Nicole R. Jackson Versus B.A.L. & Associates, LLC, and R. Joseph Tamimie, Md

NICOLE R. JACKSON NO. 22-C-179

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

B.A.L. & ASSOCIATES, LLC, AND COURT OF APPEAL
R. JOSEPH TAMIMIE, MD
STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 788-403, DIVISION "H"
HONORABLE DONALD L. FORET, JUDGE PRESIDING

September 21, 2022

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

REVERSED
JJM
SMC
SJW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
NICOLE R. JACKSON
Pamela W. Carter
Linda Estelle Gonzales
Atticus Hanrahan

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
B.A.L. AND ASSOCIATES
Carl E. Hellmers, III

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR,
DR. R. JOSEPH TAMIMIE
Christy M. Howley
M. Elizabeth Bowman

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
LANDMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
Adam D. Whitworth

MOLAISON, J.

The appellant, Dr. Joseph Tamimie, seeks review of the trial court’s denial

of his motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we reverse.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The appellee, Nicole Jackson, filed the lawsuit below which alleges that the

appellant, Dr. Joseph Tamimie, improperly communicated the results of a positive

drug screen which ultimately led to her termination of employment by Hiller

Company. Dr. Tamimie filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied

following a hearing on March 29, 2022. At issue in the instant application is

whether the trial court erred in determining that there were genuine issues of

material fact as to whether Dr. Tamimie violated applicable state and federal

guidelines in disclosing her drug test results and whether Dr. Tamimie breached a

contractual duty to B.A.L. that caused damages to Ms. Jackson as a third party.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Appellate courts review the granting or denying of a summary judgment de

novo, using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether

summary judgment is appropriate. Davis v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 13-255 (La. App.

5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128 So.3d 471, 475, writ denied, 13-2818 (La. 2/14/14), 132

So.3d 967. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of

material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P.

art. 966(B)(2).

After our de novo review of the application, we find the following facts to be

uncontested: Ms. Jackson was employed by Hiller as a non-DOT (Department of

Transportation) employee; Ms. Jackson’s voluntary drug test, which was collected

at B.A.L. & Associates, LLC (“B.A.L.”), and tested by Quest Diagnostics, was

positive for amphetamines; at the time of the drug test, Ms. Jackson claims to have

had a valid prescription for Adderall, which is an amphetamine; Dr. Tamimie

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served as B.A.L.’s medical review officer (“MRO”) and reviewed the results of

Ms. Jackson’s test; Dr. Tamimie’s office made three unsuccessful attempts over a

72-hour period from October 17, 2017, through October 20, 2017, to contact Ms.

Jackson in order allow her to explain the presence of amphetamines in her sample;

at no time did Ms. Jackson respond to Dr. Tamimie’s messages; after

unsuccessfully attempting to contact Ms. Jackson, Dr. Tamimie certified to B.A.L.

that Ms. Jackson’s drug test was positive for amphetamines, and; Dr. Tamimie did

not communicate the results of Ms. Jackson’s drug test to Hiller, only to B.A.L.

SAMHSA Guidelines

LSA-R.S. 49:1005(B) provides that the type of drug testing conducted in

this case shall be in compliance with Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services

Administration (“SAMHSA”) guidelines. Ms. Jackson does not allege the

guidelines in the actual testing for a non-DOT employee were not followed. She

also does not dispute the test result that her sample tested positive for

amphetamines. Ms. Jackson does allege, however, that there is an issue of material

fact of whether Dr. Tamimie failed to follow “SAMHSA 4.2.”

We first note that the provision of “SAMHSA 4.2,” captioned as “Who may

not collect a specimen?” and which is attached to Ms. Jackson’s opposition to the

motion for summary judgment as “Exhibit 6,” appears to have been provided in

error.1 The accurate reference to the suggested protocols used by MROs in

contacting a specimen donor is found in section 4.2 of the publication “Medical

Review Officer Guidance Manual for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs”

1
While she incorrectly provided the text of section 4.2, Ms. Jackson’s argument below accurately
identified the recommended guidelines found in “Medical Review Officer Guidance Manual for Federal
Workplace Drug Testing Programs.” Dr. Tamamie specifically referenced this publication in his motion
for summary judgment, as well as correct excerpt from the publication, and the website at which the
entire version is located. Appellate courts are allowed to take judicial notice of governmental websites.
See, La. C.E. art. 201, Mendoza v. Mendoza, 17-70 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/6/18), 249 So.3d 67, writ denied,
18-1138 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 1083, and Daurbigney v. Liberty Pers. Ins. Co., 18-929 (La. App. 3 Cir.
5/9/19), 272 So.3d 69, 71. Another exhibit in the record, a letter from Dr. Brian M. Bourgeois to counsel
for B.A.L., also provides an excerpt from the guidance manual, which Dr. Bourgeois acknowledges is not
a mandatory protocol for MROs making a determination of a lab result.

22-C-179 2

titled “Donor Interview,” which became effective on October 1, 2017. The

manual, which is not codified, states in its preface:

This guidance is intended to assist Medical Review Officers
(MROs) in carrying out their regulated responsibilities under the
Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs
using Urine (82 FR 7920). This guidance does not establish legally
enforceable responsibilities, but may reference actions or
responsibilities that are required under statutory or regulatory
authorities. The use of the word “should” in this guidance means
that something is suggested or recommended, but not necessarily
required by law.

[Emphasis added.] Without the force of law, we find that the guidance provided

therein does not serve as a standard under which Dr. Tamimie could have sustained

liability. Even so, it appears from the record before us that Dr. Tamimie did, in

fact, substantially comply with the recommendations for contacting Ms. Jackson,

only certifying the positive result after she failed to return the three calls from his

office.

Related to this argument by Ms. Jackson in her opposition were assertions

that there were genuine issues of material fact:

1. Whether Plaintiff failed to answer or return the MRO's phone calls.
2. Whether the drug test results for Ms. Jackson were accurate,
considering she was not provided with the opportunity to submit a
valid, legal prescription.
5. Whether Dr. Tamimie was required to allow five business days for
Ms. Jackson to respond after his first attempt at contact.

As noted above, evidence was presented that Dr. Tamimie attempted on three

occasions to contact Ms. Jackson to no avail. Ms. Jackson stated in her deposition

that she never spoke to, or returned phone calls to, Dr. Tamimie’s office about her

drug test. Had she replied, however, she would have had the opportunity to provide

information about any prescriptions she may have been taking to explain the

presence of amphetamines in her sample.2

2
We also note that section 5.4 of Hiller’s “Substance Abuse Program Policy Manual,” identified
as Exhibit 5 in Ms. Jackson’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment provides:

22-C-179 3

Considering the foregoing, we do not find that Ms. Jackson showed that

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Tamimie violated

SAMHSA drug testing guidelines when he confirmed that Ms. Jackson’s sample

was positive for amphetamines.

Allegations involving B.A.L.

In opposing the motion for summary judgment, Ms. Jackson argued that Dr.

Tamimie was negligent “by failing to advise BAL when he was unable to make

contact with Ms. Jackson, per the parameters of Dr. Tamimie's assignment as MRO

outlined in B.A.L.'s letter of October 13, 2017.” The letter referred to by Ms.

Jackson states, in its entirety:

Please perform a Medical Review on the results of a
Reasonable cause drug test for Nicole Jackson an employee of Hebert
Hiller. Client provided telephone number 504-274-6662. If you cannot
make contact, please advise and the company will facilitate.

[Emphasis as in the original.] As can be seen from the plain language of the letter,

the form of the advisal is not specified.

Ms. Jackson contends that the foregoing letter constitutes a contract between

B.A.L. and Dr. Tamimie, which created a legal obligation by Dr. Tamimie to her,

personally.3 Ms. Jackson further argues that the letter “clearly imposes upon Dr.

A confirmed positive result may be caused by prescribed medications. Notify your supervisor of
medications you have recently taken that may affect your drug test. In case of a confirmed
negative
result, the employee will be reimbursed for the expense of confirmation.

While there is evidence in the record that Ms. Jackson followed this exact procedure for a prior 2015 drug
test, it is not clear whether Ms. Jackson availed herself of this remedy with Hiller after her most recent
test was returned as positive. In any event, Hiller’s compliance with its own policy can in no way be
attributed to Dr. Tamimie.
3
In support of this argument below, Ms. Jackson relied upon cases such as Elliott v. Lab'y
Specialists, Inc., 588 So.2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (La. 1992), wherein this
Court held that there was a non-contractual obligation between companies testing for drugs and the
person being tested to the extent that the laboratories had a duty to analyze bodily fluid in a “scientifically
reasonable manner.” Elliot, and the other opinion cited by Ms. Jackson on this issue, Lewis v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 588 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 411 (La. 1992), are
distinguishable in one important respect: the instant case does not involve an error in testing or a false
positive result. As previously noted, the result of Ms. Jackson’s test which showed positive for
amphetamines is not contested.

22-C-179 4

Tamimie duties beyond the standard SAMHSA guidelines,” which he accepted

“when he began his performance by serving as MRO for Ms. Jackson’s drug

screen.”

The record before us provides no basis to support Ms. Jackson’s contention

that Dr. Tamimie breached any duty to B.A.L. First, as noted above, there is no

evidence that Dr. Tamimie failed to follow any laws pertaining to the actual

handling of the sample. There is no dispute that the sample was, in fact, positive

for amphetamines. An attachment to Dr. Tamimie’s motion for summary judgment

titled, “Medical Review Officer’s Contact Record of Urine Drug Screen/Alcohol

Testing,” records in writing Dr. Tamimie’s three unsuccessful attempts to contact

Ms. Jackson. In his deposition, Dr. Tamimie stated that it was his practice to

declare a negative or positive finding after contacting Mr. Balash at B.A.L. In this

case, Dr. Tamimie stated that he certified the finding as positive after documenting

that he had not been able to make contact with Ms. Jackson. Dr. Tamimie further

indicated that the call log documenting the phone calls to Ms. Jackson was part of

the record of the test certification. One exhibit included in the record, a letter dated

December 14, 2021 from Dr. Brian M. Bourgeois to counsel for B.A.L., opines

that Dr. Tamimie fulfilled his role as MRO for B.A.L. on October 20, 2017, when

he transmitted his signed letter and call log to B.A.L.

Therefore, even if were to conclude that B.A.L.'s letter of October 13, 2017,

to Dr. Tamimie imposed an additional contractual duty to notify B.A.L. of an

inability to contact Ms. Jackson, Ms. Jackson has not demonstrated a failure by Dr.

Tamimie to convey the documentation to B.A.L. of the three unsuccessful attempts

to contact her. What B.A.L. did with that information after it was provided,

however, is not attributable to Dr. Tamimie. Accordingly, we find no merit in Ms.

Jackson’s argument, as raised below.

22-C-179 5

CONCLUSION

After our de novo review of the record before us, we find there is no genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Tamimie complied with all applicable laws

in his certification of Ms. Jackson’s urine test results. We also find that Ms.

Jackson has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding her

allegation that Dr. Tamimie breached a contractual duty to B.A.L. Accordingly,

we reverse the trial court’s ruling, grant summary judgment in Dr. Tamimie’s

favor, and dismiss with prejudice Ms. Jackson’s claims against Dr. Tamimie.

REVERSED

22-C-179 6

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
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SEPTEMBER 21, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL
PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

22-C-179
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE DONALD L. FORET (DISTRICT JUDGE)
LINDA ESTELLE GONZALES (RESPONDENT) PAMELA W. CARTER (RESPONDENT) CHRISTY M. HOWLEY (RELATOR)
M. ELIZABETH BOWMAN (RELATOR) ADAM D. WHITWORTH (RESPONDENT)

MAILED
CARL E. HELLMERS, III (RESPONDENT) ATTICUS HANRAHAN (RESPONDENT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW ATTORNEY AT LAW
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SUITE 3700 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70123
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70163