id. A legal error occurs when a

trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Evans

v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735.

The record in this case reveals that the children, as intervenors, contemplated

offering the testimony of M.N. at the adjudication—in addition to the video

forensic interview evidence of M.N. presented by the State—when the juvenile

court granted the children’s motion for a Watermeier hearing filed on December

17, 2020.9 On January 14, 2021, the juvenile court granted the children’s motion,

stating: “Court does not have a problem with the attorneys questioning the minor in

a closed hearing in accordance with Ch. C. art. 661B, but will not allow the father

to be present during the child’s testimony.” In addition, counsel for the children

explained at the outset of the July 2020 adjudication that the children were “present

today in court, but are in the D.A.’s office in the playroom.” Immediately after the

juvenile court granted the father’s motion for a “directed verdict,” the State asked

the court for written reasons; the court “note[d] the State’s objection”; and counsel

9
See Watermeier v. Watermeier, 464 So.2d 301 (La. 1985). In their motion the children claimed
that they “will not be able to speak freely within a contentious courtroom atmosphere where they
may be required to speak negatively of their father within his presence.” The motion also stated
that the mother “does not want her children to speak in court in front of her or the children’s
father,” and that the children would be comfortable speaking outside of their presence.

21-CA-634 10

for the children indicated that the children were “very adamant about their fear of

returning to the father.”

Based on the record before us, we find the juvenile court clearly erred in

granting a “directed verdict” and dismissing the State’s petition before hearing

from counsel for the children. These adjudication proceedings were not about

exonerating the father of any alleged guilt but instead about determining whether

the children’s health, safety, or welfare are at risk of substantial harm. La. Ch. C.

art. 601. While our ruling does not foreclose the possibility of granting a motion

for involuntary dismissal in CINC proceedings in the future, and although we

recognize that the State retains the burden of proving a child’s CINC status

pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 665, in this instance we find the juvenile court erred

when dismissing the State’s petition without giving the children, as intervenors, an

opportunity to offer additional evidence – an opportunity that the juvenile court

had previously recognized when granting the children’s motion for a Watermeier

hearing in January 2021.

The children’s right to be heard at the adjudication is legislatively protected

through La. Ch. C. arts. 661 B and 662. Counsel for the children noted on the

record at the beginning of the adjudication that the children were present in court,

but at the close of the State’s case, the juvenile court immediately dismissed the

proceedings before the children had an opportunity to offer any additional

evidence, including the testimony of M.N. in a closed-court setting. Under La. Ch.

C. art. 662, if the child is present in court, “he may choose to testify as to his

wishes, and the court shall consider his testimony in the matter.” (Emphasis

added). This statutory directive could not be more clear.

Again, the primary purpose of CINC proceedings is to determine whether a

child’s welfare is seriously endangered if left in the custody of the parent against

whom allegations have been brought (regardless of parallel custody proceedings in

21-CA-634 11

the district court). Furthermore, this Court cannot properly review the juvenile

court’s adjudication without an adequate record on appeal. Given that the parties’

apparent expectations of producing additional evidence were thwarted when the

juvenile court immediately dismissed the State’s petition on the father’s motion for

directed verdict, we reverse the juvenile court’s ruling and remand for a new

adjudication.10

Proffering inadmissible evidence

The State’s second assignment of error argues that the juvenile court abused

its discretion in preventing the State from proffering evidence related to the

father’s possible motivation for allegedly coaching his daughter to lie about sexual

abuse, and in limiting the State’s discussion of the evidence to issues addressed in

its petition. We agree.

Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1636 A, “[w]hen the court rules against the

admissibility of any evidence, it shall either permit the party offering such

evidence to make a complete record thereof, or permit the party to make a

statement setting forth the nature of the evidence.” The foremost goal in CINC

proceedings, protection of a child from abuse or neglect, requires that any evidence

adjudged inadmissible be proffered for review. Although the hearing transcript

reflects that the juvenile court initially indicated it would permit the State to proffer

evidence related to the father’s alleged motive—namely, the child support and

custody dispute—the court thereafter sustained the father’s objection as the State

attempted to elicit this additional evidence, in violation of Article 1636’s mandate.

10
To the extent appellee’s brief to this Court and/or the juvenile court’s Reasons for Judgment
include facts that were not made part of the record in this case, we note that such facts are not
reviewable unless admitted into evidence or proffered. When a bench trial is conducted, as here,
there is scant reason to prohibit the introduction of evidence into the record unless that evidence
is completely unrelated to the proceedings before the court. See La. Ch. C. art. 663; La. C.E. art.
402.

21-CA-634 12

The juvenile court further abused its discretion when it ruled that the State’s

questioning was limited to the specific allegations listed in the petition. No such

limitation is imposed by the Children’s Code or CINC jurisprudence. A CINC

petition must allege only “facts demonstrating grounds for adjudicating the child in

need of care.” State in the Interest of H.C., 12-1119 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/16/13), 106

So.3d 769, 772, writ denied, 13-0394 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 388. The petition

here alleges such facts. Nothing prohibits the parties from offering additional

evidence relevant to the CINC adjudication and the children’s safety. The State’s

second assignment of error has merit.

Sequestration of expert witness

The State’s third assignment of error contends the juvenile court erred in

refusing to exempt Dr. Ann Troy from the sequestration order. The court’s

evidentiary ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Brandt v. Engle, 00-3416

(La. 6/29/01), 791 So.2d 614, 620.

La. Ch. C. art. 661 D states:

On its own motion the court may, and on the request of a
party the court shall, order that the witnesses, other than
parties, be excluded from the courtroom or from a place
where they can see or hear the proceedings, and refrain
from discussing the facts of the case with anyone other
than counsel in the case. In the interest of justice, the court
may exempt any witness from its order.

Similarly, La. C.E. art. 615 provides for witness sequestration but specifically

exempts “A person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the

presentation of his cause such as an expert.” The State argues on appeal that there

was no need for a special showing that Dr. Troy was essential to the State’s

presentation, yet the clear wording of the La. C.E. art. 615, which the State argues

is applicable here, requires such a showing. The hearing transcript reflects that the

State objected to the juvenile court’s refusal to exempt Dr. Troy from the

sequestration order but does not include a showing why Dr. Troy should not be

21-CA-634 13

sequestered. Without such a showing, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its

discretion in refusing to exempt Dr. Troy from the sequestration order.

CONCLUSION

The juvenile court’s ruling granting the father’s motion for a directed verdict

(involuntary dismissal) is reversed and the case is remanded for a new

adjudication. The parties may enter into the record all relevant evidence admissible

under the Louisiana Children’s Code and the Louisiana Code of Evidence. Should

the juvenile court determine that potential evidence is inadmissible, the court must

state the reason for its inadmissibility, and the parties must be permitted to proffer

inadmissible evidence.

REVERSED AND REMANDED
FOR NEW ADJUDICATION HEARING

21-CA-634 14

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
JANUARY 7, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

21-CA-634
E-NOTIFIED
JUVENILE COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE ANN MURRY KELLER (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ELIZABETH B. CURREN (APPELLANT) LEKITA G. ROBERTSON (APPELLANT) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLANT)
FATMEH T. ALI (APPELLANT) DOUGLAS L. HARVILLE (APPELLEE) JENNIFER G. WOMBLE (APPELLEE)
ELIZABETH G. LINCOLN (APPELLEE)

MAILED
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLANT)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
DOUGLAS E. RUSHTON (APPELLANT)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053