State of Louisiana Versus Lawrence Staehle

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 22-K-335

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE STAEHLE COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

August 23, 2022

Susan Buchholz
Chief Deputy Clerk

IN RE LAWRENCE STAEHLE

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE
CONNIE M. AUCOIN, DIVISION "C", NUMBER 21,284

Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and June B. Darensburg

WRIT GRANTED

Relator/Defendant, Lawrence Staehle, seeks review of the trial court’s July 5,
2022 denial of his motion to recuse. For the following reasons, we grant the writ
application and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Procedural History

On July 19, 2021, the St. Charles Parish District Attorney filed a bill of
information charging Defendant, Lawrence Staehle, with second degree kidnapping,
in violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1 (count one), and aggravated second degree battery,
in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.7 (count two). On December 29, 2021, the State filed
its “Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Similar Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts in a
Domestic Abuse Case.” Defendant filed “Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition
to State’s Motion in Limine to Confirm Admissibility of Similar Crimes, Wrongs,
or Acts Pursuant to La. C.E. 412.4 and 404(B)” on March 14, 2022. On March 17,
2022, the State filed a Notice of Supplemental Discovery. The trial court held a
hearing on the matter on the same day and granted the State’s motion.

On March 31, 2022, Defendant filed a “Motion to Recuse Judge and to Place
Motion Under Seal with Incorporated Memorandum.” Judge M. Lauren Lemmon,
the trial judge, ordered that the matter be re-allotted for a hearing on the motion to
recuse. The case was then randomly re-allotted to Division “C”, Judge Connie M.
Aucoin, on that same date.

On April 4, 2022, Judge Lemmon issued an order of recusal. In that order,
Judge Lemmon self-recused, and she provided the following:

Presently pending is a Motion to Recuse the undersigned judge, which
was filed following a ruling by the Court on certain evidentiary issues.
The motion initially was referred to another judge of this Court rather
than granted. The Court felt then, and feels now, that it was and could
continue to be impartial in its rulings in this matter. Nonetheless, the
Court also freely acknowledges that in prior cases it has recused itself
in certain cases involving allegations regarding certain crimes with
which the Court has personal familiarity due to close relationships with
the victims. The Court also is mindful of Canon 3C that instructs that
a judge “should recuse” in a proceeding where “the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned”, and, as the movant points out, the
circumstances of this case present “extremely high stakes” for the
defendant and for the State. While the Court maintains that it could
continue to be fair and impartial in this matter, and that its rulings were
not affected by bias or prejudice, the motion itself presents a distraction
and a delay in the resolution of this matter that could prejudice one or
both parties and could impeded [sic] the just resolution of this case. For
these reasons, the Court hereby enters this Order recusing itself from
this matter.

The matter was then re-allotted to Division E, Judge Timothy S. Marcel, on
April 6, 2022. Thereafter, on April 19, 2022, an “Order Vacating Reallotment” was
signed by Judge Marcel. In the order, Judge Marcel stated:

The above entitled and numbered cause was reallotted to this
Division from Division “D” on April 7, 2022 on the Order of recusal
issued by the Division “D” Judge. For the grounds set forth in the
written reasons issued herewith,

IT IS ORDERED that the reallotment of the above entitled and
numbered case to Division “E” is hereby vacated.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall
reinstate allotment of the motion to recuse filed by the defendant on
March 31, 2022 to Division “C” of this District.”

Judge Marcel also issued “Reasons for Order Vacating Reallotment” on that
1
date. In it, he concluded that his order vacated re-allotment of this case to Division
“E” and allowed the case to revert to Division “C” for further proceedings on
Defendant’s motion to recuse. Afterwards, on April 14, 2022, Defendant filed a
“Motion for New Hearings on the State’s Three Motions in Limine” with the trial
court.

On April 28, 2022, counsel for Judge Lemmon filed an “Application for
Clarification of Order for Self Recusal and/or Application for Recusal” with the

1
In the “Reasons for Order Vacating Reallottment,” Judge Marcel explained that re-allotment of this case
to his division created “significant procedural due process issues.” He reasoned that under La. C.Cr.P. art. 673,
Judge Lemmon did not possess power or authority to issue the Order of Recusal after the case was transferred to
Division “C” on March 31, 2022. He stated that on its face, the Order of Recusal did not present any mandatory
grounds for disqualification under La. C.Cr.P. art. 671. He provided that the jurisprudence interpreting Judicial
Canon 3(C) reflects that a determination should be made following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion
to recuse. He indicated that this case demonstrated “the foreseeability that, in an allotted case, the Division ‘D’
Judge could be disqualified based on prior orders of recusal after having performed judicial acts of setting bail,
appointing counsel, and ruling on pre-trial motions.”

Louisiana Supreme Court. In it, counsel for Judge Lemmon requested that the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognize or reinstate her Order of Recusal in this case.2,3

On May 6, 2022, in case number 22-OK-00702, Judge Marcel filed a
“Memorandum in Response to Application for Clarification of Order for Self
Recusal and/or Application for Recusal Filed by District Court Judge M. Lauren
Lemmon” with the Louisiana Supreme Court. There, Judge Marcel largely raised
the same arguments as set forth in his “Reasons for Order Vacating Reallotment.”4

On May 18, 2022, in case number 22-OK-00702, the State filed an
“Application for Appointment of Judge Ad Hoc” with the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The State requested that an ad hoc judge be appointed to preside over the remainder
of the case. Thereafter, in 22-OK-00702, Defendant filed a “Memorandum in
Opposition to the State’s Application for Appointment of Judge Ad Hoc for Trial”
with the Louisiana Supreme Court. In the opposition, Defendant argued that the
State’s application was premature and that the interest of justice would not be served
by the appointment of another ad hoc judge.

On June 8, 2022, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied the writ application.
See State v. Staehle, 22-702 (La. 6/8/22), 338 So.3d 1198.5 Later, a letter dated June
15, 2022, from the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed to an assistant district
attorney6 provides, “This is to advise that the court took the following action on your
Motion for Appointment of Judge Ad Hoc filed in the above entitled matter. Motion
for Appointment of Judge Ad Hoc denied.”

Subsequently, Judge Aucoin then set the motion to recuse for hearing on July
5, 2022. This writ application contains a letter dated June 18, 2022, from
Defendant’s counsel directed to Judge Lemmon’s attorney. In it, Defendant
requested that Judge Lemmon voluntarily appear at the hearing and give testimony
relevant to the motion to recuse.7 Thereafter, on June 20, 2022, Judge Lemmon’s
counsel sent a letter via e-mail denying the request.

On June 20, 2022, Defendant filed a “Motion for Court to Recognize and
Accept Judge Lemmon’s Order of Self-Recusal in Lieu of Recusal Hearing” with
the trial court. In that motion, Defendant averred that the court should “simply
recognize and accept Judge Lemmon’s self-recusal order, pursuant to Judicial Canon
3C, in lieu of having a hearing on the motion to recuse—especially considering that
Judge Lemmon has already recused herself in this case.”8

2
In the application, Judge Lemmon’s counsel argued that Judge Marcel’s analysis of a judge’s continued
power to recuse was incorrect. Counsel argued that La. C.Cr.P. art. 672 provided the judge with the power and
authority to recuse herself pending a hearing on the motion to recuse. Counsel indicated that Judge Lemmon
maintained that she believes her impartiality “could be reasonably questioned” and warranted recusal pursuant to
Judicial Canon 3(C).
3
On May 11, 2022, Defendant filed “Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Judge M. Lauren Lemmon’s
Application” in case number 22-OK-00702 with the Louisiana Supreme Court.
4
Judge Marcel averred that Defendant’s motion to recuse should be set for a hearing and then written
reasons for judgment should be issued regarding Judge Lemmon’s ability to impartially preside over this category of
cases.
5
It is noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision states, “IN RE: Honorable Judge M. Lemmon,
Division ‘D’ of the 29th Judicial District Court of St. Charles Parish – Application Other, Applying for Supervisory
Writ, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Court Number(s) 21-0284.”
6
It is noted that the letter was addressed to Louis Gerard Authement, and his name appears on the State’s
application filed with the Louisiana Supreme Court.
7
In this letter, counsel indicated that a motion to recuse was scheduled for July 5, 2022, and that she
wanted to call Judge Lemmon as a witness during the hearing. Defendant’s counsel acknowledged that La. C.E. art.
519 prohibits a judge to be subpoenaed in a case for the “mere purpose of seeking recusal of the judge.”
8
In the “Motion for Court to Recognize and Accept Judge Lemmon’s Order of Self-Recusal in Lieu of
Recusal Hearing,” Defendant stated that the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Judge Lemmon’s writ application

On June 21, 2022, Judge Aucoin issued an “Order Denying Defendant’s
Motion for Court to Recognize and Accept Judge Lemmon’s Order of Self Recusal
In Lieu of Recusal Hearing with Reasons.” Judge Aucoin determined that the motion
was not timely because Defendant failed to file his writ application with this Court
regarding the April 19, 2022 “Order Vacating Reallotment.”9 On July 5, 2022, Judge
Aucoin denied the motion to recuse after a hearing. The filing of the instant writ
application followed.

Law and Analysis

In this writ application, Defendant argues that Judge Aucoin erred by denying
his motion to recuse Judge Lemmon. Defendant contends that, due to the similarities
between this case and other cases where Judge Lemmon recused herself, it is logical
and reasonable to infer that she is biased and unable to conduct fair and impartial
proceedings here. In denying the motion to recuse, Defendant asserts that Judge
Aucoin held that Judge Lemmon was already divested of jurisdiction and no longer
had authority to self-recuse at that time. He maintains that the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure clearly allows a judge to self-recuse after a motion to recuse is
filed. He contends that Judge Lemmon’s self-recusal was based on Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 3(C), which forms a separate and distinct basis for self-recusal and
does not provide any time limitation for a judge to self-recuse. Additionally, he
disagrees with Judge Aucoin’s holding that there were no valid grounds for Judge
Lemmon’s recusal. He disagrees that Judge Lemmon’s other orders for self-recusal
in similar cases were too vague to constitute valid grounds for recusal.

Defendant alleges that Judge Aucoin submitted that a judge has a duty and an
obligation not to recuse themselves from a case without a valid, reasonable, objective
basis. He contends that neither La. C.Cr.P. art. 671 or Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 3(C), require a judge to state with specificity the factual grounds for self-
recusal. He contends that the carefully considered conclusion by Judge Lemmon
should be sufficient. Defendant points out that there is strong circumstantial
evidence supporting recusal in his motion, that Judge Lemmon self-recused in this
case, and that the State did not challenge the grounds for Judge Lemmon’s self-

without addressing the merits. Defendant further stated that the Louisiana Supreme Court notified the parties by
letter that the State’s motion for appointment of an ad hoc judge was also denied. He claimed that the Louisiana
Supreme Court indicated that it wanted the “members” of the 29th Judicial District Court to resolve the matter on
their own. He provided that Judge Lemmon already recused herself and acknowledged that it is reasonable to
question her impartiality in both her “Order of Recusal” and her application to the Louisiana Supreme Court. He
asserted that La. C.E. art. 519 prohibited him from issuing a subpoena to Judge Lemmon for the recusal hearing, and
thus, he would not be able to present any additional evidence. Defendant stated that he would only be able to
present Judge Lemmon’s order of self-recusal, the aforementioned applications of Judge Lemmon and the State to
the Louisiana Supreme Court, and evidence that Judge Lemmon has recused herself in an additional sex crime case
since the filing of the motion to recuse. Defendant asserted that a hearing on the motion to recuse was only required
if the judge did not self-recuse. As such, Defendant contended that there was no need for a hearing on the motion to
recuse and that another order of recusal should be issued based on the record.
9
In the “Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Court to Recognize and Accept Judge Lemmon’s Order of
Self Recusal in Lieu of Recusal Hearing with Reasons,” Judge Aucoin provided in part that on April 25, 2022,
defense counsel filed a notice of intent to apply for a writ of certiorari with this Court from the April 19, 2022
“Order Vacating Reallotment” issued by Judge Marcel. The judge provided that on April 28, 2022, Judge Marcel
ordered that Defendant’s writ application be returnable to this Court on or before May 29, 2022. Judge Aucoin
stated that Judge Lemmon’s application with the Louisiana Supreme Court was denied without reasons on June 8,
2022, and that the State’s application for appointment of an ad hoc judge was denied by the Louisiana Supreme
Court on June 15, 2022. Judge Aucoin then determined, “Inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his writ
application on this issue with the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, on or before May, 2022, the Court is denying the
motion as untimely.” She stated that Defendant would not be “unduly prejudiced by this delay.” Judge Aucoin
noted that the hearing on Defendant’s motion to recuse was set for July 5, 2022.

recusal. He notes that he was prohibited from issuing a subpoena for Judge Lemmon
and that she denied his request to voluntarily appear and testify.10

Defendant further asserts that if this Court should determine that a more
specific factual basis was required, then this Court has the power and authority to
instruct Judge Lemmon to provide the specific factual bases “in whatever format”
deemed appropriate. In addition, Defendant argues that Judge Lemmon should be
recused from this matter in order to ensure that his due process rights are not
violated. With regard to the burden placed on the other judges of the 29th Judicial
District Court by Judge Lemmon’s self-recusal, Defendant notes that she recused
herself in ten cases over a three-year period. He asserts that the pattern of recusals
or the effect of the recusals on other judges should not be considered.

In addition, Defendant argues that if Judge Lemmon remains as the trial judge,
then questions concerning her impartiality will result in reversible error “because of
the extremely consequential sweeping pre-trial ruling” regarding the admissibility
of alleged other crimes, wrongs, or acts. He explains that after Judge Lemmon
recused herself, he filed a motion for new hearings on the State’s notice of intent.
He avers that it is necessary for a different judge to consider this motion and to
handle the trial of this matter. In conclusion, Defendant requests that this Court
order Judge Lemmon to be recused from this case.

In its opposition, the State argues that the sole issue before this Court is
whether Judge Aucoin erred in denying Defendant’s motion to recuse Judge
Lemmon. The State contends that Defendant did not meet the requisite burden of
proof to recuse Judge Lemmon from this matter. The State provides that Judge
Lemmon indicated in the instant recusal order that she “could be fair and impartial
and that her prior rulings were not affected by bias or prejudice.” The State
maintains that no other evidence was submitted to refute the contents of Judge
Lemmon’s recusal order or to establish that she could not be fair. Additionally, the
State points out that the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to recuse Judge Lemmon
upon her request pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 672.

The State avers that Judge Aucoin correctly addressed this issue, noting that
the facts or the bases of Judge Lemmon’s recusal in the other matters are unknown
and cannot be compared to the present case. The State points out that Defendant is
charged with second degree kidnapping and aggravated second degree battery of his
wife in this domestic abuse case. As such, the State argues that this case is unique
and distinguishable from the charges involving sex crimes in Judge Lemmon’s prior
self-recusals. The State asserts that Defendant did not introduce any evidence at the
hearing to suggest that Judge Lemmon cannot be fair or impartial in this case or in
any domestic abuse cases. Finally, the State contends that the timing of the motion
to recuse suggests an attempt to delay because it was filed on the eve of trial
following significant evidentiary rulings in the State’s favor.

10
Defendant notes that the State did not argue or address whether Judge Lemmon’s self-recusal pursuant to
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C), was improper. He also notes that the State did not object when Judge
Lemmon recused herself from the case, that the State did not “make a writ application on Judge Lemmon’s self-
recusal,” and that the State did not file an opposition to Judge Lemmon’s application with the Louisiana Supreme
Court. He points out that the State filed its own application with the Louisiana Supreme Court for an ad hoc judge
to be appointed to handle the case.

First, we will address Defendant’s assertion that the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure clearly allows a judge to self-recuse after a motion to recuse has
been filed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 67311 states,

A judge has full power and authority to act, even though a ground for
recusal exists, until he is recused, or a motion for his recusal is filed.
The judge to whom the motion to recuse is assigned shall have full
power and authority to act in the cause pending the disposition of the
motion to recuse.”

La. C.Cr.P. art. 67412 provides the procedure for recusal of a trial judge, and states,
in pertinent part:

B. If the motion to recuse sets forth facts constituting a ground for
recusal under Article 671, not later than seven days after the judge’s
receipt of the motion from the clerk of court, the judge shall either
recuse himself or refer the motion for hearing to another judge or to an
ad hoc judge, as provided in Article 675.

In this matter, Judge Lemmon referred Defendant’s recusal motion to another
division for a hearing on the motion. After the referral, Judge Lemmon issued an
order of recusal, self-recusing herself from the cause.13 According to La. C.Cr.P.
arts. 673 and 674, once Judge Lemmon referred the motion for recusal to another
division, the trial judge to which the motion was assigned—Judge Aucoin—then had
full power and authority to act pending the resolution of the motion. Judge Lemmon
was divested of her authority to act in the matter while the motion to recuse was
pending, which includes being divested of her authority to issue an order of recusal.
Therefore, because Judge Lemmon issued her recusal order while the recusal motion
was pending in another division, we find that the trial court did not err in conducting
a hearing on the recusal motion.

Now, we will address the motion to recuse. La. C.Cr.P. art. 67114 specifies
the grounds upon which a judge may be recused in a criminal case, which provided
in pertinent part:

A. In a criminal cause, a judge of any trial or appellate court shall be
recused upon any of the following grounds:
(1) The judge is biased, prejudiced, or personally interested in the
cause to such an extent that the judge would be unable to conduct
a fair and impartial trial; …
(6)The judge would be unable, for any other reason, to conduct a
fair and impartial trial.
B. In a criminal cause, a judge of any trial or appellate court shall also
be recused when there exists a substantial and objective basis that
would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from conducting
any aspect of the cause in a fair and impartial manner.

In reference to Paragraph B, Comment (i) for La. C.Cr.P. art. 671 provides:

11
La. C.Cr.P. art. 673 was amended by Acts 2022, No. 42, § 1, which became effective on August 1, 2022.
12
La. C.Cr.P. art. 674 was amended by Acts 2022, No. 42, § 1, which became effective on August 1, 2022.
13
In her recusal order, Judge Lemmon acknowledged the procedural posture of the case at that time by
stating that the motion to recuse was referred to another judge of the court, rather than being granted.
14
La. C.Cr.P. art. 671 was amended by Acts 2022, No. 42, § 1, which became effective on August 1, 2022.

A new Paragraph B has been added to provide an additional
mandatory ground for recusal when a substantial and objective basis
exists that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from
conducting any aspect of the case in a fair and impartial manner. This
provision is intended to serve as a catch-all supplementing the
mandatory grounds for recusal set forth in Paragraph A and to
incorporate a clearer, more objective standard than the language of
Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that a judge
should recuse himself when “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.”

In each possible recusal situation, there is a countervailing consideration
which militates in favor of a judge’s not recusing himself, or being recused—that is,
that the judge has an obligation, part of his sworn duty as a judge, to hear and decide
cases properly brought before him. He is not at liberty, nor does he have the right,
to take himself out of a case and burden another judge with his responsibility without
good and legal cause. In re Lemoine, 96-2116, (La. 1/14/97), 686 So.2d 837, on
reh’g, 96-2116 (La. 4/4/97), 692 So.2d 358. A trial judge is presumed to be
impartial, and the burden is on the party seeking to recuse a judge to prove otherwise.
State v. Strickland, 04-843 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/1/05), 900 So.2d 885, 893, writ denied,
05-820 (La. 6/17/05), 904 So.2d 683. The grounds for recusal based on bias or
prejudice must amount to more than conclusory allegations. State v. Galliano, 05-
962 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/29/06), 945 So.2d 701, 727-28, writ denied, 06-2367 (La.
4/27/07), 955 So.2d 682. However, as discussed in Anderson v. Dean, 22-233 (La.
7/25/22), --- So.3d ---, 2022WL2914069, writ granted in part, 22-1098 (La.
7/22/22), --- So.3d ---, 2022WL3009666, the grounds for recusal have recently been
expanded by the Louisiana legislature.

In Anderson, this Court considered whether a trial judge should have been
recused from a civil matter, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 151. Article 151(B)15 states:

A judge of any trial or appellate court shall also be recused when there
exists a substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be
expected to prevent the judge from conducting any aspect of the cause
in a fair and impartial manner.16

When applying Article 151(B) and ultimately recusing the trial judge in that matter,
this Court explained:

In adopting this new language, the Legislature clearly intended
to broaden the mandatory grounds for recusal beyond the previously
enumerated grounds, including the ground for bias or prejudice
enumerated in Paragraph A(4). Whereas prior law recognized this
mandatory ground for recusal only where there was a high probability
of actual bias (proved either directly or circumstantially), the addition
of Paragraph B recognized that there may be instances in which actual
bias or prejudice cannot be proven, but which nonetheless require the
recusal of the judge. These instances occur where there exists a
“substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be expected to

15
La. C.C.P. art. 151 was amended by Acts 2021, No. 143, § 1.
16
La. C.C.P. art. 151 is the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure’s counterpart to the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure’s Article 671 concerning recusals. The language in Subsection B of this article is the same as
the language adopted by the Legislature in the current version of La. C.Cr.P. art. 671(B).

prevent the judge from conducting any aspect of the case in a fair and
impartial manner.” The words “substantial” and “objective” present
the first two requirements. “Substantial” means something of
substance, material, real, and not imaginary. Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019). This may be understood as requiring the mover to
support his motion to recuse with material evidence, and not mere
allegations. “Objective” means something externally verifiable, as
opposed to the feelings of one individual. Id. “Basis” means some
foundation or starting point on which something may rest. Id. This is
a broad term clearly intended to cover more instances than solely
“bias.” The phrase “any aspect of the cause” additionally broadens the
scope of this ground for recusal beyond the obvious and public aspects
of the judge sitting on the bench in the courtroom. Finally, the phrase
“reasonably expected” recognizes that there may be substantial and
objective bases claimed that a neutral observer would not expect to
prevent the judge from trying the cause in a fair and impartial manner.

Whether the requirements of this new ground from recusal in
Paragraph B are met will necessarily vary to some degree depending on
the facts and circumstances of each case: the conduct complained of
and the relationships and interests involved. In determining whether a
recusal is necessary under Paragraph B, a judge’s decision should be
guided by the twin imperative duties of a judge: to try the case fairly
and impartially on the one hand, and on the other to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Anderson, at p. 9.

In Judge Lemmon’s recusal order, she stated that she felt that she has and
could continue to be impartial in her rulings in this matter. However, Judge Lemmon
then freely acknowledges that she had recused herself in prior cases involving
allegations regarding certain crimes with which she has personal familiarity due to
close relationships with the victims. Being mindful of Louisiana Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 3(C), Judge Lemmon stated that the motion itself presented a
distraction and a delay in the resolution of the matter that could prejudice one or both
parties and could impede the just resolution of the case. In her “Application for
Clarification of Order of Self Recusal and/or Application for Recusal,” Judge
Lemmon asserted to the Louisiana Supreme Court that she “must be allowed to
recuse due to her own admission that, under the canons, she has determined that her
‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’” particularly when considering the
weight of the consequences for the trial in this matter. Judge Lemmon goes on to
state,

Further, it is suggested to this Honorable Court that considering
[her] acknowledgment in her Order of Recusal that her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, any trial of [Lawrence Staehle] that
she were to preside over would create a questionable constitutional
position, and infect the overall trial with reversible error, given that the
judge herself has now stated that she may not be seen as fair and
impartial. Preventing [her] appropriate recusal would interfere [with]
administration of justice in this matter.

After review of the writ application and its exhibits, we find that La. C.Cr.P.
art. 671(B) applies to this cause, and Judge Lemmon should be recused. When

considering the facts and circumstances of this particular case, we agree with Judge
Lemmon’s assertion in her application to the supreme court that presiding over this
matter would create a questionable constitutional issue and infect the overall trial
with reversible error. Allowing Judge Lemmon to continue to preside over this
matter, coupled with Judge Lemmon’s insistence that she be allowed to recuse,
would undermine public confidence in the judiciary.17 Therefore, we grant the writ
application, reverse the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to recuse, order
that Judge Lemmon be recused from this cause, and remand the matter to the trial
court for further proceedings.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 23rd day of August, 2022.

MEJ
JJM
JBD

17
We adopt the rationale in Anderson, supra, where this Court stated, “Subsequent assurances to the
contrary are like trying to close the barn door after the horse has bolted.”

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON .
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

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22-K-335
E-NOTIFIED
29th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Connie M. Aucoin (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Maria M. Chaisson

MAILED
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District Attorney
Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court
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• Attach this card to the back of the malfptece,
or on the front If apace permits.
1. Article Addressed to: D. la delvery addrasa different from ll8ln 1? D Yes
HYES. enl8I' dellwry addrees below: 0 No
Hon. Joel T. Chaisson, II, DA
Rochelle Champagne Fahrig, ADA
Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court
Post Office Box 680
Hahnville, LA 70057
22-K-335 _ 08~23-2~ _ ) J!=:;:=:;::=.:===;=========il!!:SJ

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