Stuart Services, L.L.C. Versus Nash Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. and Ronnie Camet

STUART SERVICES, L.L.C. NO. 22-CA-105

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

NASH HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING, COURT OF APPEAL
INC. AND RONNIE CAMET
STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 707-856, DIVISION "G"
HONORABLE E. ADRIAN ADAMS, JUDGE PRESIDING

December 07, 2022

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Robert A. Chaisson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

AMENDED; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED
JJM
FHW
RAC

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
STUART SERVICES, LLC
Raymond B. Landry
John F. Lee
Thomas M. Flanagan
Camille E. Gauthier
Alixe Duplechain
Leonard L. Levenson
Christian W. Helmke
Colleen B. Gannon
Donna R. Barrios

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
RONNIE CAMET
T. Randolph Richardson
Thomas J. Barbera

MOLAISON, J.

Appellant, Stuart Services, L.L.C, seeks review of the trial court’s judgment

which declined to award damages resulting from the breach of an employment

agreement, and further awarded costs and attorneys’ fees to the appellee, Ronnie

Camet. Mr. Camet has filed an answer and seeks additional attorneys’ fees

incurred in connection with the appeal as well as the trial court proceedings. For

the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court is amended in part and

affirmed as amended. Mr. Camet’s answer to the appeal is granted, in part. We

further remand the matter for additional proceedings related to the calculation of

Mr. Camet’s attorneys’ fees.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 8, 2008, Mr. Camet sold the “goodwill,” client list,1 and the

name of his business, “R.C. Camet Air Conditioning” to Stuart Services, L.L.C

(“Stuart”) for the sum of $60,000. In tandem with the sale, Mr. Camet entered into

an employment agreement with Stuart which provided, in relevant parts, that Mr.

Camet would become an employee for Stuart and his duties would fall “primarily

in the capacity of a salesperson,” and that he would also serve as a liaison between

his former customers and Stuart. The term for the employment agreement specified

that it would be effective from January 1, 2008 until December 31, 2009, unless

sooner terminated. The agreement also specified that Mr. Camet could not engage

in a business similar to Stuart, and could not solicit Stuart’s customers, for a period

of two years following his termination. Mr. Camet subsequently worked for Stuart

until November 1, 2009. After leaving employment there, Mr. Camet

unsuccessfully sought to negotiate a change in terms of the noncompetition

1
While the agreement refers to a “client list” generically, no specific clients of Mr.
Camet’s former business were named.

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agreement. In February, 2010, Mr. Camet began working for Nash Heating & Air

Conditioning, (“Nash”).

On October 31, 2011, Stuart filed a petition for damages at the Twenty-

Fourth Judicial District Court which alleged that Mr. Camet had violated the non-

competition term of their employment agreement when he accepted a position with

Nash, which was engaged in a similar business as Stuart.2 The petition also alleged

that Mr. Camet had actively pursued, within an unidentified time frame, three of

his former accounts3 and took their business away from Stuart, in violation of the

Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act.

On February 23, 2014, Stuart filed a motion for partial summary judgment

on the issue of whether Mr. Camet had breached the 2008 employment agreement.

On June 19, 2014, the trial court granted Stuart’s motion for partial summary

judgment and found that Mr. Camet had failed to fulfill his obligations under the

employment agreement with Stuart.4 In the same order, the trial court provided

that “the issue of the damages for which Camet is liable to Stuart is reserved for

future resolution.”5

A judge trial on the issue of damages was eventually held on March 1 and 3,

2021. In its judgment dated April 23, 2021, the trial court ruled in favor of Mr.

2
Stuart’s petition alleged that Mr. Camet and Nash were liable for damages in solido;
however, Nash was dismissed from the lawsuit pursuant to a joint motion granted on March 18,
2014.
3
The accounts identified by name in Stuart’s petition for damages were the St. Ann
School and Church, the St. Clement of Rome School and Church, and Guaranty Savings Bank.
4
The trial court specifically found that Mr. Camet “breached the employment agreement”
but reserved the issue of damages for future trial. As explained in the 1984 Revision Comments
to Louisiana Civil Code Article 1994 cited infra, the word “breach” was replaced by “failure to
perform”. As explained by Litanoff in the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, the term “breach” was
deliberately removed from the Civil Code during the 1984 revisions; “…the expression defective
performance, rather than breach of one kind or another, conveys with greater clarity the idea of a
performance rendered in an unsatisfactory manner.” (Emphasis original.) The Law of
Obligations: Putting in Default and Damages, 2.18. With this in mind, we endeavor in this
opinion to use the correct terminology while still recognizing the merits of parties’ arguments.
5
It does not appear that either Mr. Camet or Nash sought review of the trial court’s ruling
on the motion for partial summary judgment at that time.

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Camet, and dismissed all of Stuart’s claims against him with prejudice. The trial

court further indicated that pursuant to “Provision 5.4 of the Employment

Agreement and Provision 6.8 of the Sales Agreement,” Mr. Camet, as the

prevailing party, was entitled to collect reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees.

Mr. Camet’s motion to tax costs and expenses was heard on August 13,

2021, and, on September 27, 2021, the trial court awarded Mr. Camet $3,873.60 in

costs, in addition to $86,536.75 in attorneys’ fees. This appeal by Stuart followed.

Mr. Camet has answered the appeal and requests attorneys’ fees incurred in

connection with his opposition to Stuart’s appeal and his motion to tax costs, as

well as additional costs not awarded by the trial court.

ASSIGMENTS OF ERROR

1. The district court erred in admitting a hearsay letter into
evidence under the business records exception; that letter was not
properly authenticated as a business record of either the author or
recipient.

2. The district court erred in dismissing Stuart’s claims and finding
that it suffered no damages as a result of Camet’s breach of the
noncompetition provision.

3. The district court erred in allowing Camet, who breached the
employment agreement, to enforce the contract and collect attorney’s
fees and costs, including those incurred for issues on which Camet lost.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

In its first assignment of error, Stuart asserts that that trial court erred in

admitting one of Mr. Camet’s exhibits6 into evidence at trial, a letter from Francis

Minor, a former business manager for St. Clement of Rome, which purportedly

explains why St. Clement no longer did business with Stuart.7 At trial, Stuart

6
The exhibit at issue is identified as “Defense Exhibit-11.” The record shows that Mr.
Camet initially identified the letter as “Exhibit 13” in the joint pre-trial order filed by the parties
on February 22, 2021.
7
Among the reasons provided by the author of the letter were Stuart’s billing errors and
Stuart’s rates being higher than those of competitors.

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timely objected to the letter as hearsay. Counsel for Mr. Camet argued that the

letter was admissible under the business records exception, and Mr. Camet testified

that he kept correspondence from his former customers even after he sold his

business to Stuart. The trial court ultimately found the letter admissible under the

business records exception. While we agree with the appellant that the document

was hearsay that did not fit the parameters of the business document exception

defined in La. C.E. art. 803(6), for the reasons discussed more fully below we do

not find that the admission of the document constitutes reversible error.

La. C.E. art. 103 provides that “[E]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling

which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is

affected.” In this case the court had the benefit of Mr. Camet’s and Mr. Nash’s

trial testimony to demonstrate why St. Clement decided to no longer use Stuart and

the circumstances through which Nash was hired by St. Clement. Specifically, Mr.

Camet testified as to his understanding that St. Clement objected to being required

to pay a one-half deposit prior to the work being done. Mr. Nash testified that he

and his family had been parishioners at St. Clement’s church for some time and

that he and his wife were active in the parish. Mr. Nash stated that he was

contacted by Mr. Minor directly and asked to give an estimate on replacing some

equipment.

In light of the other evidence presented by Mr. Camet at trial, we cannot say

that the admission of the letter substantially affected Stuart’s rights.8 Accordingly,

we find the trial court’s error to be harmless in this case and the assignment of

error to be without merit.

8
In its reasons for judgment, the trial court refers only to the testimony of Mr. Camet and
Mr. Nash, but not Mr. Minor, with regard to the St. Clement’s account.

22-CA-105 4

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

In its second assignment of error, Stuart contends that the trial court erred in

finding that it suffered no damages as a result of Camet’s breach of the

noncompetition provision of the employment contract, or, in other words as

pointed out above, Camet’s failure to fulfill his obligation not to compete under the

employment agreement.

The relevant provision of the employment contract between the parties

contained both a non-compete and a non-solicitation clause. It states:

The Employee, including any members of his immediate family, shall
refrain - both directly and indirectly- from carrying on or engaging in
a business similar to Stuart Services, LLC or R.C. Camet Air
Conditioning & Heating, Inc. and/or from soliciting customers of
those businesses.

Pursuant to this language, Mr. Camet had two obligations: to not compete with

Stuart by going to work for a competitor and to not solicit customers from Stuart.

This Court has previously acknowledged that non-competition agreements are

separate and distinct from non-solicitation agreements. Wechem, Inc. v. Evans, 18-

743 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/19), 274 So.3d 877, 885, writ denied, 19-01176 (La.

10/15/19), 280 So.3d 600. The record shows that when Stuart sought a motion for

partial summary judgment on the issue of Mr. Camet’s breach of contract, it was

based on the “non-compete provision” of the employment contract, with the

specific allegation that:

Camet left Stuart’s employ, triggering the two-year period in the
Employment Agreement's non-compete provision. Shortly into that
two-year period, Camet became employed by defendant Nash
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. (“Nash”). Nash was and is a
competitor of Stuart, doing business in several of the same parishes.
As such, Camet violated the non-compete provision of the
Employment Agreement and, therefore, breached the Employment
Agreement.

The parties do not contest that Mr. Camet worked for Nash, a competitor,

within the two-year time period specified in the employment agreement in

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violation of the non-competition clause. However, Stuart’s allegations that Mr.

Camet diverted its clients, resulting in lost profits, would fall under the non-

solicitation portion of the employment agreement. There was no finding by the trial

court in the June 19, 2014 judgment that Mr. Camet had solicited Stuart’s clients.

The issue of damages at the recent trial was based solely on damages resulting

from the non-compete clause. It is evident, however, that the trial court necessarily

analyzed the acts of alleged solicitation of Stuart’s clients to determine whether

Mr. Camet had caused economic injury to Stuart during his employment with

Nash. The trial court further made a determination that because Mr. Camet did not

solicit Stuart’s clients, his breach of the non-competition clause of the employment

agreement, without more, did not result in compensable damages to Stuart.9 We

find no conflict in the rulings that found a breach by Mr. Camet in joining a

competing business, but did not find that the specific accounts identified by Stuart

were solicited to Nash by Mr. Camet, resulting in a monetary loss to Stuart. As

will be discussed more fully below, causation is an essential element for a party

seeking to recover damages due to an obligor’s failure to perform.

The non-competition agreement

A non-competition agreement is a contract between the parties who enter it,

and it is to be construed according to the general rules of contract interpretation. 17

SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 00-1695 (La. 6/29/01), 808 So.2d 294

(superseded by statute on other grounds); ADVANCED MEDICAL REHAB, L.L.C.

V. SHELBY MANTON, 21-315 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/23/22), reh’g denied (Mar. 10,

9
The trial court stated in its reasons for judgment that it had found guidance on this issue
from Smith v. Conam Inspection & Eng'g Servs., Inc., 14-0161 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/10/14)
(unpublished opinion):

This Court finds that the case currently before the Court is akin to Smith. In this case,
although this Court has previously determined that Mr. Camet did in fact breach the
Employment Agreement that he and the plaintiff executed; this Court maintains that that
the plaintiff has failed to establish how Mr. Camet's breach was the cause of several
customers leaving Stuart Services, L.L.C., and going to Nash Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc.

22-CA-105 6

2022), writ denied sub nom. Advanced Med. Rehab, L.L.C. v. Manton, 22-00606

(La. 6/1/22), 338 So.3d 494.

Under La. C.C. art. 1994, an obligor is liable for damages caused by his

failure to perform a conventional obligation. The failure to perform may result

from nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance. Courts

have interpreted this to mean that there are three essential elements of a breach of

contract claim. Sanga v. Perdomo, 14-609 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/14), 167 So.3d

818, 822, writ not considered, 15-0222 (La. 4/17/15), 176 So.3d 1032, and writ

denied, 15-0222 (La. 6/19/15), 172 So.3d 650; La. C.C. art. 1994. First, a plaintiff

must prove that the obligor undertook an obligation to perform. Id. Next, they must

prove that the obligor failed to perform the obligation. Id. Finally, the failure to

perform must result in damages to the obligee. Id.

In the instant case, the trial court in its reasons for judgment10 considered

whether or not the plaintiff, Stuart Services, L.L.C., is entitled to damages for Mr.

Camet's failure to fulfill his obligation not to compete with Stuart. Specifically,

Stuart sought to recover damages in the form of profits lost after clients left Stuart.

In finding that Mr. Camet did not cause Stuart’s damages, the court referenced

several key pieces of evidence in the record.

First, the court observed that Mr. Camet had not made a guarantee at the

time of sale that any of his past customers would remain current customers of

Stuart. Nevertheless, all three of the accounts named by Stuart in its petition for

damages did, in fact, become Stuart customers at the time that Mr. Camet started

10
Appellate courts do not review reasons for judgment as a part of the judgment itself.
La. C.C.P. art. 1918; Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 07-1311 (La. 8/31/07), 963
So.2d 378, 379. The written reasons for judgment are merely an explication of the trial court's
determinations. State in the Interest of Mason, 356 So.2d 530, 532 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1977). The
Louisiana Supreme Court has held, however, that a court of appeal can use reasons for judgment
to gain insight into the district court's judgment, and we refer to them now for that purpose. See,
Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507.

22-CA-105 7

his employment there. However, as correctly noted by the trial court, after the sale

all three accounts decided to no longer use Stuart for various reasons.

The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated through the testimony of former

Executive Vice President Bruce Scott that, in 2010, Guaranty Bank chose not to

renew its contract with Stuart based upon poor workmanship and inadequate

response times to requests for service. Mr. Scott’s testimony was that Mr. Camet

did not ask him to change from Stuart Services. Mr. Scott also testified that it was

his wife’s suggestion to use Nash, as the owner was a personal family

acquaintance.

The evidence regarding St. Clement’s account was previously discussed.

Concerning the St. Ann account, Mr. Nash testified that he obtained the St. Ann

account after he received a phone call to meet with a Deacon11 to start doing

service and maintenance on the property. Further, Mr. Nash contended that St. Ann

was referred to Nash Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., by St. Clement.

Additionally, Ronda D' Anna Mendel, Stuart Services' former Administrative

Assistant, testified at trial that St. Ann terminated Stuart because it was unhappy

with the services that Stuart provided.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated that it found that the

witnesses were credible and truthful in their accounts of the events that led to each

eventually refusing to no longer use Stuart to service its units. When the factual

findings are based on the credibility of a witness's testimony, the appellate court

must give great deference to the fact finder’s decision to credit a witness's

11
The deposition of Deacon Raymond Bertin, the facility manager for St. Ann Church
and School was also entered into evidence at trial on March 1, 2021, and accepted by the trial
court on joint stipulation of the parties as Exhibit D-57. Mr. Bertin explained in his deposition
that St. Ann entered into a yearly contract with Stuart through Mr. Camet. St. Ann became
discontent with Stuart because a different serviceman came out on every call, which meant that
St. Ann had to show the layout and function of the units each time, which resulted in an
additional cost. Mr. Bertin stated that the decision to terminate Stuart was made by him, the
pastor, and the school principal. St. Ann chose Nash as a replacement based on information
provided by Mr. Minor at St. Clement of Rome. Mr. Bertin testified that Mr. Camet did not divert
St. Ann’s business to Nash.

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testimony. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). The trial court also

found it significant that Mr. Camet continued his employment with Stuart after the

three clients had stopped using Stuart’s services. Finally, the court observed that

Stuart produced no evidence that Mr. Camet had directed these accounts to Nash

during his employment there, or at any time thereafter. Accordingly, the trial court

found that Stuart failed to satisfy the essential element of causation and/or

connectivity to its alleged lost profits.12

A trial court’s factual findings are subject to the manifest error standard of

review. Brooks v. Union Pacific R. Co., 08-2035 (La. 5/22/09), 13 So.3d 546, 554.

Subject to the manifest error standard, its factual findings can only be reversed

upon finding, based on the entire record, no reasonable factual basis for its findings

and that the factfinder is wrong. Stobart v. State, through Department of Transp.

and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). After our review of the record,

we find that a factual basis exists to support the trial court’s ruling regarding

causation and damages in this matter. Accordingly, we find this assignment to be

without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE

In its final assignment of error, Stuart contends that the district court erred in

allowing Mr. Camet to enforce the contract and collect attorneys’ fees and costs

even though he was found to be in “breach” of the employment agreement or that

he failed to perform his obligations under the employment agreement.

Section 5.4 of the employment agreement, and Section 6.8 of the sales

agreement both state, in relevant part, “If any litigation or dispute occurs arising

12
With respect to Stuart’s alleged lost profits, the trial court opined that, [d]uring trial,
the plaintiff submitted thousands of pages of exhibits into the record seeking to establish the
amount of damages, in the full sum of $358,513.36, that Mr. Camet is responsible for; however,
the testimony elicited at trial does not corroborate the plaintiff's position.” The trial court also
acknowledged Mr. Camet’s argument “that there were several contributing factors that led to the
decline in Stuart's business and ultimately the gross margins, including: poor customer service,
The Great Recession of 2008, and internal financial problems.”

22-CA-105 9

out of or connected in any way with this Agreement or its underlying terms, the

prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees…” In

Peyton Place, Condo. Assocs., Inc. v. Guastella, 08-365 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/09),

18 So.3d 132, 147, this Court previously referred to the definition of “prevailing

party” as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). In Hensley, the Supreme Court

opined that a “typical formulation [of the prevailing party standard] is that

‘plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorneys’ fees purposes if they

succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit

the parties sought in bringing suit.” As found by the trial court in its February 23,

2014 order that granted Stuart’s motion for partial summary judgment, Stuart did

establish that Mr. Camet failed to perform his obligation not to compete under the

employment agreement. However, this was only one of three elements necessary to

establish a breach of contract by Mr. Camet. To prevail on the claims alleged in its

petition, Stuart needed to prove damages caused by Mr. Camet’s failure to

perform. For the reasons stated above, Stuart did not establish this necessary

element of its claim, and therefore did not successfully prove the entirety of its

case. Accordingly, we decline to adopt Stuart’s contention that it was the

prevailing party in this matter. All claims against Mr. Camet were dismissed by

the trial court.

In the alternative, Stuart disputes the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to

Mr. Camet. In Quantum Res. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 13-74 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128 So.3d 462, 465-66, writ denied, 2013-2759 (La.

2/14/14), 132 So.3d 963, we acknowledged the factors a trial court should consider

in awarding attorneys’ fees:

A reasonable attorney’s fee is determined by the facts of an
individual case. St. Blanc, supra at 1160; Gottsegen v. Diagnostic
Imaging Services, 95–977 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/96), 672 So.2d 940,

22-CA-105 10

943, writ denied, 96–0707 (La.4/26/96), 672 So.2d 909. Factors to be
taken into consideration in determining the reasonableness of
attorney's fees include: (1) the ultimate result obtained; (2) the
responsibility incurred; (3) the importance of the litigation; (4) the
amount of money involved; (5) the extent and character of the work
performed; (6) the legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the
attorneys; (7) the number of appearances involved; (8) the intricacies
of the facts involved; (9) the diligence and skill of counsel; and (10)
the court’s own knowledge. Rivet v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev.,
96–0145 (La.9/5/96), 680 So.2d 1154, 1161, citing State, DOTD v.
Williamson, 597 So.2d 439 (La.1992).

In the instant case, the hearing on Mr. Camet’s motion for attorneys’ fees

was held on August 13, 2021. Mr. Camet testified that after Stuart filed its petition

naming him as a defendant, he hired Tom Barbera to represent him. Mr. Barbera

also filed a countersuit against Stuart on Mr. Camet’s behalf. Mr. Camet

authenticated an invoice from Mr. Barbera for work that spanned from November

16, 2011, through June 16, 2021, which totaled $46,437.50. Mr. Camet asked the

court to award him that amount for Mr. Barbera’s services.13

Mr. Richardson, who represented Mr. Camet at the hearing, asked Mr.

Camet to identify three separate bills for his legal services as well. The bills from

Mr. Richardson, which detailed his work on the case from January 30, 2021,

through August 26, 2021, totaled $47,849.25. In total, Mr. Camet sought

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $94,286.75.

We note that throughout the hearing on the motion, counsel for Mr. Camet

made repeated references to the factors detailed in Quantum Res. Mgmt., L.L.C.,

supra, and asked the witnesses questions directly addressing those factors.

The trial court awarded $86,536.75 to Mr. Camet, without an explanation of

how the amount was calculated.14 A trial court’s award of attorney fees is reviewed

13
Mr. Barbera testified at trial about his retainer with Mr. Camet, his hourly fee, and the
type of work he performed. He was also questioned about miscellaneous expenses associated with
litigation.
14
It appears from the evidence introduced that the trial court did not award attorney fees for work
performed in connection with the motion for partial summary judgment.

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using an abuse of discretion standard. Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 12-2182,

(La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 343, 348. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that in

applying the standard, “the role of the reviewing court is not to determine what it

considers to be an appropriate award, but rather it is to review the exercise of

discretion by the trier-of-fact.” Id., at 351. The trial court’s factual findings used to

determine the award are reviewed pursuant to the manifest error/clearly wrong

standard. Stobart v. State, Dep't of Trans. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993).

After a review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

award of attorneys’ fees in this matter.

However, as will be more fully discussed, we find it necessary to remand

this matter to the trial court to make an additional award for expenses incurred in

connection with Mr. Camet’s motion to tax costs and his defense of Stuart’s

appeal.

ANSWER TO THE APPEAL

In his answer to Stuart’s appeal, Mr. Camet first seeks additional attorneys’

fees in the amount of $7,750 for work performed from August 11, 2021, through

August 26, 2021. This Court has held that where a party is forced to litigate

payment of a fee to which it is entitled, collection of an additional fee for that work

is allowed as well. Quantum Res. Mgmt., L.L.C., supra. Accordingly, we find the

trial court erred in failing to award Mr. Camet attorneys’ fees for the work

performed in connection with his motion to tax costs and expenses. We believe the

trial court is in a better position to apply the relevant law to the particular facts and

circumstances of the case in order to determine a reasonable attorney fee for

services performed on Mr. Camet’s behalf pertaining to his motion to tax costs and

expenses, and we remand for that purpose.

Mr. Camet also seeks additional attorneys’ fees and costs for work by his

counsel in defending and responding to Stuart’s appeal, in the amount of

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$33,211.50. No invoice or affidavit providing justification for these fees have been

provided for our consideration. An increase in attorneys’ fees is usually awarded

where a party who was awarded attorneys’ fees by the trial court is forced to and

successfully defends an appeal. State Dept. of Transp. and Development v.

Brookhollow of Alexandria, Inc., 578 So.2d 558 (La. App. 3 Cir.1991), writ

denied, 581 So.2d 709, 710 (La.1991). Although Mr. Camet has successfully

defended this appeal, we cannot, on the showing made, sufficiently ascertain the

appropriate amount of an additional award of attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, we

decline to set an attorneys’ fees award for this appeal and remand this matter to the

trial court for a hearing on the issue.

Mr. Camet further contends that the trial court erred in not awarding the cost

of nine depositions totaling $2,794.94 for the witnesses deposed in this case. Stuart

argued against the admission of these bills on the basis that they were not admitted

into evidence at trial. Mr. Camet argued that he was asking for the deposition costs

under the prevailing party clause of the agreement between the parties and not on a

statutory basis. In Succession of Franz, 242 La. at 882-83, 139 So.2d at 218-19,

the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Legislature intended that only

depositions “used on the trial” were taxable as costs. Accordingly, the trial court

correctly denied the costs on that basis. To the extent that the costs for the

depositions may have been discretionary with the court, we find no abuse of

discretion in its denial of Mr. Camet’s request.

Mr. Camet asks that this Court reverse the portion of the trial court’s

judgment that denied its request for $960 in copy costs. After a review of the

record, we find that the trial court erred in failing to award $338.75 for the

production of Mr. Camet’s bench books which were used at trial. La. R.S. 13:4533

reads, in part, that, “The cost of ... copies of acts used on the trial, and all other

costs allowed by the court, shall be taxed as costs.” [Emphasis added.]

22-CA-105 13

Accordingly, we amend the trial court judgment to include this amount as a cost of

litigation.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment dismissing Stuart’s

claims against Mr. Camet with prejudice. We also affirm the trial court’s initial

award of attorneys’ fees to Mr. Camet. The judgment is amended, in part, to

include an additional $338.75 in costs for the production of Mr. Camet’s bench

books, and we affirm the judgment as amended. With respect to Mr. Camet’s

answer to the appeal, we find that Mr. Camet is entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred

in connection with his motion to tax costs and attorneys’ fees and for his successful

defense of Stuart’s appeal. We therefore remand the matter to the trial court for a

determination of those two attorneys’ fees issues.

AMENDED; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 7, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

22-CA-105
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE E. ADRIAN ADAMS (DISTRICT JUDGE)
CAMILLE E. GAUTHIER (APPELLANT) CHRISTIAN W. HELMKE (APPELLANT) JOHN F. LEE (APPELLANT)
LEONARD L. LEVENSON (APPELLANT) RAYMOND B. LANDRY (APPELLANT) THOMAS M. FLANAGAN (APPELLANT)
T. RANDOLPH RICHARDSON (APPELLEE) DAVID H. WILLIAMS (AMICUS) HANNAH D. ADAMS (AMICUS)

MAILED
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