State of Louisiana Versus Rene Fuentes

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 22-KA-89

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

RENE FUENTES COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20,330, DIVISION "D"
HONORABLE M. LAUREN LEMMON, JUDGE PRESIDING

November 02, 2022

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Hans J. Liljeberg, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED;
SENTENCE VACATED;
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
SMC
HJL
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Joel T. Chaisson, II
Louis G. Authement

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
RENE FUENTES
Lieu T. Vo Clark

CHEHARDY, C.J.

Defendant-appellant, Rene Fuentes, appeals the trial court’s ruling denying

his motion to suppress evidence. He also contends that the sentence imposed is

excessive and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider

sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of defendant’s motion to

suppress as well as defendant’s conviction. We pretermit discussion of defendant’s

second and third assignments of error related to his sentence, however, and remand

for resentencing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 20, 2020, law enforcement received a call from a Popeye’s

Restaurant in Destrehan reporting that someone driving a light-colored Buick SUV

allegedly fell asleep in the drive-thru line. After arriving at the Popeye’s and

determining that the vehicle had departed up River Road, deputies eventually

located a vehicle meeting the description, followed it, and, after allegedly seeing

the vehicle swerve toward the center line at least twice, pulled over the driver, who

denied being intoxicated.

The deputies did not issue a citation for any moving violation. They asked

defendant to perform field sobriety tests, however, for which he performed poorly.

Defendant subsequently was charged by bill of information with driving a vehicle

while intoxicated (DWI) subsequent to a fourth offense, in violation of La. R.S.

14:98.1

Defendant initially pled not guilty but later withdrew his not-guilty plea and

entered a plea of guilty, while reserving his rights to appeal the trial court’s denial

1
Appellant previously pled guilty at least five other times to driving under the influence of
alcohol—three times in Jefferson Parish and twice in St. Charles Parish. According to the
application for a search warrant, which was introduced into evidence by defense counsel, a
computer search indicated that defendant has had 15 previous DWI arrests since 1985, with the
last arrest being in May 2009, after which he was sentenced to serve six years imprisonment.

22-KA-89 1

of his motion to suppress, as well as any excessive sentence, as permitted by State

v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 588 (La. 1976). See also State v. Ramsey, 10-333 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 1/25/11), 60 So.3d 36, 40 (a defendant may be allowed appellate

review after entering a guilty plea if, at the time of his plea, he expressly reserves

his right to appeal a specific adverse ruling).

Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that because there was no

traffic violation, the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. Defendant

claims that he never left his lane of travel so as to violate La. R.S. 32:79.2 As such,

the stop constituted an unreasonable and unconstitutional seizure of his person and

his vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In

opposition, the State argued that defendant’s vehicular movements, as recorded on

the Mobile Video Recorder (“MVR”), show that he swerved toward or across the

center line of the roadway. As such, the deputy’s observations created reasonable

suspicion for the stop.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State and defendant referred to

the testimony and evidence from the preliminary examination (P.E.) and admitted

into evidence the transcript from the P.E. hearing. The trial court evaluated the

following evidence when adjudicating defendant’s motion to suppress:

Deputy Jerry Fountain of the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office testified at

both the preliminary examination hearing and the motion to suppress hearing that

he and Deputy Jeff Mahan responded to the call at Popeye’s, but when they

reached Popeye’s, the suspicious vehicle already had left the area and reportedly

was traveling west on River Road. The deputies later located a vehicle in a

convenience store parking area that matched the description of the vehicle reported

at Popeye’s. When that vehicle left the convenience store, the deputies followed it

2
La. R.S. 32:79 (1) provides: “A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained
that such movement can be made with safety.”

22-KA-89 2

and observed defendant swerve toward the center line, hitting the line at least a

couple of times. When they stopped the vehicle, the deputies approached and

Deputy Fountain requested defendant’s driver’s license. Deputy Fountain testified

that defendant’s eyes were red and glassy and that his speech was somewhat

slurred. He confirmed that defendant had been at Popeye’s. Deputy Fountain also

noticed that defendant was reaching to his right and pushing down on something.

Deputy Fountain asked defendant to exit the vehicle and to submit to a field

sobriety test. Deputy Fountain indicated that he could smell alcohol on defendant’s

breath when he stepped out of the car. Deputy Fountain conducted a Horizontal

Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, noting nystagmus at maximum deviation, lack of

smooth pursuit, and nystagmus onset prior to forty-five degrees, and determined

that defendant was impaired.

Deputy Fountain also asked defendant to perform the walk-and-turn test. He

stated that he told defendant three times how to perform the test, but defendant did

not perform the test correctly the first two times. On the third attempt, defendant

“slightly fell off line” and then walked nine steps but did so without touching heal

to toe, as instructed. He turned and walked back, again without touching heal to

toe. Defendant declined to take the one-leg-stand test because of a prior injury.

Accordingly, Corporal Scott Huff, a drug-recognition expert, performed the

Modified Romberg Balance test and the Lack of Convergence test on defendant,

which presented additional clues of impairment. Corporal Huff explained that the

Lack of Convergence test addresses four drug categories: depressants, inhalants,

dissociative anesthetics, and cannabis. He testified that defendant’s left eye did not

converge during the test, which was a symptom under four different drug

categories. Corporal Huff further stated that defendant’s girlfriend, who showed up

later on the scene, confirmed that defendant took Xanax, a CNS depressant.

22-KA-89 3

Deputy Fountain testified that the six clues needed for a DWI arrest were

satisfied with the HGN alone, but that he had at least seven or eight clues with the

walk-and-turn test and with Corporal Huff’s tests. Therefore defendant was placed

in custody and put in Deputy Fountain’s unit. Upon searching the vehicle, Corporal

Huff found a small bottle of Crown Royal that was three-quarters full on the

passenger seat. A receipt found in the vehicle confirmed that defendant had

purchased the bottle that same afternoon. The deputies released the vehicle to

defendant’s girlfriend and arrested defendant for possessing an open container of

an alcoholic beverage and for a DWI.

Based on the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

Defendant thereafter changed his plea to guilty, reserving his rights to appeal the

denial of the motion to suppress and any excessive sentence.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to serve 30 years

with the Department of Corrections, suspending 10 years “to run consecutive to the

revocations in 2 other matters, which I understand that you’re backing up 9 years,

and you’ll do substantially less than that, based on the Department of Corrections

guidelines.” The trial court further imposed five years of home incarceration with a

SCRAM bracelet after defendant was released. As conditions of his home

incarceration and probation, the court required defendant to undergo a substance

abuse evaluation, granted him permission to attend substance abuse treatment, and

imposed a ban on all alcohol or drugs without a prescription. The court also

suspended the mandatory fine of $5,000 and suspended any requirement to

perform community service. Finally, the court ordered defendant to be assessed for

drug court upon his release or inpatient treatment. The sentencing Minute Entry

also indicated that defendant would be allowed to go to work and doctors’

appointments, in addition to attending substance abuse treatment.

22-KA-89 4

Counsel for defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial

court denied on January 20, 2022. Defendant appeals the motion to suppress,

asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider sentence, and

that the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error # 1 – Motion to Suppress

In his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in

denying the motion to suppress evidence because the stop of his vehicle was

illegal, where he was not cited for committing any traffic violation. On the other

hand, the State contends that the trial court reviewed the MVR recording at both

hearings, which clearly showed defendant almost hit the center line on one

occasion and actually hit it twice. According to the State, defendant swerved at

least three separate times in a very short time span in a 25 mph zone in a residential

neighborhood next to a school zone.

A trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress is afforded great weight

and will not be set aside unless the preponderance of the evidence clearly favors

suppression. State v. Calvert, 01-826 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/02), 811 So.2d 1081,

1084. See also State v. Carter, 20-1193 (La. 1/26/21), 309 So.3d 333, 336.

As a general rule, searches and seizures must be conducted pursuant to a

validly executed search warrant or arrest warrant. State v. Holmes, 08-719 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 3/10/09), 10 So.3d 274, 278, writ denied, 09-816 (La. 1/8/10), 24 So.3d

857. Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless justified by

one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. A defendant who is adversely

affected may move to suppress evidence from use at the trial on the merits on the

ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(A). When the

constitutionality of a warrantless search or seizure is placed at issue by a motion to

22-KA-89 5

suppress the evidence, the State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of

any evidence seized without a warrant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Davis, 09-

452 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/26/10), 31 So.3d 513, 516, writ denied, State ex rel. Davis v.

State, 10-2201 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So.3d 373. Evidence derived from an

unreasonable stop will be excluded from trial. State v. Taylor, 12-25 (La. App. 5

Cir. 6/28/12), 97 So.3d 522, 529.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1 recognizes the right of law enforcement officers to

stop and interrogate those reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity.

See also State v. Mitchell, 10-334 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/26/10), 52 So.3d 155, 158,

writ denied, State ex rel. Mitchell v. State, 11-355 (La. 12/2/11), 76 So.3d 1170

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v.

Belton, 441 So.2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct.

2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984)). Pursuant to the investigatory stop recognized by the

United States Supreme Court in Terry, supra, a police officer may briefly seize a

person if the officer has an objectively reasonable suspicion, supported by specific

and articulable facts that the person is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal

conduct, or is wanted for past criminal acts. Carter, supra.

Traffic violations serve as valid bases for investigatory stops. State v.

Leonard, 06-361 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/31/06), 945 So.2d 764, 766. The fact that an

officer does not issue a traffic citation is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the

stop. State v. Williams, 13-732 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/26/14), 138 So.3d 727, 732.

When an officer observes what he objectively believes is a traffic offense, the

decision to stop the vehicle is reasonable, regardless of the officer’s subjective

motivation. State v. Hunt, 09-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 753 (citing Whren

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d

89 (1996)). A vehicle need not leave its lane to provide reasonable suspicion, by

reason of its erratic movements, that the driver may be impaired or intoxicated.

22-KA-89 6

State v. Waters, 00-356 (La. 3/12/01), 780 So.2d 1053, 1057. See also La. R.S.

32:79 (1). The standard is purely objective and does not take into consideration the

subjective beliefs or expectations of the detaining officer. State v. Martin, 11-160

(La. 12/28/11), 83 So.3d 230, 237. “Although they may serve, and may often

appear intended to serve, as the prelude to the investigation of much more serious

offenses, even relatively minor traffic violations provide an objective basis for

lawfully detaining the vehicle and its occupants.” Waters, 780 So.2d at 1056.

In Waters, Corporals Magee and Edwards pulled behind the defendant’s

vehicle on I-12. As they approached, they observed it drift to the right and make

contact with the fog line along the shoulder. At a suppression hearing, Corporal

Magee testified that the defendant’s vehicle merely touched the right-hand fog line

on the shoulder but did not cross it, but he was concerned that the driver was either

too fatigued to operate the vehicle safely or was intoxicated. He therefore stopped

the defendant’s car. In denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court

found that Corporal Magee’s testimony “established a traffic violation” which,

given the early morning hours, “indicated a quite reasonable suspicion that either

the defendant was intoxicated or that he was too weary to safely operate a motor

vehicle.” Id. at 1055. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that Corporal Magee

had an objectively reasonable basis for stopping the defendant’s vehicle, where La.

R.S. 32:79 (1) provides that on a divided roadway, “[a] vehicle shall be driven as

nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane ... (emphasis added).” Corporal

Magee therefore observed a violation of the statute, albeit a minor one, when the

vehicle veered in its lane for no apparent reason and made contact with the right-

hand fog line. Id. at 1056-57.

Likewise, in State v. McVan, 32,434 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/11/99), 744 So.2d

641, 642, writ not considered, 99-1021 (La. 5/26/99), 743 So.2d 653, the Second

Circuit determined that “the motorist never left his lane, though he did travel from

22-KA-89 7

the fog line to the center line, back to the center of the lane and then to the center

line again. He was traveling 10 miles under the speed limit, which is somewhat

unusual.” (Emphasis in original). The court noted that after an officer stopped the

defendant, the officer confirmed the defendant’s “obvious and significant

impairment.” The appellate court acknowledged that it was a close call but

nevertheless ruled that there was reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory

stop, expressly declining to follow the Third Circuit’s ruling in State v. Vaughn,

448 So.2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).3

Crossing over a highway line is a traffic violation and a sufficient reason to

stop a vehicle. See State v. Calvert, supra, 811 So.2d at 1083; State v. Miller, 00-

1657 (La. 10/26/01), 798 So.2d 947. Merely touching the line is also sufficient to

initiate a stop. See State v. Boeh, 20-461 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 324 So.3d 653,

writ denied, 21-689 (La. 10/5/21), 325 So.3d 379; State v. Hinojosa, 07-586 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 11/2/07), 2007 WL 3407732 (unpublished opinion). See also United

States v. Hernandez, 744 F. App’x 873, 874 (5th Cir. 2018).

In State v. McLendon, 15-668 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/10/16), 185 So.3d 303, a

detective and probation officer in an unmarked police vehicle observed defendant’s

vehicle crossing into Louisiana from Texas. The detective followed the vehicle for

approximately twelve miles before he saw it touch the fog line. Soon thereafter,

that detective informed another detective in a marked police car to initiate a traffic

stop for the alleged traffic violation. The second detective testified that after

following the defendant for approximately thirty seconds, he also saw the vehicle

3
In Vaughn, supra, the Third Circuit found there was no reasonable cause to stop the
defendant, stating that the action of “crossing six inches over the center line and traveling like
this for approximately ten feet, even when coupled with the observation of a vehicle swaying
within its own lane, does not per se present sufficient facts to establish the requisite reasonable
cause” for an officer to legally stop a motorist, especially “when the police officer followed the
defendant for only one and one-half blocks, and further, when defendant’s driving presented no
evidence of danger to himself or to others.” More recently, however, the Third Circuit stated that
Vaughn “is an outlier in an array of Louisiana case law whose precedent expressly advances the
opposite outcome.” State v. McLendon, 15-668 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/10/16), 185 So.3d 303, 306.

22-KA-89 8

“bump” the fog line, and he initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 305. On appeal, the

defendant asserted that merely touching the fog line constituted a de minimis

violation for which one cannot justifiably be subjected to a traffic stop. Citing La.

R.S. 32:79 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, the court found that the defendant had

committed a traffic violation when his vehicle touched the fog line, and the

detectives were justified in initiating the traffic stop. Id. at 306.

At the preliminary examination hearing in the present case,4 Deputy

Fountain stated that while following the vehicle, he observed it swerve to the left a

couple of times, hitting the center line. He testified that the vehicle swerved to the

center lane “at least twice.” While viewing the MVR, the deputy noted that

defendant was “straddling the center line.” The deputy stated that defendant “hit

the center line, and then he began riding the center line for a short distance.” At the

end of the preliminary examination hearing, the trial court indicated seeing “on the

video that he did not straddle the center line, but he did swerve towards the center

line.”

At the suppression hearing, Deputy Fountain testified that defendant was

seen “swerving a couple of times and he hit the centerline at least twice.” When

asked what crime he believed defendant had committed or was committing, the

deputy replied, “careless operation, at the very least.” In denying the motion to

suppress, the trial court stated: “Just like in the preliminary examination where I

said he did swerve towards the centerline, I did see it. I just saw it again. … And I

understand what the sole basis for the stop is.”

The MVR recording reflects that defendant at least touched the center line

more than once. It was not necessary for defendant to cross the center line to

justify the initiation of a traffic stop. Additionally, the fact that no traffic citation

4
As previously noted, evidence and testimony offered at the preliminary examination
hearing was also referenced at the suppression hearing, and the transcript from the earlier hearing
was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing.

22-KA-89 9

was issued is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the stop. Williams, 138 So.3d at

732. Based on the totality of the evidence, we find the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that the deputies had reasonable suspicion to conduct a

traffic stop and denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

Assignments of Error #2 and #3 – Sentencing

In his second and third assignments of error, defendant argues that the trial

court erred in denying his motion to reconsider sentence, and further erred because

the sentence imposed is unconstitutionally excessive, given his age (60) and the

fact that he is already serving time on another sentence. We pretermit a discussion

of defendant’s sentencing assignments of error, however, because our review of the

record indicates a number of errors patent in sentencing.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years

with the Department of Corrections, suspending 10 years “to run consecutive to the

revocations in 2 other matters, which I understand that you’re backing up 9 years,

and you’ll do substantially less than that, based on the Department of Corrections

guidelines.” The court further imposed five years of home incarceration with a

SCRAM bracelet after defendant was released. As conditions of his home

incarceration and probation, the court required defendant to undergo a substance

abuse evaluation, granted permission to attend substance abuse treatment, and

imposed a ban on all alcohol or drugs without a prescription. The court also

suspended the mandatory fine of $5,000 and suspended any requirement to

perform community service. Finally, the court ordered defendant to be assessed for

drug court upon his release or inpatient treatment. The sentencing Minute Entry

also indicated that defendant would be allowed to go to work and doctors’

appointments, in addition to attending substance abuse treatment.5

5
The uniform commitment order (UCO) provides that the total length of the sentence is 30
years; defendant is to serve 20 years in custody; the sentence is not concurrent with any other
sentence defendant is now serving; the sentence is consecutive to “09-0306 St. Charles, 29th

22-KA-89 10

Our review of the record indicates that the trial court sentenced defendant

pursuant to the wrong provision of La. R.S. 14:98.4.6 The record contains evidence

of five of defendant’s prior DWI cases and sentences. In case 09-0306 (29th JDC

for the Parish of St. Charles), defendant pled guilty to a fourth or subsequent DWI

in violation of La. R.S. 14:98 and was “sentenced to 10 years Dept. of Corrections,

2 years suspended,” and given credit for time served. The trial court also

recommended a clinical substance abuse treatment program. In case 04-2286 (24th

JDC for the Parish of Jefferson), defendant pled guilty to two counts of fourth-

offense DWI, in violation of La. R.S. 14: 98 (E), and was sentenced to 10 years

imprisonment at hard labor on each count, to run concurrently, with credit for time

served. All but 60 days of the sentence was suspended, and 60 days were to be

served on home incarceration. Defendant would then be on probation for three

years and would be required to undergo evaluation for substance abuse and submit

to in-patient treatment, after which he would be placed on home incarceration for

the remainder of the probationary period.

JDC;” defendant is given credit for time served; and substance-use-disorder screening is
recommended. A box remains empty on the UCO next to the statement: “amount of time to be
served without benefit, if applicable.”
6
La. R.S. 14:98.4 (A)(1) provides that on a conviction of a fourth or subsequent offense
violation of R.S. 14:98, the offender shall be fined $5,000 and imprisoned, with or without hard
labor, for not less than ten years nor more than 30 years, and two years of the sentence of
imprisonment shall be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:98.4 (A)(1)(a), however, the two-year period may be suspended if the
offender is accepted into a drug division probation program pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5301 et seq.
On the other hand, La. R.S. 14:98.4 (A)(1)(b) states that if the offender has previously
participated in a drug division program pursuant to a sentence imposed on a third or subsequent
offense conviction, three years of the sentence shall be imposed without benefits, and the
offender shall not be eligible to have the mandatory portion of his sentence suspended because of
his participation in a drug division program.
La. R.S. 14:98.4 (B), which applies if the offender previously was required to participate
in substance abuse treatment or home incarceration pursuant to a sentence imposed on a third
offense conviction, at least three years of the sentence shall be imposed without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence.
La. R.S. 14:98.4 (C), which applies if the offender previously received the benefit of
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on a conviction of a fourth or subsequent offense in
violation of La. R.S. 14:98, provides that no part of the sentence shall be imposed with benefit of
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

22-KA-89 11

Here, although not specifically enunciated, the trial court appears to have

sentenced defendant pursuant to La. R.S. 14:98.4 (A), because during the guilty-

plea colloquy, the trial court informed defendant of the maximum sentence that

could be imposed and indicated that two years of the sentence must be imposed

without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Further, the

trial court indicated that it was suspending the community service requirement,

which may be found only in La. R.S. 14:98.4 (A). Because defendant received the

benefit of probation and suspension of sentence on previous fourth-offense DWI

convictions, however, the trial court incorrectly sentenced him under La. R.S.

14:98.4 (A) rather than La. R.S. 14:98.4 (C).

Due to this error in sentencing, defendant’s sentence is vacated and the

matter is remanded for resentencing. The additional errors patent, including

incorrectly advising defendant of the maximum sentence (referencing the

maximum under La. R.S. 14:98.4 (A) rather than 14:98.4 (C)); the failure to

specify all the conditions to home incarceration at sentencing or to give defendant

a certificate setting forth those conditions, are moot in light of the remand.

DECREE

The trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress and defendant’s

conviction are affirmed. Due to errors patent in sentencing, we vacate defendant’s

sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED;
SENTENCE VACATED;
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING

22-KA-89 12

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
NOVEMBER 2, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

22-KA-89
E-NOTIFIED
29TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE M. LAUREN LEMMON (DISTRICT JUDGE)
LIEU T. VO CLARK (APPELLANT)

MAILED
LOUIS G. AUTHEMENT (APPELLEE) HON. HONORABLE JOEL T. CHAISSON, II
ATTORNEY AT LAW (APPELLEE)
13919 RIVER ROAD DISTRICT ATTORNEY
SUITE 300 TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LULING, LA 70070 COURT
POST OFFICE BOX 680
HAHNVILLE, LA 70057