Laura Eugene Versus Frederick M. Boutte, Warden
Laura Eugene Versus Frederick M. Boutte, Warden, No. 21-KH-414 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2021).
The holding in the court’s own words
Upon review, we conclude that relator’s case does present a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel under Harris.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Eugene 866 So. 2d 985
- State v. Eugene 889 So. 2d 263
- State Ex Rel. Melinie v. State 665 So. 2d 1172
- State v. Cotton 45 So. 3d 1030
- 304 So. 3d 846 not in our corpus
- State v. Dorthey 623 So. 2d 1276
- 316 So. 3d 443 not in our corpus
- State v. Fobbs 744 So. 2d 1274
- State v. Temple 806 So. 2d 697
- State v. Temple 836 So. 2d 58
Opinion text
LAURA EUGENE NO. 21-KH-414
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
FREDERICK M. BOUTTE, WARDEN COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
August 12, 2021
Nancy F. Vega
Chief Deputy Clerk
IN RE LAURA EUGENE
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE FORTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST JOHN THE BAPTIST, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE
J. STERLING SNOWDY, DIVISION "C", NUMBER 00,430
Panel composed of Judges Stephen J. Windhorst,
Hans J. Liljeberg, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
WRIT GRANTED FOR LIMITED PURPOSE
Relator, Laura Eugene, seeks review of the trial court’s April 30, 2021
judgment denying her third application for post-conviction relief (“APCR”). In light
of the following, we grant this writ for the limited purpose of ordering the trial court
to rule on the merits of relator’s argument of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
during the sentencing proceedings in light of State v. Harris, 18-1012 (La. 7/9/20),
2020 WL 3867207 and conduct an evidentiary hearing if necessary. We deny this
writ in part relative to the relator’s reliance on Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. —, 140
S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020).
On January 16, 2003, a jury found relator guilty of second degree murder.
This Court affirmed relator’s conviction and sentence, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court denied relator’s writ application. State v. Eugene, 03-1128 (La. App. 5 Cir.
1/27/04), 866 So.2d 985, writ denied, 04-515 (La. 1/14/05), 889 So.2d 263.
On April 15, 2021, relator, through counsel, filed an APCR, arguing Ramos
should be applied retroactively to her case. In addition relator, relying on, State v.
Harris, 18-1012 (La. 7/9/20), 2020 WL 3867207, claimed that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at her sentencing hearing by failing to move for a downward
departure from the statutory life sentence mandated by La. R.S. 14:30.1, in light of
relator’s intellectual disabilities and her status as a domestic violence victim.
On April 30, 2021, the trial court denied relief, finding that Ramos applied to
cases not yet final, and relator’s conviction and sentence became final sixteen years
ago. With respect to relator’s ineffective counsel claim at sentencing, the trial court
rejected relator’s claim that the holding in Harris, supra, established an unknown
interpretation of constitutional law that applied retroactively to her case. See La.
C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 A(2).
The Ramos Issue
The Ramos opinion indicates that it applies only to cases pending on direct
appeal and to future cases. 140 S.Ct. at 1407. Recently, in Edwards v. Vannoy, 593
U.S.—, 141 S.Ct. 1547, 209 L.Ed.2d 651 (2021), the United States Supreme Court
held that the jury-unanimity rule in Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal
collateral review. The Edwards court noted that states remain free to retroactively
apply the jury-unanimity rule as a matter of state law in state post-conviction
proceedings if they choose to do so. Id. at 1559. The Louisiana Supreme Court has
not rendered such a ruling.
At the time of relator’s conviction, a non-unanimous jury verdict was
constitutional under Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d
184 (1972). Relator’s conviction became final long before the Ramos decision, and
under Edwards, Ramos does not apply retroactively. Further, our state laws do not
currently provide that the requirement of a unanimous jury applies to cases on state
collateral review for offenses occurring before January 1, 2019. See La. Const. Art.
I, Sec. 17; La. C.Cr.P. art. 782. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion
that Ramos does not apply to relator’s case.
The Harris Issue
Relator contends that the trial court erred in finding the Harris holding,
permitting an ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim on collateral
review, was inapplicable to her case.
In Harris, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that if they did not
make an exception to the holding in State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.
1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172 and State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d
1030, which barred the defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on collateral review, defendant would be left with no remedy for a possible
constitutional violation depriving him of due process of law.” Harris, at *10. Thus,
it concluded that the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing
claim was cognizable on collateral review and remanded the matter to the trial court
for an evidentiary hearing to consider this claim. Id. The court did not state whether
this holding would apply retroactively.
Subsequently, in State v. Cardell Demond Robinson, 19-1330 (La. 11/24/20),
304 So.3d 846 (per curiam), defendant was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute marijuana, adjudicated a fourth-felony habitual offender, and sentenced to
life imprisonment. Counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence but did not ask
the trial court to declare the sentence excessive, unaware that State v. Dorthey, 623
So.2d 1276 (La. 1993), would allow the trial court to consider whether a downward
departure from the mandatory life sentence was warranted. Robinson, supra.
Because these proceedings occurred before its decision in Harris, supra, a court had
never reviewed defendant’s case in light of its holding in that case, and defendant
had presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing
meriting an evidentiary hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded defendant’s
case to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel at sentencing.
Most recently, in State v. Robinson, 20-427 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/8/21), 2021
WL 863395, writ denied, 21-485 (La. 5/25/21), 316 So.3d 443, the defendant was
convicted of simple burglary, adjudicated a third-felony habitual offender, and
sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2020, the defendant in Robinson, 20-427, 2021
WL 863395, sought review of the denial of his Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence
and Hold a Dorthey Hearing. This Court granted the writ application in part, finding
that the defendant had presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of trial
and appellate counsel, similar to the defendant in Harris and remanded the matter to
the trial court to allow leave of court to either amend his motion to correct illegal
sentence or file an APCR and hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Thus, while the Harris decision did not make a statement as to the retroactivity
of its holding nor have the few subsequent cases relying on Harris specifically
addressed this issue, as discussed above, both the supreme court and this Court have
permitted Harris-based claims to move forward in cases where La. C.Cr.P. art.
930.8’s prescriptive period for filing an APCR has expired, and the defendant has
presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Considering the
foregoing, we find the trial court erred in finding that Harris only applied to cases in
which the trial court had discretion in the sentencing range.1 Consequently, we find
that relator is entitled to the benefit of the Harris holding if she presented a prima
facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Upon review, we conclude that relator’s case does present a prima facie
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel under Harris. Relator was convicted of
second degree murder which carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at
hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La.
R.S. 14:30.1 B. In addition, similar to Harris, relator received a life sentence that
was statutorily mandated, the trial judge believed that he had no discretion in the
imposition of the sentence, and relator’s counsel did nothing to correct the trial
judge’s mistaken belief that there was no possibility of a downward departure from
the life sentence required by law. The sentencing transcript shows that the trial judge
stated, “In this matter, because of the very language of 30.1, the Court is endued with
no discretion at all.” Following sentencing, relator did not object to the sentence and
further failed to file a motion to reconsider sentence.
In light of the foregoing, and that this issue has been raised within one year of
the Harris decision, relator meets the exception for the delay in filing under La.
C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 A(2). We therefore grant this writ for the limited purpose of
remanding this matter to the trial court to rule on the merits of relator’s argument of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the sentencing proceedings in light of
Harris and Robinson and conduct an evidentiary hearing if necessary.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 12th day of August, 2021.
SJW
HJL
JJM
1
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that sentencing review for downward departures applies to all
sentencing laws and is not limited to mandatory sentences under the Habitual Offender Laws. See State
v. Fobbs, 99-1024 (La. 9/24/99), 744 So.2d 1274, 1275 (per curiam); State v. Temple, 01-655 (La. App. 5
Cir. 12/12/01), 806 So.2d 697, 707 n.3, writ denied, 02-234 (La. 4/3/98), 836 So.2d 58.
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 08/12/2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
21-KH-414
E-NOTIFIED
40th District Court (Clerk)
Honorable J. Sterling Snowdy (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Honorable Bridget A. Dinvaut (Respondent) Stanislav L. Moroz (Relator)
Grant L. Willis (Respondent)
Justin B. LaCour (Respondent)
MAILED
Honorable Jeffrey M. Landry (Respondent)
Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
1885 North 3rd Street
6th Floor, Livingston Building
Baton Rouge, LA 70802