Rajesh Ramchandra Chauhan Versus Southern Pacific Holding Corp. and Kumiai Senpaku Co Ltd
Rajesh Ramchandra Chauhan Versus Southern Pacific Holding Corp. and Kumiai Senpaku Co Ltd, No. 22-C-432 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2022).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Sanders v. Sanders 812 So. 2d 749
- State v. Willis 818 So. 2d 780
- Giroir v. Giroir 536 So. 2d 830
- Dosfer Intercontinental Commercial & Investment, Inc. v. Amerwood International, A Division of Hansen-Pringle Co. 468 So. 2d 634
- Higley v. Higley 658 So. 2d 42
- State v. Simms 663 So. 2d 732
- 297 So. 3d 770 not in our corpus
- Lejano v. Bandak 705 So. 2d 158
Opinion text
RAJESH RAMCHANDRA CHAUHAN NO. 22-C-432
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
SOUTHERN PACIFIC HOLDING CORP. COURT OF APPEAL
AND KUMIAI SENPAKU CO LTD
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 89,972, DIVISION "E"
HONORABLE TIMOTHY S. MARCEL, JUDGE PRESIDING
November 02, 2022
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Hans J. Liljeberg
WRIT DENIED
JGG
FHW
HJL
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
RAJESH RAMCHANDRA CHAUHAN
Richard J. Dodson
Kenneth H. Hooks, III
Henry P. Mounger
Michael A. Colomb
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR,
SOUTHERN PACIFIC HOLDING CORPORATION
Robert H. Murphy
Peter B. Sloss
Samuel L. Sands
Tarryn E. Walsh
GRAVOIS, J.
Relator/defendant, Southern Pacific Holding Corporation, seeks this Court’s
supervisory review of the trial court’s August 5, 2022 judgment which denied its
“Declinatory Exceptions of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Improper Venue,
Insufficiency of Citation, and Improper Service of Process.” The issue before this
Court is whether the Louisiana state court in question has personal jurisdiction
over Southern Pacific. For the reasons that follow, we deny the writ application.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondent/plaintiff, Rajesh Ramchandra Chauhan, filed a petition for
damages against Southern Pacific and Kumiai Senpaku Co. Ltd., arising out of
injuries he allegedly sustained as a seaman while working aboard the M/V WHITE
HORSE.1 The M/V WHITE HORSE is owned by Southern Pacific, a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of Panama with its principal place of
business in Tokyo, Japan. Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of India. On
November 17, 2021, while plaintiff was on the M/V WHITE HORSE in the
Atlantic Ocean on a voyage from Tarragona, Spain to Baltimore, Maryland, he
allegedly sustained an injury to his right thumb. In January 2022, while the M/V
WHITE HORSE was called at port at St. Rose, Louisiana, in St. Charles Parish, the
St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office attached the M/V WHITE HORSE pursuant to
La. C.C.P. arts. 9 and 3541(5).
Southern Pacific filed “Declinatory Exceptions of Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, Improper Venue, Insufficiency of Citation, and Improper Service of
Process.” Regarding the exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, Southern
Pacific argued that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), for the
1
A copy of the petition for damages was not included with the writ application.
22-C-432 1
trial court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction through the attachment of property,
Southern Pacific must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to
satisfy International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.
95 (1945), and its progeny. Southern Pacific asserted that it does not have the
requisite minimum contacts with Louisiana to allow Louisiana state courts to
exercise jurisdiction over it.2
Following a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on August 5, 2022
denying the exceptions. In written reasons for judgment, the trial court found that
in maritime and admiralty actions, the presence of the vessel (the res) is the only
jurisdictional fact necessary to support in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. Further, the trial court found that even if the “minimum contacts” test
applies in the realm of jurisdiction by attachment, Southern Pacific’s “action of
utilizing Louisiana territorial waters satisfies any substantive due process concerns
for in personam jurisdiction.”
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In reviewing a ruling on an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant by a Louisiana court, this Court conducts a de novo review
of the legal issue of personal jurisdiction. See Sanders v. Sanders, 00-2899 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 2/15/02), 812 So.2d 749, 752, writ denied, 02-1145 (La. 6/14/02), 818
So.2d 780.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 9 contemplates the assertion of
quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if property is located in this
state. See Giroir v. Giroir, 536 So.2d 830, 833 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). La.
C.C.P. art. 9 provides:
A court which is otherwise competent under the laws of this state has
jurisdiction to render a money judgment against a nonresident if the
2
Concerning the other exceptions, Southern Pacific argued that the writ of attachment served as
the basis for venue, citation, and service of process, and since the writ of attachment was invalid, those
too were invalid.
22-C-432 2
action is commenced by an attachment of his property in this state.
Unless the nonresident subjects himself personally to the jurisdiction
of the court, the judgment may be executed only against the property
attached.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3541(5) provides that a writ of
attachment may be obtained when the defendant “[i]s a nonresident who has no
duly appointed agent for service of process within the state.”
In this writ application, Southern Pacific, relying on Shaffer, supra, argues
that the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction is not applicable in the present case
since Southern Pacific lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Louisiana to justify
personal jurisdiction.
Shaffer involved a shareholder’s derivative action in a Delaware state court.
The plaintiff filed suit against 30 defendants, including a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Arizona, its wholly owned subsidiary,
incorporated in California with its principal place of business in Arizona, and 28
present and former officers or directors of the corporations, none of whom were
Delaware residents. The activities that led to the action occurred in Oregon. Quasi
in rem jurisdiction was established by a Delaware sequestration statute that
allowed for the seizure of corporate shares and stock options of 21 of the
defendants. Id. at 189-91, 97 S.Ct. at 2572-73. The defendants moved to vacate
the sequestration order, arguing that it violated due process since under
International Shoe,3 they lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Delaware to
sustain the jurisdiction of the state’s court. Id. at 193, 97 S.Ct. at 2573-74. The
Supreme Court agreed and found that the presence of property in the forum state
alone does not support the state’s jurisdiction, noting that the relationship between
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation was the “central concern of the inquiry
3
International Shoe held that due process requires that in order to subject a nonresident defendant
to a personal judgment, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 326
U.S. at 320, 66 S.Ct. at 160.
22-C-432 3
into personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 204, 97 S.Ct. at 2580. The Supreme Court
concluded that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.” Id. at
212, 97 S.Ct. at 2584.
Louisiana courts have followed Shaffer and have held that to exercise quasi
in rem jurisdiction through nonresident attachment under La. C.C.P. art. 9, the
nonresident defendant must have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state. In
Dosfer Intercontinental Commercial & Inv., Inc. v. Amerwood Int’l, a Div. of
Hansen-Pringle Co., 468 So.2d 634 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff, a
Florida corporation, sold wooden tool handles to the defendant, a Texas
corporation. The plaintiff filed suit on an open account for goods sold to the
defendant, and obtained a writ of attachment on a shipment of wooden handles
purchased by the defendant from a third party in Honduras that was in transit in the
Port of New Orleans. Id. at 635. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found that
the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction under La. C.C.P. art. 9 must satisfy the
demands of due process. The court applied the standards set forth in International
Shoe to find that the defendant did not have sufficient “contacts, ties, or relations”
with Louisiana to permit Louisiana jurisdiction by attachment of the defendant’s
property. Id. at 636.
Likewise, in Higley v. Higley, 95-0965 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/29/95), 658 So.2d
42, writ denied, 95-2266 (La. 11/27/95), 663 So.2d 732, the plaintiff claimed that
the defendant owed her $25,000 for repayment of personal loans. Both the
plaintiff and the defendant were residents of Florida. The plaintiff sought a writ of
attachment of money owed to the defendant by a Louisiana corporation with its
principal place of business in New Orleans. Id. at 44. Finding Shaffer applicable,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found that though the defendant had contacts
with Louisiana, the contacts did not outweigh the evidence of unfairness to the
22-C-432 4
defendant to require him to defend the suit in Louisiana. The court stated that
Louisiana had no interest in a suit for repayment of a loan involving two out-of-
state residents, and the property attached had no relation to the cause of action
asserted by the plaintiff. The court ordered that the writ of attachment be
dissolved. Id. at 46.
Nevertheless, neither Shaffer nor the above-referenced Louisiana cases
involved a maritime or admiralty claim and the attachment of a vessel.4
Following Shaffer, federal courts have considered Shaffer’s application to
Supplement Rule B for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture
Actions. Rule B establishes quasi in rem jurisdiction by attachment of property if
the defendant is not found within the district.5 Federal courts have upheld the
constitutionality of Rule B and have found that the rule of Shaffer did not apply to
maritime quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI, 310
F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2002); Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transp.
Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978); Polar Shipping Ltd. v.
Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982); and Amoco Overseas Oil
Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir.
1979). In Great Prize, S.A. v. Mariner Shipping Party, Ltd., 967 F.2d 157, 159
(5th Cir. 1992), the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding quasi in
rem jurisdiction, that “a good-faith allegation in the complaint that the res is
4
In opposition to this writ application, plaintiff references a recent case in which he alleges that
Southern Pacific argued “an almost identical exception to personal jurisdiction over another owner whose
vessel was attached in the Mississippi River.” According to plaintiff, the Plaquemines Parish trial court
found no merit to the argument, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and the Louisiana Supreme Court
both denied writs. See Int’l Transp. Workers Fed’n v. Forever Pescadores S.A. Panama, 20-00516 (La.
7/2/20), 297 So.3d 770.
5
Rule B states, in part:
(1) When Available; Complaint, Affidavit, Judicial Authorization, and Process. In an in
personam action:
(a) If a defendant is not found within the district when a verified complaint praying
for attachment and the affidavit required by Rule B(1)(b) are filed, a verified
complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant’s tangible or
intangible personal property--up to the amount sued for--in the hands of
garnishees named in the process.
22-C-432 5
present within the geographical jurisdiction of the court is the jurisdictional fact
which gives the court in personam jurisdiction over the defendant purported to
own the res.”6
Though not binding, and recognizing that these federal cases dealt with Rule
B, we nevertheless find them persuasive. Also, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
dicta in Lejano v. Bandak, 97-0388 (La. 12/12/97), 705 So.2d 158, 164, discussed
the importance of quasi in rem jurisdiction in maritime actions, stating:
Admiralty, however, still has a legitimate need for limited
forms of jurisdiction such as in rem and quasi in rem. The admiralty
court’s primary concern is maritime commerce, which is conducted on
both a national and international scale. Those involved in maritime
activities are often thinly financed, on narrow margins, highly mobile,
and potentially difficult and expensive to locate. Moreover, even if
personal jurisdiction can be asserted, when the defendant is a foreign
national the judgment may not be enforceable at the place where the
defendant’s assets are located. Thus, in cases involving foreign
parties, an inability to assert in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction may
mean the effective loss of the claim. … Permitting the quasi in rem
action also provides additional assurance to local suppliers and others
providing services on credit to transient vessels that they may be able
to enforce their claims locally. Such assurances can only operate to
the overall benefit of maritime commerce. While it is true that not all
of these considerations apply to domestic maritime commerce or our
own citizens, the need for such jurisdictional bases when dealing with
foreign nationals is not diminished. (Citation omitted.)
Accordingly, upon our de novo review, we find that in this maritime action,
attachment of the M/V WHITEHORSE established quasi in rem jurisdiction over
Southern Pacific. Thus, we find that the trial court properly denied Southern
Pacific’s declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction.
6
The lower federal courts have cited Great Prize to find that the presence of property in the
jurisdiction is sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. See Bank of W. v. Motor
Vessel 2000 FOUNTAIN 27 FEVER, No. 00-6007, 2001 WL 1795540 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2001), where the
court adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Great Prize to find that the court may impose in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant by attachment of his vessel in the jurisdiction; MARMAC, LLC v.
InterMoor, Inc., 566 F.Supp.3d 559 (E.D. La. 2021), appeal dismissed sub nom, Marmac, L.L.C. v. US
Wind, Inc., 21-30662, 2021 WL 8201393 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 2021), where the court found that if the
requirements for Rule B attachment were met, “minimum contacts and the traditional notions do not
matter” since any attached property serves as the basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
See also, Agrocooperative Ltd. v. Sonangol Shipping Angl. (Luanda) Limitada, No. H-14-1707,
2015 WL 138114 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015), where the court found that any attached property served as the
basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
22-C-432 6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s August 5,
2022 judgment which denied Southern Pacific’s Declinatory Exceptions of Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction, Improper Venue, Insufficiency of Citation, and Improper
Service of Process.” This writ application is accordingly denied.
WRIT DENIED
22-C-432 7
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
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GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
NOVEMBER 2, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
22-C-432
E-NOTIFIED
29TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE TIMOTHY S. MARCEL (DISTRICT JUDGE)
KENNETH H. HOOKS, III (RESPONDENT) PETER B. SLOSS (RELATOR) SAMUEL L. SANDS (RELATOR)
TARRYN E. WALSH (RELATOR)
MAILED
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MICHAEL A. COLOMB (RESPONDENT) ATTORNEY AT LAW
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