State of Louisiana Versus Husam Odeh

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 21-KP-657

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

HUSAM ODEH COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW
FROM THE FIRST PARISH COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. F-2125202, DIVISION "B"
HONORABLE DENNIS J. WALDRON, JUDGE AD HOC PRESIDING

December 23, 2021

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

AFFIRMED
FHW
SJW
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Thomas J. Butler

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR,
HUSAM ODEH
George G. Angelus
Stephen H. Shapiro

WICKER, J.,

After a two-day bench trial, Defendant, Husam Odeh, was found guilty as

charged of riding on a levee in violation of La. R.S. 38:213 and failing to obey the

direction of a traffic officer in violation of La. R.S. 32:56. Immediately after finding

the defendant guilty, the trial court sentenced defendant to a fine of $50.00 on each

count, a total of $100.00. Defendant now seeks review of his two misdemeanor

convictions and sentences. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm defendant's

convictions and sentences, and we amend the minute entry to correct the patent error

to accurately reflect Mr. Odeh has a balance of $50.00 owed for the fine imposed by

the trial court as to count 2 and that the $50.00 fine paid by Mr. Odeh on May 26,

2021 applies to count 1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 29, 2018, the District Attorney for First Parish Court in Jefferson

Parish filed a bill of information charging defendant, Husam Odeh, with riding on a

levee in violation of La. R.S. 38:213 and failing to obey the direction of a traffic

officer in violation of La. R.S. 32:56.1 At the January 14, 2019 arraignment,

defendant pled not guilty.

On November 15, 2019, Mr. Odeh filed a Motion to Quash regarding La. R.S.

38:213. In his motion, Mr. Odeh argued that the charge of violating La. R.S. 38:213

must be quashed since the charge was not relevant or material to the facts alleged in

the bill of information considering there were no allegations that he was riding,

driving, or hauling a vehicle upon the public levee.

At the October 14, 2003 hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A two-day

bench trial occurred on May 24, 2021 and May 26, 2021. Defendant was found

guilty as charged and sentenced to a fine of $50.00 on each count, a total of $100.00.

Thereafter, on June 23, 2021, defendant filed an application for writ of review

requesting this Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction regarding his

convictions and sentences.

FACTS

This case arises from an incident that occurred on October 18, 2018, on the

levee located at North Arnoult and River Road on the East Bank of Jefferson Parish.

A cross-country track meet was being held in the levee batture (the river side of the

levee) for several local participating elementary schools. The race was scheduled to

begin at 8:00 a.m., and generally, the duration of the event was about 30 minutes.

Because he was running late for the event, Mr. Odeh parked his vehicle on the

levee to drop off his 11-year-old son who was participating in the race. Once he was

parked, Mr. Odeh’s son exited the vehicle to join the other participants of the race.

Two additional unoccupied vehicles were also parked on the levee. Mr. Odeh

remained in the vehicle, and was planning to exit the vehicle to observe and take

photographs of his son at the race. Prior to Mr. Odeh exiting his vehicle, Lieutenant

Kirt Arnold used the speaker of the public address (PA) system attached to his patrol

vehicle to alert and inform Mr. Odeh that parking on the levee was prohibited and

that he must move his vehicle immediately.

At trial, Lieutenant Arnold1 testified that after the first announcement, he

made two additional announcements for Mr. Odeh to move his vehicle. Mr. Odeh

did not respond to Lieutenant Arnold’s directives. For that reason, Lieutenant Arnold

pulled his patrol vehicle next to the driver-side window of Mr. Odeh’s vehicle and

instructed Mr. Odeh to roll down his window. At that point, Lieutenant Arnold again

told Mr. Oden that individuals were not permitted to park their vehicles on the levee,

and that Mr. Odeh had to move his vehicle. In response, Mr. Odeh told Lieutenant

Arnold that he was a parent of one of the race participants and that he was going to

take pictures. Mr. Odeh believed that vehicles were permitted to park on the levee

for the limited purpose of the race. Again, Lieutenant Arnold explained to Mr. Odeh

1
For eleven years, Lieutenant Arnold has been employed by the East Jefferson Levee District Police Department,
and assigned to patrol River Road on the Eastbank of Jefferson Parish. He supervises a platoon of over four men,
and works the 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift.
2

that he had to move his vehicle and parking was not permitted on the levee. Mr.

Odeh did not at first move his vehicle after Lieutenant Arnold instructed him to do

so.

Lieutenant Arnold further testified that eventually Mr. Odeh moved his

vehicle and parked about 20 feet from his original parking place, and thus, remained

parked on the levee. Ten minutes passed from the time Lieutenant Arnold first

instructed Mr. Odeh to move his vehicle from the first location until the time Mr.

Odeh moved his vehicle and parked at the second location on the levee.

After parking in the second location on the levee, Mr. Odeh exited his vehicle

and proceeded to the race. Lieutenant Arnold again informed Mr. Odeh that he could

not park on the levee and to move his vehicle. Since Mr. Odeh refused to move his

vehicle, Lieutenant Arnold dispatched Officer Michael Rosenbohm, Officer Scott

Menieur, and Lieutenant Tyron Butler to assist him. Upon Officer Rosenbohm’s

arrival to the scene, Mr. Odeh proceeded to return to his vehicle. At the same time,

Officer Menieur and Lieutenant Butler arrived on the scene. Lieutenant Butler, who

was Lieutenant Arnold’s supervisor, took over the scene and interactions with Mr.

Odeh. In the meantime, Lieutenant Arnold went to Officer Rosenbohm’s patrol

vehicle to use the computer system to perform a background search of Mr. Odeh’s

license plate, and the results of the search revealed that Mr. Odeh had a concealed

carry license which prompted Lieutenant Arnold to inform Officer Menieur

regarding the possibility that Mr. Odeh had a weapon.

Lieutenant Arnold recounted speaking with a woman who informed him that

she heard his announcement regarding parking on the levee being barred, she owned

one of the other two vehicles parked on the levee, and her husband was going to

move her vehicle. Lieutenant Arnold testified that Mr. Odeh was given citations by

Lieutenant Butler after Mr. Odeh moved his vehicle to a third location which was to

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the side of the road and off of the levee system. He explained that Mr. Odeh would

not have been cited if he had moved his vehicle as initially requested.

Lieutenant Arnold pointed out that when this incident occurred there was a

sign next to the access road that reads: “Motorized Vehicles Prohibited La. R.S.

38:213,” which Lieutenant Arnold recalled was the Louisiana statute that prohibits

riding and hauling on the levee. He further explained that La. R.S. 38:213 was a

moving violation that can be issued by the officer who observes it or by anybody on

the scene. He maintained that he was going to arrest defendant for disobedience but

did not do so because defendant’s son was present. Lieutenant Arnold recalled that

Mr. Odeh had a “serious attitude,” raised his voice, and his hands were “flying”

while Mr. Odeh was interacting with the officers. Lieutenant Arnold testified that

after Mr. Odeh received his citation, Mr. Odeh told Lieutenant Butler that he made

more money in a month than Lieutenant Butler made in a year, after which defendant

laughed and then left the scene. Lieutenant Arnold stated that the total interaction

with Mr. Odeh lasted approximately forty to fifty minutes.

At trial, Lieutenant Butler2 testified that on the day of the incident at issue he

was working a detail with the levee police for an elementary school race. Prior to

being dispatched by Lieutenant Arnold, he was located on the unprotected side of

the levee which is parallel to the river. Lieutenant Butler explained that he was

dispatched by Lieutenant Arnold on the date in question regarding a parent who

refused to move his parked vehicle off of the levee. He recalled confirming that he

was able to observe Lieutenant Arnold and Mr. Odeh at the top of the levee from his

current location. Upon arrival to the scene, Lieutenant Butler requested that Mr.

Odeh, who was standing at the top of the levee system, move his vehicle but Mr.

2
Since 2006, Lieutenant Butler has been employed with the East Jefferson Levee District Police Department. Prior
to his employment with the levee district, he was employed with the New Orleans Police Department. Lieutenant
Butler has been in law enforcement for approximately twenty years.
4

Odeh did not respond to his directives. Instead, Mr. Odeh continued to gaze at the

children on the grassy area.

Lieutenant Butler testified that once Mr. Odeh did not reply to his second

request to move his vehicle, he instructed Officer Rosenbohm to get his ticket book

so Lieutenant Butler could write a citation which was in fact issued. As Lieutenant

Butler proceeded to walk towards Mr. Odeh’s parked vehicle to issue the citation,

Mr. Odeh replied, “Do not f**k with my vehicle. I have a gun in there.” Lieutenant

Butler recalled that he asked Mr. Odeh if he was threatening him and that Mr. Odeh

replied, “I’m just telling you don’t f**k with my vehicle. I have a gun in there.”

Lieutenant Butler maintains that he asked Lieutenant Arnold to accompany him

since Mr. Odeh stated he had a gun in his vehicle. Mr. Odeh then returned to his

vehicle, started it, but did not move it. Mr. Odeh started recording the interaction

with his cell phone. Mr. Odeh refused to move his vehicle and continued to record

the incident.

Lieutenant Butler testified that he tried to get Mr. Odeh to cooperate several

times for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes. He explained that he asked Mr.

Odeh three or four times to move his vehicle before writing the ticket and that

Lieutenant Arnold had also asked him to move his vehicle several times prior to

Lieutenant Butler’s involvement in the incident. Lieutenant Butler described Mr.

Odeh’s demeanor throughout the incident as “total disrespect.” He explained that

during his interactions with Mr. Odeh, the race had not started, and that in general,

the levee police does not tolerate illegal parking during the races. Lieutenant Butler

recalled that Mr. Odeh moved his vehicle approximately fifteen to twenty minutes

later. He maintained that if Mr. Odeh had simply moved his vehicle as requested, a

citation would not have been issued and Mr. Odeh would not have missed the race.

At trial, Lieutenant Butler confirmed that he provided a statement to Internal

Affairs about the incident. On cross-examination, Lieutenant Butler reviewed his

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statement and confirmed that he had stated the following to Mr. Odeh: “I don’t know

how you treat police in the country you come from. However, the police are treated

with respect in this country.” Lieutenant Butler denied that the comment was racist.

He explained that the sole reason for issuing the citation was due to Mr. Odeh’s

vehicle being illegally driven on the levee. He recalled that because Mr. Odeh sped

off from the second location where he had parked his vehicle, Lieutenant Butler then

drove to the third location at which Mr. Odeh had parked his vehicle to issue the

citation.

At trial, Officer Michael Rosenbohm3 testified that on October 20, 2018, his

supervisor Lieutenant Arnold called him for backup regarding a parent refusing to

move his vehicle that was parked on the levee. He stated that he requested that Mr.

Odeh move his vehicle, but received a negative reply from Mr. Odeh, which

prompted him to allow Lieutenant Arnold to handle the incident. Officer Rosenbohm

described the incident as continuously escalating with a lot of children and parents

around to witness it. He recalled that they were trying to get Mr. Odeh to move his

vehicle. Officer Rosenbohm testified that he observed the vehicle at location one

when Lieutenant Arnold called him over, and at location two after Mr. Odeh had

moved his vehicle.

Officer Scott Menieur4 also testified at trial. He recalled on October 20, 2018,

being dispatched to provide backup assistance by Lieutenant Arnold who informed

him that assistance was needed for an individual who was acting “somewhat irate.”

Once he arrived to the scene of the incident, Officer Menieur observed police units

on the levee along with Mr. Odeh’s vehicle. He tried to assist with de-escalating the

situation and calming Mr. Odeh down. Officer Menieur reported that he observed

Lieutenant Butler and Mr. Odeh speaking to each other in a loud, angry fashion. He

3
Since 2005, Officer Rosenbohm has been employed as a patrol officer with East Jefferson Levee Police
Department.
4
For the past three years, Officer Menieur has been employed with East Jefferson Levee District Police Department.
6

recalled Lieutenant Arnold informed him that Mr. Odeh had a firearm in his vehicle,

and that Lieutenant Arnold requested that he search Mr. Odeh’s license plate through

a database to discern whether he had a concealed handgun permit. Officer Menieur

recalled Mr. Odeh moved his vehicle off of the levee and onto the side of the road.

Thereafter, he recalled Lieutenant Butler issued a citation to Mr. Odeh, who

appeared to be upset.

Zachary Bordelon, the cross-country track coach employed by Arden Cahill

School, testified that Mr. Odeh’s son was on the track team for the race. He explained

that on October 20, 2018, fourteen to fifteen schools with 289 runners, both boys

and girls, participated in a race at the levee batture. Mr. Bordelon maintained that

parents would drive their children to the race, and that many observers of the race

would be seated in chairs on top of the levee. He further explained that the children

would run at the bottom of the levee, about three quarters of a mile down, turn

around, and run three quarters of a mile back. The girls’ race started at 7:30 a.m.

and the boys’ race started at 8:00 a.m. Mr. Bordelon reported that the track event

was sanctioned by the school board and parish authorities and that levee police

assisted with crowd control along the levee. Mr. Bordelon testified that there were

various stretches along the levee for parking and that sometimes vehicles parked

alongside the levee. He recounted that the police were tolerant of illegal parking

that occurs during these events. No parents or anyone else, other than Mr. Odeh,

had informed him that they had received a parking ticket at that event. Mr. Bordelon

pointed out that a medal ceremony occurred after the race, which the parents

attended.

When the incident occurred, Mr. Bordelon testified that he was coaching on

top of the levee facing towards the river and the street. While primarily focused on

the race, Mr. Bordelon explained that he observed when Mr. Odeh drove up to the

levee and that other vehicles were parked in the vicinity of his vehicle. Although he

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could not hear the conversations, Mr. Bordelon did observe the interactions between

Mr. Odeh and the police officers when Mr. Odeh had parked in the third location.

He stated Mr. Odeh appeared to be detained by the police, and that while his son was

still in the race, Mr. Odeh was told to move his vehicle. He further testified that Mr.

Odeh’s vehicle was on the levee, and that he did not see any interactions that

occurred on the levee.

Mr. Odeh also testified at trial. He stated that he was a United States citizen

but originally from Palestine. Regarding the incident at issue, Mr. Odeh confirmed

that he was driving his son to the race on the levee. He reported that he arrived at

the levee at 7:54 a.m. Mr. Odeh explained that there was parking available “before

the stables” but it was full, and vehicles were parked everywhere. He dropped his

son off and then proceeded to find a place to park. Mr. Odeh reported that he saw

other cars parked on the grassy area of the levee, which led him to believe it was a

good place to park. Initially, he did not recall seeing any signs that prohibited parking

or riding on the levee. However, sometime thereafter, he noticed a sign, but it was

hidden by vegetation.

Mr. Odeh testified that he parked, took his phone out, exited his vehicle, and

removed his folding chair and backpack from his vehicle. He recalled Lieutenant

Arnold announced on the PA system that no parking was permitted on the levee. In

response, Mr. Odeh shouted to Lieutenant Arnold that he would be back in 2 minutes

after he took a picture of the race. Mr. Odeh confirmed that Lieutenant Arnold

repeated that no parking was allowed, and at this point, Mr. Odeh reported that he

entered his vehicle and started it. Lieutenant Arnold had already driven up to Mr.

Odeh’s driver-side window, and informed him that parking on the levee was

prohibited and to move his vehicle “now.”

In an effort to comply with Lieutenant Arnold’s directives, Mr. Odeh reported

that he moved his vehicle twenty to thirty feet away to location two. Since other

8

vehicles were parked in the area, Mr. Odeh explained that he was under the

impression that he was properly parked at location two. Mr. Odeh testified that he

did not know where the levee ended. After he parked, Mr. Odeh exited his vehicle,

and heard the race gun had been fired which signaled the start of the race. Mr. Odeh

immediately ran up to the top of the levee and told an officer that he was going to

take a picture and come right back down. The officer did not respond to Mr. Odeh’s

statement. For that reason, Mr. Odeh testified that he took three or four photographs

of the race, and that after doing so, he observed two police cars facing his vehicle,

which he stated made him uncomfortable.

Mr. Odeh further testified that he walked from the top of the levee to his

vehicle, entered it, started it, and put it in drive. He recalled Lieutenant Butler

appeared behind him “yelling and screaming. Give him a ticket now.” Mr. Odeh

stated that Lieutenant Arnold and Lieutenant Butler were both present when he

parked at location two, but Lieutenant Arnold did not talk to him after leaving

location one. He described Lieutenant Butler as angry, and that Lieutenant Butler

abruptly opened his vehicle door. Mr. Odeh recalled that Lieutenant Butler was

talking and shouting most of the time and uttered, “I don’t know what country you

come from, but that’s not how we do it around here.” He also testified that Lieutenant

Butler called him “stupid” a couple of times and commented that he was “sick of

you people.”

In an effort to explain his actions, Mr. Odeh testified that he tried to explain

the situation to Lieutenant Butler but denied yelling, cursing, or name calling. Mr.

Odeh reported that he asked Lieutenant Butler to close the door to his vehicle, and

Lieutenant Butler responded by commenting that he did not want to see him around

here anymore and slammed his door. At this point, Mr. Odeh stated that he

understood he needed to leave. At trial, Mr. Odeh denied being asked for his license,

registration, and proof of insurance. He recalled informing the officers that he had a

9

gun in his vehicle but did not threaten any of them with it. Afterwards, Mr. Odeh

reported that he left location two in a safe manner.

Thereafter, Mr. Odeh recalled that Officer Menieur moved in between him

and Lieutenant Butler. After explaining that he needed to issue a citation, Officer

Menieur then requested Mr. Odeh’s license and insurance information, and that

failure to provide him with the information would result in Mr. Odeh going to jail.

Officer Menieur also asked Mr. Odeh if there was a weapon in his vehicle and Mr.

Odeh responded affirmatively. Officer Menieur removed Mr. Odeh’s weapon from

his vehicle and later returned it. Lieutenant Butler issued two tickets at location three

and then asked Mr. Odeh to leave the area. After leaving the scene, Mr. Odeh

testified that he picked up his son.

At trial, Mr. Odeh confirmed that he videotaped part of the incident with his

cell phone. Mr. Odeh further admitted that he was very angry during the incident

and that he called Lieutenant Butler an “idiot” and “a**hole.” He explained that he

was more comfortable when Officer Menieur arrived to the scene and that Officer

Menieur spoke to him in a “calm, positive way.”

After considering the evidence and hearing arguments of counsel, the trial

judge found defendant guilty as charged.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his application for writ of review, Mr. Odeh sets forth the following

assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in denying Odeh’s re-urged Motion to Quash the alleged

violation of La. R.S. 38:213 after trial, when all the material facts missing at

the initial Motion to Quash hearing were later developed at trial, and which

facts conclusively proved defendant’s violation was merely a non-moving,

parking violation that the statute clearly does not encompass.

10

2. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty

of violating La. R.S. 38:213 because there was no evidence to prove defendant

was riding, hauling, or driving upon the levee as proscribed by the statute.

3. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty

of violating La. R.S. 32:56 because: (1) the police order to remove the parked

vehicle from the levee was admittedly complied with in a delayed fashion; (2)

the police order to remove his vehicle from the levee was given in an arbitrary

and discriminatory fashion under the circumstances; (3) the disobedience

citation was issued by a levee police officer who had accosted defendant

racially, fabricated evidence in his Internal Affairs statement to investigators,

and was not present when the order to move the vehicle was given by the

ordering officer; and (4) the officer who issued the order, in his sole discretion,

chose not to issue any citations at all.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Odeh contends that the trial court erred by

denying his re-urged Motion to Quash the alleged violation of La. R.S. 38:213 after

trial. Seven months prior to trial, the trial court denied his motion to quash on the

basis that it was a procedural device available to raise pre-trial defenses that do not

go to the merits of the charge and that the only question at that time was whether the

bill of information charged a valid offense. Now, Mr. Odeh asserts that during the

two-day trial, the missing facts were developed and proved that he was not riding,

driving, or hauling upon the levee. Specifically, Mr. Odeh argues that La. R.S.

38:213 does not encompass parking on the levee and makes no mention of the word

“parking” in its text. He further argues that the applicable law on statutory

interpretation and the long-standing jurisprudential law are both plentiful and quite

clear. Mr. Odeh maintains that the articles of the Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure cannot be extended by analogy to create crimes not provided for. He

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contends that the officers’ explanation, that any parking maneuver made on the levee

naturally encompasses driving on the levee, is a strained and arbitrary interpretation

that is prohibited by the law and jurisprudence. Mr. Odeh points out that Lieutenant

Arnold only observed a parked vehicle initially and that the ticket was not issued by

him but by Lieutenant Butler, who saw no movement on the levee at all. He contends

that his motion to quash was re-urged and should have been granted by law after the

trial court heard all of the factual evidence.

A motion to quash is a mechanism by which to raise pre-trial pleas or

defenses, or those matters which do not go to the merits of the charge. State v.

Arceneaux, 13-953 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/23/14) (unpublished); citing State v.

Boudreaux, 99–1017 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/16/00); 756 So.2d 505, 507. In considering

a motion to quash, a court must accept as true the facts contained in the bill of

information and determine, as a matter of law and from the face of the pleadings,

whether a crime has been charged. Id; citing State v. Byrd, 96–2302 (La.3/13/98);

708 So.2d 401, 411, cert. denied sub nom. Peltier v. Louisiana, 525 U.S. 876, 119

S.Ct. 179, 142 L.Ed.2d 146 (1998).

At a hearing on a motion to quash, evidence is limited to procedural matters

and the question of factual guilt or innocence is not before the court. Id; Boudreaux,

supra. When the issue presented in a motion to quash is exclusively a question of

law, appellate courts review the ruling de novo. Id; citing State v. Hamdan, 12–1986

(La.3/19/13); 112 So.3d 812, 816. Generally, the trial judge’s denial of a motion to

quash should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court’s

discretion. State v. Lommasson, 11-536 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/11), 81 So.3d 796,

799.

A review of the trial transcript reveals that Mr. Odeh did not re-urge his

motion to quash after the trial. In fact, the record shows instead that Mr. Odeh orally

moved for an acquittal following the State’s case-in-chief during which he merely

12

referenced his previously filed motion to quash. Notwithstanding Mr. Odeh’s failure

to re-urge his motion to quash after trial, the record further reveals that Mr. Odeh did

not give notice to the Court of his intent to seek this Court’s supervisory review of

the trial court’s ruling denying his motion to quash. Thus, this assignment of error

has not been properly preserved for review by this Court.

Additionally, we point out that Mr. Odeh has not briefed the issue of the trial

court denying his request for an acquittal. However, to the extent that Mr. Odeh is

arguing that the trial court erred in denying the motion for acquittal, we acknowledge

that the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to uphold the convictions will

be addressed in the remaining assignments of error.

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Odeh avers that there was insufficient

evidence pursuant to the Jackson standard to support his conviction of riding,

hauling, or driving upon the levee in violation of La. R.S. 38:213. He further argues

that: (1) the officers testified that his violation was a parking violation; (2) no

evidence was presented at trial to support that he was riding, hauling, or driving on

the levee; (3) none of the officers, except Lieutenant Arnold, observed his vehicle at

location one; and (4) none of the officers observed any vehicle movement except the

non-levee movement from location two to location three, which was made at the

officers’ insistence.

The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence is

whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d

560 (1979). Both the direct and circumstantial evidence must be sufficient to support

the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.

Harrell, 01–841 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/02), 811 So.2d 1015, 1019. Circumstantial

evidence is evidence of facts or circumstances from which one might infer or

13

conclude, according to reason and common experience, the existence of other

connected facts. State v. Kempton, 01–572 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/12/01), 806 So.2d

718, 722. Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:438, assuming every fact to be proven that the

evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence. However, this requirement does not establish a standard

that is separate from the Jackson standard, but instead provides a helpful

methodology for determining the existence of reasonable doubt. State v. Lathers,

03–941 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/23/04), 868 So.2d 881, 884. To support the conclusion

that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, all evidence, both direct and

circumstantial, must be sufficient. Id.

Here, the State presented its case at trial through the testimony of Lieutenant

Kirt Arnold, Lieutenant Tyron Butler, Officer Michael Rosenbohm, and Officer

Scott Menieur. The witnesses' testimony regarding the October 20, 2018 incident

were substantially similar. The State presented evidence to show that Mr. Odeh

violated La. R.S. 38:213 by operating his motor vehicle on the levee. At trial,

Lieutenant Arnold testified that next to the access road on the levee was a posted

sign visible to motorist that stated “Motorized Vehicles Prohibited La. R.S. 38:213.”

Further, Lieutenant Arnold explained that while he did not observe Mr. Odeh in the

act of riding on the levee, in order to park on the levee as Mr. Odeh had successfully

done, he had to ride on the levee to get to the location where his vehicle was parked.

Moreover, Mr. Odeh testified at trial that he had in fact driven his son to the race,

and that he had observed other vehicles parked on the grassy area of the levee, which

he believed was an area where parking was permissible. Mr. Odeh did not deny that

he was riding on the levee. Instead, he testified that he did not notice the sign

instructing motorists that no riding on the levee was permitted until sometime after

he encountered the officers.

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Further, we find that Parish of Jefferson v. Davie Shoring, Inc., 14-701 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 2/11/15), 167 So.3d 925, is instructive regarding the interpretation of La.

R.S. 38:213, which provides, in pertinent part:

A. No person shall ride, drive, or haul upon the public
levees or integrated coastal protection projects or their
rights-of-way except where, in the judgment of the levee
commissioners of a district and the Department of
Transportation and Development, or, for levees or
integrated coastal protection projects in the coastal area as
defined in R.S. 49:214.2, the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority, ample provision has been made to
guard against any damage to which the levees or integrated
coastal protection projects may thereby be exposed from
wear, tear, and abuse. Each levee district shall publish
guidance, erect signage, and require special permits as
they deem appropriate to allow them to make provisions
for limited riding, driving, or hauling.

In Davie, this Court found that in paragraph A, the statute described the

prohibited actions as riding, driving, or hauling “upon” the public levees or

integrated coastal protection projects or their rights-of-way. This Court stated that it

was undisputed that defendant did not drive upon the levee itself but rather drove

across the levee on a paved road open to the public. This Court found this distinction

was important, because paragraph D of the statute provided that “[n]othing in this

Section shall interfere with the crossing over any public levees, at ramps or inclines

established under plans and specifications of the [DOTD], ...”. This Court noted that

Paragraph D used the words “crossing over” as opposed to riding, driving, or hauling

“upon” the levee. As such, this Court found that the legislature’s specific exemption

of the act of “crossing over” the levee on a DOTD specified roadway distinguished

that act from the prohibited acts described in the first paragraph, which logically

referred to acts of driving, riding, and hauling that take place upon the levee at

locations other than on a DOTD specified paved road crossing thereof. Davie, 925

So.3d at 930-31.

15

Further, this Court in Davie asserted that paragraph A of the statute provided

that “[e]ach levee district shall publish guidance, erect signage, and require special

permits as they deem appropriate to allow them to make provisions for limited

riding, driving, or hauling.” This Court found that it was undisputed that no signage

of this sort was placed at this particular paved crossing of the levee. As such, this

Court further found that the public was not placed on notice that a special permit

was required to cross over the levee at that location, if in fact a permit to cross here

was required by La. R.S. 38:213, a requirement which it found unsupported by the

record. Additionally, this Court found that no evidence was presented that that road

crossing was used for “limited” riding, driving, or hauling but was in fact used for

public access to the Bucktown Marina and U.S. Coast Guard Station. This Court

stated that the record was devoid of any mention of limitations on vehicular travel

over the levee at this road crossing. Accordingly, this Court ultimately found that

defendant’s actions were not in violation of La. R.S. 38:213, among other things.

Thus, this Court reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of

the Levee District and remanded this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Davie, 925 So.3d at 931-33.

Unlike the defendant in Davie, in this instance, based on the evidence adduced

at trial, Mr. Odeh did not drive across the levee on a paved road open to the public.

Instead, he drove upon the levee to find parking so he could observe the race his son

was participating in on the levee. While no signage had been erected on the road

that the defendant in Davie drove across, here, the access road to the levee had a sign

erected to notify motorists that riding or driving upon the levee was prohibited. Mr.

Odeh admitted that there was signage erected although he stated he did not notice

the signage initially. In its oral reasons for finding Mr. Odeh guilty as charged, the

trial court explained that in all likelihood, Mr. Odeh was running late because he

testified that he arrived at 7:54 a.m., approximately 6 minutes before the race was

16

scheduled to begin. We further point out that Mr. Bordelon, the cross-country track

coach for Arden Cahill, testified that fourteen to fifteen elementary schools

participated in the race, and that there were 289 runners. Mr. Odeh testified that he

dropped his son off so he could most likely check-in with his coach and join the

other runners present from his school. Additionally, the trial court reasoned that Mr.

Odeh acknowledged that he was unable to find any parking, and in an effort not to

disappoint his son, he quickly drove up the levee and parked where the two other

vehicles had illegally parked.

In its oral reasons for finding Mr. Odeh guilty, the trial court further pointed

out that the only circumstantial evidence presented at trial pertained to Mr. Odeh

having driven on the levee rather than being parked on the levee. It reasoned that “a

reasonable person could find that any and all other reasonable explanations or

hypothesis of innocence, is excluded.” We agree. The trial court explained that

through Mr. Odeh’s testimony it had become apparent “officially and directly, who

drove the vehicle where it was first spotted by the police.” It further stated that even

if Mr. Odeh had not testified at trial, “it’s only reasonable that someone could say,

that vehicle had to be driven from the roadway to get to where it was first spotted up

on the levee.”

The credibility of witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact,

who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness; and the

credibility of the witnesses will not be reweighed on appeal. State v. Rowan, 97-21

(La. App. 5 Cir. 4/29/97), 694 So.2d 1052, 1056. Accordingly, considering the

foregoing, we find the State presented sufficient evidence under the Jackson

standard for the trial court to conclude that Mr. Odeh was guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of riding or driving on a levee in violation of La. R.S. 38:213.

In his final assignment of error, Mr. Odeh contends that the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of failing to obey the

17

direction of a traffic officer in violation of La. R.S. 32:56. Specifically, he asserts

that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of

violating La. R.S. 32:56 because: (1) the police order to remove the parked vehicle

from the levee was admittedly complied with in a delayed fashion; (2) the police

order to remove his vehicle from the levee was given in an arbitrary and

discriminatory fashion under the circumstances; (3) the disobedience citation was

issued by a levee police officer who had just accosted defendant racially, fabricated

evidence in his Internal Affairs statement to investigators, was not present when the

order to move the vehicle was given by the ordering officer; and (4) the officer who

issued the order, in his sole discretion, chose not to issue any citations at all.

La. R.S. 32:56 provides in pertinent part:

A. No person shall fail or refuse to comply with any lawful
order or direction of any police officer or weights and
standards police officer invested by law with authority
to direct, control, or regulate traffic.

This statute imposes a duty upon a motor vehicle operator to comply with any

lawful order or directive of any police officer invested by law with the authority to

direct, control or regulate traffic, irrespective of the instructions or signals of a traffic

control device. Theriot v. Bergeron, 05-1225 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/06), 939 So.2d

379, 380 (internal citations omitted).

In the case at bar, the trial transcript is replete with testimony that Mr. Odeh

was given several directives from the officers that parking on the levee was not

permitted and that Mr. Odeh had to move his vehicle. Further, through his own

admission, Mr. Odeh acknowledges that he was told repeatedly by the officers to

move his vehicle because parking on the levee was prohibited.

Regarding Mr. Odeh’s contention that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he was guilty of violating La. R.S. 32:56 because the police

order to remove the parked vehicle from the levee was admittedly complied with in

a delayed fashion, we find it is without merit.
18

La. R.S. 32:56 is clear that no person may fail or refuse to comply with any

lawful order or direction of any police officer invested by law with authority to

direct, control, or regulate traffic. Mr. Odeh admits that he delayed in complying

with the directives of the officers to move his vehicle. He cites reasons for his

delayed compliance, however, the statute is clear that Mr. Odeh was required to

immediately comply with the orders given to him without delay.

In State v. Carter, 95-703 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/12/95), 663 So.2d 152, 153, the

Third Circuit reversed the trial court’s ruling granting a motion to suppress based on

a lack of defendant's consent to search the vehicle because defendant's driving

conduct during flight from the deputy provided deputy with probable cause to arrest

defendant. In Carter, the court found that the deputy attempted to pull over

defendant's vehicle for a lack of license plate, but defendant fled, ran a stop sign, and

did not stop until he pulled into private driveway. It explained that even though the

defendant eventually stopped, at the time the defendant pulled into the private

driveway, the deputy had probable cause to arrest the relator for a violation of La.

R.S. 32:56, failure to obey a police officer.

Here, just like the defendant in Carter, Mr. Odeh did eventually obey the

officers’ request to move his vehicle. However, his failure to promptly comply with

the officers’ orders was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial, Lieutenant

Arnold testified that Mr. Odeh moved his vehicle ten minutes after the order to move

was initially given. He further testified that Mr. Odeh moved his vehicle from

location two to location three after ten additional minutes had passed. Lieutenant

Arnold stated that the entire interaction with Mr. Odeh lasted approximately forty to

fifty minutes.

Mr. Odeh also asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that he was guilty of violating La. R.S. 32:56 because the disobedience citation was

issued by a levee police officer who had just accosted him racially, fabricated

19

evidence in his Internal Affairs statement to investigators, and was not present when

the order to move the vehicle was given by the ordering officer. He further argues

that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of

violating La. R.S. 32:56 because the officer who issued the order, in his sole

discretion, chose not to issue any citations at all. We find no merit to Mr. Odeh’s

assertions.

At trial, Lieutenant Butler admitted that he stated, “I don’t know how you treat

the police in the country you come from, however, the police are treated with respect

in this country.” Lieutenant Butler denied that the comment was racial. Also, a

review of Lieutenant Butler’s Internal Affairs statement reflects that it is similar to

his trial testimony. No evidence was presented at trial that Lieutenant Butler has a

history or pattern of bias or racially motivated behavior towards persons from

Palestine. Also, no evidence was presented at trial by Mr. Odeh that Lieutenant

Butler fabricated evidence in his Internal Affairs statement to investigators. Mere

conjecture is insufficient to challenge if an element of a crime has been met.

As to Mr. Odeh’s contentions regarding issuance of the citation, a review of

the record reveals that at trial Lieutenant Arnold explained that La. R.S. 38:213 was

a moving violation and that tickets for such violations could be issued by the officer

who saw it or by any other officer on the scene. He further testified that Lieutenant

Butler was his supervisor, who agreed to take over the scene and believed that Mr.

Odeh would comply if his supervisor spoke with him.

Considering the evidence presented at trial, we find that a rational trier of fact

could have found that the evidence was sufficient under the Jackson standard to

support the conviction of failing to obey the direction of traffic officers in violation

of La. R.S. 32:56.

ERROR PATENT REVIEW

20

Finally, as is our customary practice, we have reviewed the record for errors

patent, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La.1975);

State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir.1990). Our review reveals the

following errors patent that require correction.

According to the sentencing transcript, the trial court imposed a $50.00 fine

on each count, for a total of $100.00. However, the minute entry on the docket master

attached to the writ application reflects that the fine was $50.00. The docket master

does not indicate which count or counts that fine was associated with. When there is

a discrepancy between the minute entry and the transcript, the transcript prevails.

State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732 (La.1983).

The record reflects that Mr. Odeh paid a $50.00 fine on May 26, 2021, the day

he was convicted and was sentenced, and that his remaining balance was zero.

Nevertheless, it is unknown which sentence, if either, was satisfied. It does not

appear that the record before this Court adequately shows that both fines were paid.

Thus, we hereby amend the minute entry to accurately reflect that Mr. Odeh has a

balance of $50.00 owed for the fine imposed by the trial court as to count 2. We

further amend the minute entry to reflect that the $50.00 fine paid by Mr. Odeh on

May 26, 2021 applies to count 1, which was imposed by the trial court during

sentencing.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we find no merit in defendant's arguments in the writ of review

application. Mr. Odeh’s convictions and sentences are hereby affirmed, and we

amend the minute entry to accurately reflect Mr. Odeh has a balance of $50.00 owed

for the fine imposed by the trial court as to count 2 and that the $50.00 fine paid by

Mr. Odeh on May 26, 2021, applies to count 1.

AFFIRMED

21

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 23, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

21-KP-657
E-NOTIFIED
FIRST PARISH COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE JOHN J. LEE, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
THOMAS J. BUTLER (RESPONDENT) STEPHEN H. SHAPIRO (RELATOR)

MAILED
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(DISTRICT JUDGE) ATTORNEY AT LAW
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