State of Louisiana Versus Donovan Hinojosa

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 22-K-312

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

DONOVAN HINOJOSA COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

July 28, 2022

Susan Buchholz
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE STATE OF LOUISIANA

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE DANYELLE M.
TAYLOR, DIVISION "O", NUMBER 21-4469

Panel composed of Judges Robert A. Chaisson,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg

WRIT GRANTED

Relator, the State of Louisiana, seeks review of the trial court’s June 15,

2022 ruling granting defendant’s motion to suppress statement. For the following

reasons, we grant this writ application and reverse.

On September 24, 2021, defendant, Donovan Hinojosa, was charged by bill

of information with second degree rape, in violation of La. R.S. 14:42.1. On

November 3, 2021, defendant filed pre-trial motions, including a motion to

suppress statement. A hearing on the motion to suppress statement was held on

February 17, 2022.

At the hearing, Detective Biana Robinson of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s

Office testified that she was involved in investigating allegations that defendant

raped his sister’s best friend. She indicated that defendant was arrested and that

she took an audiovisual recorded statement from him on July 28, 2021. Portions of

the recording were played in court. Prior to questioning defendant, Detective

Robinson advised him of his Miranda rights, which she read from a Rights of

Arrestee form. Detective Robinson stated that defendant indicated he understood

his rights and waived them. She acknowledged that the Rights of Arrestee form

indicated that defendant was arrested for third degree rape, but she did not give

him the form to read or sign. Detective Robinson agreed that she told him he was

there about a rape but did not explain to defendant whether he would be charged

with first, second, or third degree rape.

At the hearing, defendant argued that his statement should be suppressed

because he was not fully advised of the reason for his arrest and detention as

required by La. Const. art. I, §13. He argued that it was not sufficient that the

officer told him he was being questioned “about a rape.” He complained that the

investigating officer should have informed him that he was a suspect, who the

accuser was, and the specific degree of rape he was being charged with. The State

responded that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, indicated he

understood and waived them, and voluntarily gave a statement. It argued that the

detective’s statement that defendant was there “about a rape” was sufficient to

comply with La. Const. art. I, §13 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 218.1.

The trial judge found that informing defendant he was being questioned

“about a rape” was insufficient to fully advise him of the reason for his arrest or

detention. The judge determined that Detective Robinson did not fully advise

defendant of the reason for his arrest, because she did not inform him of the

specific charge against him or specifically state that he was under arrest, both of

which were noted on the form. The trial judge also noted that the detective did not

allow defendant to review the form himself or to sign it. The trial judge then

granted defendant’s motion and suppressed defendant’s statement.

On April 18, 2022, the State filed a writ application with this Court seeking

review of the trial court’s ruling granting suppression of defendant’s statement. On

April 20, 2022, this Court granted the writ for the limited purpose of remanding the

matter to the trial court to reopen the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress

statement to allow him to introduce into evidence the audiovisual recording

containing the statements at issue in his motion. On May 12, 2022, defendant

formally offered, filed, and introduced into evidence the recorded statement at a

hearing, and it was admitted into evidence. On June 15, 2022, the trial court again

granted defendant’s motion to suppress statement. The State seeks supervisory

review of this ruling.

In this writ application, the State argues that the trial court erred by

suppressing defendant’s statement, because Detective Robinson satisfied the

mandates of La. Const. art. I, §13 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 218.1 that defendant be

advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention by informing him that he was

being questioned “about a rape.” The State avers that it is undisputed that

Detective Robinson advised defendant of his Miranda rights and that defendant

indicated that he understood his rights and wished to waive them and give a

statement. The State also notes that the District Attorney, not the police, chooses

what a defendant is to be charged with and that the police are not in a position to

tell a suspect definitively what charges he is facing. Additionally, the State

contends that defendant knew he was under arrest, noting that the video shows

defendant being walked into the interrogation room and handcuffed to a chain on

the floor, which remained in place during questioning.

Defendant responds that the advisement that they were there “about a rape”

was vague and insufficient to satisfy La. Const. art. I, §13. He notes that he was

not “picked up” until sixteen months after the alleged rape and thus, he was not on

notice about the incident that was the subject of Detective Robinson’s

interrogation. Defendant further argues that the detective agreed that defendant

answered her questions in a paranoid manner, which suggested that he was

suffering from some form of mental impairment. Thus, he claims his Miranda

waiver and subsequent statements were not voluntary under a totality of the

circumstances.

In deciding the admissibility of a statement, the trial judge must consider the

totality of the circumstances. State v. Taylor, 99-1154 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/29/00),

757 So.2d 63, 67, writ denied, 00-1021 (La. 3/30/01), 788 So.2d 441. The State

has the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement

by the defendant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Arias-Chavarria, 10-116 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 9/28/10), 49 So.3d 426, 433, writ denied, 10-2432 (La. 2/25/11), 58

So.3d 460. Trial courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to

suppress. State v. Smith, 11-638 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/12), 90 So.3d 1114, 1120.

Thus, the ruling of a trial judge on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed

absent an abuse of that discretion. Id.

Before an inculpatory statement made during a custodial interrogation may

be introduced into evidence, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

the defendant was first advised of his Miranda rights, that he voluntarily and

intelligently waived them, and that the statement was made freely and voluntarily

and not under the influence of fear, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or

promises. State v. Loeb, 09-341 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/23/10), 34 So.3d 917, 924-25,

writ denied, 10-681 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1110. A determination of

voluntariness is made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the totality of the facts

and circumstances of each situation. Arias-Chavarria, 49 So.3d at 433.

Both La. Const. art. 1, §13 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 218.1 provide:

When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the
investigation or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully
of the reason for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his
right against self incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel
and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel.

There is no requirement that a defendant be read the technical definition of a

crime in order to be fully advised of the reason for his arrest or detention. State v.

Jackson, 27,855 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/03/96), 672 So.2d 215, 221, writ denied, 96-

1386 (La. 11/01/96), 681 So.2d 1258, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1252, 117 S.Ct. 2409,

138 L.Ed.2d 175 (1997); State v. Scott, 42,997 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 975

So.2d 782, 787 n.4; State v. Jenkins, 12-4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/12), 2012 WL

2061514.

In State v. Brown, 18-1999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 248-49, cert.

denied, -- U.S. --, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d 596 (2002), the defendant argued

that the statements in which he asked detectives if he needed a lawyer were

inadmissible, because they were made after law enforcement failed to inform him

of the true nature of the investigation. The defendant asserted that telling him they

were investigating “a fire with some deaths” was a “far cry” from informing him

that they were investigating an arson and triple homicide. Brown, 330 So.3d at

248. The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that when ruling on the motion to

suppress, the trial court found that the officers fulfilled their duty in advising the

defendant of the reason for his detention, even if the reason may not have been

“artfully stated,” especially when they clarified that they were investigating a fire

and the deaths of three people. Id. at 249. The trial court found that no

misrepresentation occurred as the officers were not required to tell the defendant

that they suspected him of murder. The Supreme Court found that the trial court’s

ruling was correct, noting that the police are afforded some degree of trickery

during an interrogation, and the failure of law enforcement to specify that the

deaths were being treated as homicides did not render his statements invalid. Id.

In State v. Glynn, 94-332 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/7/95), 653 So.2d 1288, writ

denied, 95-1153 (La. 10/6/95), 661 So.2d 464, the defendant argued that the trial

court erred in denying his motion to suppress his oral confession based on four

arguments, including an assertion that the detective failed to inform the defendant

of the charges pending against him. The appellate court stated that there was no

doubt that the detective gave ambiguous responses on the subject of whether or not

the defendant was advised of the reason for his detention. The court noted that

when the detective first saw the defendant at his residence, he referred to “an

incident that happened to a lady across the street,” and he asked the defendant to

account for “his whereabouts during the night.” When the detective returned to the

defendant’s residence and asked him to come to the sheriff’s office, he apparently

told the defendant that he was investigating “some crimes.” Glynn, 653 So.2d at

1303. The court noted that at some point, the defendant’s wife was informed that a

burglary was being investigated. The court provided that the detective admitted

that he did not inform the defendant that they were investigating a rape during the

first period of questioning at the sheriff’s office, but he believed the defendant was

informed of the alleged rape during the second interrogation period. The appellate

court found that considering the detective’s responses as a whole, assuming the

defendant was “detained” for purposes of Article 218.1, he was sufficiently

advised of the reason for his detention and questioning. Id.

In the present case, defendant argues that Brown, supra, and Glynn, supra,

are distinguishable because the questioning in those cases occurred soon after the

offenses were committed, whereas defendant in the present case was not

questioned until almost sixteen months after the alleged rape. He contends that the

lapse of time “militates against the inference that Mr. Hinojosa knew of the reason

for his arrest.” However, the recording reflects that when Detective Robinson

advised defendant that they were there “about a rape,” defendant appeared to know

not only that there was a rape allegation against him, but also who the alleged

victim was, as he provided a name.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that defendant was

sufficiently advised of the reasons for his arrest or detention to comply with La.

Const. art. I, §13 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 218.1, and that his statement was voluntary.

The recording of the statement reflects that defendant was handcuffed to a chain on

the floor during the entirety of his statement, indicating he knew he was under

arrest. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, stated he understood them,

and chose to speak to the detective. The recording shows that Detective Robinson

told defendant they were there about a rape. While defendant suggests that the

detective’s statement that they were there about a rape was inadequate, the failure

of the detective to specify that the rape was being investigated as a third degree

rape or that he was arrested for that specific charge did not render his statement

involuntary.

For those foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court abused its discretion

in suppressing defendant’s statement. Accordingly, we grant the State’s writ

application and reverse the trial court’s ruling.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 28th day of July, 2022.

HJL
RAC
SJW

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 07/28/2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

22-K-312
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Danyelle M. Taylor (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Zachary Orjuela (Respondent) Thomas J. Butler (Relator)
Darren A. Allemand (Relator)

MAILED
Andrew J. Duffy (Respondent) Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr. (Relator)
Attorney at Law District Attorney
848 2nd Street Twenty-Fourth Judicial District
3rd Floor 200 Derbigny Street
Gretna, LA 70053 Gretna, LA 70053