Curtis Joseph Lawrence Versus Ashton Plantation Home Owners Association, Inc.

CURTIS JOSEPH LAWRENCE NO. 22-C-122

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

ASHTON PLANTATION HOME OWNERS COURT OF APPEAL
ASSOCIATION, INC.
STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 86,580, DIVISION "E"
HONORABLE TIMOTHY S. MARCEL, JUDGE PRESIDING

June 28, 2022

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg

AFFIRMED
SJW
MEJ
HJL

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR,
CURTIS JOSEPH LAWRENCE
Michael G. Bagneris
John O. Pieksen, Jr.

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
ASHTON PLANTATION HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
Louis G. Authement

WINDHORST, J.

Relator, Curtis Lawrence, seeks review of the trial court’s February 14, 2022

judgment (hereafter “the judgment”). Although the trial court was not sufficiently

convinced that relator contumaciously failed to comply with the mandates of the

prior consent judgment and did not hold him in contempt, the court found that relator

was nonetheless obligated to perform everything the consent judgment had ordered

and to which he had agreed, as well as damages to which he had agreed in the event

of non-performance. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment awarding

executory damages commensurate with those previously specified in the consent

judgment. For the reasons stated herein, we find no error in the trial court judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent, Ashton Plantation Home Owners Association, Inc., filed a

petition and amended petition for permanent injunction against relator in 2019 and

2020 respectively. Trial was set on January 19, 2021. In lieu of a trial, the parties

reached a compromise (hereafter “the Stipulations”) whereby relator stipulated that

he violated the restrictions as alleged in the petitions, and relator was given an

additional six months to resolve the violations. The Stipulations further provided

that if relator did not resolve said violations, a trial was set for July 23, 2021. Relator

again failed to resolve said violations. On July 23, 2021, in lieu of the trial, the

parties entered into the consent judgment in which relator agreed to perform various

specified actions to resolve the violations, within specified deadlines, and agreed to

the imposition of daily penalties for the failure to comply, the same executed by the

trial court on July 26, 2022.

On November 8, 2021, respondent filed a pleading captioned “Rule for

Contempt,” seeking to: (1) have relator held in contempt for his failure to comply

with the terms of the consent judgment; (2) enforce the penalty provisions of the

consent judgment for failure to timely comply with the mandated actions; and

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(3) for legal fees and expenses (hereafter cumulatively “the Rule”). The trial court

found relator was not in contempt, but enforced the penalty provisions of the consent

judgment. The February 14, 2022 judgment addresses respondent’s motion to

enforce consent judgment; calculates and orders the imposition of penalties against

relator and makes the penalties executory; and is silent as to the trial court’s ruling

on the issue of contempt.1

In his writ application, relator contends that (1) the trial court abused its

discretion by imposing monetary penalties against relator after finding that relator

was not in contempt of the July 23, 2021 consent judgment; (2) the trial court

erroneously relied on contract principles when imposing monetary penalties against

relator; and (3) the trial court erred by denying relator the use of the contract defense

theories to defend against the imposition of monetary penalties.

Relator incorrectly asserts that the only matter set before the trial court on

January 20, 2022 was the issue of contempt. Relator maintains that the trial court

did not have authority to rule in favor of respondent and impose monetary penalties

against relator after ruling that relator was not in contempt. Therefore, relator argues

that the trial court’s finding of no contempt is inconsistent with and precludes, the

imposition of any monetary penalties, so the judgment must be vacated or amended

to reflect the denial of respondent’s rule and removal of any award of monetary

penalties. Relator further argues that despite a finding that he was not in contempt,

the trial court “unilaterally, and without legal basis, inexplicably imposed what is

essentially a ‘strict liability’ standard to the consent judgment, and held that [relator]

was obligated to pay $38,700.00 in penalties to [respondent].” He claims that he did

1 Although the judgment is silent as to the trial court’s finding on the issue of contempt, the transcript shows

that the trial court specifically found that relator was not in contempt of the consent judgment. Regardless,
when a judgment is silent as to a claim or demand that was litigated, it is deemed denied by the trial court.
Cambre v. St. John the Baptist Parish, 12-590 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/16/13), 119 So.3d 73, 81, writ denied,
13-1415 (La. 10/11/13), 123 So.3d 1227; Oreman v. Oreman, 07-296 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/07), 971 So.2d
1149, 1158, writ denied, 08-128 (La. 03/12/08), 977 So.2d 919. Neither party has sought review of the trial
court’s finding that relator was not in contempt.

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not agree in the consent judgment to waive any contract defenses, such as Hurricane

Ida’s impact, force majeure, Act of God, and other bases for the impossibility of

performance. Thus, relator asserts if the trial court was correct in applying a breach-

of-contract analysis to the Rule, which he disputes, he should have been allowed to

present contractual defenses, including Hurricane Ida, to justify his inability to

perform the obligations required of him. Relator therefore argues that the trial

court’s use of a “strict liability” breach-of-contract analysis to impose penalties

against relator constitutes error as well.

In opposition, respondent contends that while captioned as “Rule for

Contempt,” respondent requested three separate and distinct forms of relief in the

prayer and in the rule to show cause order, specifically: (i) for relator to be found in

contempt of court; (ii) for relator to be cast in judgment for the daily penalties set

forth in the consent judgment; and (iii) for relator to be responsible for the costs and

attorneys’ fees incurred in the enforcement of the consent judgment. Respondent

argues that relator did not except or raise any objections, in writing or orally at the

hearing, to the scope of the proceeding or the forms of relief sought. Respondent

maintains that cumulation of the actions/relief requested in the Rule was permitted

under La. C.C.P. art 462 and La. C.C.P. art. 2592; therefore, any objection relator

may have was waived by relator and his counsel’s participation in the January 20,

2022 hearing. Respondent further asserts that the testimony and evidence supports

the relief requested in the Rule and the trial court did not err in imposing the daily

penalties set forth in consent judgment for relator’s noncompliance by the specific

deadlines to resolve the violations. Respondent contends that the trial court denied

its request to find relator in contempt, granted its request for imposition of penalties

set forth in the consent judgment, and preserved respondent’s right for costs and

attorneys’ fees. Respondent initially contends that relator is prohibited from

appealing enforcement of the penalties imposed by the consent judgment pursuant

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to La. C.C.P. art. 2085.2 Respondent argues that the February 14, 2022 judgment is

a final judgment because it determined the merits of respondent’s request for

penalties and thus, this writ application “should be dismissed as procedurally

improper and otherwise barred.” In response to relator’s arguments, respondent

contends it specifically sought separate and distinct relief in the Rule, contempt and

enforcement of the consent judgment. Therefore, the trial court had authority to and

correctly determined respondent’s second request for relief, the enforcement of the

consent judgment as a contract. As such, under the clear and explicit terms of the

consent judgment, respondent contends that the trial court did not err in the

calculation and imposition of penalties against relator.

Respondent’s Procedural Objection

Respondent contends that the February 14, 2022 judgment is a final

appealable judgment, and that therefore it cannot be reviewed on an application for

writs pursuant to our supervisory jurisdiction. We disagree.

La. C.C.P. art. 1915 A provides that a final judgment may be rendered,

although it does not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, in six specific instances.

The judgment in this case is none of the six specified instances.

La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B further provides:
B. (1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary
judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less
than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party,
whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim,
third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a
final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court
after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any such
order or decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose
of an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to
rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties. [Emphasis added.]

2 La. C.C.P. art. 2085 provides that “An appeal cannot be taken by a party who confessed judgment in the
proceedings in the trial court or who voluntarily and unconditionally acquiesced in a judgment rendered
against him.”

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Thus, La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B (1) says that when a court, as herein, renders a partial

judgment to one or more, but fewer than all of the claims, the judgment shall not

constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the trial

court, and after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. The

trial court here made no determination that there is no just reason for delay, nor a

designation of the February 14, 2022 judgment as final and appealable. Under the

provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B(2), the judgment does not constitute a final

judgment making it immediately appealable. In the absence of the designation, it

remains a partial, interlocutory judgment.

The judgment in this case does not determine the merits of all claims of the

Rule in that nearly all of the obligations mandated by the consent judgment, which

remain orders of the trial court, had not been fulfilled at the time of the trial and

remain as matters before the trial court. Until those obligations are fulfilled or

waived, the daily penalties which may result from non-compliance may also be

ongoing.3 Lastly, the judgment does not determine the amount of unpaid legal fees.

La. C.C.P. art. 1841; Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC v. Davis, 20-271 (La. App.

5 Cir. 10/13/21), 329 So.3d 1047, 1051. All of these are claims made in the original

Rule. The judgment here is partial under La. C.C.P. art. 1915, and has not been

certified and designated as final and appealable by the trial judge under La. C.C.P.

art. 1915 B.

Lastly, La. C.C.P. art. 2083 C emphatically states:
An interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly
provided by law. [Emphasis added.]

Other than as provided in La. C.C.P. art. 1915, we see no provision which expressly

makes the judgment here appealable. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the

February 14, 2022 judgment is properly before this court on supervisory review.

3 Based on the terms of the consent judgment, until resolution of the violations acknowledged therein,
relator is subject to the imposition of further penalties for noncompliance.

22-C-122 5

Discussion of Merits

Relator argues that the sole matter before the trial court was a rule for

contempt, and he refers to the caption, “Rule for Contempt.” Harsh rules of pleading

are not favored in this state. State, Dept. of Children and Family Services ex rel.

A.L. v. Lowrie, 14-1025 (La. 05/05/15), 167 So.3d 573, 578. Pleadings must be

construed reasonably so as to afford litigants their day in court, to arrive at the truth,

and to do substantial justice. La. C.C.P. art. 865; Teachers’ Retirement System v.

Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System, 456 So.2d 594 (La. 1984).

Therefore, courts should look through the caption of pleadings in order to ascertain

their substance and to do substantial justice to the parties. Lowrie, 167 So.3d at 578,

citing Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So.2d 398, 402 n.1 (La. 1980).

The Rule clearly set forth all matters heard and decided by the judgment. The

Rule states that trial on the merits of respondent’s petition for permanent injunction

was set for July 23, 2021. In lieu of a trial, the parties entered into the consent

judgment. Under the clear and explicit terms of the consent judgment, relator was

ordered to perform certain actions to remedy the stipulated violations, including

surveying work and construction work, time deadlines, with the failure to comply

resulting in relator specified penalties owed to respondent per day for each violation.

The Rule further alleges that relator failed to timely perform the specific actions

ordered in the consent judgment. In the prayer, respondent specifically requested:

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that, after due proceedings, there be
judgment in its favor and against Curtis Joseph Lawrence for contempt
of court in violation of R.S. 13:4611(1)(c).
FURTHER, Plaintiff prays that Defendant be cast in judgment for all
daily fines imposed by the Consent Judgment, along with all
remaining legal fees and expenses incurred by Plaintiff during the
pendency of this proceeding, and for all costs incurred in the
enforcement of the Consent Judgment, including attorney’s fees
incurred, as provided for in Section 3.07 of Declaration of Covenants
& Restrictions for Plantation Lakes at Ashton Plantation recorded at
COB 660, page 455, Entry No. 313725 of the conveyance records of
St. Charles Parish. Plaintiff also request that legal interest be imposed

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upon the delinquent balances owed by the Defendant as provided for
by law. [Emphasis added.]
The order attached to the motion setting the hearing required relator to show cause:
(i) why he should not be held in contempt of court under R.S.
13:4611(1)(c) for his alleged failure to satisfy the terms of the
Consent Judgment signed by this Court on July 26, 2021;
(ii) why he should not be cast in judgment for the daily fines imposed
by said Consent Judgment along with all remaining legal fees and
expenses incurred by Plaintiff during the pendency of this
proceeding; and
(iii) why he should not be held liable for the costs of bringing this
action, including Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and legal interest on the
delinquent amounts owed by Defendant.

The Rule clearly sought to have relator held in contempt for failure to comply

with the consent judgment, and sought enforcement of the consent judgment’s

penalty provisions for relator’s violations, and sought all legal fees and costs

incurred. Relator did not object orally or by written exception to the nature and

scope of the proceeding, nor the scope of the relief requested in the Rule. Further,

relator and counsel appeared at the hearing and argued the merits of respondent’s

Rule without any objection to consideration of penalties, legal fees and costs. Any

objection thereto is therefore waived.

Based on the substance of the Rule, the prayer, and the show cause order,

enforcement of the consent judgment was also properly before the trial court.

Accordingly, we will review the correctness of the trial court’s ruling granting

respondent’s request for enforcement of the consent judgment by imposing daily

penalties against relator for his noncompliance.

A judgment is a solemn adjudication of a court, settling the rights of the

parties, as disclosed by the record, and which passes on the matters presented for

determination. Peeler v. Dural, 06-936 (La. App. 5 Cir. 04/11/07), 958 So.2d 31,

34. Whether a judgment results from the assent of the parties or is the result of a

judicial determination after a trial on the merits, it is accorded sanctity under the law.

Id. at 35.

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A consent judgment is a bilateral contract in which parties adjust their

differences by mutual consent, thereby putting an end to a lawsuit with each party

balancing hope of gain against fear of loss. La. C.C. art. 3071; Plaquemines Parish

Government v. Getty Oil Co., 95-2452 (La. 05/21/96), 673 So.2d 1002, 1006. It has

attributes both of contracts and of judicial decree. Peeler, 958 So.2d at 35. A consent

judgment can be enforced by summary proceedings. La. C.C.P. art. 2593; Peeler,

958 So.2d at 35; Preston Oil Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 594 So.2d

908, 914 (La. App 1 Cir. 1991). A trial court’s judgment on a motion to enforce is

an interlocutory judgment and the proper method to sue when seeking review of an

interlocutory judgment is to apply for supervisory writs. Crown Pine Timber 4, LP

v. Crosby Land & Resources, L.L.C., 20-356 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/25/20), 311 So.3d

434, 439. The standard of review of a motion to enforce settlement or consent

judgment is the manifest error/clearly wrong standard. Eckstein v. Becnel, 17-868

(La. App. 4 Cir. 06/27/18), 250 So.3d 1046, 1053, writ denied, 18-1275 (La.

11/05/18), 255 So.3d 1054. When reviewing and interpreting a consent judgment,

the court applies the basic principles of contract interpretation, which begins with

the determination of the common intent of the parties in forming the contract. La.

C.C. art. 2045. The reasonable intention of the parties to the contract is sought by

examining the words of the contract itself. Prejean v. Guillory, 10-740 (La.

07/02/10), 38 So.3d 274, 279. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit

and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search

of the parties’ intent. La. C.C. art. 2046.

The law of contracts is the law that supports all subsequent court orders with

deadlines that follow a consent judgment. See City of Kenner v. Jumonville, 97-125

(La. App. 5 Cir. 08/27/97), 701 So.2d 223, 228. Deadlines are supported by the

general law of contracts. Id. The court cannot undermine a contract simply because

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it was a bad deal, or is believed to be, for one of the parties.4 Id. When parties

voluntarily negotiate and sign a consent judgment, Louisiana law recognizes that as

the law between the parties, and the trial court’s enforcement of a consent judgment

must follow the intent of the parties based upon the explicit words of the contract.

Jones v. City of New Orleans, 20-247 (La. App. 4 Cir. 04/14/21), 315 So.3d 963, 966.

Relator argues that the trial court “unilaterally, and without legal basis,

inexplicably imposed what is essentially a ‘strict liability’ standard to the Consent

Judgment.” We disagree. The consent judgment provided for “daily penalties,”

which amount to liquidated damages, in the event relator does not perform as

mandated by the consent judgment. By the Stipulations and the evidence produced

at trial, respondent proved its case. The trial court applied the consent judgment, the

law between the parties, to the stipulated facts and trial evidence. We see no

application of strict liability.

In determining whether to impose daily penalties per the consent judgment,

the transcript shows that the trial court considered relator’s contractual defense

arguments, including the impact of Hurricane Ida on his inability to retain surveyors,

craftsmen, and/or tradesmen to perform the required work. The trial court ultimately

rejected the same, finding that relator consented to and obligated himself to perform

the work and that he is responsible for its nonperformance not any surveyors,

craftsmen, and/or tradesmen. The trial court stated:

If there were concerns about securing the necessary surveying
professionals, craftsmen, and tradesmen to perform this work, that
should have been taken into account prior to entering into the
agreement. It wasn’t. And as [counsel for respondent] pointed out, the
deadlines for retaining a survey actually expired before the August 29th
Hurricane Ida event. There are consequences, and the parties
contemplated the consequences for nonperformance in their agreement.
And today I am going to enforce the parties’ agreement as it relates to
the penalties. [Emphasis added.]

4 This court does not address the issue of whether the consent judgment was a “bad deal” for relator
concerning the deadlines and imposition of daily penalties for failure to comply.

22-C-122 9

The trial court considered the evidence and testimony, calculated the imposition of

daily penalties per the terms of the consent judgment, and imposed the same against

relator in favor of respondent. Relator did not object to the trial court’s calculation

of the penalties.

We find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in enforcing the

consent judgment by imposition of the agreed upon penalties for failure to comply

with the terms of the consent judgment. We find the wording agreed to by the parties

in the consent judgment is clear and unambiguous. The parties voluntarily and freely

entered into this consent judgment, which contained specific deadlines for

completion of certain tasks to eliminate said violations and the imposition of daily

penalties for noncompliance. Any concerns by relator about the ability to hire

surveyors, craftsmen, and/or tradesmen and for their performance of the tasks

specified within the specific deadlines, as stated by the trial court, could have and

should have been considered by relator prior to agreeing to the same. Moreover, we

note relator did not dispute that the terms of the consent judgment were accepted

knowingly and voluntarily, or that relator failed to comply with those terms; rather,

relator only argued that his noncompliance was due to circumstances beyond his

control, including the impact of Hurricane Ida.

Here, relator, as the noncompliant party to the consent judgment, was aware

from the clear and unambiguous agreed-upon terms that noncompliance in resolving

the violations within the requisite deadlines would result in, and continue to result

in, the imposition of daily penalties for the same until the terms of the consent

judgment are satisfied. A judgment, whether it results from the assent of the parties

or is the result of a judicial determination after a trial on the merits, is and should be

accorded sanctity under the law. Preston, 594 So.2d at 913. We therefore find that

the trial court did not err.

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DECREE

After thorough review of the record, and for the reasons stated above, we find

no error in the trial court’s February 14, 2022 judgment granting respondent’s

motion to enforce the consent judgment and in imposing penalties against relator

and in favor of respondent.5 Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

5 Although not argued, we further note that the trial court also could have enforced the provisions of the
consent judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2502, which provides:
If a judgment orders the delivery of a thing and the sheriff cannot seize it because the
defendant has concealed or removed it from the jurisdiction of the court, or when the
judgment orders a defendant to do or refrain from doing an act other than the delivery of a
thing, and he refuses or neglects to comply with the order, the party entitled to performance
may obtain by contradictory motion the following remedies:
(1) A writ to distrain the property of the defendant;
(2) An order adjudging the disobedient party in contempt; or
(3) A judgment for any damages he may have sustained. He may likewise sue for
damages in a separate action.

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
JUNE 28, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

22-C-122
E-NOTIFIED
29TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE TIMOTHY S. MARCEL (DISTRICT JUDGE)
JOHN O. PIEKSEN, JR. (RELATOR) MICHAEL G. BAGNERIS (RELATOR)

MAILED
LOUIS G. AUTHEMENT (RESPONDENT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
13919 RIVER ROAD
SUITE 300
LULING, LA 70070