Clayton Cangelosi Versus Jefferson Parish Council Jefferson Parish Council Chair Scott Walker And In Person: Byron Lee (Not as Council Member) And Jefferson Parish President Cynthia Lee Sheng Jefferson Parish Parish Attorney
Clayton Cangelosi Versus Jefferson Parish Council Jefferson Parish Council Chair Scott Walker And In Person: Byron Lee (Not as Council Member) And Jefferson Parish President Cynthia Lee Sheng Jefferson Parish Parish Attorney, No. 22-CA-338 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2022).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State, Division of Administration, Office of Facility Planning & Control v. Infinity Surety Agency, L.L.C. 63 So. 3d 940
- Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc. 616 So. 2d 1234
- Bryant v. Premium Food Concepts, Inc. 227 So. 3d 288
- Meckstroth v. La. Dept. of Transp. and Dev. 962 So. 2d 490
- Driscoll v. Stucker 893 So. 2d 32
Opinion text
CLAYTON CANGELOSI NO. 22-CA-338
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
JEFFERSON PARISH COUNCIL, ET AL. COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 814-570, DIVISION "B"
HONORABLE R. CHRISTOPHER COX, III, JUDGE PRESIDING
December 14, 2022
ROBERT A. CHAISSON
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Robert A. Chaisson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
AFFIRMED
RAC
FHW
JJM
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
CLAYTON CANGELOSI
In Proper Person
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
BYRON LEE
William Peter Connick
Michael J. Monistere
CHAISSON, J.
In this case arising from the denial of a permit to sell merchandise, Clayton
Cangelosi appeals a July 6, 2022 judgment of the trial court sustaining a
peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by defendant Councilman Byron
Lee, in his personal capacity. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
BACKGROUND
The facts and procedural history of this case arise from the same petition and
events described in the companion appeal, 22-CA-174, and for the purposes of this
appeal, we adopt the background section from that appeal herein in its entirety
without additional restatement.
In January of 2021, pursuant to the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances, Mr.
Cangelosi sought a permit to conduct outdoor sales of Valentine’s Day-related
merchandise from February 12 to February 14, 2021. Permits to conduct such
sales are authorized by resolution of Jefferson Parish Council.
The resolution authorizing Mr. Cangelosi’s sales permit was initially
scheduled to be considered as part of the Addendum Agenda at the January 13,
2021 meeting of the Jefferson Parish Council; however, it was removed from the
agenda at the request of Councilman Byron Lee, who later stated that he had
received complaints about the annual sales and was concerned about traffic
congestion given the limited ingress and egress at the identified location.
Councilman Lee encouraged Mr. Cangelosi to identify other locations for the sale
and to reapply for the permit, which could be approved at the next council meeting
on February 3.
At the February 3 council meeting, a resolution authorizing Mr. Cangelosi’s
sales permit was adopted en globo with other resolutions as part of a consent
agenda. Mr. Cangelosi made an appearance and proceeded to question the council
22-CA-338 1
as to why his permit requests for other additional locations had not been approved.
He also stated that he was working with a lawyer to get approval for these
additional permits. Following a discussion with Councilman Lee over Mr.
Cangelosi’s treatment of the councilman’s staff, Councilman Lee moved to
reconsider and cancel the previously adopted resolution authorizing Mr.
Cangelosi’s sales permit. This motion was seconded and then approved by the
Council.
Two days later, Mr. Cangelosi filed his original petition for damages in
forma pauperis against the Jefferson Parish Council, Jefferson Parish Council
Chair Scott Walker, Jefferson Parish President Cynthia Lee Sheng, Jefferson
Parish Attorney Peggy Barton, and Councilman Byron Lee in his personal rather
than official capacity. The petition was amended on February 8 to add Jefferson
Parish as a defendant. The original petition was served on all of the named
defendants in their official capacities on April 26, 2021; however, Councilman
Lee, in his personal capacity, was not served until March 22, 2022.
In his petition, Mr. Cangelosi makes numerous allegations. His charges are
made specifically against Councilman Lee and “the Parish as a Whole.” He makes
no specific allegations against Parish President Cynthia Lee Sheng or Jefferson
Parish Attorney Peggy Barton. His allegations against Parish Council Chair Scott
Walker appear to be made against Mr. Walker in his official capacity for
purportedly allowing Councilman Lee’s “misconduct” and “abuse of power” to
continue. His charges against the Parish defendants include violations of his rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
abuse of power. He seeks damages for lost earnings, aggravation, pain and
suffering, and time spent on this suit.
Councilman Lee filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action, in
which he argues that Mr. Cangelosi failed to allege facts sufficient to support a
22-CA-338 2
claim for relief pursuant to Councilman Lee’s alleged violations of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments or alleged abuse of power. Following a hearing on the
merits, the trial court sustained this exception and dismissed Mr. Cangelosi’s
claims with prejudice on July 6, 2022. It is from this judgment that Mr. Cangelosi
appeals.1
DISCUSSION
Mr. Cangelosi’s brief in this appeal states identical purported errors by the
trial court as those he states in the companion appeal, 22-CA-174, and does not
raise any new or additional purported issues or assignments of error.
The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the
legal sufficiency of the petition, which is done by determining whether the law
affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. State, Div. of Admin., Office
of Facility Planning & Control v. Infinity Sur. Agency, L.L.C., 10-2264 (La.
5/10/11), 63 So.3d 940, 945. A cause of action, when used in the context of the
peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the
plaintiff’s right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Everything on
Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru S., Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1238 (La. 1993). No
evidence may be introduced to support or controvert an exception of no cause of
action. La. C.C.P. art. 931. The court reviews the petition and accepts the well-
pleaded allegations of fact as true. Khoobehi Properties, LLC v. Baronne Dev. No.
2, L.L.C., 16-506 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/29/17), writ denied, 17-0893 (La. 9/29/17),
227 So.3d 288. Because Louisiana utilizes a system of fact pleading, it is not
necessary for a plaintiff to plead a theory of the case in the petition; however, mere
conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by the facts do not set forth a cause of
action. Meckstroth v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 07-0236 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1
A prior judgment dated March 24, 2022, sustaining a near identical exception of no cause of
action filed by the other defendants, is the subject of a companion appeal, 22-CA-174.
22-CA-338 3
6/27/07), 962 So.2d 490. In reviewing the judgment of the district court relating to
an exception of no cause of action, appellate courts should conduct a de novo
review because the exception raises a question of law and the lower court’s
decision is necessarily based solely on the sufficiency of the petition. Id. The
issue is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the
relief sought. State, Div. of Admin., Office of Facility Planning & Control v.
Infinity Sur. Agency, L.L.C., 63 So.3d at 946.
Mr. Cangelosi alleges claims against Councilman Lee in his personal
capacity for proposing and voting to rescind a previously adopted resolution
authorizing a vendor’s permit for Mr. Cangelosi. Personal or individual capacity
suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he
takes under color of state law causing the deprivation of a constitutional right. A
state official is individually liable for violating the constitutional rights of his
victim. Driscoll v. Stucker, 04-0589 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 32.
In support of his claim, Mr. Cangelosi cites Louisiana Revised Statute 14:48.
This statute, which was repealed on July 31, 2021, stated:
Where a non-privileged defamatory publication or expression is false
it is presumed to be malicious unless a justifiable motive for making it
is shown. Where such publication or expression is true, actual malice
must be proved in order to convict the offender.
Mr. Cangelosi’s reliance on this statute is misplaced. The language of the
statute creates an evidentiary presumption that relieves the prosecution from
having to prove one element of a claim for criminal defamation. In this case, Mr.
Cangelosi has alleged that Councilman Lee acted with malice, an allegation of fact
which may be accepted as true for the purposes of the analysis of the petition on
the exception of no cause of action. However, the allegation of that fact alone is
insufficient to support a civil cause of action against the defendant; it is merely one
22-CA-338 4
element among many that must be alleged in the petition in order to state a
justiciable claim that must be then later proven at a trial on the merits.
For the reasons discussed in the companion appeal, 22-CA-174, which we
adopt in full and without additional restatement here, we have found that Mr.
Cangelosi has failed to allege facts sufficient to state claims for violation of his
rights under the Louisiana or United States Constitutions. Further examination of
his petition shows that he has failed to allege facts sufficient to state cognizable
claims against Councilman Lee in his personal capacity.
CONCLUSION
Upon de novo review of the petition, we find that Mr. Cangelosi has failed to
allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action against Councilman Lee in his
personal capacity. We further find that such deficiency cannot be cured through
amendment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
22-CA-338 5
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 14, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
22-CA-338
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE R. CHRISTOPHER COX, III (DISTRICT JUDGE)
MICHAEL J. MONISTERE (APPELLEE) WILLIAM PETER CONNICK (APPELLEE)
MAILED
CLAYTON CANGELOSI (APPELLANT) ELIZABETH O. CLINTON (APPELLEE)
2357 CADDY DRIVE ATTORNEY AT LAW
MARRERO, LA 70072 3421 NORTH CAUSEWAY BOULEVARD
SUITE 408
METAIRIE, LA 70002