In Re: J. W. R., D. C. R., and D. J. R.

IN RE: J. W. R., D. C. R., AND D. J. R. NO. 21-CA-691

FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 10,24, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE CONNIE M. AUCOIN, JUDGE PRESIDING

March 03, 2022

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

AFFIRMED
JGG
SJW
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PARENT/APPELLEE,
G. R.
Martha J. Maher

COUNSEL FOR MINOR/APPELLEE,
J. W. R., D. C. R., AND D. J. R.
Lauren Davey Rogers

COUNSEL FOR PARENT/APPELLANT,
C. M. B., MOTHER
Joseph B. Rochelle

GRAVOIS, J.

C.M.B., the biological mother of the three minor children involved in this

adoption proceeding, appeals a judgment of the trial court granting a Petition for

Stepparent Adoption. Based on our review of the record and the totality of the

circumstances, we find that the trial court was not clearly wrong or manifestly

erroneous in finding that C.M.B. “has refused or failed to comply with a court

order of support, without just cause, for a period of at least six months,” per La.

Ch.C. art. 1245(C)(1), that C.M.B. “refused or failed to visit, communicate, or

attempt to communicate with the child[ren] without just cause for a period of at

least six months,” per La. Ch.C. art. 1245(C)(2), and that the proposed adoption is

in the best interest of the minor children. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

K.W.R. and C.M.B. were married on June 5, 2006. Three children were

born of the marriage: J.W.R., a son born on November 3, 2005, D.C.R., a son born

on August 1, 2007, and D.J.R., a son born on May 21, 2010.1 K.W.R. and C.M.B.

divorced on March 6, 2015. On July 6, 2017, a Consent Judgment was rendered

regarding K.W.R. and C.M.B.’s custody of their minor children. The Consent

Judgment stated that the parties were awarded joint custody of the children, with

K.W.R. being designated as domiciliary parent. C.M.B. was granted unsupervised

physical custody of the children every other weekend, with pick-up and drop-off

occurring at K.W.R.’s mother’s home. The Consent Judgment reflected that each

year both parties would have vacation options with the children and that the parties

would be entitled to visitation with the children on alternate holidays each year.

Further, the Consent Judgment stated that each parent would be entitled to

1
The initials of the children and their parents are used to protect the identity of the minor
children. Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1, 5-2.

21-CA-691 1

reasonable telephone contact with the children when they were with the other

parent and that the children could contact either parent any day at any reasonable

time. The parties agreed to follow the co-parenting guidelines as stated in the

Consent Judgment. Finally, the Consent Judgment stated that the children were

not to have any contact whatsoever with Michael Chartier.2 Additionally, the

record reflects that a child support obligation of C.M.B. in the amount of $330.00

per month payable to K.W.R. was established on September 25, 2017.

On June 29, 2019, K.W.R. married G.M.A.R. On May 15, 2020,3 K.W.R.

and G.M.A.R. filed a Petition for Stepparent Adoption, wherein G.M.A.R. sought

to adopt the minor children J.W.R., D.C.R., and D.J.R. The petition alleged that

C.M.B. had not had any contact with the children for more than two years and had

not contributed any financial support to the children. K.W.R. gave his written

consent to G.M.A.R.’s adoption of the children.4

On August 6, 2020, K.W.R. and G.M.A.R. requested that the trial court

appoint a Curator Ad Hoc to represent C.M.B. since attempts to locate her were

unsuccessful. On that same day, the trial court appointed Juanita Marino as

C.M.B.’s Curator Ad Hoc. Ms. Marino filed an Answer to the Petition on August

13, 2020, denying the allegations of the same. At the trial on the Petition for

Stepparent Adoption on October 14, 2020, C.M.B. appeared pro se and objected to

the adoption. After brief testimony by C.M.B. and K.W.R., the trial court recessed

and stayed the remainder of the matter. On December 22, 2020, the trial court

appointed an attorney to represent the minor children pursuant to La. Ch.C. art.

1244.1(B). On February 1, 2021, the trial court appointed an attorney to represent

2
At trial, C.M.B. testified that she is still involved with Mr. Chartier. He currently lives
with her and is the father of two of her other children.
3
The trial court’s reasons for judgment states that the petition was filed on June 5, 2020.
The record reflects, however, that the petition was actually filed on May 15, 2020.
4
The suit was originally filed in the 24th Judicial District Court (Jefferson Parish). It was
transferred to the 29th Judicial District Court (St. Charles Parish) in July of 2020.

21-CA-691 2

C.M.B. after she indicated that she could not afford one. On February 19, 2021,

C.M.B. filed a Declinatory Exception of Insufficiency of Citation and Notice and

Opposition and Answer to Petition for Stepparent Adoption. At a hearing on

March 23, 2021, the trial court denied the exception.

The trial on the Petition for Stepparent Adoption proceeded on July 19,

2021. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court requested that the parties file

post-trial briefs. On August 27, 2021, the trial court signed a written judgment

granting the Petition for Stepparent Adoption. In its extensive written reasons for

judgment, the trial court found that there were three periods of time when C.M.B.

failed to furnish her child support payments: a period of five months and 16 days

from September 25, 2017 to March 13, 2018; a period of at least 10 months from

June 2018 until April 2019; and a period of seven months and 29 days from June

26, 2019 through February 20, 2020. The court found that C.M.B. failed to

demonstrate “just cause” for her failure to pay her child support obligation.

Further, the trial court found that both K.W.R. and G.M.A.R. testified that C.M.B.

only saw the children two or three times in the last six years and that she plays

almost no role in the children’s lives. All three children testified that they had not

seen C.M.B. in approximately two to five years. The trial court found that C.M.B.

did not demonstrate just cause for her failure to visit or communicate with the

children. The trial court stated that C.M.B. knew where the children lived in

Westwego, and after they moved to Norco, she made no substantive attempts to

find them. Finally, the trial court noted that C.M.B. never moved the court for

contempt of the Consent Judgment relative to K.W.R.’s alleged attempts to hide

the children from her. Finally, the trial court found that the adoption was in the

best interest of the children. The trial court noted that the evidence showed that

G.M.A.R. knows the children and their needs, and C.M.B. has played no role in

her children’s lives.

21-CA-691 3

This timely appeal followed. On appeal, C.M.B. argues that the trial court

erred in granting the intrafamily adoption because the evidence and testimony

show that there was never a six-month period between June 2017 and January 2021

when she did not attempt to contact the children; that she was paying substantial

child support payments in the six months immediately prior to the filing of the

Petition for Stepparent Adoption, and any previous lapses in payments were not

without just cause; and that the adoption is not in the best interest of the children.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Intrafamily adoptions, the adoption of a child by a stepparent or certain other

relatives, are authorized by the Louisiana Children’s Code. La. Ch.C. arts. 1170,

1243. Under La. Ch.C. art. 1245(C), the consent of a biological parent is not

required for adoption by a stepparent petitioner married to the parent with lawful

custody when either (1) the other parent “has refused or failed to comply with a

court order of support, without just cause, for a period of at least six months,” or

(2) the other parent “has refused or failed to visit, communicate, or attempt to

communicate with the child without just cause for a period of at least six months.”

The party petitioning for adoption has the initial burden of proving that a

biological parent’s consent is not required due to the parent’s nonsupport of or lack

of communication with the child by clear and convincing evidence. In re Orgeron,

94-458 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/16/94), 646 So.2d 1137, 1139; In re R.A.L., 54,052 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 7/14/21), 323 So.3d 1006, 1015-16. Once a prima facie case is proven,

the opposing parent then has the burden of proving that his failure to provide

support or communicate with his child was with “just cause,” or due to factors

beyond his control. In re C.B., 94-0755 (La. 10/17/94), 643 So.2d 1251, 1253; In

re D.D.D., 06-2274 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 1216, rehearing denied,

writ denied, 07-1669 (La. 8/31/07), 962 So.2d 436, certiorari denied, 552 U.S.

21-CA-691 4

1195, 128 S.Ct. 1243, 170 L.Ed.2d 85. The trial court must thereafter consider

whether the adoption is in the best interest of the child. In re Orgeron, supra.

Upon review of a decision regarding intrafamily adoption, a reviewing court

should affirm the trial court where the judgment is not clearly wrong or manifestly

erroneous because the determination of whether the adoption is in the best interest

of the child must be decided on the facts of each case. In re B.V.G., 04-969 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 12/14/04), 893 So.2d 106, 108, writ denied, 05-0109 (La. 1/26/05), 893

So.2d 56.

Child Support

C.M.B. argues that the evidence and testimony presented at trial reveal that

she was paying substantial child support in the six months immediately prior to the

filing of the Petition for Stepparent Adoption. Nevertheless, C.M.B. argues that to

the extent there were any past lapses in her court-ordered support, it was not

without “just cause.”

George Higgins, an attorney supervisory at Department of Children and

Family Services (“DCFS”), testified at trial regarding C.M.B.’s child support

payment history. He testified that C.M.B.’s child support obligation of $330.00

per month was established on September 25, 2017, and that a wage assignment was

issued in the child support case. Regarding wage assignments, he testified that

often there are arrears; thus DCFS will collect more than the ongoing obligation

each month in order to catch up on the arrears. He confirmed that the child support

payment history submitted into evidence reflects that C.M.B. made zero child

support payments from September 2017 until March 2018; from July 2018 until

April 2019; and from July 2019 until February 2020. According to C.M.B.’s child

support payment history, in the six months immediately preceding the filing of the

petition, she made the following payments: February 2020, $198.46; March 2020,

21-CA-691 5

$396.92; April 2020, $396.92; and May 1, 2020, $198.46.5 As of the date of trial

on July 19, 2021, Mr. Higgins testified that C.M.B. was in arrears for $660.00 for

May and June of 2021.6

At trial, C.M.B. testified that when the child support obligation was

established in 2017, she was working about 15 hours per week at Little Caesars

making $7.25 an hour. She could not work more hours because Little Caesars

would give their managers scheduling priority. C.M.B. took home about $220.00

every two weeks while working at Little Caesars. At that time, she was also

supporting her two other small children that lived with her. In 2018, C.M.B. was

employed at St. Luke’s, a nursing home, as a receptionist making $9.50 an hour

and working around 20 hours a week. On April 29, 2019, she had another child

and took an unpaid maternity leave. Prior to giving birth, she testified that she had

too much amniotic fluid and that the doctor suggested she rest up “because the

baby was having problems.” After she had the baby, C.M.B. testified that she had

to wait another six weeks before she could go back to work. She later began

5
The following chart represents C.M.B.’s child support payments from September 2017,
when her child support obligation was imposed, until May 15, 2020, when the Petition for
Stepparent Adoption was filed.
Date Child Support Obligation
Collected

September 2017 – February $0
2018
March 2018 $1,650.00
April 2018 $0
May 2018 $0
June 2018 $163.83
July 2018 – March 2019 $0
April 2019 $95.24
May 2019 $76.18
June 2019 $76.18
July 2019 – January 2020 $0
February 2020 $198.46
March 2020 $396.92
April 2020 $396.92
May 1, 2020 $198.46

6
Based on the child support payment history submitted as evidence, from May 18, 2020
until the date of trial on July 19, 2021, C.M.B. paid $11,502.24 in child support payments.

21-CA-691 6

working at Pizza Hut, where she started out making $9.50 an hour and then got a

raise to $10.00 an hour. While at Pizza Hut, she worked “around the clock”

working 38 hours some weeks and 55 hours other weeks. She stated that she did

file a request that the child support obligation be reduced with the juvenile court

because she wasn’t making enough money; however, she testified that her boss

would not let her off of work so “there was no point for [her] to go to court to

reduce it.” She also testified that once she got the job at Pizza Hut, she realized

she could “do it.” She admitted that she is in arrears for $660.00 at the time of trial

because her two sons were sick, and she had to take care of them. At the time of

the trial, she was not employed but planned on going back to work.

On appeal, C.M.B. argues that the trial court erred in considering the periods

of nonpayment outside of the six-month period immediately prior to when the

Petition for Stepparent Adoption was filed. She also argues that the evidence

presented showed that she was paying substantial child support in the months

immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

In Haynes v. Mangham, 375 So.2d 103 (La. 1979), the Louisiana Supreme

Court interpreted La. R.S. 9:422.1, the predecessor to La. Ch.C. art. 1245.7 The

Court stated:

The language “refused or failed to comply with a court order of
support for a period of one year” can be interpreted in a number of

7
La. Ch.C. art. 1245 was added by Acts 1991, No. 235, § 12, effective January 1, 1992.
La. R.S. 9:422.1 stated at the time of Haynes:
If the spouse of the petitioner is the legitimate parent of the child or if the
petitioner is the grandparent or grandparents of the child, then the consent of the
other legitimate parent is not necessary if the first and second or the first and third
conditions exist:
(1) The spouse of the petitioner or the grandparent or grandparents or the mother
or the father have been granted custody of the child by a court of competent
jurisdiction and
(2) The other legitimate parent has refused or failed to comply with a court order
of support for a period of one year or
(3) The other legitimate parent is a nonresident of this state and has failed to
support the child for a period of one year after judgment awarding custody to
the mother or father or grandparent or grandparents.

21-CA-691 7

ways: It can be interpreted on the one extreme so rigorously as to
apply even to the parent who pays each month for twelve consecutive
months prior to suit, but in each case for an arrearage, so that for the
full twelve months he had never been in full compliance with the
court order, and on the other extreme so leniently as to permit any
payment however small, within twelve months prior to the filing of
the petition for adoption and irrespective of the amount of
accumulated arrearages, to suffice to prevent application of the
statute. Neither of these extremes is acceptable.

Required as we are to achieve a result in this litigation by
interpreting and applying the statute, we find that a common sense
interpretation is the following: If a parent under court order to support
a child has not made a significant support payment within a year prior
to filing of the petition for adoption, that parent loses the right to
prevent the adoption by withholding consent.
Id. at 105.

The Court also noted that it was mindful of its previous decision in In re

Ackenhausen, 244 La. 739, 154 So.2d 380 (1963), where it held that one $50

payment within a year of suit on a $1,440 annual support obligation could not

prevent the child’s adoption under La. R.S. 9:422.1. The Court stated there that

despite the jurisprudential rule that laws providing for adoption should be strictly

construed, La. R.S. 9:422.1 should not be so narrowly interpreted that any payment

within the year could prevent the adoption. Id. at 383.

In Haynes, the father consistently paid his child support obligation payments

of $400.00 per month until August of 1976. Thereafter, his next payment was for

$1,200.00 (the equivalent of three months’ payments) on March 31, 1977. He

made no additional payments after that. A petition for adoption was filed in

December of 1977. Id. at 104. The Supreme Court found that the father’s

payment, made within a year of the filing of the petition for adoption, was 25% of

his yearly obligation and was 42% of his arrearages at the time the payment was

paid. Id. at 105. The Court found that this was a significant payment to bar the

application of the statute. Id. at 106.

In Anderson v. Ramer, 27,469 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/95), 661 So.2d 584,

586-587, the father’s payment of $950.00 within the year before the institution of

21-CA-691 8

adoption proceedings constituted 39% of his annual support obligation; however,

this payment was less than 10% of the accumulated arrearage. The Second Circuit

found that the trial court was in error in not considering the total history of

noncompliance by the father with his support responsibility. After reviewing all of

the circumstances, the Second Circuit could not find that the payments made by the

father in the year preceding the petition for adoption to be significant. Id.

In the present case, in the six months immediately preceding the May 15,

2020 filing of the petition, C.M.B. did not pay any amount until February 24, 2020,

when she paid $198.46. In March 2020, she paid $396.92, and in April 2020, she

paid $396.92. On May 1, 2020, she paid $198.46.8 Thus, in the six months

immediately prior to the petition being filed, she paid $1,190.76, which is 60% of

her six-month child support obligation. However, prior to February 2020, C.M.B.

failed to make regular and substantial child support payments. From September

2017 until February 2020, a period of almost two and a half years, she only paid a

total of $2,061.43, the equivalent of just over six months’ payments. Though

C.M.B. argues that she was only in arrears for $660.00 dollars at the time of the

trial, the evidence shows that it wasn’t until after the petition was filed that she

consistently paid her child support obligation and that she paid a large additional

sum toward her arrearages. Thus, we do not find that the payments made by

C.M.B. in the six months preceding the filing of the Petition for Stepparent

Adoption to be significant.

Upon review, taking into consideration the total history of non-compliance

by C.M.B. with her child support obligation since her obligation was imposed

(which included two periods of more than six months of no payments at all and one

period of almost six months of no payments at all), we find that the evidence

8
For the remainder of May 2020, C.M.B. paid an additional $396.92.

21-CA-691 9

supports the trial court’s determination that C.M.B. failed to comply with the court

order of support imposed on her on September 25, 2017. La. Ch.C. art.

1245(C)(1).9

We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that there was no just cause

for C.M.B.’s failure to pay her child support. C.M.B. testified that in 2017 and

2018, she worked at Little Caesars and St. Luke’s, working 15-20 hours.

Nonetheless, her payments during this time period were sporadic and insubstantial.

We recognize that C.M.B. did seek to reduce her child support obligation in 2018;

however, she ultimately never appeared at court for the hearing so there was no

reduction. Further, she testified that once she became employed at Pizza Hut, she

realized she could make the payments. However, she still failed to consistently

pay her child support until February 2020.

Accordingly, based on our review of the record and the totality of the

circumstances, we find that the trial court was not clearly wrong or manifestly

erroneous in finding that C.M.B. “has refused or failed to comply with a court

order of support, without just cause, for a period of at least six months.” La. Ch.C.

1245(C)(1).

Contact with the Children

C.M.B. also argues that the trial court erred in granting the adoption without

her consent because the cell phone records submitted as evidence show that there

was never a six-month period between June 2017 and January 2021 where she did

not attempt to contact K.W.R. She argues that she was thwarted from visiting and

communicating with her children by K.W.R. and G.M.A.R. She contends that the

9
La. Ch.C. art. 1245(C)(1) provides that the consent of the parent as required by Article
1193 may be dispensed with upon proof by clear and convincing evidence at the hearing on the
opposition and petition when the spouse of a stepparent petitioner has been granted sole or joint
custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction or is otherwise exercising lawful
custody of the child and the other parent has refused or failed to comply with a court order of
support without just cause “for a period of at least six months.” Article 1245(C)(1) clearly does
not limit our inquiry to the six-month period immediately prior to the filing of the petition.

21-CA-691 10

evidence showed that nearly all of her calls were going to K.W.R.’s voicemail, and

that once K.W.R. “began cutting off access,” she did all she could to maintain

contact.

At trial, G.M.A.R. testified that C.M.B. only visited with the children two or

three times in the last six years, and that it had been more than two years since she

last saw them. She stated that while living in Westwego, C.M.B. showed up to

their house and spoke to the children for a little while and then left. According to

G.M.A.R., in the last six years C.M.B. has not brought Christmas gifts, has not

called for the children’s birthdays and major holidays, and has not been involved in

any of the children’s school activities.

K.W.R. testified that since the 2017 Consent Judgment, the children have

only had physical contact with C.M.B. two or three times. On one occasion in

September or October 2017, C.M.B. came to their home in Westwego and talked to

the children. That same year, he also brought them to the park to see her. When

asked about how often C.M.B. called the children, he responded:

Not really often. It’s more of a one-way street. It’s me calling her all
the time to say, ‘Hey, you know, you want to talk to your kids?’
She’s never really picked up the phone to say, ‘Hey, I want to talk’ --
or if she does, it’s late at night when they’re sleeping, or if I’m at
work she calls them, ‘Hey, can I talk to the boys?’ I’m like, ‘I’m at
work.’ I can’t, you know –

K.W.R. testified that C.M.B. would call only when it was convenient for her.

According to K.W.R., C.M.B. has not provided birthday gifts, birthday cards, and

Christmas gifts to the children since 2017. She also has not participated in any of

the children’s school meetings or activities or any doctor appointments. He

testified that he had tried to contact C.M.B. to keep her updated about the children,

as required by the Consent Judgment, but he believed her phone was “cut-off,

disconnected, or she had another number.” He later testified that he did try to call

C.M.B. on Christmas and the children’s birthdays. If she answered, they would

21-CA-691 11

speak with her, but if she didn’t answer, there was nothing he could do. He stated

that he never blocked C.M.B.’s number. He admitted he received two voicemails

from C.M.B. after court hearings in 2017.

C.M.B. testified that after the Consent Judgment was reached in 2017, she

and K.W.R. had no issues; however, in 2018, when she called K.W.R. to inquire

about seeing the children, she was told that she couldn’t see the children again

because she wasn’t paying child support. She testified that at this time, her calls

started going to his voicemail. She testified regarding two occasions when she

went to the children’s Westwego residence in 2018. On the first occasion, she

knocked and could hear voices inside, but no one answered the door. On the

second occasion, the children were leaving the house when she arrived, so she was

able to talk with them for ten minutes until they left. She also would meet the

children when K.W.R.’s mother would take them to the park or take them for ice

cream. This occurred in 2017 and 2018 until K.W.R.’s mother was no longer

allowed to see the children. She testified that she did not know that they had

moved to Norco until she came for a court date in October. She stated that she has

had the same cell phone number for six or seven years, and that K.W.R. did not

always return her phone calls. When K.W.R. would call her, he would tell her that

the children didn’t want to speak to her. She admitted that in the year preceding

the filing of the petition, she only called six times and sent four text messages, and

that she never saw the children. When questioned about why she stopped trying to

call, she stated that she didn’t call much because it was hurtful when she would

call and couldn’t get in touch with anyone.

Hillary Rapson, a custodian of records for T-Mobile (formally Sprint),

testified at trial regarding the phone records between C.M.B. and K.W.R. from

March 6, 2015 to January 28, 2021. According to the records submitted as

evidence, in the year prior to the filing of the Petition for Stepparent Adoption,

21-CA-691 12

from May 2019 to May 2020, C.M.B. called or texted K.W.R. on four different

days.10 The records show that these calls were routed to voicemail. According to

Ms. Rapson, one cannot glean from the records if voicemails are listened to or not,

or if a call went to voicemail because it was blocked.

Upon review of the entire record, considering all the facts and circumstances

presented, we find that the trial court was not clearly wrong or manifestly

erroneous in finding that G.M.A.R. met her burden of proving that C.M.B.

“refused or failed to visit, communicate, or attempt to communicate with the

child[ren] without just cause for a period of at least six months.” La. Ch.C. art.

1245(C)(2).11 The parties do not dispute that C.M.B. had not seen the children

since 2018. It is also undisputed that she has not provided birthday or Christmas

gifts to the children since 2017. In the six months prior to the Petition for

Stepparent Adoption being filed, the cell phone records do show that calls were

made on both December 25, 2020 and May 3, 2020 to K.W.R.’s phone number.

However, the only information that is gleaned from these records is that the calls

went to voicemail and lasted mere seconds. We do not find this to be sufficient

proof of attempts by C.M.B. to contact the children. C.M.B. argues that K.W.R.

thwarted her attempts to maintain a relationship with her children. To constitute

“just cause,” a parent’s failure to support, visit, or communicate with his children

must be due to factors beyond his control. In re B.L.M., 13-0448 (La. App. 1 Cir.

10
The calls and/or texts took place on May 21, 2019, August 19, 2019, December 25,
2019, and May 3, 2020. Prior to that, the records indicate that she called and/or texted in the
following months: June – December 2017; January – June 2018; August – December 2018;
February 2019, and April 2019.
11
La. Ch.C. art. 1245(C)(2) provides that the consent of the parent as required by Article
1193 may be dispensed with upon proof by clear and convincing evidence at the hearing on the
opposition and petition when the spouse of a stepparent petitioner has been granted sole or joint
custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction or is otherwise exercising lawful
custody of the child and the other parent has refused or failed to visit, communicate, or attempt
to communicate with the child without just cause “for a period of at least six months.” Article
1245(C)(2) clearly does not limit our inquiry to the six-month period immediately prior to the
filing of the petition.

21-CA-691 13

11/1/13), 136 So.3d 5. C.M.B. admitted that she failed to take any action,

specifically with the court, when she believed K.W.R. was thwarting her attempts

at seeing the children. Further, though she asserts her calls were blocked, the cell

phone records could not show whether or not a call was blocked.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court was not clearly wrong or manifestly

erroneous in finding that G.M.A.R. met her burden of proving that C.M.B.

“refused or failed to visit, communicate, or attempt to communicate with the

child[ren] without just cause for a period of at least six months.” La. Ch.C. art.

1245(C)(2).

Best Interest of the Children

C.M.B. also argues the trial court erred in finding that the adoption was in

the children’s best interest since she demonstrated that she previously enjoyed a

good relationship with the children and desires to continue with that relationship.

Even where the other parent’s consent is obviated by failure to visit or

communicate with his child, the court must still consider whether the adoption is in

the best interest of the child. In re D.D.D., 961 So.2d at 1222. Courts must make

this determination by examining the child’s relationship with the stepparent and the

noncustodial natural parent. Id. Important factors include the depth and closeness

of the child’s ties with the noncustodial natural parent, the effect which the loss of

this relationship would have on the child, the seriousness and finality of severing

the relationship between the parent and child, and the importance and benefit to the

child of a continued relationship with the parent. In re C.E.F., 07-0992 (La. App.

1 Cir. 9/14/07), 977 So.2d 1, 7.

At trial, G.M.A.R. testified that she’s been with K.W.R. for six years, and

has lived with the children since 2017. She testified that she is closely involved in

their daily lives and has come to love the children as her own.

21-CA-691 14

As previously noted, its undisputed that C.M.B. had not seen the children

since 2018. It was also undisputed that since 2017, she had not provided them

consistently with Christmas or birthday presents and had not participated in any of

the children’s school meetings or activities, as well as any of their doctor visits.

Though she alleges that her attempts to be in the children’s lives were thwarted by

K.W.R., there was no evidence presented that she took any action in court

concerning her inability to see or talk to the children.

Additionally, all three children testified that they wished to be adopted by

G.M.A.R. D.J.R. and D.C.R. testified that they wanted to be adopted because

G.M.A.R. was there for them. D.C.R. testified that his dad told him that C.M.B.

did not want to talk to him. Also, D.J.R. testified that his dad and G.M.A.R. told

him that his mom has three other children and does not worry about him and his

brothers. When the trial court questioned K.W.R. regarding these statements, he

testified that he did not recall making them. He said that he told the boys that if

they wanted to talk to C.M.B., he’d call her. He concluded by saying, “And there

was [sic] times lately they’ve been saying they don’t want to talk to her. You

know, they don’t want to - - ‘Don’t call her.’ I’d go, ‘Okay.’”

As a reviewing court, we may not set aside a trial court’s finding of fact in

the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. To reverse a fact

finder’s determination, the appellate court must find from the record that a

reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court and that the

record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, Department of

Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). When factual

findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the

manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review demands great deference to the

trier of fact’s findings, because only the trier of fact can be aware of the variations

21-CA-691 15

in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding

and belief in what is said. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989).

Considering all of the facts and evidence presented, we find that the trial

court was not manifestly wrong or clearly wrong in finding that the proposed

adoption is in the best interest of the minor children. Accordingly, we find no error

in the trial court’s judgment granting the Petition for Stepparent Adoption.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment granting the Petition for

Stepparent Adoption is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

21-CA-691 16

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
MARCH 3, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

21-CA-691
E-NOTIFIED
29TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE CONNIE M. AUCOIN (DISTRICT JUDGE)
MARTHA J. MAHER (APPELLEE) LAUREN DAVEY ROGERS (APPELLEE)

MAILED
JOSEPH B. ROCHELLE (APPELLANT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
110 AVENUE OF OAKS
DESTREHAN, LA 70047